conform as nearly as may be to the method provided by the state law for that purpose. In re McCutchen (D. C. 1900) 100 Fed. 779, 4 Am. Bankr. Rep. 81; In re Woodard (D. C. 1899) 95 Fed. 955, 2 Am. Bankr. Rep. 692. But compare In re Lynch (D. C. 1900) 101 Fed. 579, 4 Am. Bankr. Rep. 262. Where the state statute provides that the homestead shall be appraised by three persons, chosen respectively by the debtor, the creditor, and the officer holding the writ, a trustee in bankruptcy, when a claim of homestead is made by the bankrupt, should cause the property to be appraised by three persons, one named by himself, one by the bankrupt, and one by the creditors, and an appraisement made by three persons all chosen by the trustee, the bankrupt not being represented in their selection, will be set aside on objections by the latter, and a new appraisement ordered. In re McCutchen (D. C. 1900) 100 Fed. 779, 4 Am. Bankr. Rep. 81. But it has been ruled that there is no provision of the bankruptcy law authorizing the valuation by appraisers of the property claimed by the bankrupt as exempt, and that, where the appraisers value the entire estate of the bankrupt, as provided by law, their inventory is not binding on the trustee as respects the exempt property nor can he adopt it as his own. In re Grimes (D. C. 1899) 96 Fed. 529, 2 Am. Bankr. Rep. 730. And see In re Andrews & Simonds (D. C. 1911) 193 Fed. 776, 27 Am. Bankr. Rep. 116; Bank of Nez Perce v. Pindel (1912) 193 Fed. 917, 113 C. C. A. 545, 28 Am. Bankr. Rep. 69, holding that the time and manner of setting apart the bankrupt's exemptions must be determined by and in accordance with the bankruptcy act.

Where the state law exempts to a debtor personal property to a certain value, "to be selected by him," the debtor, on being adjudged bankrupt, has the right to select specific personal property, to that value, from the estate in the hands of his trustee, even though the property is not divisible without loss nor salable except as a whole. In re Grimes (D. C. 1899) 96 Fed. 529, 2 Am. Bankr. Rep. 730. On the other hand, where the state law provides that the exempt property shall be selected by the debtor, it is not permissible to allow the bankrupt to select a trifling amount of personal property and re. ceive the entire difference in cash from the trustee. In re Woodard (D. C. 1899) 95 Fed. 955, 2 Am. Bankr. Rep. 692. But when property claimed by the bankrupt as exempt has been sold by the trustee, the exemption should be set apart out of the proceeds of the sale. In re Park (D. C. 1900) 102 Fed. 602, 4 Am. Bankr. Rep. 432.

A mistake made by the trustee in valuing or setting off the property may be corrected by amendment, or by a revaluation of the property, where that

is the proper course. Brady v. Brady (1883) 71 Ga. 71. Where a trustee in bankruptcy, in setting off to the bankrupt the property claimed as his homestead, has adopted the value placed upon it by appraisers fifteen years before, when it was allotted to the bankrupt as a homestead under process of a state court, but it appears that the property has since increased in value beyond the amount allowed as exempt by the laws of the state, the court of bankruptcy will direct the trustee to re-value the property and set apart to the bankrupt so much thereof as shall not exceed in value the amount so allowed. In re McBryde (D. C. 1899) 99 Fed. 686, 3 Am. Bankr. Rep. 729.

When the trustee has set apart the property to be allowed as exempt and made report of his doings, and his action is either approved by the court or passes without exceptions being taken, it is then his further duty to deliver the possession to the bankrupt. In re Soper (D. C. 1909) 173 Fed. 116, 22 Am. Bankr. Rep. 868. But he is not authorized to dispense with the requirements of the statute and simply pay the bankrupt a sum of money equivalent to the value of the exemptions, where no proper steps have been taken to select and set apart the exempt property, and especially where it does not appear that the money was placed in a designated depository and drawn out according to the rules in bankruptcy. In re Hoyt (D. C. 1903) 119 Fed. 987, 9 Am. Bankr. Rep. 574.

The bankrupt is entitled to receive the full amount of his exemption, and it cannot be diminished by deducting from it any costs and expenses made in the proceedings, even the necessary cost of selling perishable property. In re Le Vay (D. C. 1903) 125 Fed. 990, 11 Am. Bankr. Rep. 114; In re Hopkins (D. C. 1900) 103 Fed. 781, 4 Am. Bankr. Rep. 619. But storage charges on the specific property, pending its delivery to the bankrupt, may be deducted. In re Grimes (D. C. 1899) 96 Fed. 529, 2 Am. Bankr. Rep. 730.

24.

Report, exceptions, and confirmation.-General Order in Bankruptcy No. 17 (post, § 9614), providing that "the trustee shall make report to the court within twenty days after receiving the notice of his appointment, of the articles set off to the bankrupt by him, with the estimated value of each article," requires a specification of items and a separate appraisal of the property set apart to the bankrupt. And under the laws of Pennsylvania, a trustee in bankruptcy, in setting aside as exempt household goods and book accounts, must itemize them and value each item separately. In re Manning (D. C. 1902) 112 Fed. 948, 7 Am. Bankr. Rep. 571. The time thus limited may be extended by the court for good cause shown, and leave given to the trustee to make a later or further

report. In re Shields (D. C. 1868) 1 N. B. R. 603, Fed. Cas. No. 12,785.

The mere setting apart by the trustee in bankruptcy of exempt property to the bankrupt, as required by section 47, par. 11 (post, § 9631), is not an adjudication. Seedig v. First Nat. Bank of Clifton (Tex. Civ. App. 1914) 168 S. W. 445. The decision of the court of bankruptcy on the allowance of exemptions to the bankrupt and exceptions thereto will be accepted as conclusive by the state courts. Morton v. Jones (1910) 136 Ky. 797, 125 S. W. 247; McKinley v. Morgan (1905) 36 Wash. 561, 79 Pac. 45. The action of the court of bankruptcy on the trustee's report cannot be impeached collaterally, and if it wrongfully allows and sets apart to the bankrupt property which he claims as exempt, the remedy is not in the state courts. Brengle v. Richardson's Adm'r (1884) 78 Va. 406; Brady v. Brady (1883) 71 Ga. 71.

A judgment of the bankruptcy court, setting apart mortgaged property as a homestead, held conclusive on the parties to an action to foreclose the mortgage, where the debt secured was duly scheduled, and plaintiff appeared and objected to its being set apart. McCurry v. Sledge (Okl. 1915) 149 P. 1124. A creditor not a party to the debtor's bankruptcy proceedings was not bound by the decree of the federal court setting aside to the bankrupt and his wife certain lands as a homestead. Bogart v. Cowboy State Bank & Trust Co. (Tex. Civ. App. 1916) 182 S. W. 678.

The action of the trustee in bankruptcy, in allotting to the bankrupt the property exempt under the state law, may be excepted to and the propriety of his action, either as to whether the exemption was lawful or whether too much or too little was set apart, may be finally determined by the bankruptcy courts. In re Cheatham (D. C. 1914) 210 Fed. 370. If the bankrupt is dissatisfied with the allowance made by the trustee, he may except to the latter's decision and have the question heard by the referee, and if necessary certified to the court. In re Sloan (D. C. 1905) 135 Fed. 873, 14 Am. Bankr. Rep. 435; Richardson v. Trubey (1911) 250 Ill. 577, 95 N. E. 971; In re Pryor (D. C. 1868) Fed. Cas. No. 11,457; In re Thiell (D. C. 1868) Fed. Cas. No. 13,882; In re Smith (D. C. 1899) 93 Fed. 791, 2 Am. Bankr. Rep. 190. Any creditor may take exceptions to the determination of the trustee within twenty days after the filing of the report. McGahan v. Anderson (1902) 113 Fed. 115, 51 C. C. A. 92, 7 Am. Bankr. Rep. 641; E. B. Taylor Co. v. Williams (Ga. 1913) 77 S. E. 386. To be entitled to take exceptions, it is not necessary that the creditor should be armed with any process. In re Campbell (D. C. 1903) 124 Fed. 417, 10 Am. Bankr. Rep. 723. The trustee, on behalf of

all the creditors, may object to the bankrupt's claim of exemptions, or take exceptions to the decision of the referee thereon. In re Rice (D. C. 1908) 164 Fed. 589, 21 Am. Bankr. Rep. 202.

Where a bankrupt, before confirmation of a homestead exemption allowance, required by general order No. 17 (post, § 9614), assigned the same to a creditor, and after objections filed by other creditors moved to amend his schedules so as to withdraw his application for a homestead exemption, the application was properly allowed. In re Herrin & West (D. C. 1914) 215 Fed. 250. Creditors of bankrupt husband and wife, who failed to object to improper allowance in lieu of homestead to the husband, held not precluded from objecting to a similar allowance to the wife. In re Crum (D. C. 1913) 221 Fed. 729.

Though exceptions should be taken within the limited time of 20 days, it is in the discretion of the court to consider objections presented by creditors after the expiration of that time, in cases of fraud or mistake or for other good cause. In re Perdue (D. C. 1868) 2 N. B. R. 183, Fed. Cas. No. 10,975. But compare In re Cotton & Preston (D. C. 1910) 183 Fed. 190, 25 Am. Bankr. Rep. 532. And see In re Gainey (D. C. 1869) 2 N. B. R. 525, Fed. Cas. No. 5,181. Where the trustee has not filed his report within the time limited for that purpose, creditors are not bound to except to the same within twenty days after its filing. In re Peabody (D. C. 1877) 16 N. B. R. 243, Fed. Cas. No. 10,866. A creditor seeking to present objections after the time limited must excuse his delay and clear himself of the imputation of laches. In re Reese (D. C. 1902) 115 Fed. 993, 8 Am. Bankr. Rep. 411.

Where an insolvent is adjudged a bankrupt on his voluntary petition, and a trustee sets aside property as exempt and files his report, to which no exception is taken, the bankrupt may assign the property, in good faith, for pre-existing debts, though made within the 20 days allowed, under general order in bankruptcy No. 17 (post, § E. 9614), in which to file exceptions. B. Taylor Co. v. Williams (1913) 77 S. E. 386, 139 Ga. 581.

An exception to the allowance of exemptions to a bankrupt is not strictly speaking a pleading, and the want of a verification is not a jurisdictional defect. In re Campbell (D. C. 1903) 124 Fed. 417, 10 Am. Bankr. Rep. 723.

Where the bankrupt makes out a prima facie case in support of his claim of exemptions, the burden is on the objecting creditors to show that he is not entitled to what he demands. In re Rippa (D. C. 1909) 180 Fed. 603; In re Grimes (D. C. 1899) 94 Fed. 800, CONTRA, 2 Am. Bankr. Rep. 160. that the burden is on the bankrupt to prove his right to the exemptions claimed, by conclusive evidence, see In

re Rainwater (D. C. 1911) 191 Fed. 738, 25 Am. Bankr. Rep. 419; In re Campbell (D. C. 1903) 124 Fed. 417, 10 Am. Bankr. Rep. 723.

On hearing exceptions to the allowance of exemptions to a bankrupt, the court will not enter upon an inquiry as to whether he has made a fraudulent conveyance such as would bar his right to a discharge. In re W. C. Allen & Co. (D. C. 1904) 134 Fed. 620, 13 Am. Bankr. Rep. 518. Rulings of the referee on questions of fact in allowing exemptions will not be reversed unless clearly erroneous. In re Rutland Grocery Co. (D. C. 1911) 189 Fed. 765, 26 Am. Bankr. Rep. 942.

25. Sale of property and allowance of exemptions out of proceeds.-Where the law of the state exempts to the debtor personal property to a certain value, "to be selected by him," the debtor, on being adjudged bankrupt has the right to select specific personal property to that value from the estate in the hands of his trustee, and although his personal estate consists of a stock of goods not divisible without loss, nor salable except as a whole, yet the court cannot order the trustee to sell the whole stock and pay the bankrupt the value of his exemptions out of the proceeds. In re Grimes (D. C. 1899) 96 Fed. 529, 2 Am. Bankr. Rep. 730; In re Shrimer (D. C. 1916) 228 Fed. 794; In re Crum (D. C. 1913) 221 Fed. 729. Where the exemption law of the state does not exempt money, or any sum in money, but only property to a certain value, the trustee has no right, where the bankrupt's property has been seized and sold under execution and distress for rent, leaving him no property to claim as exempt, to allow money, the proceeds of debts due to the bankrupt, for the purpose of making good the property which would have been exempted if it had not been sold. In re Lawson (D. C. 1868) 2 N. B. R. 54, Fed. Cas. No. 8,149.

Though the statute requires a debtor to select the specific personal property which he claims as exempt, a court of bankruptcy is not bound to require such selection, and where it is to the best interest of all concerned, or where, by reason of its being mortgaged, specific property cannot be selected and set apart as exempt, it may properly permit such property to be sold as an entirety by the trustee, and award the bankrupt his exemption from the proceeds. In re Kane (1904) 127 Fed. 552, 62 C. C. A. 616, 11 Am. Bankr. Rep. 533.

If the trustee takes the goods selected by the bankrupt and mixes them with others and sells the whole indiscriminately, the bankrupt will not be entitled to claim out of the proceeds the maximum value allowed by the exemption law, but only the price brought by the specific goods which he had selected. In re Arnold (D. C. 1909) 169 Fed.

1000, 22 Am. Bankr. Rep. 392; In re Friend (C. C. 1877) Fed. Cas. No. 5,120. If the bankrupt, after making the selection, allows the selected articles to be sold with the rest, by an agreement to that effect with his trustee, that course being for the benefit of the estate, in that it makes the stock as a whole more salable, the trustee should allow to the bankrupt, as his exemption, out of the proceeds of the sale, a sum of money equal to the value of the goods originally selected. In re Richard (D. C. 1899) 94 Fed. 633, 2 Am. Bankr. Rep. 506; In re Hutchinson (D. C. 1912) 197 Fed. 1021, 28 Am. Bankr. Rep. 405; In re Hargraves (D. C. 1907) 160 Fed. 758, 20 Am. Bankr. Rep. 186; In re Renda (D. C. 1906) 149 Fed. 614, 17 Am. Bankr. Rep. 521. Where personal property which the bankrupt was entitled to claim as exempt was sold, on his request that cash should be allowed him instead of the property, he should be charged with his percentage of the difference between the proceeds of the property and its appraised value as against the amount of his exemptions. In re Ansley Bros. (D. C. 1907) 153 Fed. 983, 18 Am. Bankr. Rep. 457. But under the laws of Pennsylvania, the trustee cannot set apart as empt cash out of the proceeds of a future sale of the bankrupt's personal property. In re Manning (D. C. 1902) 112 Fed. 948, 7 Am. Bankr. Rep. 571.

ex

If, before the appointment of a trustee, the property has come into the hands of a receiver in bankruptcy, who proposes to sell the same, the proper course is for the court to direct the receiver to set aside the specific property which the bankrupt claims as exempt, to await the determination of his claim. In re N. Shaffer & Son (D. C. 1904) 128 Fed. 986, 11 Am. Bankr. Rep. 717; In re Joyce (D. C. 1904) 128 Fed. 985, 11 Am. Bankr. Rep. 716. But if the receiver has sold the property (as being perishable or for other good reasons) before the appointment of a trustee, and the bankrupt has duly made his claim for his exemptions, it will be his right to receive the proper amount out of the proceeds of the sale. Zack (D. C. 1912) 196 Fed. 909, 28 Am. Bankr. Rep. 138; In re Le Vay (D. C. 1903) 125 Fed. 990, 11 Am. Bankr. Rep. 114; In re Haskin (D. C. 1901) 109 Fed. 789, 6 Am. Bankr. Rep. 485; In re Bolinger (D. C. 1901) 108 Fed. 374, 6 Am. Bankr. Rep. 171; In re Sloan (D. C. 1905) 135 Fed. 873, 14 Am. Bankr. Rep. 435.

In re

Where the state law does not give the debtor the right to select specific property as exempt, but fixes the value in money of the exemption to be allowed, if the property in the hands of the trustee is not capable of division into parts without injury to the whole, or if it is of such a nature that it cannot advantageously be sold except as a whole, the court may order a sale of

18,148; In re Richardson (D. C. 1874) 11 N. B. R. 114, Fed. Cas. No. 11,776. New York. Stewart v. Brown (1867) 37 N. Y. 350, 93 Am. Dec. 578. Michigan. In re Andrews & Simonds (D. C. 1911) 193 Fed. 776, 27 Am. Bankr. Rep. 116; In re Parks (D. C. 1874) 9 N. B. R. 270, Fed. Cas. No. 10,765.

In the following states, the individual members of a bankrupt partnership are not entitled to claim any separate exemption out of the partnership assets: Ohio. In re Tonne (D. C. 1875) 13 N. B. R. 170, Fed. Cas. No. 14,095; In re Rosenbaum, 1 Nat. Bankr. News, 541. South Dakota. In re Abrams (D. C. 1912) 193 Fed. 271; In re Novak (D. C. 1907) 150 Fed. 602, 18 Am. Bankr. Rep. 236; In re Lentz (D. C. 1899) 97 Fed. 486; In re I. S. Vickerman & Co. (D. C. 1912) 199 Fed. 589, 29 Am. Bankr. Rep. 298. Compare In re McKercher, 8 N. B. R. 409. Pennsylvania. In re Prince & Walter (D. C. 1904) 131 Fed. 546, 12 Am. Banky. Rep. 675; In re Hafer (D. C. 1868) 1 N. B. R. 547, Fed. Cas. No. 5,896. Arkansas. In re Head (D. C. 1902) 114 Fed. 489, 7 Am. Bankr. Rep. 556; In re Meriwether (D. C. 1901) 107 Fed. 102, 5 Am. Bankr. Rep. 435; In re Handlin (C. C. 1875) Fed. Cas. No. 6,018. Alabama. In re McCrary Bros. (D. C. 1909) 169 Fed. 485, 22 Am. Bankr. Rep. 161. New Jersey. In re Demarest (D. C. 1901) 110 Fed. 638, 6 Am. Bankr. Rep. 232. Vermont. In re Mosier (D. C. 1901) 112 Fed. 138, 7 Am. Bankr. Rep. 268. Washington. Jennings V. Staunus (1911) 191 Fed. 347, 112 C. C. A. 91, 27 Am. Bankr. Rep. 384. Mississippi. In re H. W. Bundy & Co. (D. C. 1914) 218 Fed. 711.

A partner having an equal interest with his copartner in the firm property is entitled to claim his statutory exemption therefrom, in case of the bankruptcy of the firm, although the amount contributed by him to the capital of the firm was less than the amount of such exemption. In re Grimes (D. C. 1899) 94 Fed. 800, 2 Am. Bankr. Rep. 160. But compare In re Rutland Grocery Co. (D. C. 1911) 189 Fed. 765, 26 Am. Bankr. Rep. 942.

A surviving partner may have his personal exemption set apart to him out of the partnership effects with the consent of the administrator of deceased partner. In re Seabolt (D. C. 1902) 113 Fed. 766, 8 Am. Bankr. Rep. 57; In re Dinglehoef (D. C. 1901) 109 Fed. 866, 6 Am. Bankr. Rep. 242.

ty, and if any object, it cannot be done. In re J. M. Monroe & Co. (D. C. 1907) 156 Fed. 216, 19 Am. Bankr. Rep. 255. A partner cannot be allowed an exemption out of the firm's property unless it appears that he has no individual estate out of which to claim and receive the exemption. In re Steed (D. C. 1901) 107 Fed. 682, 6 Am. Bankr. Rep. 73.

To be entitled to claim his individual exemption out of assets of a firm in bankruptcy, the claimant must establish his status as a member of the firm. In re E. M. Fowler & Co. (D. C. 1906) 145 Fed. 270, 16 Am. Bankr. Rep. 580; In re Wilson (D. C. 1900) 101 Fed. 571, 4 Am. Bankr. Rep. 260; In re W. J. Floyd & Co. (D. C. 1907) 154 Fed. 757, 18 Am. Bankr. Rep. 827. An alleged partner who escapes adjudication on the ground of his being an infant cannot claim exemptions as a partner. In re Ellenbecker (D. C. 1913) 205 Fed. 396, 30 Am. Bankr. Rep. 537.

One is not deprived of his right to exemptions by the mere fact that he has conducted his business under a name indicating that it was owned by a firm or a corporation, if in fact he was the sole owner of it. In re Carpenter (1901) 109 Fed. 558, 48 C. C. A. 545, 6 Am. Bankr. Rep. 465.

Where, by agreement between the partners, the partnership property is turned over to one of the partners, to become his individual property, he is entitled to claim his exemption out or such property in bankruptcy proceedings subsequently brought against him. In re Kolber (D. C. 1912) 193 Fed. 281, 27 Am. Bankr. Rep. 414, citing Sargent v. Blake (1908) 160 Fed. 57, 87 C. C. A. 213, 20 Am. Bankr. Rep. 115, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1040. And see In re Bjornstad (D. C. 1878) 18 N. B. R. 382, Fed. Cas. No. 1,453.

Where members of partnership the day preceding the adjudication in bankruptcy took $200 each from the partnership assets, held, that the money became their separate property and subject to claims of exemption, under Kirby's Dig. Ark. § 3903. Crawford v. Sternberg (1915) 220 Fed. 73, 135 C. C. A. 641.

Where a firm which is insolvent dissolves, but there is no transfer of the property by the retiring partner to the liquidating partner, but the former simply abandons his interest in the firm, the liquidating partner will not be allowed to claim an individual exemption out of the assets of the firm, on the theory that he is now the sole owner. In re Abrams (D. C. 1912)