tending the university to receive personal instruction, but that such instruction was given to those who desired it. The fact is, complainant gave instructions in no other way than by correspondence.

There are many other things which might be referred to to show that complainant was practicing fraud and deception in the conduct of its business, but, as we have said, it insists that its business of teaching chiropratic by correspondence is lawful; that its methods of conducting and managing its business are immaterial so far as defendants are concerned and should not be considered as a bar to relief from the malicious and unlawful acts of defendants, committed for the purpose of destroying complainant's business; also that "puffing" and "exaggerations" in its advertising do not constitute fraud or unclean hands. There can be no dispute that defendants were conducting a campaign against complainant for the purpose of destroying or injuring its business. The Chicago University was incorporated almost immediately after Wood's discharge by complainant for the purpose of teaching chiropractic by correspondence. Wood was made its chancellor, and complainant's lists of patrons were used by him and his university in the very vigorous and malicious campaign conducted to injure complainant and themselves profit by complainant's destruction. Nothing in the attitude and conduct of defendants toward complainant commends them to the consideration of a court of equity, and their advertising methods were no less objectionable and misleading than those of complainant. In fact, Dr. Wood, whose picture was on some of the Chicago University publications, and, following his name, LL.B., D.M.T., Opt. D., D.O., M.D., D.C., was as much responsible for the character of complainant's advertising and the method of conducting its business while he was its president as anyone else and has carried similar methods into the conduct of defendants'

business. The maxim that he who comes into a court of equity must come with clean hands was never intended to bar everyone guilty of wrongful conduct from relief in a court of equity, and as a general rule it is required that the wrongdoing or fraud of the complainant, to bar him from relief on the ground that he comes with unclean hands, must be connected with the subject of the litigation and have some relation to the rights of the parties arising out of the transaction. That rule is not applicable to the facts in this record. It is true, the fraud and wrongdoing of complainant did not affect the private rights of defendants and afforded no justification in morals for their seeking to profit by exposing them, but on the ground of the public interest and policy we do not think complainant's grievance is of a character to be redressed in a court of equity. The misrepresentations of complainant in the conduct of its business affected the public, and it would seem a strange thing if a court of conscience should be required to protect a suitor in the commission of a fraud upon the public. A court of equity is a court of conscience and will exercise its extraordinary powers only to enforce the requirements of conscience. It is no part of its function to aid a litigant in the promotion of a fraud upon the public. These views support in Primeau v. Granfield, 114 C. C. A. 549, writ of certiorari denied 225 U. S. 708; 4 A. L. R. 92, div. 6 of note; 16 Cyc. 148; Manhattan Medicine Co. v. Wood, 108 U. S. 218. To our minds the principle seems So sound that we think it should be applied here even if it has not been previously applied. On that ground we think the judgment of the Appellate Court was right, and it is Judgment affirmed.

find

affirmed.

(No. 13367.-Judgment affirmed.)

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Defendant in Error, vs. WALTER COLVIN et al. Plaintiffs in Error. Opinion filed June 16, 1920-Rehearing denied October 18, 1920,

I. CRIMINAL LAW-when refusal to strike out testimony of admissions is not error. Refusal of the trial court to strike out testimony as to admissions of guilt is not error, where the defendants' testimony that the admissions were made under duress is contradicted and the whole question is submitted to the jury under instructions requested by the defendants.

2. SAME when conclusion of jury as to credibility of witnesses cannot be interfered with. Where the issue depends upon the credibility of the witnesses, the conclusion of the jury, when approved by the trial judge, cannot be interfered with, unless some fact or circumstance appears in the evidence from which the court can say that some witnesses have been truthful and worthy of credit while others have been untruthful or mistaken.

3. SAME-newly discovered evidence must be of such character as to change result if a new trial is granted. A new trial will be granted for newly discovered evidence only where it is shown that the evidence could not have been produced on the trial by the use of reasonable diligence and is not merely cumulative; and even if the question of reasonable diligence is waived and the evidence is not cumulative, it must appear that it is of such a nature that it will probably change the result if a new trial is granted.

4. SAME when it cannot be said that newly discovered evidence will change result. Where newly discovered evidence set forth in affidavits on a motion for a new trial is inconsistent with uncontradicted physical facts which the jury cannot disregard, it cannot be said that the result of a new trial will be different if the newly discovered evidence is admitted.

WRIT OF ERROR to the Criminal Court of Cook county; the Hon. JOSEPH SABATH, Judge, presiding.

F. L. BARNETT, and BENJAMIN POLLARD, (James J. BARBOUR, of counsel,) for plaintiffs in error.

EDWARD J. BRUNDAGE, Attorney General, MACLAY HOYNE, State's Attorney, ALBERT D. RODENBERG, EDWARD E. WILSON, and JAMES C. O'BRIEN, for the People.

Mr. CHIEF JUSTICE CARTWRIGHT delivered the opinion of the court:

On July 28, 1919, race riots between the white and the black people were in progress in the vicinity of Thirtysixth and State streets, in what is called the "black belt," in Chicago. At about 4:30 in the afternoon of that day Morris Lazzeroni, a banana peddler, who was driving his horse and wagon south on State street, was murdered near No. 3626 by stabbing him in the abdomen in two places, cutting into his stomach through the center to the breast bone, and he was also cut on the right arm, right wrist and right thigh and on the corner of his mouth. He fell from his wagon, and at about 4:50 a police wagon came to the place and took his dead body to an undertaker's place. The coroner's physician found two deep incised wounds in the abdomen and one deep incised wound in the right thigh. The plaintiffs in error, Walter Colvin and Charles Johnson, together with John Green and Frank Coachman, were indicted for the murder. The plaintiffs in error were tried and found guilty and their punishment was fixed at life imprisonment, with a finding of the jury that Johnson was eighteen years of age and Colvin sixteen years of age.

No error was committed on the trial. There was testimony that the defendants admitted their participation in the murder to an assistant State's attorney and police officers in the presence of two other witnesses, and that Colvin described the manner in which the murder was committed. This evidence was received without objection, but at the close of the evidence for the People a motion was made to strike it out for the reason that the statements were made under duress. There had been some cross-examination of the witnesses for the People as to whether there were any threats, misconduct or inducements to obtain the admissions. from the defendants and all such conduct had been denied, so that there was no evidence which, if true, tended to prove

duress, and the motion was denied. At the conclusion of all the evidence the motion to strike out all testimony relating to statements of the defendants on the ground that they were made under duress was renewed and again denied. The defendant Johnson testified that he was called vile names; that the police threatened to beat him to death if he did not tell the truth and confess that he committed the murder; that he was struck on the head with a club, beaten with clubs, struck in the mouth, and otherwise mistreated until he admitted that he took part in the murder. Colvin testified that he was told if he did not say that he killed the man it would go hard with him; that he was struck in the face, choked, locked up and kept on bread and water three days and nights. If this testimony, or a considerable part of it, was true a gross outrage was committed, which not only deserves the severest condemnation, but which would exclude as evidence any admissions obtained by such means. The claim that there had been any improper conduct to obtain the admissions had, however, been contradicted on cross-examination of witnesses testifying to admissions, and although Johnson testified that he was beaten with clubs, there was no evidence whatever of any physical signs of injury which might have been expected, and it is evident that the court did not believe the defendants. The question, however, was afterward submitted to the jury on instructions requested by the defendants. In one instruction the court advised the jury that an admission, to be admissible in any criminal case, must have been made freely and voluntarily by the defendants; that it must not have been induced by any person or persons by the remotest fear or injury or duress or the slight hope of benefit or reward of anything whatsoever and must have been freely and voluntarily made, otherwise the jury should disregard the alleged admission on the part of the defendants. These rules were amplified in another instruction, in which the jury were told that it was their right and duty to determine for themselves