single person, and as a corporation is a person under the statute, so it is also an individual under the order. In re United Button Co. (D. C. 1904) 137 Fed. 668, 13 Am. Bankr. Rep. 454; In re Globe Sec. Co. (D. C. 1904) 132 Fed. 709. And where two petitions are filed against a corporation, one in the state by which it was incorporated, and one in a district in which it does business, the first hearing should be had at the former place, as that is the place of its domicile, and proceedings in the other court will be stayed to await such hearing and the decision thereon. In re Globe Sec. Co. (D. C. 1904) 132 Fed. 709; In re United Button Co. (D. C. 1904) 132 Fed. 378, 12 Am. Bankr. Rep. 761. In case there is substantial doubt as to the domicile or place of residence of a debtor, against whom petitions are filed in different districts, the court having jurisdiction of the petition earliest in date should be allowed to hear and determine the question of jurisdiction as depending on domicile, and the other court, without dismissing the petition before it, will stay proceedings thereon to await the result. In re Waxelbaum (D. C. 1899) 98 Fed. 589, 3 Am. Bankr. Rep. 392.

The provision of the general order that the court which makes the first adjudication shall "retain jurisdiction over all proceedings," is to be taken subject to the directions of this section with reference to the transfer of cases to other districts. In re Isaacson (D. C. 1908) 161 Fed. 779, 20 Am. Bankr. Rep. 430. This provision is not to be read as narrowly restricted to the bankruptcy of single debtors, but it applies equally to cases where different petitions are filed against a partnership. In re Sears (D. C. 1901) 112 Fed. 58, 7 Am. Bankr. Rep. 279. The "parties in interest" whose convenience is to be consulted, are not limited to unsecured creditors of the bankrupt, but the term is intended to include all persons whose pecuniary interests may be directly affected by the bankruptcy proceedings. In re United Button Co. (D. C. 1904) 137 Fed. 668, 13 Am. Bankr. Rep. 454. The burden of proof, however, as to the place where the proceedings will be most convenient for parties in interest rests upon those who ask for a transfer. And where the applicants are a minority of the creditors, and represent only a small part of the indebtedness, a transfer will not be warranted by the single fact that the greater part or all of the bankrupt's

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property is in the other district, as the court has power to order its sale there if deemed best. In re Tybo Mining & Reduction Co. (D. C. 1904) 132 Fed. 978, 13 Am. Bankr. Rep. 68. So a transfer will not be ordered where the request therefor is presented by creditors who have received preferences which they do not offer to surrender, and it is doubtful whether the transfer will be for the greater convenience of the creditors who have not been preferred. In re Sears (D. C. 1901) 112 Fed. 58, 7 Am. Bankr. Rep. 279. Prox. imity of the place of business of a bankrupt to the court entertaining proceedings in bankruptcy, and proximity of a majority of the bankrupt's creditors in number or amount of claims, is persuasive, but not conclusive, in determining the court which shall assume final jurisdiction. In re United Button Co. (D. C. 1904) 137 Fed. 668, 13 Am. Bankr. Rep. 454.

Where a petition in involuntary bankruptcy against a debtor was filed in Georgia, and, pending a hearing thereon, he filed his voluntary petition in New York, alleging that he was a resident of the latter state, but it appeared that he had formerly been engaged in business in Georgia, that the debts to be affected were all contracted there, that his present business was as an agent or employé of the corporation which succeeded his former firm, that he was accustomed to spend a part of his time in Georgia, and that his creditors desired that the bankruptcy proceedings should be conducted in the latter state, it was held that it would be for the "greatest convenience of the parties in interest" that the court in Georgia should proceed with the case. In re Waxelbaum (D. C. 1899) 98 Fed. 589, 3 Am. Bankr. Rep. 392. And see further as to considerations affecting question of "greatest convenience." In re Southwestern Bridge & Iron Co. (D. C. 1904) 133 Fed. 568, 13 Am. Bankr. Rep. 304; In re General Metals Co. (D. C. 1904) 133 Fed. 84, 12 Am. Bankr. Rep. 770.

Relationship between the bankrupt and the deputy clerk of the district court in whose office the petition was filed will be cause for transferring the case to another seat of the court in the same district and division and ordering the record to be filed and docketed in the office of the clerk of the court at the latter place. Bray v. Cobb (D. C. 1898) 91 Fed. 102, 1 Am. Bankr. Rep. 153.

2.

1. Jurisdiction and powers of referees. Determination of adverse claims. 3. Specific powers and authorities of ref

17.

by

Effect of referee's findings of fact.

1. Jurisdiction and powers of referees. -The jurisdiction of referees in bankruptcy is confined to the limits of the districts for which they are appointed by the judge, and does not extend to cases pending outside such districts, except where the referees are specially appointed to fill a vacancy temporarily. In re Schenectady Engineering & Const. Co. (D. C. 1906) 147 Fed. 868, 17 Am. Bankr. Rep. 279.

A referee in bankruptcy has no jurisdiction of summary proceedings to compel a corporation to issue stock to the trustee pursuant to an agreement made with the bankrupt. A referee in bankruptcy, having no jurisdiction of a suit by a trustee to enforce specific performance of a contract between the bankrupt and a third person, acquires no jurisdiction by the consent of such third person. In re Ballou (D. C. 1914) 215 Fed. 810.

On a petition to sell mortgaged property free from the lien and transfer the same to the proceeds, there being no allegation in the petition nor in the notice that an attack was made on the validity of the mortgage, the referee had no jurisdiction to adjudge it void. In re Martin (C. C. A. 1914) 210 Fed. 620.

2. Determination of adverse claims. The referee has no power or jurisdiction to order third persons, in possession of property claimed by the trustee, to deliver it to the latter, where the possession of the third person is not admitted to be in subordination to the bankrupt's title, but is based on a bona fide adverse claim. In re Blum (C. C. A. 1913) 202 Fed. 883, 29 Am. Bankr. Rep. 332; In re Gill (1911) 190

Fed. 726, 111 C. C. A. 454, 26 Am. Bankr. Rep. 883; In re Peacock (C. C. 1910) 178 Fed. 851, 24 Am. Bankr. Rep. 159; In re F. M. & S. Q. Carlile (D. C. 1912) 199 Fed. 612, 29 Am. Bankr. Rep. 373; In re Bacon (D. C. 1912) 196 Fed. 986, 28 Am. Bankr. Rep. 565. As to consent of defendant conferring jurisdiction in such cases, see Kilgore v. Barr (1912) 114 Va. 70, 75 S. E. 762. A referee in bankruptcy has no jurisdiction of a proceeding to determine the validity of a transfer of property by bankrupts to one claiming adversely, and who objects to the jurisdiction. In re Petronio (C. C. A. 1914) 220 Fed. 269. Where a creditor asserted that he had received goods from a bankrupt in payment of his debt, and refused consent to a summary adjudication, the referee is without jurisdiction, and must remit the trustee to a plenary suit. In re Vallozza (D. C. 1915) 225 Fed. 334.

Where such a case arises, it is the duty of the referee to hear the testimony, in order to determine whether the third person's claim is real or pretended. If he finds that the claim is made in good faith and is probably real, but of doubtful validity or questionable faith, it should then be determined in a plenary suit; but if he finds that the claim is without any actual merit or legal foundation, he should require a surrender of the property to the trustee. In re Holbrook Shoe & Leather Co. (D. C. 1908) 165 Fed. 973, 21 Am. Bankr. Rep. 511.

Within the rule that a referee has jurisdiction to determine claims of third persons which are merely colorable, a claim to property alleged to belong to a bankrupt's estate is not "colorable" when the claimant sets up as facts and not as conclusions of law matters which, if true, would constitute a statement of an adverse claim. In a proceeding by a trustee against a bankrupt's wife to recover $3,000, alleged to belong to his estate, her answer, that she had owned the money since 1910, had loaned it to her son-in-law, and that he had repaid it in May, 1911, did not indicate that her claim was merely colorable, and she was therefore entitled to a determination thereof in a plenary suit. In re Blum (1913) 202 Fed. 883, 121 C. C. A. 241.

The administrator of an estate, who appeared in bankruptcy proceedings in response to an order of the referee to show cause, and went to trial upon the

merits without questioning the jurisdiction, waived his right to insist that the trustee should have proceeded against him by an action. In re F. W. Hall & Sons (D. C. 1913) 208 Fed. 578.

A referee in bankruptcy has jurisdiction to determine whether a preference has been received by a secured creditor. In re Keystone Press (D. C. 1913) 203 Fed. 710.

3. Specific powers and authorities of referees. The referee has power to make an order requiring the trustee to give the bankrupt a certificate of the names and addresses of the creditors who have proved their claims, to enable him to apply for his discharge. In re Blaisdell (D. C. 1871) 6 N. B. R. 78, Fed. Cas. No. 1,488.

The referee, in case there is delay in winding up the estate in bankruptcy, may properly inquire why a settlement has not been made, and suggest the propriety of making progress, and indicate what steps the trustee should take. In re Bank of North Carolina (D. C. 1879) 19 N. B. R. 164, Fed. Cas. No. 896.

The referee has authority to order notice to creditors of a meeting to authorize the trustee to oppose the bankrupt's application for discharge. In re Hockman (D. C. 1912) 205 Fed. 330. He may call a meeting of creditors, if deemed advisable, before action is taken with respect to property subject to liens. In re Cutler & John (D. C. 1916) 228 Fed. 771. An order continuing a meeting of creditors of a bankrupt estate was a matter of discretion with the referee. In re RosenfeldGoldman Co. (D. C. 1915) 228 Fed. 921.

Referees in bankruptcy may administer the oath to witnesses appearing for examination or in any hearing before them.. U. S. v. Simon (D. C. 1906) 146 Fed. 89, 17 Am. Bankr. Rep. 41; In re Dean (D. C. 1874) 2 N. B. R. 89, Fed. Cas. No. 3,700.

It is within the jurisdiction and the discretion of a referee in bankruptcy to order amendments to be made in the petition and schedules of a voluntary bankrupt referred to him, in particulars as to which he finds them defective or insufficient, and to refuse to call a first meeting of creditors until such amendments are made. In re Brumelkamp (D. C. 1899) 95 Fed. 814, 2 Am. Bankr. Rep. 318.

A referee in bankruptcy has no authority to dismiss a bankruptcy proceeding generally, or any particular matter in bankruptcy referred to him after the adjudication. In re Elby (D. C. 1907) 157 Fed. 935, 19 Am. Bankr. Rep. 734.

A referee in bankruptcy has no authority to collect or receive money belonging to an estate in bankruptcy. In re Pierce (D. C. 1901) 111 Fed. 516, 6 Am. Bankr. Rep. 747.

Although courts of bankruptcy have

jurisdiction and authority to authorize the business of the bankrupt to be continued for a limited time, when that is for the best interests of the estate, yet a referee in bankruptcy should not take it upon him to exercise such authority, where it involves transactions of considerable magnitude, especially since the amount of his own compensation may be directly involved, nor in any case should he authorize the issue of trustee's certificates to raise money to accomplish that end. Bray v. Johnson (1908) 166 Fed. 57, 91 C. C. A. 643, 21 Am. Bankr. Rep. 383.

4. Ordering surrender of property.-A referee in bankruptcy has jurisdiction of an application by a trustee in bankruptcy for an order requiring the bankrupt to surrender money or property of his estate alleged to be in his possession or control and to be withheld or concealed from the trustee, to cite the bankrupt before him to show cause, and to make an order in accordance with his findings. In re Oliver (D. C. 1899) 96 Fed. 85, 2 Am. Bankr. Rep. 783; In re Tudor (D. C.) 96 Fed. 942, 2 Am. Bankr. Rep. 808; In re Mayer (D. C. 1900) 98 Fed. 839, 3 Am. Bankr. Rep. 533; In re Miller (D. C. 1900) 105 Fed. 57, 5 Am. Bankr. Rep. 184; Prather v. Prather (1882) 4 Ky. Law Rep. 454. His action is subject to review by the judge of the court of bankruptcy, but his decision will not be reversed unless plainly erroneous or based on clearly insuffi cient evidence. In re Tudor (D. C.) 98 Fed. 942, 2 Am. Bankr. Rep. 808. If, the order of the referee requiring a surrender of property was based on a mistake of fact, the referee has power, on petition of the bankrupt, filed within the time limited for review of his decision, to reopen and reconsider the matter, and, the mistake being shown, to set aside the order. In re Brenner (D. C. 1911) 190 Fed. 209, 26 Am. Bankr. Rep. 646. If the bankrupt fails or refuses to obey an order of this kind, lawfully made, the referee may enter the fact on his record, and it is then his duty to certify the facts to the judge, as the latter alone has the authority to adjudge the bankrupt in contempt and impose a punishment therefor. In re Miller (D. C. 1900) 105 Fed. 57, 5 Am. Bankr. Rep. 184.

The referee has power in the first instance to enter an order against a third person to show cause why he should not be required to surrender or pay over to the trustee property or money in his hands, alleged to belong to the estate in bankruptcy, and upon a hearing, to make an order requiring such surrender or payment within a limited time. Mueller v. Nugent (1902) 184 U. S. 1, 22 Sup. Ct. 269, 46 L. Ed. 405, 7 Am. Bankr. Rep. 224; In re Famous Clothing Co. (D. C. 19-10) 179 Fed. 1015, 24 Am. Bankr. Rep. 780.