Accordingly, the Secretary's Final Decision and Order reversed the Initial Decision and Order of the ALJ, imposed a fine of $2,000, and prohibited the Kellys from taking part in horse shows for one year. The Kellys appeal from the Secretary's Order. They maintain that the Secretary's finding that Pride was sore when entered in the Celebration was not supported by substantial evidence. In its Response to the Kellys' petition, the USDA contends that the petition for review should be dismissed because the notice of appeal was untimely, and in the alternative, that the Secretary's decision was supported by substantial evidence. II. The Secretary's order was signed and docketed on December 28, 1993. The order was mailed on December 29, and received by the Kellys' counsel on January 4, 1994. On January 29, 1994, the Kellys filed a notice of appeal in this Court." 10 We may review an administrative order if "within the time prescribed by law... a notice of appeal" is filed with the clerk of this Court. Fed. R. App. P. 15(a). Under the Horse Protection Act, an appeal from the Secretary's order must be filed "within 30 days from the date of such order and by simultaneously sending a copy of such notice by certified mail to the Secretary 15 U.S.C. § 1825(b)(2) (emphasis added). The USDA submits that, in this case, the "date of such order" commencing the 30-day period was December 28, the date on which the order was signed and docketed. The Kellys, on the other hand, contend that the 30-day period commenced on December 29, the date on which the order was mailed. They advance two arguments in support of this contention. We consider each argument in turn. First, they point to the following language found in the order: "The provisions of the disqualification order shall become effective on the 30th day after service of this Order on Respondents." They suggest that the effective date of the sanctions marks the commencement of the 30-day period. We reject this argument without hesitation. The date of an order and the effective date of its penalties are clearly distinct. 10On April 6, 1994, the Kellys also filed an Application for Stay Pending Review to suspend the imposition of the period of disqualification by the Secretary. The USDA made no objection, and the stay was granted by this Court on April 25, 1994. They stay is dissolved with the filing of this opinion. 53 Agric. Dec. 1200 Next, the Kellys insist that December 29, the date of service, or the mailing of the order, marks the commencement of the 30-day period. In support of their position, the Kellys cite Energy Probe v. United Stated Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 872 F.2d 436 (D.C. Cir. 1989). In Energy Probe the Court concluded that the "date on which the order is signed, the Commission's seal is affixed, and the order is served" commenced the appeal period at issue. Energy Probe, 872 F.2d at 437. The Kellys maintain that in the instant case, as in Energy Probe, the period begins on the date the order is mailed or served. We find the Kellys' argument unpersuasive for several reasons. First, the plain language of the provision before us identifies the commencing day as the date of the order. The order in question is dated December 28, 1993. Giving the words of the Horse Protection Act their ordinary meaning, Bruhn's Freezer Meats v. United States Department of Agriculture, 438 F.2d 1332, 1338 (8th Cir. 1971), we can only conclude that December 28 commences the limitation period. Further, while we might agree with the Energy Probe Court with regard to its interpretation of the Hobbs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2341 et. seq., we are convinced that the rule pronounced is not applicable in this case. The issue in Energy Probe differs factually from the one presented to us. In Energy Probe, the question was whether the "entry date of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's order was the date on which it was signed and stamped served," or the date that the parties actually received the order by mail. The Court chose the earlier of the two dates. Notably, in Energy Probe, the date the order was signed and the date of service coincided. In this case, the issue is whether the period begins on the date of the order, or on the date service was effected by mailing. The Kellys urge this Court to adopt the rule found in Energy Probe, which makes the date of service the beginning of the period in question in cases involving the Hobbs Act. As we read § 1825(b) of the Horse Protection Act, the 30-day period begins on the date of the order," not the date on which service is mailed. 11Section 1.145(i) of Title 7 A C.F.R provides in part: (i) Decision of the judicial officer on appeal. As soon as practicable... the Judicial Officer... shall rule on the appeal. . . . A final order issued by the Judicial Officer shall be filed with the Hearing Clerk. Such order may be regarded by the respondent as final for purposes of judicial review.... Service is a distinct function occurring after the order is issued and docketed.12 Consequently, under the Horse Protection Act, the date of the order may differ from the date of service. When the two dates differ, as in this case, it is the date of the order which marks the beginning of the 30-day period. Moreover, because the Act is clear on its face, it would be improvident to attempt to find meaning elsewhere. See Arkansas AFL-CIO v. Federal Communication Commission, 11 F.3d 1430 (8th Cir. 1993). Here we consider the provision of the Horse Protection Act which applies specifically to the order issued by the Secretary in the case, not the Hobbs Act considered in Energy Probe. Thus, the holding in Energy Probe is of limited persuasive value. Additionally, we recognize that we must give the Secretary's interpretation of the Horse Protection Act some deference absent precedent or legislative history to the contrary. See Beef Nebraska, Inc. v. United States, 807 F.2d 712, 716 (8th Cir. 1986). The Secretary maintains that the date of the order, December 28, 1993, marks the beginning of the the period. We agree. The appeal period begins on the date found on the face of the order, and not on the date on which the order is served. Finally, we venture the following observation. Even if this case were properly before us, the Kellys would receive no relief on the merits of their claim. This Court will set aside the Secretary's order only if it is unsupported by substantial evidence. 15 U.S.C. 1825(b)(2). Substantial evidence is "such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Cox v. United States Dept. of Agriculture, 925 F.2d 1102, 1104 (8th Cir.) cert. denied, U.S., 112 S.Ct. 178, 116 L.Ed.2d 141 (1991), quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 217, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938). In this instance, the record is replete with evidence supporting the Secretary's conclusion that Pride was sore when entered in the Celebration. The veterinarians' joint report and affidavits indicate that Pride was sensitive to the touch. In addition, the veterinarians describe their usual testing procedure and indicated that the same procedure was used to test Pride. The Kellys' claim that the veterinarians' joint report was inadmissible is without merit. We find nothing nefarious about the changes on the veterinarians' joint report which would lead us to discredit its content. This is particularly true since the since the changes had little or no impact on the 127 A C.F.R. § 1.147(b). 53 Agric. Dec. 1207 outcome of the case. In sum, we believe that the Secretary's finding that Pride was sore when entered in the Celebration is supported by substantial evidence. III. The Kellys' notice of appeal was filed with this Court one day late. We have stated that timeliness of an appeal from an administrative order is a jurisdictional requirement that cannot be modified or waived by this Court, Cartersville Elevator, Inc. v. I.C.C., 724 F.2d 668, 672 (8th Cir.) adhered to en banc, 735 F.2d 1059 (1984). We have no choice but to dismiss this appeal. The stay previously entered is dissolved. It is so ordered. CALVIN L. BAIRD, SR. v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE. No. 93-3975. Filed November 10, 1994. (Cite as 39 F.3d 131) Horse soring Substantial evidence - Horse owner - Entry. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the decision of the Secretary, which found the subject horses to be sore under the HPA and assessed a $4,000 civil penalty and a one-year disqualification against petitioner. In order to determine whether horse owner has violated provision with respect to allowing entry of sore horse, government must first establish prima facie case, i.e., (1) ownership; (2) showing, exhibition, or entry; and (3) soreness. Owner may then offer evidence that he took affirmative step to prevent soring, whereupon government must then prove that such steps constituted a mere pretext or self-serving ruse. Here, government offered no proof to counter petitioner's testimony that he directed his trainers not to sore his horses and that he would take horses away from trainers he suspected of disobeying his instruction. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS G. Thomas Blankenship, Indianapolis, IN, for petitioner. M. Bradley Flynn, Washington, D.C., for respondent. RALPH B. GUY, JR., Circuit Judge. Petitioner appeals the decision of the Secretary of the United States Department of Agriculture ("Secretary") finding that he violated 15 U.S.C. § 1824(2)(D) on two separate occasions by allowing horses he owned to be exhibited and entered in a horse show while the horses were "sore." Because we find that petitioner actually attempted to prevent, rather than allow, the exhibition or entry of his horses while they were sore, we reverse. I. Before addressing the circumstances surrounding petitioner's violations, a discussion of the relevant statutory framework is necessary to bring the issues involved in this appeal into sharper focus. A. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK The Horse Protection Act ("Act") prohibits: The (A) showing or exhibiting, in any horse show or horse exhibition, of any horse which is sore, (B) entering for the purpose of showing or exhibiting in any horse show or horse exhibition, any horse which is sore, (C) selling, auctioning, or offering for sale, in any horse sale or auction, any horse which is sore, and (D) 'allowing any activity described in clause (A), (B), or (C) respecting a horse which is sore by the owner of such horse. 15 U.S.C. § 1824(2) (emphasis added).' 'The Fourth Circuit recently discussed the purpose underlying the Horse Protection Act. Congress enacted the Horse Protection Act to end the practice of deliberately making Walkers "sore" for the purpose of altering their natural gait and improving their performance at horse shows. When the front limbs of a horse have been deliberately made "sore," usually by using chains or chemicals, "the intense pain which the animal suffered when placing his forefeet on the ground would cause him to lift them up quickly and thrust them forward, reproducing exactly [the distinctive high-stepping gait |