tutional, but it does not justify inserting in that act a grant of rights of which the title makes no mention and which the legislature itself did not include in the act. The legislature is prohibited from including in an act a subject not mentioned in the title, and certainly the court cannot include in an act by construction a subject not mentioned either in the act or the title. The object of a curative act is not to change the law governing future action but to waive some requirement of the law in regard to past action. (People v. Madison, 280 Ill. 96.) The act of 1915 did not give women the right to vote at any election.

The appellees insist that the relator having voted at the election cannot question its legality. Laches or the acquiescence of individuals does not bar the public, and the conduct of a relator does not constitute an estoppel except where the information is filed for his private and exclusive benefit. People v. Keigwin, 256 Ill. 264.

The circuit court should have permitted the information. to be filed. Its judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded, with directions to allow the motion to file the information. Reversed and remanded, with directions.

CARTWRIGHT, C. J., and STONE, J., dissenting:

After this court decided that women had no right to vote at an election organizing a community high school district the legislature passed a curative act, which came before the court in People v. Militzer, 272 Ill. 387, when it was decided that the act was valid, on the ground that the legislature might, in the act authorizing the organization of such districts, have authorized women to vote. The right of women to vote at an election subsequently held was considered in People v. Vaughan, 282 Ill. 163, and it was decided that inasmuch as the legislature could not have authorized women to vote at some elections for the organization of high school districts and not at others, and it had been held that the curative act was valid, the curative act gave

women the right to vote at all elections for the organization of such districts. That decision was either correct, or the curative act was void and the decision holding it valid was wrong. The opinion adopted in this case holds that both decisions were wrong, and the final resting place of the decision is that the curative act was in violation of the constitution, because it could only be held within the power of the legislature if it authorized women to vote at all elections for the organization of high school districts. Whether that conclusion is right or wrong, and not conceding that it is right, we are satisfied that the decision should not be overruled and numerous high school districts all over the State be destroyed. Courts refuse to re-examine and overrule decisions which have become a rule of property, and the decisions here overruled not only involve questions of property, contracts, bonds and obligations, but public interests of great importance. Neither the decision that the curative act was valid nor that women had a right to vote at high school elections is res judicata except as to the particular districts involved in the cases decided, and this decision will create widespread disaster and confusion. In neither of the cases which have been before this court was the discovery made by any party or counsel, or by any member of the court, that the curative act was invalid because it limited the right of women to vote at elections which had been held, nor that women were not entitled to vote as a necessary consequence of the decision that the act was valid.

Mr. JUSTICE CARTER, also dissenting:

I do not concur with the final conclusion reached in the opinion in this case. Conceding that the opinion is right and that if this were a matter of first impression the decisions in People v. Militzer, 272 Ill. 387, and People v. Vaughan, 282 id. 163, are wrong, still I think that on the principle of stare decisis the judgment in this case should

be affirmed. Parties should not be encouraged to seek reexamination of determined principles. The establishment of a certain guide is of more significance than the precise form of the rule, and substantial justice may be more often promoted by adhering to an erroneous decision than by overthrowing a rule once established. (Weaver v. First Nat. Bank of Chicago, 76 Kan. 540.) Where the error of a previous decision is recognized, the question whether or not the rule of stare decisis shall be followed becomes a simple choice between relative evils. The rule should be adhered to unless it appears that the principle established must be productive of greater mischief to the community than can possibly ensue from not following previous decisions on the subject. (7 R. C. L. 1009.) Stability and uniformity of decisions in judicial proceedings conduce so much to the welfare and happiness of the people that when a question has been once settled and no serious question is liable to arise prejudicial to the public interest such adjudication ought to stand. (Koch v. Sheppard, 223 Ill. 172; Heidenreich v. Bremner, 260 id. 439.) The points upon which this case is reversed received serious consideration by this court in its former decisions and the principles then established have now been the rule for more than two years. The act was held to be a valid exercise of legislative power in People v. Militzer, supra, and the identical points raised here upon which this case is decided were passed upon and decided contrary to the conclusion here reached in People v. Vaughan, supra, and again on petition for rehearing in that case. Later the same principle was approved in Zeigler v. Douglas, 283 Ill. 407. "The rule of stare decisis is founded largely on considerations of expediency and sound principles of public policy, it being indispensable to the due administration of justice, especially by a court of last resort, that a question once deliberately examined and decided should be considered as settled and closed to further argument, and the courts are slow to interfere with the prin

ciple announced by the decision, and it may be upheld even though they should decide otherwise were the question a new one." (15 Corpus Juris, 918.) The courts will not, as a general rule, inquire into and reconsider a question as to the construction and operation of the statute or constitution when such construction or principle has been discussed and decided by the court. (11 Cyc. 748.) "The most indispensable guaranty of civil liberty is the 'open administration of justice according to known laws.' The law can be known only if fixed rules once established are consistently adhered to. * * ** 'Respect for precedents, alone, can secure stability and uniformity of the law. Without such respect it would be a shifting quicksand.' If ever there should be an adherence to former decisions, it should be in cases of construction of the constitution involving the rights of citizens as declared by that instrument. There is no higher privilege of citizenship in the State than that of suffrage." Scown v. Czarnecki, 264 Ill. 305.

There can be no question, under the present state of the Federal amendment as to woman suffrage, that women will be entitled to vote hereafter on all questions that are presented to any locality or class of citizens for popular suffrage and that any future legislation by any State on this question is of little importance. As a matter of public policy, it seems to me beyond peradventure, in view of the previous decisions of this court,—which, doubtless, have been followed in many localities in this State,-that much greater mischief will arise by overruling the previous decisions of this court on this question than will arise by adhering to the principles therein laid down. Whatever view we might feel inclined to take if the question were undecided, in my judgment it is the duty of this court to adhere to its former decisions and to hold that the question here under discussion is not now and here open for review. Richter v. Burdock, 257 Ill. 410.

(No. 13338.-Reversed and remanded.)

E. ARLINE OPP, Defendant in Error, vs. EDWARD B. PRYOR,

Receiver, Plaintiff in Error.

Opinion filed October 23, 1920.

I. NEGLIGENCE-personal tort action may be brought wherever defendant can be served with process. A personal tort action may be maintained in any jurisdiction in which the defendant can be legally served with process unless the cause of action is prohibited by law or public policy or is against morals, natural justice or the general interest of the citizens of the State of the forum, but the right to recover will depend upon the law of the State where the cause of action accrued.

2. SAME what is waiver of objection that court appointing receiver of railroad company did not give leave to bring suit. In an action for negligence against a railroad company which is in the hands of a receiver, an objection that the suit was brought without first obtaining leave of the court appointing the receiver is waived if not raised in any way in the trial court.

3. SAME common law imposes no duty on railroad company to maintain watchmen at crossings in residence districts. The common law makes it the duty of a railroad company to use such precautions as will enable a traveler on the highway, if he exercises ordinary care, to ascertain in the night time the approach of an engine backing cars over a street crossing, but there is no general duty of a railroad company, in the absence of special conditions, to maintain watchmen or gates at public crossings in the residence districts of a city.

4. SAME what degree of care must be exercised by passenger in automobile. One who is voluntarily riding in an automobile as a guest of the driver is not relieved of the duty to exercise ordinary care, and where the passenger has equal opportunity with the driver to observe danger in crossing a railroad track it is her duty to warn the driver, if possible, and under such a state of facts an instruction that the negligence of the driver cannot be imputed to the passenger is erroneous.

5. EVIDENCE-what is presumed and what must be alleged and proved as to the law of another State. It is presumed that the law of another State is the common law as administered by the courts of Illinois, but statutes and local usages of another State must be alleged and proved as facts, and where the common law is differently construed or applied in another State that fact must be alleged and proved.