173. But he need not prove his appointment and qualification unless his right to recover in the capacity of a trustee in bankruptcy is challenged in such form as the state law requires. Jones v. Meyer Bros. Drug Co. (1901) 25 Tex. Civ. App. 234, 61 S. W. 553.

The bankruptcy act does not undertake to regulate the practice in the state courts, but places on the trustee the official duty of appearing according to the rules and practice of such courts, so as to protect the interests of the general creditors. Bacon v. George (1910) 206 Mass. 566, 92 N. E. 721. The trustee is not exempt from the necessity of proper pleadings and evidence. Wikle v. Jones (1909) 133 Ga. 266, 65 S. E. 577. But he cannot set up either the bankrupt's adjudication or his discharge as a ground for staying the proceedings or in bar of the action, as that is a right personal to the bankrupt. Serra é Hijo v. Hoffman (1877) 29 La. Ann. 17.

Where the trustee is brought in as a defendant, it is not necessary that the plaintiff's pleadings, alleging the trustee's representative capacity, and the transfer to him of the title to the defendant's property, should also state a cause of action against him. Latimer v. McKinnon (1903) 85 App. Div. 224, 83 N. Y. Supp. 315. If the defendant in an action in a state court wishes to object to the substitution of the plaintiff's trustee in bankruptcy in place of the plaintiff himself, he must do so by objection or exception taken at the time; if he goes to trial, it will then be too late to object to any irregularity. Chicago Legal News Co. v. Browne (1882) 103 Ill. 317; Brandon v. Cabiness (1846) 10 Ala. 155.

A bankrupt's trustee, substituted as complainant in a pending suit by the bankrupt to recover personal property, held to occupy the same position that the bankrupt would have occupied in the absence of adjudication. Earl v. Jacobs (Mich. 1913) 142 N. W. 1079.

22. Suits begun after adjudication.As a general rule, no suit can lawfully be commenced against a bankrupt, in any court, after the adjudication of bankruptcy and until the question of his discharge is determined. Greenwald v. Appell (C. C. 1883) 17 Fed. 140; In re Williams (C. C. 1874) 11 N. B. R. 145, Fed. Cas. No. 17,700; In re Archenbrown (D. C. 1875) 11 N. B. R. 149, Fed. Cas. No. 504; Woolfolk v. Murray (1871) 44 Ga. 133, 10 N. B. R. 540; Wilson v. Capuro (1871) 41 Cal. 545, 4 N. B. R. 714; Rogers v. Wentworth (1878) 58 N. H. 318; Collins v. Scheeline (1877) 52 Cal. 450. Compare Hackett v. Supreme Council A. L. H. (1910) 206 Mass. 139, 92 N. E. 133; Davidson v. Fisher (1889) 41 Minn. 363, 43 N. W. 79; Thompson v. Massie (1884) 41 Ohio St. 307. The court of bankruptcy has jurisdiction to stay the prosecution of an action against the

In

bankrupt in a state court, on a debt from which his discharge would be a release, pending the determination of the question of his discharge, although the action was not begun until after the filing of the petition in bankruptcy. re Basch (D. C. 1899) 97 Fed. 761, 3 Am. Bankr. Rep. 235; In re Cohen (D. C. 1879) 19 N. B. R. 133, Fed. Cas. No. 2,961. But on the application of a creditor the court of bankruptcy may grant him leave to begin a suit against the bankrupt in a state court, where there are special circumstances rendering such a proceeding necessary. But when the creditor has brought his suit, pursuant to such leave, and saved his rights thereby, the court of bankruptcy will then order a stay of further proceedings to await the determination of the question of discharge. In re Ghirardelli (D. C. 1870) Fed. Cas. No. 5,376; Brooks v. Bates (1884) 7 Colo. 576, 4 Pac. 1069; In re Whiting (D. C. 1874) Fed. Cas. No. 17,574; In re Scott (D. C. 1874) Fed. Cas. No. 12,520.

A creditor holding a promissory note, valid and enforceable against the maker at the date of the latter's adjudication in bankruptcy, but against which the statute of limitations has nearly run, may reduce the same to judgment by suit brought in a state court after such adjudication, and such judgment will establish the claim and stop the running of the statute, though it will not give the creditor any lien or priority nor entitle him to levy on the bankrupt's property. In re McBryde (D. C. 1899) 99 Fed. 686, 3 Am. Bankr. Rep. 729. The same principle applies where it is necessary to begin a suit in order to preserve a mechanic's lien. Clifton v. Foster (1869) 103 Mass. 233.

Creditors permitted to recover judgments against the bankrupt after his adjudication can acquire no lien on any of the property in the custody or control of the trustee in bankruptcy by such judgments nor by executions thereon. In re Franklin Lumber Co. (D. C. 1906) 147 Fed. 852, 17 Am. Bankr. Rep. 443; McLean v. Rockey (C. C. 1843) Fed. Cas. No. 8,891; In re Dey (D. C. 1869) 3 N. B. R. 305, Fed. Cas. No. 3,870; In re Tifft (D. C. 1879) 19 N. B. R. 201, Fed. Cas. No. 14,034; Sicard v. Buffalo, N. Y. & P. R. Co. (C. C. 1879) Fed. Cas. No. 12.831; Stuart v. Hines (1871) 33 Iowa, 61, 6 N. B. R. 416; Manwarring v. Kouns (1872) 35 Tex. 171; Clifton v. Foster (1869) 103 Mass. 233, 4 Am. Rep. 539; Williams v. Merritt (1869) 103 Mass. 184, 4 Am. Rep. 521, 4 N. B. R. 706. Nor can they interfere with the possession of the trustee in bankruptcy by attachments. In re Renda (D. C. 1906) 149 Fed. 614, 17 Am. Bankr. Rep. 521; In re John L. Nelson & Bro. Co. (D. C. 1907) 149 Fed. 590, 18 Am. Bankr. Rep. 66; Williams v. Merritt (1869) 103 Mass. 184, 4 Am. Rep. 521, 4 N. B. R. 706.

tion which is defective in this respect, without objection seasonably taken, and an adjudication is made, the defect is cured by the decree, and will not constitute ground for setting aside the adjudication or impeaching it collaterally. In re First Nat. Bank (1907) 152 Fed. 64, 81 C. C. A. 260, 18 Am. Bankr. Rep. 265; In re Stern (1902) 116 Fed. 604, 54 C. C. A. 60, 8 Am. Bankr. Rep. 569.

In a bankruptcy proceeding against a firm, a creditor's petition against an alleged secret partner seeking to compel him to file schedules of assets and liabilities, but not alleging that he was insolvent, held not sustainable. In re Samuels (C. C. A. 1914) 215 Fed. 845, reversing decree In re Samuels & Lesser (D. C. 1913) 207 Fed. 195.

The allegation that the respondent in an involuntary petition owes debts to the amount of $1,000 or over is indispensable, and its omission leaves the court without jurisdiction. C. C. Taft Co. v. Century Sav. Bank (1905) 141 Fed. 369, 72 C. C. A. 671, 15 Am. Bankr. Rep. 594.

5. Residence, domicile, or place of business.-An allegation as to the - debtor's "principal place of residence" does not satisfy the statute, although such a defect may be considered as immaterial when the court has taken jurisdiction and granted a discharge. Ross-Lewin v. Goold (1904) 113 Ill. App. 499, judgment affirmed (1904) 211 III. 384, 71 N. E. 1028.

A petition which states disjunctively that the respondent has had his principal place of business, or has resided, or has had his domicile, within the district, is insufficient upon its face to confer jurisdiction. In re Laskaris, 1 Nat. Bankr. News, 209.

In a case of voluntary bankruptcy of a partnership, where the allegation of residence within the district as a ground of jurisdiction is false as to one of the petitioning partners, the court will have no jurisdiction as to any of them. In re Beals (D. C. 1877) Fed. Cas. No. 1,165.

An allegation, in a bankruptcy petition, as to the residence of three defendants as individuals, held to sufficiently show jurisdiction dependent on residence, both as to the individuals and a partnership composed of them. In re Mitchell & Co. (D. C. 1914) 211 Fed. 778.

6. Acts of bankruptcy.-It is necessary to allege the insolvency of the respondent in all cases where insolvency is an essential element of the act of bankruptcy charged and relied on. In re Lachenmaier (C. C. A. 1913) 203 Fed. 32; In re Hammond (D. C. 1908) 163 Fed. 548, 20 Am. Bankr. Rep. 776. In partnership cases it is not enough to allege that the firm is insolvent, but there must also be an

averment as to the solvency or insolvency of each of the partners. In re Blair (D. C. 1900) 99 Fed. 76, 3 Am. Bankr. Rep. 588. CONTRA, In re Everybody's Grocery & Meat Market (D. C. 1908) 173 Fed. 492, 21 Am. Bankr. Rep. 925.

A petition in bankruptcy is fatally defective if it fails to allege that the bankrupt has committed one or more of the acts of bankruptcy specified in the statute. In re Louisell Lumber Co. (1913) 209 Fed. 784, 126 C. C. A. 508. The petitioning creditors are not restricted to the allegation of a single act of bankruptcy, but they may include as many separate acts as they have knowledge of, provided they were all committed within the four months. Bradley Timber Co. v. White (1903) 121 Fed. 779, 58 C. C. A. 55, 10 Am. Bankr. Rep. 329; In re Nusbaum (D. C. 1907) 152 Fed, 835, 18 Am. Bankr. Rep. 598.

The petition is fatally defective if it does not show that the act of bankruptcy charged was committed within four months prior to the filing of the petition. In re Louisell Lumber Co. (1913) 209 Fed. 784, 126 C. C. A. 508; Bradley Timber Co. v. White (1903) 121 Fed. 779, 58 C. C. A. 55, 10 Am. Bankr. Rep. 329; In re Muller (D. C. 1869) Fed. Cas. No. 9,912; Gross v. Potter (1860) 15 Gray (Mass.) 556.

It is not sufficient to charge the commission of an act of bankruptcy in the words of the statute, but there must be a specification of time, place, persons concerned, and other circumstances, such as to inform the respondent of the charge which he is to meet. In re Condon (1913) 209 Fed, 800, 126 C. C. A. 524; In re Pressed Steel Wagon Goods Co. (D. C. 1911) 193 Fed. 811, 27 Am. Bankr. Rep. 44; In re Cliffe (D. C. 1899) 94 Fed. 354, 2 Am. Bankr. Rep. 317; In re Hark (D. C. 1905) 135 Fed. 604, 14 Am. Bankr. Rep. 400; In re Randall (D. C. 1870) 3 N. B. R. 18, Fed. Cas. No. 11,551; In re Nelson (D. C. 1899) 98 Fed. 76, 1 Am. Bankr. Rep. 63; Clark v. Henne & Meyer (1904) 127 Fed. 288, 62 C. C. A. 172, 11 Am. Bankr. Rep. 583; In re Deer Creek Water & Water Power Co. (D. C. 1913) 205 Fed. 205, 29 Am. Bankr. Rep. 356; In re Stone (D. C. 1913) 206 Fed, 356, 30 Am. Bankr. Rep. 392; In re Sig. H. Rosenblatt & Co. (1912) 193 Fed. 638, 113 C. C. A. 506, 28 Am. Bankr. Rep. 401; In re Hallin (D. C. 1912) 199 Fed. 806, 28 Am, Bankr. Rep. 708.

Petitioning creditors are bound to as full a disclosure in their petition, in respect to the acts of bankruptcy charged, as their information enables them to make, supplemented by an explanation of its lack of completeness, so far as it may be thus lacking, and their case must rest on something more than rumor or vague hearsay or mere suspicion. In re Blumberg (D. C. 1904)

20.

Effect on rights of secured cred

itors.

Joint liability of others with bankrupt.

21. New promise to pay debt.

1. Nature of composition in bankruptcy.-A composition of a bankrupt with his creditors is at once a settlement and a discharge. In re Ullman (D. C. 1919) 180 Fed. 944, 24 Am. Bankr. Rep. 755. It is in the nature of an accord and satisfaction. Harrison v. Gamble (1888) 69 Mich. 96, 36 N. W. 682. The theory of a composition is that the cash value of the bankrupt's estate is substantially divided among the creditors in proportion to their respective claims. In re Lissburger (D. C. 1880) 2 Fed. 153. In the absence of any expressed restrictions in the law, it should not be held that any act or omission of a bankrupt can operate to prejudice the creditors from entering into a composition whenever they deem it best to do so. In re Joseph (C. C. 1885) 24 Fed. 137. But see In re Rider (D. C. 1899) 96 Fed. 808, 3 Am. Bankr. Rep. 178, where it is said that the provisions of the bankruptcy act prescribing the requisites of a composition are to be strictly construed as against those who seek by this means to deprive non-assenting creditors of their right to have the debtor's property administered upon and distributed in the ordinary course of bankruptcy proceedings.

The court of bankruptcy may enjoin creditors from harassing the debtor by proceedings at law, while his composition proceeding is pending, except as to proceedings to enforce a valid security. In re Hinsdale (D. C. 1877) Fed. Cas. No. 6,526.

2. Right to offer composition.-A corporation, as well as a natural person, may avail itself of the right to offer a composition to creditors. In re Weber Furniture Co. (D. C. 1876) 13 N. B. R. 529, Fed. Cas. No. 17,330. One member of a firm which has been adjudged bankrupt may submit an offer

of composition to the firm creditors and his individual creditors. Pool v. McDonald (C. C. 1877) 15 N. B. R. 560, Fed. Cas. No. 11,268. The refusal or neglect of one of the partners in a bankrupt firm to sign a proposition for composition, unless fraudulent, will not render the proceedings invalid as against the other partners, though he will be deprived of all benefit of it. In re Henry (D. C. 1878) Fed. Cas. No. 6,370.

To authorize any step to be taken for the offer and acceptance of a composition, there must first be a pending case in bankruptcy. In re Reiman (D. C. 1874) Fed. Cas. No. 11,673. Until the amendment of the bankruptcy act in 1910, a debtor was not entitled to offer a composition to his creditors until after there had been an adjudication of bankruptcy entered in his case. In re Back Bay Automobile Co. (D. C. 1907) 158 Fed. 679, 19 Am. Bankr. Rep. 835.

The proceeding for a composition will not be vitiated by a statement in the bankrupt's schedule that the value of his real estate is unknown. In re Welles, 18 N. B. R. 525, Fed. Cas. No. 17,377. Nor by an innocent mistake in stating the amount due to a particular creditor. Ex parte Trafton (D. C. 1876) Fed. Cas. No. 14,133.

A bankrupt will not be permitted to trade with his creditors by increasing an offer of composition after he finds his first offer was rejected as insufficient. But a bankrupt who in good faith made an insufficient offer of composition, because of lack of opportunity to examine the property, may be permitted to amend his offer. In re Cockshaw (D. C. 1915) 220 Fed. 239.

Where there is a fatal defect in the proceedings relating to an offer of composition, and a majority of the creditors are apparently willing to accept the offer made, the court will reject such offer, but may permit the bankrupt to make a new offer, if he desires so to do. In re Kinnane Co. (D. C. 1914) 217 Fed. 488, confirmation denied (D. C. 1915) 221 Fed. 762.

If a trustee in bankruptcy has not been appointed before the offer of a composition, none will be appointed after its acceptance by the creditors, since his services are not needed. But in that case, the bankrupt himself stands in the place of a trustee, so far as regards such matters as the set-off of mutual debts. Ex parte Howard Nat. Bank (D. C. 1876) Fed. Cas. No. 6,764.

3. Examination of bankrupt.-In the provision of this section that the bankrupt cannot offer terms of composition until after "he has been examined in

concealment of assets is wholly circumstantial, it is unnecessary to set out the precise details in the petition. In re Bellah (D. C. 1902) 116 Fed. 69, 8 Am. Bankr. Rep. 310. A charge that the respondent, at a certain time, received a specific sum of money, and that he has ever since concealed it, with intent to hinder, delay, and defraud his creditors, is not defective for failing to set forth the manner and details of the concealment. In re Bel

lah (D. C. 1902) 116 Fed. 69, 8 Am. Bankr. Rep. 310.

9.

Suffering a preference through legal proceedings.-Where the act of bankruptcy alleged is the suffering a preference through legal proceedings, it is not sufficient to allege that the bankrupt suffered the recovery of a judgment against him and had not "at least five days before a sale or final disposition of any property affected by such preference vacated or discharged the same" (in the words of the statute) without alleging the issuance of an execution on the judgment, or the levying thereof on any property of the debtor, and making no allegation of the date of any proposed sale. In re Pressed Steel Wagon Goods Co. (D. C. 1911) 193 Fed. 811, 27 Am. Bankr. Rep. 44. See In re Truitt (D. C. 1913) 203 Fed. 550, 29 Am. Bankr. Rep. 570.

It is not enough to allege that attachments have been issued and levied, which "have not to the present time been vacated." Seaboard Steel Casting Co. v. William R. Trigg Co. (D. C. 1903) 124 Fed. 75, 10 Am. Bankr. Rep. 594. It is not sufficient to allege that executions have been levied on the bankrupt's property without stating the further history of the executions. In re Vastbinder (D. C. 1903) 126 Fed. 417, 11 Am. Bankr. Rep. 118.

A bankruptcy petition alleging that the debtor was the owner of certain described real estate, and within four months before the filing of the petition, while insolvent, with intent to prefer certain creditors, had transferred to them by way of security his interest therein by permitting confessed judgments to be docketed against him, held to sufficiently charge the commission of the second act of bankruptcy. In re Truitt (D. C. 1913) 203 Fed. 550.

A petition which alleges that the bankrupt suffered and permitted certain creditors to obtain a preference by suffering a judgment to be rendered against him, and an attachment and execution issued thereon against the garnishee, and that judgment had been obtained against the garnishee, is sufficient, since the rendering of the judgment against the garnishee is as final a disposition of the property as a sale under execution. In re Fineman (D. C. 1915) 223 Fed. 653.

10. Appointment of receiver.Where the ground of the petition is the appointment of a receiver for the insclvent defendant on the ground of insolvency, it should allege the fact of the appointment, and show that it was made by a court of competent jurisdiction, and that the reason for the appointment was insolvency. In re Kennedy Tailoring Co. (D. C. 1909) 175 Fed. 871, 23 Am. Bankr. Rep. 656; Exploration Mercantile Co. v. Pacific Hardware & Steel Co. (1910) 177 Fed. 825, 101 C. C. A. 39, 24 Am. Bankr. Rep. 216; Doyle-Kidd Dry Goods Co. v. Sadler-Lusk Trading Co. (D. C. 1913) 206 Fed. 813, 30 Am. Bankr. Rep. 604.

Where a petition alleges as an' act of bankruptcy that because of insolvency a receiver was put in charge of defendant's property and the order appointing the receiver does not state the grounds therefor, the record on which it was made must be referred to. In re Maplecroft Mills (D. C. 1914) 218 Fed. 659.

Allegation in an involuntary bankruptcy petition against a corporation, that it had made an assignment by filing a petition admitting its insolvency and inability to pay its debts and asking the appointment of a receiver, held an allegation that the corporation, being insolvent, applied for a receiver of its property. Doyle-Kidd Dry Goods Co. v. Sadler-Lusk Trading Co. (D. C. 1913) 206 Fed. 813.

Allegation that corporation permitted appointment of receiver because of insolvency, though its language was inartificial, held to allege an act of bankruptcy. In re Valentine Bohl Co. (1915) 224 Fed. 685, 140 C. C. A. 225. 11. Multifarious and misjoined matter. It is improper to incorporate in a creditors' petition for an adjudication in bankruptcy allegations charging other creditors with having received voidable preferences, or a request for a warrant directing the marshal to seize and hold the debtor's property pending an adjudication, or a prayer for the seizure of property of the alleged bankrupt in the hands of adverse claimants, or for an injunction forbidding a third person having property of the respondent in his possession (such as a receiver appointed by a state court) to dispose of the same. All these are matters which can only be litigated in a separate proceeding. And hence such allegations and prayers are multifarious and will be stricken out, or treated as having been stricken. Mather v. Coe (D. C. 1899) 92 Fed. 333, 1 Am. Bankr. Rep. 504; In re Ogles (D. C. 1899) 93 Fed. 426, 1 Am. Bankr. Rep. 671; In re Kelly (D. C. 1899) 91 Fed. 504, 1 Am. Bankr. Rep. 306; In re Hadley (D. C. 1875) 12 N. B. R. 366, Fed. Cas. No. 5,894; Creditors v. Cozzens (D. C. 1869) 3 N. B. R. 281, Fed. Cas. No. 3,378; In re

creditors no evidence of the deferred payments, and required them to be governed by the vote of the majority of the creditors in enforcing their security. In re Kinnane Co. (D. C. 1915) 221 Fed. 762.

5. Acceptance by creditors.-All of the creditors must have notice of the proposed composition, whether or not they have proved their claims at the time of the offer, and the proposition must be offered and explained to all, and they must have a reasonable opportunity to consider it. In re Rider (D. C. 1899) 96 Fed. 808, 3 Am. Bankr. Rep. 178. These conditions being fulfilled, the decision of the majority will be binding upon all, where their judgment is exercised in good faith, and there is no evidence of fraud, accident or mistake. In re Weber Furniture Co. (C. C. 1876) 13 N. B. R. 559, Fed. Cas. No. 17,331.

In re

Creditors who have signed an acceptance of the composition will not be permitted afterwards to defeat it by withdrawing their signatures, where it is not alleged that they were procured by fraud or misrepresentations. Levy (D. C. 1901) 110 Fed. 744, 6 Am. Bankr. Rep. 299. But the fact that a former offer of composition, confirmation of which was refused because of irregularity in proceedings, was accepted by a creditor, does not preclude him from objecting to a subsequent offer in substantially the same terms. In re Kinnane Co. (D. C. 1915) 221 Fed. 762.

Mere delay, without laches, in obtaining the requisite number of signatures, will not be sufficient ground for refusing to confirm the composition. In re Cavan (D. C. 1879) 19 N. B. R. 303, Fed. Cas. No. 2,528.

Under this section, a proposed composition between a bankrupt and his creditors must be accepted in writing by a majority of the creditors, both in number and amount, before the court can order confirmation. And where a proposed composition between a bankrupt and his creditors has not been assented to by a majority, both in number and amount, of the bankrupt's creditors, the court cannot compel those who have not consented to accept the proposition. In re Goldstein (D. C. 1914) 213 Fed. 115.

Those creditors signing the acceptance must constitute a majority in number and amount of the claims at the time of the hearing on the application to confirm the composition; it is not enough that they constituted a majority at the time the composition was offered or accepted. In re Rider (D. C. 1899) 96 Fed. 808, 3 Am. Bankr. Rep. 178.

An assignee holding a large number of claims should be counted as only one creditor in making up this majority, and he is not entitled to as many votes as the creditors whom he represents, nor

are his assignors to be counted in determining the number necessary to make a majority. In re Messengill (D. C. 1902) 113 Fed. 366, 7 Am. Bankr. Rep. 669.

A partnership being a creditor, any one of the partners may bind the firm by accepting the terms of composition. Bruen v. Marquand (1819) 17 Johns. (N. Y.) 58. But in the case of the bankruptcy of a firm and its members, a partner who desires to make a composition with his individual creditors must obtain the acceptance of a majority of those creditors; it is not enough that he obtains the acceptance of a majority of the firm creditors, even though the consenting creditors may be more than a majority of all the creditors, both firm and individual. In re Ullman (D. C. 1910) 180 Fed. 944, 24 Am. Bankr. Rep. 755; In re Spades (D. C. 1875) Fed. Cas. No. 13,196.

6. Creditors entitled to vote.Only those creditors are entitled to vote on a composition agreement, or be counted in ascertaining the necessary majority, who have claims technically provable in bankruptcy. Ex parte Trafton (D. C. 1876) Fed. Cas. No. 14,133. This does not include the holder of a merely uncertain or contingent claim. In re Kahn (D. C. 1902) 121 Fed. 412, 9 Am. Bankr. Rep. 107. Nor the accommodation maker of a note for the bankrupt's benefit. Liebke v. Thomas (1886) 116 U. S. 605, 6 Sup. Ct. 496, 29 L. Ed. 744. Nor one whose claim is for damages for a tort, not assessed or liquidated in any way. In re Bailey (C. C. 1868) Fed. Cas. No. 729. But for this purpose the court may allow the ascertainment of an unliquidated claim by permitting the prosecution of a pending suit in a state court, or by ordering an inquiry before itself. Ex parte Trafton (D. C. 1876) 14 N. B. R. 507, Fed. Cas. No. 14.133. But where, in composition proceedings, the amount of the claim of one of the creditors is disputed by the debtor, and an estimate is made to be used merely as showing on what sum the creditor is entitled to vote, such estimate does not estop the debtor from questioning the amount of the claim on which the percentage of the composition shall be calculated in paying the composition. In re Holmes (C. C. 1878) 18 N. B. R. 230, Fed. Cas. No. 6,632a.

To give a valid consent to the acceptance of a composition, it is necessary that the creditor should have proved his claim and secured its allowance. In re Ennis (D. C. 1910) 183 Fed. 859, 25 Am. Bankr. Rep. 383; American Woolen Co. v. Cohen (1911) 142 App. Div. 880, 127 N. Y. Supp. 787; In re Keller (D. C. 1878) 18 N. B. R. 331, Fed. Cas. No. 7,654; In re Bryce (D. C. 1879) 19 N. B. R. 287, Fed. Cas. No. 2,069.