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conform as nearly as may be to the method provided by the state law for that purpose. In re McCutchen (D. C. 1900) 100 Fed. 779, 4 Am. Bankr. Rep. 81; In re Woodard (D. C. 1899) 95 Fed. 955, 2 Am. Bankr. Rep. 692. But compare In re Lynch (D. C. 1900) 101 Fed. 579, 4 Am. Bankr. Rep. 262. Where the state statute provides that the homestead shall be appraised by three persons, chosen respectively by the debtor, the creditor, and the officer holding the writ, a trustee in bankruptcy, when a claim of homestead is made by the bankrupt, should cause the property to be appraised by three persons, one named by himself, one by the bankrupt, and one by the creditors, and an appraisement made by three persons all chosen by the trustee, the bankrupt not being represented in their selection, will be set aside on objections by the latter, and a new appraisement ordered. In re McCutchen (D. C. 1900) 100 Fed. 779, 4 Am. Bankr. Rep. 81. But it has been ruled that there is no provision of the bankruptcy law authorizing the valuation by appraisers of the property claimed by the bankrupt as exempt, and that, where the appraisers value the entire estate of the bankrupt, as provided by law, their inventory is not binding on the trustee as respects the exempt property nor can he adopt it as his own. In re Grimes (D. C. 1899) 96 Fed. 529, 2 Am. Bankr. Rep. 730. And see In re Andrews & Simonds (D. C. 1911) 193 Fed. 776, 27 Am. Bankr. Rep. 116; Bank of Nez Perce v. Pindel (1912) 193 Fed. 917, 113 C. C. A. 545, 28 Am. Bankr. Rep. 69, holding that the time and manner of setting apart the bankrupt's exemptions must be determined by and in accordance with the bankruptcy act.
Where the state law exempts to a debtor personal property to a certain value, "to be selected by him," the debtor, on being adjudged bankrupt, has the right to select specific personal property, to that value, from the estate in the hands of his trustee, even though the property is not divisible without loss nor salable except as a whole. In re Grimes (D. C. 1899) 96 Fed. 529, 2 Am. Bankr. Rep. 730. On the other hand, where the state law provides that the exempt property shall be selected by the debtor, it is not permissible to allow the bankrupt to select a trifling amount of personal property and re. ceive the entire difference in cash from the trustee. In re Woodard (D. C. 1899) 95 Fed. 955, 2 Am. Bankr. Rep. 692. But when property claimed by the bankrupt as exempt has been sold by the trustee, the exemption should be set apart out of the proceeds of the sale. In re Park (D. C. 1900) 102 Fed. 602, 4 Am. Bankr. Rep. 432.
A mistake made by the trustee in valuing or setting off the property may be corrected by amendment, or by a revaluation of the property, where that
is the proper course. Brady v. Brady (1883) 71 Ga. 71. Where a trustee in bankruptcy, in setting off to the bankrupt the property claimed as his homestead, has adopted the value placed upon it by appraisers fifteen years before, when it was allotted to the bankrupt as a homestead under process of a state court, but it appears that the property has since increased in value beyond the amount allowed as exempt by the laws of the state, the court of bankruptcy will direct the trustee to re-value the property and set apart to the bankrupt so much thereof as shall not exceed in value the amount so allowed. In re McBryde (D. C. 1899) 99 Fed. 686, 3 Am. Bankr. Rep. 729.
When the trustee has set apart the property to be allowed as exempt and made report of his doings, and his action is either approved by the court or passes without exceptions being taken, it is then his further duty to deliver the possession to the bankrupt. In re Soper (D. C. 1909) 173 Fed. 116, 22 Am. Bankr. Rep. 868. But he is not authorized to dispense with the requirements of the statute and simply pay the bankrupt a sum of money equivalent to the value of the exemptions, where no proper steps have been taken to select and set apart the exempt property, and especially where it does not appear that the money was placed in a designated depository and drawn out according to the rules in bankruptcy. In re Hoyt (D. C. 1903) 119 Fed. 987, 9 Am. Bankr. Rep. 574.
The bankrupt is entitled to receive the full amount of his exemption, and it cannot be diminished by deducting from it any costs and expenses made in the proceedings, even the necessary cost of selling perishable property. In re Le Vay (D. C. 1903) 125 Fed. 990, 11 Am. Bankr. Rep. 114; In re Hopkins (D. C. 1900) 103 Fed. 781, 4 Am. Bankr. Rep. 619. But storage charges on the specific property, pending its delivery to the bankrupt, may be deducted. In re Grimes (D. C. 1899) 96 Fed. 529, 2 Am. Bankr. Rep. 730.
24. Report, exceptions, and confirmation.-General Order in Bankruptcy No. 17 (post, $ 9614), providing that “the trustee shall make report to the court within twenty days after receive ing the notice of his appointment, of the articles set off to the bankrupt by him, with the estimated value of each article," requires a specification of items and a separate appraisal of the property set apart to the bankrupt. And under the laws of Pennsylvania, a trustee in bankruptcy, in setting aside as exempt household goods and book accounts, must itemize them and value each item separately. In re Manning (D. C. 1902) 112 Fed. 948, 7 Am. Bankr. Rep. 571. The time thus limited may be extended by the court for good cause shown, and leave given to the trustee to make a later or further
report. In re Shields (D. C. 1868) 1 all the creditors, may object to the N. B. R. 603, Fed. Cas. No. 12,785. bankrupt's claim of exemptions, or take
The mere setting apart by the trustee exceptions to the decision of the referee in bankruptcy of exempt property to thereon. In re Rice (D. C. 1908) 164 the bankrupt, as required by section 47, Fed. 589, 21 Am. Bankr. Rep. 202. par. 11 (post, $ 9631), is not an ad- Where a bankrupt, before confirmajudication. Seedig v. First Nat. Bank tion of a homestead exemption allowof Clifton (Tex. Civ. App. 1914) 168 ance, required by general order No. 17 S. W. 445. The decision of the court (post, & 9614), assigned the same to a of bankruptcy on the allowance of ex- creditor, and after objections filed by emptions to the bankrupt and excep
other creditors moved to amend bis tions thereto will be accepted as conclu
schedules so as to withdraw his applisive by the state courts. Morton v.
cation for a homestead exemption, the Jones (1910) 136 Ky. 797, 125 S. W. application was properly allowed. In 247; McKinley v. Morgan (1905) 36
re Herrin & West (D. C. 1914) 215 Wash. 561, 79 Pac. 45. The action of
Fed. 250. Creditors of bankrupt husthe court of bankruptcy on the trus
band and wife, who failed to object to tee's report cannot be impeached col
improper allowance in lieu of homelaterally, and if it wrongfully allows and
stead to the husband, held not precludsets apart to the bankrupt property
ed from objecting to a 'similar allowwhich he claims as exempt, the remedy ance to the wife. In re Crum (D. C. is not in the state courts. Brengle v.
1913) 221 Fed. 729. Richardson's Adm'r (1884) 78 Va. 406;
Though exceptions should be taken Brady v. Brady (1883) 71 Ga. 71.
within the limited time of 20 days, it A judgment of the bankruptcy court,
is in the discretion of the court to consetting apart mortgaged property as a
sider objections presented by creditors homestead, held conclusive on the par
after the expiration of that time, in ties to an action to foreclose the mort
cases of fraud or mistake or for other gage, where the debt secured was duly
good cause. In re Perdue (D. C. 1868) scheduled, and plaintiff appeared and
2 N. B. R. 183, Fed. Cas. No. 10,975. objected to its being set apart. Mc
But compare In re Cotton & Preston Curry V. Sledge (Okl. 1915) 149 P.
(D. C. 1910) 183 Fed. 190, 25 Am. 1124. A creditor not a party to the
Bankr. Rep. 532. And see In re Gaindebtor's bankruptcy proceedings was
ey (D. C. 1869) 2 N. B. R. 525, Fed. not bound by the decree of the federal
Cas. No. 5,181. Where the trustee has court setting aside to the bankrupt and
not filed his report within the time limhis wife certain lands as a homestead.
ited for that purpose, creditors are not Bogart v. Cowboy State Bank & Trust
bound to except to the same within Co. (Tex. Civ. App. 1916) 182 S. W.
twenty days after its filing. In re Pea678.
body (D. C. 1877) 16 N. B. R. 243,
Fed. Cas. No. 10,866. A creditor seekThe action of the trustee in bank
ing to present objections after the time ruptcy, in allotting to the bankrupt the
limited must excuse his delay and clear property exempt under the state law,
himself of the imputation of laches. In may be excepted to and the propriety
re Reese (D. C. 1902) 115 Fed. 993, of his action, either as to whether the
8 Am. Bankr. Rep. 411. exemption was lawful or whether too
Where an insolvent is adjudged a much or too little was set apart, may
bankrupt on his voluntary petition, and be finally determined by the bankruptcy
a trustee sets aside property as excourts. In re Cheatham (D. C. 1914)
empt and files his report, to which no 210 Fed. 370. If the bankrupt is dis
exception is taken, the bankrupt may satisfied with the allowance made by the
assign the property, in good faith, for trustee, he may except to the latter's
pre-existing debts, though made within decision and have the question heard by the 20 days allowed, under general orthe referee, and if necessary certified
der in bankruptcy No. 17 (post, $ to the court. In re Sloan (D. C. 1905)
9614), in which to file exceptions. E. 135 Fed. 87 14 Am. Bankr. Rep. 435;
B. Taylor Co. v. Williams (1913) 77 Richardson v. Trubey (1911) 250 Ill. . S. E. 386, 139 Ga. 581. 577, 95 N. E. 971; In re Pryor (D. C.
An exception to the allowance of ex1868) Fed. Cas. No. 11,457; In re emptions to a bankrupt is not strictThiell (D. C. 1868) Fed. Cas. No. 13,- ly speaking a pleading, and the want 882; In re Smith (D. C. 1899) 93 Fed. of a verification is not a jurisdictional 791, 2 Am. Bankr. Rep. 190. Any cred- defect. In re Campbell (D. C. 1903) itor may take exceptions to the de- 124 Fed. 417, 10 Am. Bankr. Rep. 723. termination of the trustee within twen- Where the bankrupt makes out a ty days after the filing of the report. prima facie case in support of his claim McGahan v. Anderson (1902) 113 Fed. of exemptions, the burden is on the ob115, 51 C. C. A. 92, 7 Am. Bankr. Rep. jecting creditors to show that he is not 641; E. B. Taylor Co. v. Williams entitled to what he demands. In re (Ga. 1913) 77 S. E. 386. To be entitled Rippa (D. C. 1909) 180 Fed. 603; In to take exceptions, it is not necessary re Grimes (D. C. 1899) 94 Fed. 800, that the creditor should be armed with 2 Am. Bankr. Rep. 160. CONTRA, any process. In re Campbell (D. C. tbat the burden is on the bankrupt to 1903) 124 Fed. 417, 10 Am. Bankr. prove his right to the exemptions Rep. 723. The trustee, on behalf of claimed, by conclusive evidence, see In
re Rainwater (D. C. 1911) 191 Fed. 738, 25 Am. Bankr. Rep. 419; In re Campbell (D. C. 1903) 124 Fed. 417, 10 Am. Bankr. Rep. 723.
On hearing exceptions to the allowance of exemptions to a bankrupt, the court will not enter upon an inquiry as to whether he has made a fraudulent conveyance such as would bar his right to a discharge. In re W. C. Allen & Co. (D. C. 1904) 134 Fed. 620, 13 Am. Bankr. Rep. 518. Rulings of the referee on questions of fact in allowing exemptions will not be reversed unless clearly erroneous. In re Rutland Grocery Co. (D. 0. 1911) 189 Fed. 765, 26 Am. Bankr. Rep. 942.
25. Sale of property and allowance of exemptions out of proceeds.-Where the law of the state exempts to the debtor personal property to a certain value, "to be selected by him," the debtor, on being adjudged bankrupt has the right to select specific personal property to that value from the estate in the hands of his trustee, and although his personal estate consists of a stock of goods not divisible without loss, nor salable except as a whole, yet the court cannot order the trustee to sell the whole stock and pay the bankrupt the value of his exemptions out of the proceeds. In re Grimes (D. C. 1899) 96 Fed. 529, 2 Am. Bankr. Rep. 730; In re Shrimer (D. C. 1916) 228 Fed. 794; In re Crum (D. C. 1913) 221 Fed. 729. Where the exemption law of the state does not exempt money, or any sum in money, but only property to a certain value, the trustee has no right, where the bankrupt's property has been seized and sold under execution and distress for rent, leaving him no property to claim as exempt, to allow money, the proceeds of debts due to the bankrupt, for the purpose of making good the property which would have been exempted if it had not been sold. In re Lawson (D. C. 1868) 2 N. B. R. 54, Fed. Cas. No. 8,149.
Though the statute requires a debtor to select the specific personal property which he claims as exempt, a court of bankruptcy is not bound to require such selection, and where it is to the best interest of all concerned, or where, by reason of its being mortgaged, specific property cannot be selected and set apart as exempt, it may properly permit such property to be sold as an entirety by the trustee, and award the bankrupt his exemption from the proceeds. In re Kane (1904) 127 Fed. 552, 62 C. C. A. 616, 11 Am. Bankr. Rep. 533.
If the trustee takes the goods selected by the bankrupt and mixes them with others and sells the whole indiscriminately, the bankrupt will not be entitled to claim out of the proceeds the maximum value allowed by the exemption law, but only the price brought by the specific goods which he had selected. In re Arnold (D. C. 1909) 169 Fed.
1000, 22 Am. Bankr. Rep. 392; In re Friend (C. C. 1877) Fed. Cas. No. 5,120. If the bankrupt, after making the selection, allows the selected articles to be sold with the rest, by an agreement to that effect with his trustee, that course being for the benefit of the estate, in that it makes the stock as a whole more salable, the trustee should allow to the bankrupt, as his exemption, out of the proceeds of the sale, a sum of money equal to the value of the goods originally selected. In re Richard (D. C. 1899) 94 Fed. 633, 2 Am. Bankr. Rep. 506; In re Hutchinson (D. C. 1912) 197 Fed. 1021, 28 Am. Bankr. Rep. 405; In re Hargraves (D. C. 1907) 160 Fed. 758, 20 Am. Bankr. Rep. 186; In re Renda (D. C. 1906) 149 Fed. 614, 17 Am. Bankr. Rep. 521. Where personal property which the bankrupt was entitled to claim as exempt was sold, on his request that cash should be allowed him instead of the property, he should be charged with his percentage of the difference between the proceeds of the property and its appraised value as against the amount of his exemptions. In re Ansley Bros. (D. C. 1907) 153 Fed. 983, 18 Am. Bankr. Rep. 457. But under the laws of Pennsylvania, the trustee cannot set apart as exempt cash out of the proceeds of a future sale of the bankrupt's personal property. In re Manning (D. C. 1902) 112 Fed. 948, 7 Am. Bankr. Rep. 571.
If, before the appointment of a trustee, the property has come into the hands of a receiver in bankruptcy, who proposes to sell the same, the proper course is for the court to direct the receiver to set aside the specific property which the bankrupt claims as exempt, to await the determination of his claim. In re N. Shaffer & Son (D. C. 1904) 128 Fed. 986, 11 Am. Bankr. Rep. 717; In re Joyce (D, C. 1904) 128 Fed. 985, 11 Am. Bankr. Rep. 716. But if the receiver has sold the property (as being perishable or for other good reasons) before the appointment of a trustee, and the bankrupt bas duly made his claim for his exemptions, it will be his right to receive the proper amount out of the proceeds of the sale. In re Zack (D. C. 1912) 196 Fed. 909, 28 Am. Bankr. Rep. 138; In re Le Vay (D. C. 1903) 125 Fed. 990, 11 Am. Bankr. Rep. 114; In re Haskin (D. C. 1901) 109 Fed. 789, 6 Am. Bankr. Rep. 485; In re Bolinger (D. C. 1901) 108 Fed. 374, 6 Am. Bankr. Rep. 171; In re Sloan (D. C. 1905) 135 Fed. 873, 14 Am. Bankr. Rep. 435.
Where the state law does not give the debtor the right to select specific property as exempt, but fixes the value in money of the exemption to be allowed, if the property in the hands of the trustee is not capable of division into parts without injury to the whole, or if it is of such a nature that cannot advantageously be sold except as whole, the court may order a sale of
the whole and an allowance to the bankrupt of the value of his statutory exemption to be paid to him out of the proceeds. In re Yeager (D. C. 1910) 182 Fed. 951, 25 Am. Bankr. Rep. 51; In re Diller (D. C. 1900) 100 Fed. 931, 4 Am. Bankr. Rep. 45; In re Beede (D. C. 1879) 19 N. B. R. 68, Fed. Cas. No. 1,226; In re Poleman (D. C. 1874) Fed. Cas. No. 11,247.
Where a bankrupt's exemption allowed by the state law for the benefit of his family will be defeated unless its allowance be made in cash out of the proceeds of a sale, it will, if practicable, be ordered paid out of such proceeds. In re Luby (D. C. 1907) 155 Fed. 659, 18 Am. Bankr. Rep. 801.
Where a bankrupt claims the property on which he resides as a homestead, but it is alleged that it exceeds in value the limit fixed by the homestead law of the state, and the evidence on the subject of value is conflicting, or responsible parties offer to bid a larger sum for the property, the proper course is to order the property sold by the trustee at public sale after due advertisement. At such sale, the bankrupt will be considered as bidding the amount fixed by the statute as the maximum value of a homestead exemption, and it will be knocked down to him at that price if no better offer is made. But if the property brings more than that amount, the bankrupt will be allotted a sum of money, out of the proceeds, equal to the value of a homestead exemption under the statute, and this will be considered as his exemption. In re Lynch (D. C. 1900) 101 Fed. 579, 4 Am. Bankr. Rep. 262; In re Watson (D. C. 1869) 2 N. B. R. 570, Fed. Cas. No. 17,271; Bank of Nez Perce v. Pindel (C. C. A. 1912) 193 Fed. 917, 28 Am. Bankr. Rep. 69; In re Paramore & Ricks (D. C. 1907) 156 Fed. 208, 19 Am. Bankr. Rep. 126. And see Dunlap Hardware Co. v. Huddleston (C. C. A. 1909) 167 Fed. 433, 21 Am. Bankr. Rep. 731; Smith v. Thompson (1914) 213 Fed. 335, 129 C. C. A. 637; In re Crum (D. C. 1913) 221 Fed. 729.
Where a mortgage, recognized as valid in the bankruptcy proceedings, covers an undivided fractional part of the real estate out of which the bankrupt claims his homestead exemption, the court will not order the trustee to partition the land as between the bankrupt and the mortgagee, and set apart to the former a designated portion to be held by him as his homestead in severalty and free from the mortgage, as this would change, and might impair, the security of the mortgagee. But the bankrupt may apply for an order to sell portions of the land not actually occupied as a homestead, and apply the proceeds in payment of the mortgage. In re Thomas (D. C. 1899) 96 Fed. 828, 3 Am. Bankr. Rep. 99. Upon the sale of a homestead set apart to a bankrupt to satisfy a purchase-money
lien, any surplus should be paid to the bankrupt. Sheridan State Bank Rowell (D. C. 1914) 212 Fed. 529.
26. Exemptions in partnership cases. -A partnership cannot be a "head of a family" or a "housekeeper," within the meaning of these and similar terms used in the state exemption laws, and therefore cannot, as such, claim exemptions out of the firm assets. In re Lentz (D. C. 1899) 97 Fed. 486; In re Smith (C. C. & D. C. 1874) Fed. Cas. No. 12,979.
Where the individual members of a bankrupt partnership claim the right to receive, each for himself, the statutory exemption out of the assets of the firm, there being no individual estates sufficient to yield the amount allowed as exempt, the court of bankruptcy will follow the rule established by the decisions of the highest court of the state, if any have been rendered. In re Beauchamp (D. C. 1900) 101 Fed. 106, 4 Am. Bankr. Rep. 151; In re Camp (D. C. 1899) 91 Fed. 745, 1 Am. Bankr. Rep. 165; In re Stevenson (D. C. 1899) 93 Fed. 789, 2 Am. Bankr. Rep. 230. If no rule has been thus established in the particular state, the individual partners are not entitled to exemptions out of the partnership property, unless there should be a sur. plus after paying all firm debts. Jennings v. Stannus (1911) 191 Fed. 347, 112 C. C. A. 91, 27 Am. Bankr. Rep. 384; In re Scheier (D. C. 1911) 188 Fed. 744, 26 Am. Bankr. Rep. 739; In re Beauchamp (D. C. 1900) 101 Fed. 106, 4 Am. Bankr. Rep. 151.
In case of the bankruptcy of a partnership, where the individual partners have no separate estates, but there are assets of the firm in bankruptcy, each partner is held entitled to receive, out of the partnership assets, the exemption allowed by law, under the statutes of the following states, as construed and applied by the courts of bankrupt. cy: North Carolina. In re Gartner Hancock Lumber Co. (C. C. 1909) 173 Fed. 153, 22 Am. Bankr. Rep. 898; In re Seabolt (D. C. 1902) 113 Fed. 766, 8 Am. Bankr. Rep. 57; In re Stevenson (D. C. 1899) 93 Fed. 789, 2 Am. Bankr. Rep. 230; In re Grimes (D. C. 1899) 94 Fed. 800, 2 Am. Bankr. Rep. 160; In re Duguid (D. C. 1900) 100 Fer. 274, 3 Am. Bankr. Rep. 794; In re Wilson (D. C. 1900) 101 Fed. 571, 4 Am. Bankr. Rep. 260. Georgia. In re Rutland Grocery Co. (D. C. 1911) 189 Fed. 765, 26 Am. Bankr. Rep. 942; In re Camp (D. C. 1899) 91 Fed. 745, 1 Am. Bankr. Rep. 165. Wisconsin. In re Zimmerman (D. C. 1913) 202 Fed. 812; In re Friedrich (1900) 100 Fed. 284, 40 C. C. A. 378, 3 Am. Bankr. Rep. 801; In re Friederick (D. C. 1899) 95 Fed. 282; Ex parte Robinson (C. C. 1876) Fed. Cas. No. 11,933. Missouri. In re Young (D. C. 1869) 3 N. B. R. 440, Fed. Cas. No.
18,148; In re Richardson (D. C. 1874) ty, and if any object, it cannot be done. 11 N, B, R. 114, Fed. Cas. No. 11,776. In re J. M. Monroe & Co. (D. C. 1907) New York. Stewart v. Brown (1867) 156 Fed. 216, 19 Am. Bankr. Rep. 255. 37 N. Y. 350, 93 Am. Dec. 578. Michi- A partner cannot be allowed an exgan. In re Andrews & Simonds (D. O. emption out of the firm's property un1911) 193 Fed. 776, 27 Am. Bankr. less it appears that he has no individRep. 116; In re Parks (D. 0. 1874) ual estate out of which to claim and re9 N. B. R. 270, Fed. Cas. No. 10,765. ceive the exemption. In re Steed (D.
In the following states, the individual C. 1901) 107 Fed. 682, 6 Am. Bankr. members of a bankrupt partnership are Rep. 73. not entitled to claim any separate ex- To be entitled to claim his individual emption out of the partnership assets: exemption out of assets of a firm in Ohio. In re Tonne (D. C. 1875) 13 N. bankruptcy, the claimant must estabB. R. 170, Fed. Cas. No. 14,095; In lish his status as a member of the firm. re Rosenbaum, 1 Nat. Bankr. News, In re E. M. Fowler & Co. (D. C. 1906) 541. South Dakota. In re Abrams 145 Fed. 270, 16 Am. Bankr. Rep. 580; (D. C. 1912) 193 Fed. 271; In re Novak In re Wilson (D. C. 1900) 101 Fed. (D. C. 1907) 150 Fed. 602, 18 Am. 571, 4 Am. Bankr. Rep. 260; In re W. Bankr. Rep. 236; In re Lentz (D. C. J. Floyd & Co. (D. C. 1907) 154 Fed. 1899) 97 Fed. 486; In re I. S. Vicker- 757, 18 Am. Bankr, Rep. 827. An alman & Co. (D. C. 1912) 199 Fed. 589, leged partner who escapes adjudication 29 Am. Bankr. Rep. 298. Compare In on the ground of his being an infant re McKercher, 8 N. B. R. 409. Penn- cannot claim exemptions as a partner. sylvania. In re Prince & Walter (D. In re Ellenbecker (D. C. 1913) 205 Fed. C. 1904) 131 Fed. 546, 12 Am. Bankr. 396, 30 Am. Bankr. Rep. 537. Rep. 675; In re Hafer (D. C. 1868) 1 One is not deprived of his right to exN. B. R. 547, Fed. Cas. No. 5,896. Ar- emptions by the mere fact that he has kansas. In re Head (D. C. 1902) 114 conducted his business under name Fed. 489, 7 Am. Bankr. Rep. 556; indicating that it was owned by a firm In re Meriwether (D. C. 1901) 107 or a corporation, if in fact he was the Fed. 102, 5 Am. Bankr. Rep. 435; sole owner of it. In re Carpenter In re Handlin (C. C. 1875) Fed. Cas. (1901) 109 Fed. 558, 48 C. C. A. 545, No. 6,018. Alabama. In re McCrary 6 Am. Bankr. Rep. 465. Bros. (D. C. 1909) 169 Fed. 485, 22 Where, by agreement between the Am. Bankr. Rep. 161. New Jersey. partners, the partnership property is In re Demarest (D. C. 1901) 110 Fed. turned over to one of the partners, to 638, 6 Am. Bankr. Rep. 232. Ver- become his individual property, he is mont. In re Mosier (D. C. 1901) 112 entitled to claim his exemption out of Fed. 138, 7 Am. Bankr. Rep. 268. such property in bankruptcy proceedWashington. Jennings Staunus ings subsequently brought against him. (1911) 191 Fed. 347, 112 C. C. A. 91, In re Kolber (D. C. 1912) 193 Fed. 27 Am. Bankr. Rep. 384. Mississippi. 281, 27 Am. Bankr. Rep. 414, citing In re H. W. Bundy & Co. (D. C. 1914) Sargent v. Blake (1908) 160 Fed. 57, 218 Fed. 711.
87 C. C. A. 213, 20 Am. Bankr. Rep. A partner having an equal interest 115, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1040. And with his copartner in the firm proper- see In re Bjornstad (D. C. 1878) 18 ty is entitled to claim his statutory ex- N. B. R. 382, Fed. Cas. No. 1,453. emption therefrom, in case of the bank- Where members of partnership the ruptcy of the firm, although the amount day preceding the adjudication in bankcontributed by him to the capital of the ruptcy took $200 each from the partfirm was less than the amount of such nership assets, held, that the money exemption. In re Grimes (D. C. 1899) became their separate property and 94 Fed. 800, 2 Am. Bankr. Rep. 160. subject to claims of exemption, under But compare In re Rutland Grocery Kirby's Dig. Ark. $ 3903. Crawford v. Co. (D. C. 1911) 189 Fed. 765, 26 Am. Sternberg (1915) 220 Fed. 73, 135 C. Bankr. Rep. 942.
C. A. 641.
Where a firm consists of several part- the theory that he is now the sole
Duties of Bankrupts.—a The bankrupt shall (1) attend the first meeting of his creditors, if directed by the court or a judge thereof to do so, and the hearing upon his application for a discharge, if