this record, that it did not have knowledge of the necessity for such services or that it did not have a request therefor from the defendant in error.

But it is contended by plaintiff in error that it is not liable for these services for the reason that none were rendered or requested within eight weeks from the date of the injury. It is evident from the provisions of paragraph (a) of section 8 requiring that the employer provide necessary first aid, medical, surgical and hospital services, and in addition thereto medical, surgical and hospital services for a period not longer than eight weeks, that the legislature did not intend that the eight weeks should necessarily be confined to the time immediately following the injury. Nor could such construction be reasonably put upon it, as it frequently occurs, as in this case, that the results of the injury do not develop to such an extent as to require medical, surgical or hospital services for a considerable period of time after an injury is received, and to hold that such services are to be supplied only within the first eight weeks following the injury would in many instances limit such services to but a part of eight weeks and in other cases prevent recovery for such services altogether. It is evident that the legislature intended that the medical, surgical and hospital services for which the employer is liable must be necessitated by the injury, but that such liability is not limited to the eight weeks immediately following the injury where the necessity for such services does not arise immediately following the injury.

The Industrial Commission did not err in awarding the sum of $200 for medical, surgical and hospital services. The judgment of the circuit court is therefore affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

(No. 12820.-Judgment affirmed.)

GEORGE W. DAVIS, Defendant in Error, vs. THE MICHIGAN CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY, Plaintiff in Error.

Opinion filed October 23, 1920.

I. NEGLIGENCE—when an instruction as to measure of damages should not mention amount named in declaration. In a suit under the Federal Safety Appliance act an instruction as to the measure of damages, which concludes with the statement that the damages should not exceed a certain sum, which was the sum claimed in the declaration, is improper without further explanation of such statement, as it implies that the jury may be warranted in giving the full sum claimed.

2. SAME when experts may give opinion evidence in an action under Federal Safety Appliance act. In an action under the Federal Safety Appliance act brought by a railroad employee who was injured while coupling cars, expert witnesses may give opinion evidence to the effect that the couplers, in the position in which they were found by the employee, would not have coupled by impact if the employee had not manipulated the draw-bars as he did when he received his injury.

3. RAILROADS-duty to provide automatic couplers is absolute under Federal Safety Appliance act. Under the Federal Safety Appliance act an absolute duty to provide couplers automatically coupling by impact and which can be uncoupled without the necessity of going between the cars is imposed on railroads engaged in interstate commerce.

4. SAME-assumed risk is not a defense under the Safety Appliance act-contributory negligence. Assumed risk is not a defense under the Federal Safety Appliance act, nor can the action of the employee be defeated by the carrier showing that it has exercised reasonable care in providing and keeping in repair its safety appliances, nor by showing contributory negligence on the part of the employee when he is injured by reason of a violation of the act.

5. EVIDENCE-what evidence admissible in action under Federal Safety Appliance act. In an action under the Federal Safety Appliance act by a switchman who received an injury while coupling cars, evidence that a certain device is known and in general use for the purpose of keeping the draw-bars in alignment for coupling by impact without the necessity of going between the cars is admissible to show that the statute does not require an impossibility.

6. SAME when entries in book kept by car inspector are not admissible. Entries in a book kept by a car inspector who examined the draw-bars and couplers on the day the plaintiff was injured while coupling cars are properly excluded from the jury in an action under the Federal Safety Appliance act, as such entries, made after the accident, are self-serving declarations when the making of them is not brought in issue in any way.

7. SAME when reporter's notes of plaintiff's statements to the claim agent of employer are not admissible. In an action under the Federal Safety Appliance act for an injury received while coupling cars, a court reporter's notes of statements made by the employee to the claim agent of the employer just after the accident are not admissible when not verified by the signature of the employee nor by the reporter but are read by another stenographer, who admitted that he could not read all the notes.

WRIT OF ERROR to the Appellate Court for the First District;-heard in that court on appeal from the City Court of Chicago Heights; the Hon. CHARLES H. BOWLES, Judge, presiding.

WINSTON, STRAWN & SHAW, (SILAS H. STRAWN, and J. SIDNEY CONDIT, of counsel,) for plaintiff in error.

CHARLES C. SPENCER, for defendant in error.

Mr. JUSTICE DUNCAN delivered the opinion of the court: The Appellate Court for the First District affirmed a judgment of the city court of Chicago Heights for $5000 in favor of defendant in error in a suit for personal injuries received by him while in the employ of plaintiff in error, the Michigan Central Railroad Company. A writ of certiorari was granted and the judgment is sought to be reviewed on errors assigned.

The case was submitted to the jury on the second and third counts of the declaration, which charged a violation of the Federal Safety Appliance act, charging that plaintiff in error permitted to be hauled upon its tracks certain cars used in moving interstate commerce which were not

equipped with couplers that would couple automatically by impact and which could not be uncoupled without the necessity of its employees going between the ends of the cars, and also charging that the couplers, draw-bars and other coupling apparatus of said cars were out of order, improperly adjusted and the draw-bars turned to one side so that they would not couple automatically by impact.

The material facts proved are that defendant in error was a switchman in the employ of plaintiff in error for five years previous to his injury and who had ten or twelve years' experience as a switchman. At the time of his injury a caboose or way-car was standing on a straight track in plaintiff in error's switch yard in Chicago and a cut of cars was being moved north to couple onto the caboose or way-car. The north car of the approaching cut of cars was a refrigerator car. The cars were being moved at a rate of speed a little faster than a man ordinarily walks. While defendant in error was standing about a car length north and west of the caboose he noticed that the draw-bar on the refrigerator car was pulled to the west as far as it would go and that its coupler was partly open. On looking at the caboose he saw that its coupler was partly open and was almost as far out of alignment to the east. When the cars were three or four feet from each other he took hold of the grab-iron on the end of the refrigerator car, raised his left foot and kicked the head of the draw-bar, which caused it to move to the center, and the coupling was made. Before he could remove his foot from between the couplers it was caught and crushed so that it became necessary to amputate a portion of it and he was thereby permanently disabled. The couplers on both cars were of the Simplex type. A fellow-brakeman examined the couplers of the caboose and the refrigerator car after the injury and found that they were coupled, the pins dropped in their proper places and the coupling properly made and locked in position so that the cars would hold. The couplers were

level and matched with each other up and down. The levers running to the sides were in proper position and properly connected with the couplers, with no apparent defect in the draw-bars. The train was then moved to Argo, and the car inspector at that place made an inspection and reported the couplers on the refrigerator car and the caboose in good condition. He found the draw-bar on the caboose to be five inches wide, five and three-quarters inches thick and with seven-eighths of an inch play on each side of the center of the draw-bar and the brackets holding the carry-iron, or a total of one inch and three-quarters of play. The draw-bar on the refrigerator car was five inches wide, seven inches thick and it had a play of an inch and three-quarters, or seven-eighths of an inch on either side. The draw-bars were thirty-four inches high from the top of the rails, and the knuckles, pins and pin-lifters were found in good condition. Both cars had a lever running from the couplers to one side of the car, the lever on the caboose running from the coupler to the west side of the car and the lever on the refrigerator car running from the coupler to the east side of the car. Neither car was equipped with any device by which the draw-bar would swing back or could be caused to swing to center when out of alignment, and therefore the draw-bars could not be properly aligned except by someone going in between the ends of the cars to make the alignment. The testimony of defendant in error is also to the effect that the two draw-bars were too far out of alignment to permit a coupling by impact. He testified that when the cars were about three feet from each other he saw that they were not going to make the coupling; that the draw-bars were pointing so far away from each other that he knew they would not couple by impact and that he kicked one draw-bar so that the coupling would be made; also, that he saw that the engineer was not going to stop the cut of cars in time to prevent the impact, although he had signaled him to do so.