Opinion of the Court Vickery v. Ritchie, 202 Mass. 247, there was a mutual mistake which invalidated the contract and the court held that this failure of the express contract did not prevent the application of an implied contract to pay for property furnished and used. In the case we have before us there unquestionably was a written contract made as to which there was no misunderstanding. The question is whether the understanding or belief on the part of plaintiffs (if proved) that there was an additional oral contract made, vitiates the written contract and leaves the parties with no contract at all. We are clear that such is not the rule. Finally the argument made on behalf of plaintiffs lays special stress upon a statement found in Section 71 of the Restatement of the Law of Contracts. It is as follows: (a) If the manifestations of intention of either party are uncertain or ambiguous, and he has no reason to know that they may bear a different meaning to the other party from that which he himself attaches to them, his manifestations are operative in the formation of a contract only in the event that the other party attaches to them the same meaning. If this statement is considered in connection with what precedes and the plain meaning of its language applied, it will be seen that it has nothing to do with any situation in the case before us. It is made under the following heading: UNDISCLOSED UNDERSTANDING OF OFFEROR OR OFFEREE, WHEN MATERIAL Except as stated in §§ 55, 70, the undisclosed understanding of either party of the meaning of his own words and other acts, or of the other party's words and other acts, is material in the formation of contracts in the following cases and in no others: [Statement (a) set out above then follows.] From this heading it will be seen that the subject matter being considered was when the undisclosed understanding of one party was material in the formation of a contract. Here it is contended that an undisclosed understanding will destroy a written contract. Moreover, the preliminary facts Opinion of the Court stated in paragraph (a) set out above are not claimed to exist in the instant case by either party. Having reached the conclusions as to the law in the case which have been stated above, it follows that the testimony upon which the plaintiffs rely to void the written contract is inadmissible for that purpose, and consequently, as stated above, we do not find it necessary to determine and set out in the findings what either plaintiffs or defendant understood. What we have said above is sufficient to dispose of the case but it may be that something should be added with reference to the claim presented to the Secretary of War by plaintiffs against the defendant for $7,500,000. This claim was made under what is called the Dent Act and set up the same matters that are now made the basis of plaintiffs' suit; namely, the failure of the defendant to turn the ships over to plaintiffs, and that at the time of the transfer of the ships there was no meeting of the minds between the parties to the contract and therefore plaintiffs were entitled to receive the fair market value thereof less what had been paid. The War Claims Board denied relief but on July 16, 1921, the claim having been presented to the Secretary of War, John W. Weeks, he made an award in favor of the plaintiffs in the sum of $550,000. The award recited that it was made in "full adjustment, payment, and discharge of said claim, exclusive of prospective profits." The plaintiffs, as in the present case, had made no claim for prospective profits and the Dent Act forbade an award for such profits. The plaintiffs signed an acceptance of the award and the $550,000 was paid to them. Testimony was offered with reference to statements afterwards made by Secretary Weeks, who was not living at the time the testimony was introduced. This testimony can not be received to vary the award and the acceptance for several reasons, but it is argued any finality the award may have had has been destroyed by the special jurisdictional act. We think the closing provision of the act plainly contemplates that the court shall determine whether the claim of plaintiffs was "satisfied by the subsequent payment by the Secretary of War as an accord and satisfaction." That it was satisfied, Opinion of the Court we have no doubt. Attention is called to the fact that the award excluded prospective profits and there is much discussion as to the authority of the Secretary of War under the Dent Act and speculation as to what was the basis of the award he made. It is not necessary to consider any of these matters. The plaintiffs presented to the defendant through the Secretary of War a claim in substance and effect the same as that which they now make and upon which they seek to recover judgment. The plaintiffs were paid and accepted a certain sum in full payment and discharge of their claim. We think it is entirely immaterial what the Secretary of War had in mind when he made the award and that any irregularity in the proceedings, if there was any, does not change the result that the plaintiffs' claim was satisfied. The defendant sets up as an additional defense a claim that the evidence shows that plaintiffs were paid all the ships were fairly worth in the market at that time. The conclusions we have stated above make it unnecessary to determine this question of fact. In this connection the defendant offered evidence which it is claimed showed that the plaintiffs were given the operation of other ships from which they derived a large profit. We think this evidence was properly excluded by the commissioner of this court and in any event it is not necessary that we should determine any question arising thereon. The evidence, however, does show that the defendant paid the plaintiffs the original cost of the ships to them with a very liberal allowance for expenses and the plaintiffs also received from Phelps Bros. & Co., out of what the Government paid for removing the restrictions on the ships, $188,000. In other words, it appears that the plaintiffs realized a profit out of the transaction of $738,000. The amount of this profit is not material to the decision of the case and we only mention it because in the oral argument some claim was made that the plaintiffs had not been treated fairly by the Government. The defendant contends that the plaintiffs originally contemplated a patriotic sacrifice of profits in accordance with the desire of the President but afterwards changed their Reporter's Statement of the Case minds and that this was the only misunderstanding in the case. But this also is not material to our decision. It follows from what has been stated above that the plaintiffs' petition must be dismissed and it is so ordered. WHALEY, Judge; WILLIAMS, Judge; LITTLETON, Judge; and BOOTH, Chief Justice, concur. HARRY S. COOMBS AND ALONZO J. HARRIMAN v. THE UNITED STATES [No. 42820. Decided May 2, 1938] On the Proofs Government contract; architectural services.-Where contract for architectural services, as set forth in letters and telegrams, was confined to furnishing plans and specifications and "any and all other services which may be reasonably expected of an architect," it is held that recommendations as to the location of the building, or soil tests to determine the bearing value of the soil, did not constitute any part of the contract obligations. The Reporter's statement of the case: Mr. Evert L. Bono for the plaintiffs. Mr. Manton M. Wyvell was on the brief. Mr. Albert W. Johnson, with whom was Mr. Assistant Attorney General Sam E. Whitaker, for the defendant. Mr. George F. Foley was on the briefs. The court made special findings of fact as follows: 1. The plaintiffs are architects operating as a partnership. Early in August, 1930, they entered into a contract with the defendant to furnish plans and specifications for the construction of a hospital building at Togus, Maine, for which they were to receive 22% of the cost of constructing the building. Plaintiffs prepared plans and specifications for the proposed building, which were delivered to and accepted by the Reporter's Statement of the Case defendant. Such plans and specifications are in evidence and, by reference, are made a part of this finding. On the plans and specifications so prepared and delivered by plaintiffs to the defendant, the defendant, on April 21, 1932, entered into contracts for the construction of the hospital building at a cost of $491,588.00. 2. On May 14, 1932, plaintiffs sent a letter to the defendant requesting payment for the services rendered in connection with the preparation of the plans and specifications for the construction of the hospital building, in the amount of $12,289.70, representing 22% of the total cost of the contracts as awarded, to wit: $491,588.00. The defendant on May 25, 1932, acknowledged receipt of the plaintiff's letter of May 14, and enclosed a voucher in the amount of $12,289.70, with the request that plaintiffs certify and return the voucher immediately to the defendant for payment. The plaintiffs promptly certified this voucher and returned it to the defendant, but no part of the sum of $12,289.70 certified in the voucher has been paid to the plaintiffs. 3. At the time Congress authorized the construction of the hospital building involved in this case, at the National Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers, Togus, Maine, that institution was under the supervision of a Board of Managers. By an act of Congress, July 3, 1930, known as the Williamson Act, and by executive order of the President, July 21, 1930, the duties, powers and functions of the Home were transferred to the Veterans' Administration. In the early part of June, 1930, the Board and the plaintiffs entered into an oral contract under which the plaintiffs were to furnish the plans and specifications for the new hospital and to supervise its construction at a compensation of 4% of the cost of construction. 4. After the oral contract referred to in the preceding finding had been entered into, attempts were made to reduce the contract to writing, and a number of letters were exchanged between the Board and the plaintiffs in reference to that matter. Plaintiffs submitted a standard form of agreement which did not satisfy the Board. On June 28, |