court of bankruptcy, and that court cannot thereafter entertain proceedings either to defend the property against adverse claims or liens or to subject it to liens or adjudicate the rights of claimants thereto. In re Little (D. C. 1901) 110 Fed. 621, 6 Am. Bankr. Rep. 681; In re Grimes (D. C. 1899) 96 Fed. 529, 2 Am. Bankr. Rep. 730; In re Hatch (D. C. 1900) 102 Fed. 280. But see In re Hassler (D. C. 1913) 204 Fed. 139, 29 Am. Bankr. Rep. 502. State courts have jurisdiction to enforce any specific lien upon exempt Robinson v. property of a bankrupt.

Wilson (1875) 15 Kan. 595, 22 Am. Rep. 272. And proceedings for the foreclosure of a mortgage on property which the bankrupt claims as a homestead should be brought against the bankrupt himself, and not against his trustee. Dendel v. Sutton (C. C. 1884) 20 Fed. 787. On the other hand, the action of a federal court in bankruptcy in setting apart to a bankrupt the exemption which the state law allows him has exactly the same effect as if it had been granted and allowed by the proper state court in a proceeding before it, and the property is not any more subject to levy and sale on the part of subsequent creditors in the one case than in the other. Smith v. Zachry (1902) 115 Ga. 722, 42 S. E. 102; Evans v. Rounsaville (1902) 115 Ga. 684, 42 S. E. 100; Collier v. Simpson (1885) 74 Ga. 697.

The state courts have jurisdiction to enforce a chattel mortgage given prior to bankruptcy on property set apart to the mortgagor as exempt under the state law. Bank of Mendon v. Mell (1915) 172 S. W. 484, 185 Mo. App. 510. A homestead exemption, set apart by a court of bankruptcy, cannot be levied on. Murphey v. Smith (Ga. App. 1915) 85 S. E. 791.

18. Claims for unpaid purchase money. Where the law of the state provides that the grant of an exemption of property to a debtor shall not prevail as against a claim for the unpaid purchase money of the property in question, a bankrupt cannot claim to have property set apart to him as exempt Mullinix when he has not paid for it.

v. Simon (1912) 196 Fed. 775, 116 C.
C. A. 399, 28 Am. Bankr. Rep. 1; Can-
non v. Dexter Broom & Mattress Co.
(1903) 120 Fed. 657, 57 C. C. A. 119,
9 Am. Bankr. Rep. 724; McGahan v.
Anderson (1902) 113 Fed. 115, 51 C. C.
A. 92, 7 Am. Bankr. Rep. 641; In re
Wells (D. C. 1900) 105 Fed. 762, 5
Am. Bankr. Rep. 308; In re Perdue
(D. C. 1868) 2 N. B. R. 183, Fed. Cas.
No. 10,975; In re Whitehead (D. C.
1869) 2 N. B. R. 599, Fed. Cas. No. 17,-
562; In re Brown (D. C. 1869) 3 N. B.
R. 250, Fed. Cas. No. 1,980; Camp
v. Young (1904) 119 Ga. 981, 47 S. E.
560; In re Peacock (D. C. 1913) 203
Fed. 191, 30 Am. Bankr. Rep. 179. See
In re Hammonds (D. C. 1912) 198 Fed.

as

A creditor opposing the bankrupt's claim to exempt property on the ground that it has not been paid for must have taken the steps required by the state law, such as reducing his claim to a judgment. In re Butler (D. C. 1902) 120 Fed. 100, 9 Am. Bankr. Rep. 539. And the unpaid creditor is the only proper person to raise the objection, In re not the trustee in bankruptcy. Boyd (D. C. 1903) 120 Fed. 999, 10 Am. Bankr. Rep. 337. But see In re Campbell (D. C. 1903) 124 Fed. 417, 10 Am. Bankr. Rep. 723.

An allowance of exemptions in bankruptcy out of a stock of goods cannot be defeated on the theory that the stock, being made up by commingling goods paid for with goods not paid for, must be treated as a unit, and that since it is not all paid for no part of it can be exempted, or that, since the assets are less than the liabilities, presumably nothing has been paid for, but in this case it is for the creditor to point out the items not paid for. In re Rippa (D. C. 1909) 180 Fed. 603. But compare In re Tobias (D. C. 1900) 103 Fed. 68, 4 Am. Bankr. Rep. 555.

The fact that a claim of exemptions is opposed by the claim that the property has not been paid for does not bring such property within the jurisdiction of the court of bankruptcy, nor entitle the creditor to have the trustee take possession of it and administer it for his benefit. In re Seydel (D. C. 1902) 118 Fed. 207, 9 Am. Bankr. Rep. 255. See In re Boyd (D. C. 1903) 120 Fed. 999, 10 Am. Bankr. Rep. 337. Nor has the creditor a right to enforce his vendor's lien in the court of bankruptcy. In re Wells (D. C. 1900) 105 Fed. 762, 5 Am. Bankr. Rep. 308. But the trustee will be directed to surrender the property to the bankrupt in order that

1

it may be taken on attachment or other process from the state court. In re Durham (D. C. 1900) 104 Fed. 231, 4 Am. Bankr. Rep. 760. And the fact that the goods in question have been set apart to the bankrupt as exempt is no ground for quashing an attachment in an action for their price. Northern Shoe Co. v. Cecka (1912) 22 N. D. 631, 135 N. W. 177. But in some states it is held that the remedy of the creditor in this situation is in equity. Brooks v. Britt-Carson Shoe Co. (1909) 133 Ga. 191, 65 S. E. 411.

19. Transfer and assignment of exempt property.-One who purchases from a bankrupt before the goods are set apart, as exempt under the state law, by the ordinary, gets a good title, unless the sale was made to delay or defraud creditors, who had the right to subject the exemption, and this intention was known to the purchasers. Pincus v. S. H. Meinhard & Bro. (1913) 77 S. E. 82, 139 Ga. 365.

Where a bankrupt assigns a fund in the hands of his trustee in bankruptcy which had been set apart to him under his exemption claim, and notice of such assignment is given to the trustee and to the attorney of a debtor of the bankrupt who subsequently issued an attachment against the fund under a judgment waiving exemption, the assignee has priority in the distribution of the fund over the attaching creditor, and the attachment will be dissolved. La Barre v. Doney (1913) 53 Pa. Super. Ct. 435.

The homestead exemption claimed by a bankrupt cannot be transferred until approved by the referee or 20 days have elapsed without objections by creditors being filed. In re Anderson (D. C. 1915) 224 Fed. 790.

20. Jurisdiction of bankruptcy court. -It is the duty of a bankruptcy court to determine claims of a bankrupt to exemption, and to sever the exempt property from the bankrupt's estate, but not to grant exemptions. In re Elkin (D. C. 1914) 218 Fed. 971.

Exempt property is never really in the bankruptcy court, as the bankruptcy court has no jurisdiction of it exeept to set it aside as exempt property, and as the rights of the lien creditors with reference to it must be determined in the state courts. Bogart v. Cowboy State Bank & Trust Co. (Tex. Civ. App. 1916) 182 S. W. 678.

The jurisdiction of a court of bankruptcy to "determine all claims of bankrupts to their exemptions," and to set apart to them the property which they are entitled to claim as exempt, includes the consideration of preliminary questions as to the right of the bankrupt to claim the property and as to whether he has taken the steps required by the state law to make his claim effective. In re Highfield (D. C. 1908) 163 Fed. 924, 21 Am. Bankr. Rep. 92. And the action of the trus

tee in setting apart property to the bankrupt as exempt is not final, but is subject to the determination of the court on the application of the bankrupt or any party in interest. In re White (D. C. 1900) 103 Fed. 774, 4 Am. Bankr. Rep. 613. Jurisdiction to make such determination will be exercised originally by the referee, but subject to review by the judge if desired by the bankrupt or the creditors. In re Dobbs (D. C. 1909) 175 Fed. 319, 23 Am. Bankr. Rep. 569. This jurisdiction to determine claims to exemptions is exclusive, and in the performance of this duty the court of bankruptcy will not be interfered with by any other court, nor can any independent proceedings in a state court for the same purpose be lawfully taken. McGahan v. Anderson (1902) 113 Fed. 115, 51 C. C. A. 92, 7 Am. Bankr. Rep. 641; In re Gibbs (D. C. 1900) 103 Fed. 782, 4 Am. Bankr. Rep. 619; Smalley v. Laugenour (1902) 30 Wash. 307, 70 Pac. 786; In re Overstreet, 1 Nat. Bankr. News, 408; In re Askew (D. C. 1870) 3 N. B. R. 575, Fed. Cas. No. 585; Woolfolk v. Murray (1871) 44 Ga. 133, 10 N. B. R. 540. A wrongful allowance by the bankruptcy court of the property claimed as exempt by the bankrupt cannot be remedied in the state courts. Brengle v. Richardson (1884) 78 Va. 406. Nor can the order of the court of bankruptcy in that behalf be collaterally questioned. Where the trustee sells property to which the bankrupt had title at the time of the adjudication, no state court can entertain any inquiry as to whether such property was exempt to the bankrupt. Steele v. Moody (1875) 53 Ala. 418, 16 N. B. R. 558.

The action of the court of bankruptcy has the same effect, in removing specific property from the reach of ordinary judicial process, that would attend the judgment of a state court setting apart such property as exempt, under the course of procedure prescribed by the state statute. Evans v. Rounsaville (1902) 115 Ga. 684, 42 S. E. 100; Smith v. Zachry (1902) 115 Ga. 722, 42 S. E. 102; Collier v. Simpson (1885) 74 Ga. 697; Ross v. Worsham (1880) 65 Ga. 624; Brady v. Brady (1883) 71 Ga. 71. Compare Felker v. Crane (1883) 70 Ga. 484; Adams v. Dickson (1884) 72 Ga. 846; Youngblood v. Lathen (1884) 20 S. C. 370.

When the bankrupt's exempt property has been designated and set apart to him by the trustee in bankruptcy, with the approval of the court, it has been administered, so far as the proceedings in bankruptcy are concerned, and passes out of the control of the bankruptcy court, and thereafter such court has no jurisdiction either to defend such property from adverse claims or liens or to enforce liens or claims against it. Sullivan v. Mussey (C. C. A. 1910) 184 Fed. 60, 25 Am. Bankr. Rep. 781; In re Yeager (D. C. 1910) 182 Fed. 951,

25 Am. Bankr. Rep. 51; In re MacKissic (D. C. 1909) 171 Fed. 259, 22 Am. Bankr. Rep. 817; In re Culwell (D. C. 1908) 165 Fed. 828, 21 Am. Bankr. Rep. 614; In re Sorg (D. C. 1907) 155 Fed. 550; In re Reese (D. C. 1902) 115 Fed. 993, 8 Am. Bankr. Rep. 411; In re Grimes (D. C. 1899) 96 Fed. 529, 2 Am. Bankr. Rep. 730; Jeffries v. Bartlett (C. C. 1884) 20 Fed. 496; In re Fetherston (D. C. 1872) Fed. Cas. No. 4,753; King v. Neill (C. C. 1885) 26 Fed. 721; Phillips v. Bass (1880) 65 Ga. 427; Lathrop v. Pate (1911) 136 Ga. 36, 70 S. E. 569; McKenney v. Cheney (1903) 118 Ga. 387, 45 S. E. 433; Brooks v. Eblen (1908) 106 S. W. 308, 32 Ky. Law Rep. 543; Powers Dry Goods Co. v. Nelson (1901) 10 N. D. 580, 88 N. W. 703, 58 L. R. A. 770; Newberry Shoe Co. v. Collier (1910) 111 Va. 288, 68 S. E. 974.

A bankruptcy court, having determined the property that is exempt generally to the bankrupt and set it apart to him, has exhausted its jurisdiction over such property; and creditors claiming that for any reason, as waiver, it is not exempt from their claims, must resort to a state court for enforcement of payment therefrom. In re Remmerde (D. C. 1913) 206 Fed. 822. A court of bankruptcy is without jurisdiction to order the sale for any purpose of property which it has set apart to a bankrupt as his homestead exemption. In re Yungbluth (C. C. A. 1915) 220 Fed. 110.

If exempt property is under an attachment at the time of the adjudication in bankruptcy, the lien of which is dissolved by the adjudication, the attaching creditor cannot hold the property on the theory that, being exempt, it is not subject to be administered in the bankruptcy proceedings, but the court should require the officer having possession under the attachment to surrender the property to the trustee, in order that he may set it apart to the bankrupt. In re Stevens (D. C. 1870) Fed. Cas. No. 13,392.

21. Claim of exemptions.-It is the duty of a bankrupt desiring to claim exemptions, to insert in his schedule a particular statement of the property claimed as exempt, giving each item of property and its value, and, if any portion of it is real estate, its location, description, and present use. In re Duffy (D. C. 1902) 118 Fed. 926, 9 Am. Bankr. Rep. 358; In re J. E. Maynard & Co. (D. C. 1910) 183 Fed. $23, 25 Am. Bankr. Rep. 732; In re Irwin (1909) 174 Fed. 642, 98 C. C. A. 396, 23 Am. Bankr. Rep. 487; In re Kelly (D. C. 1912) 199 Fed. 984, 28 Am. Bankr. Rep. 730; In re Diamond (D. C. 1908) 158 Fed. 370, 19 Am. Bankr. Rep. 811. But it has been held that it is not necessary for the bankrupt to specify the articles specially claimed to be exempt, as the official form is not intended to be mandatory,

but to be altered to suit the circumstances of the particular case. Burke v. Guarantee Title & Trust Co. (1905) 134 Fed. 562, 67 C. C. A. 486, 14 Am. Bankr. Rep. 31. But a claim by a bankrupt of an exemption out of a stock of goods, claiming the stock in bulk, is not a sufficient compliance. In re Wilson (D. C. 1901) 108 Fed. 197, 6 Am. Bankr. Rep. 287. So, where a bankrupt is possessed of property capable of being divided, from which he could make his selection, he must do so in his schedule, and a claim to the exemption from "proceeds of personal property" to the amount limited is not sufficient. In re Donahey (D. C. 1910) 176 Fed. 458, 23 Am. Bankr. Rep. 796. So if a bankrupt includes in his schedule all his lands, claiming, as a homestead exemption therein, "real estate to the value of $500," but without designating any particular portion, it is a defect, but one which is amendable, and of which advantage cannot be taken in a subsequent collateral proceeding. Walker v. Carroll (1880) 65 Ala. 61.

While the bankrupt's right to exemptions must be deduced from the state law, his claim must be made at the time and in the manner pointed out by the bankruptcy law, which is exclusive and controlling on these points. In re Crum (D. C. 1913) 221 Fed. 729; Lipman v. Stein (1905) 134 Fed. 235, 67 C. C. A. 17, 14 Am. Bankr. Rep. 30; In re Andrews & Simonds (D. C. 1911) 193 Fed. 776, 27 Am. Bankr. Rep. 116; In re Le Vay (D. C. 1903) 125 Fed. 990, 11 Am. Bankr. Rep. 114; In re Kane (1904) 127 Fed. 552, 62 C. C. A. 616, 11 Am. Bankr. Rep. 533; In re W. S. Jennings & Co. (D. C. 1909) 166 Fed. 639, 22 Am. Bankr. Rep. 160; In re Burnham (D. C. 1913) 202 Fed. 762, 30 Am. Bankr. Rep. 270. But compare in re Fisher (D. C. 1905) 142 Fed. 205, 15 Am. Bankr. Rep. 652; In re Garner (D. C. 1902) 115 Fed. 200, 8 Am. Bankr. Rep. 263; Northern Alabama Ry. Co. v. Feldman (1911) 1 Ala. App. 334, 56 South. 16. The only question to be determined on a bankrupt's application for his exemptions under the state law is whether he is entitled to the same against general creditors. In re Brumbaugh (D. C. 1904) 128 Fed. 971, 12 Am. Bankr. Rep. 204. Ordinarily it is sufficient if he makes his claim to exemptions in his schedule, and an extension of time for filing the 'schedule will also extend the time for making such claim. In re O'Hara (D. C. 1908) 162 Fed. 325, 20 Am. Bankr. Rep. 714. It is the ordinary method, and the one sanctioned by the rules and forms in bankruptcy, for a bankrupt to claim her homestead exemption in the schedule attached to her voluntary petition. Sheridan State Bank v. Rowell (D. C. 1914) 212 Fed. 529. Where a bankrupt claimed a homestead exemp

tion at the time of filing his schedules and as a part thereof, as he was authorized to do, the schedules having been filed in time, his claim of exemption was in time. Brandt v. Mayhew (1914) 218 Fed. 422, 134 C. C. A. 210.

If the bankrupt makes an erroneous claim to property mentioned in the schedule as being exempt, it is the duty of the trustee to correct or disregard it. In re Whetmore (D. C. 1869) Fed. Cas. No. 17.508. But a mere claim made by a bankrupt to his trustee, asserting a right to a homestead exemption, but not incorporated in the schedule nor allowed by the trustee or the court, will not be available against a purchaser of the property at the trustee's sale. Steele v. Moody (1875) 53 Ala. 418.

It is in the power of the bankrupt to waive the exemption, and he will generally be taken to have done so if he omits to set up the claim in his schedule, either originally or by seasonable amendment. In re Gerber (1911) 186 Fed. 693, 108 C. C. A. 511, 26 Am. Bankr. Rep. 608; In re Moran (D. C. 1900) 105 Fed. 901, 5 Am. Bankr. Rep. 472; In re Von Kerm (D. C. 1905) 135 Fed. 447, 14 Am. Bankr. Rep. 403; In re Harrington (D. C. 1912) 200 Fed. 1010, 29 Am. Bankr. Rep. 666.

A mortgagee of the bankrupt cannot set up the latter's rights of exemption in the mortgaged property, in order to validate his mortgage against the charge that it constituted a preference or a fraudulent conveyance. Mitchell V. Mitchell (D. C. 1906) 147 Fed. 280, 17 Am. Bankr. Rep. 382; Edmondson V. Hyde (C. C. 1872) Fed. Cas. No. 4,285. A bankrupt's wife, after his adjudication, having filed a declaration of homestead on real property on which they had been living, as she was authorized to do by the state law, held entitled to enforce her claim in the bankruptcy proceedings. Brandt v. Mayhew (1914) 218 Fed. 422, 134 C. C. A. 210. The failure of the bankrupt to claim his exemptions in his original petition will not be taken as a waiver of his right afterwards to claim the property which is exempt, by an amendment properly filed, provided, that amendment can be allowed without causing any loss or injury to persons who have acquired rights in the property in question in consequence of the bankrupt's neglect seasonably to assert his claims. In re Fisher (D. C. 1905) 142 Fed. 205, 15 Am. Bankr. Rep. 652; In re Berman (D. C. 1905) 140 Fed. 761, 15 Am. Bankr. Rep. 463; In re Moran (D. C. 1900) 105 Fed. 901, 5 Am. Bankr. Rep. 472; In re Kaufmann (D. C. 1906) 142 Fed. 898, 16 Am. Bankr. Rep. 118; In re White (D. C. 1904) 128 Fed. 513, 11 Am. Bankr. Rep. 556; Goodman v. Curtis (1909)

the

174 Fed. 644, 98 C. C. A. 398, 23 Am. Bankr. Rep. 504; In re Lenters (D. C. 1915) 225 Fed. 878; In re Crum (D. C. 1913) 221 Fed. 729. An amendment will be refused where it is avowedly sought for the purpose of preferring certain creditors to whom the bankrupt had given notes containing a waiver of the exemption law. Moran v. King (1901) 111 Fed. 730, 49 C. C. A. 578, 7 Am. Bankr. Rep. 176; In re Merry (D. C. 1913) 201 Fed. 369, 29 Am. Bankr. Rep. 829. The bankruptcy court does not favor the extension by amendment of exemptions of the bankrupt where such extension will work solely for the benefit of a creditor, though the court as a rule exercises great liberality in permitting amendments. In re Merry (D. C. 1913) 201 Fed. 369, 29 Am. Bankr. Rep. 829.

If a bankrupt, instead of incorporating a claim for his exemptions in his schedule, goes into a state court and there sets up a claim and has the exemption allowed, he will not be entitled to have the exemption set off to him by the trustee in bankruptcy on his filing a record of the proceedings in the state court. Gayle v. Randall (1882) 71 Ala. 469; In re Nunn, 1 Nat. Bankr. News, 427. But where a homestead exemption is seasonably claimed in a bankruptcy proceeding, it may thereafter be perfected under the state law, if the claimant proceeds expeditiously. In re Burnham (D. C. 1913) 202 Fed. 762.

If the bankrupt omits to claim his exemptions in the proceedings in bankruptcy, as required by the law, but allows the trustee to sell the property, he cannot afterwards assert his right to it as exempt in a proceeding to set aside the sale or in a suit against the purchaser. In re Oderkirk (D. C. 1900) 103 Fed. 779, 4 Am. Bankr. Rep. 617; In re Wunder (D. C. 1905) 133 Fed. 821, 13 Am. Bankr. Rep. 701; Steele v. Moody (1875) 53 Ala. 418, 16 N. B. R. 558. But the right of the bankrupt to the property exempted by the law of the state is a fixed and determinate right, not dependent upon the discretion of the trustee, and where it is claimed and illegally refused before the trustee's sale of the property, it may be asserted against the proceeds of the property while in the hands of the court for distribution. In re Jones (C. C. 1871) Fed. Cas. No. 7,445. And see In re Rodenhagen (D. C. 1900) 2 Nat. Bankr. News, 674.

Since the statute expressly grants to an involuntary bankrupt a period of ten days after the adjudication in which to claim his exemptions, if such claim is made before the expiration of the ten days, it is in time, and the bankrupt cannot be deprived of his exemptions by the fact that, in the meantime, the property has been sold and converted

into money by a receiver in bankruptcy appointed at the time of filing the petition. Lipman v. Stein (1905) 134 Fed. 235, 67 C. C. A. 17, 14 Am. Bankr. Rep. 30; In re Coddington (D. C. 1904) 126 Fed. 891, 11 Am. Bankr. Rep. 122.

While the bankrupt must claim his exemption as prescribed by the statute, a severance of the exempted articles or property is not to be made by the debtor before adjudication, but by the trustee when appointed; and the valuation of exempt property is to be made in the first instance by the trustee. The bankruptcy act, while allowing to debtors the exemptions proIvided by the state law, itself regulates the manner in which such exemptions are to be claimed, set apart, and awarded. In re Friedrich (1900) 100 Fed. 284, 40 C. C. A. 378, 3 Am. Bankr. Rep. 801; Burke v. Guarantee Title & Trust Co. (1905) 134 Fed. 562, 67 C. C. A. 486, 14 Am. Bankr. Rep. 31; Cowan v. Burchfield (D. C. 1910) 180 Fed. 614.

22. Setting apart exempt property.The provision of the statute that the trustee shall set apart the bankrupt's exemptions and report the items and estimated value thereof is mandatory and these duties cannot be performed by any one else. An agreement between a bankrupt and his creditors that the exemptions shall be valued and allotted by three appraisers, whose decision shall be final and not subject to exception, is void, and an order made by the referee, by consent of parties, in the terms of such agreement, will be set aside. In re Grimes (D. C. 1899) 96 Fed. 529, 2 Am. Bankr. Rep. 730.

Where a claim has been duly and properly made for the exemption allowed by the law of the state, the trustee has no right to refuse to set the property apart. If he sells it, the court has jurisdiction to award the proceeds to the bankrupt. In re Finkelstein (D. C. 1912) 192 Fed. 738, 27 Am. Bankr. Rep. 229. The bankruptcy court has no control over a bankrupt's exemption for the purpose of distributing it among creditors holding notes waiving the exemption, and will pay over the fund claimed as exempt to the bankrupt or some one duly appointed to receive it. In re Anderson (D. C. 1915) 224 Fed. 790.

The determination of a bankrupt's claim to a homestead exemption by the referee before the appointment of a trustee, though informal and not in accordance with the regular course of procedure, may be sanctioned by the court in the exercise of its equity powers, where it appears that the bankrupt has no property except that claimed as exempt, so that, if the exemption should be allowed, there would be no occasion for the appointment of a trustee. In re W. C. Allen & Co. (D. C. 1904) 134

Fed. 620, 13 Am. Bankr. Rep. 518; Snalley v. Laugenour (1902) 30 Wash. 307, 70 Pac. 786. When a trustee has been appointed and qualified, the referee has no authority to set apart the bankrupt's exemptions, nor to direct the trustee in the matter. In re Peabody (D. C. 1877) 16 N. B. R. 243, Fed. Cas. No. 10,866.

The trustee has no right to demand from the bankrupt, as a condition upon his delivering to him the property claimed as exempt and appraised for that purpose, a bond of indemnity, and where, upon demand and refusal of such a bond, the trustee sells the property in question, the bankrupt may claim the amount of his exemptions from the proceeds. In re Brown (D. C. 1899) 100 Fed. 441, 4 Am. Bankr. Rep. 46.

The setting apart of exempt property to the bankrupt, and the sale of real estate in which a homestead is claimed, if indivisible, should always be done promptly, and the referee should see that this is done. In re Brown (D. C. 1915) 228 Fed. 533.

If exemptions have recently been claimed and allowed to the bankrupt in proceedings under the state law, it is permissible for the trustee to adopt and sanction the allotment, if no circumstances of fraud or mistake appear. In re Vogler (D. C. 1873) Fed. Cas. No. 16,986. See In re Wilson (D. C. 1900) 101 Fed. 571, 4 Am. Bankr. Rep. 260. But it is not the duty of the trustee to wait until exemptions have been allowed and set apart by state officers according to the procedure prescribed by the laws of the state. In re Camp (D. C. 1899) 91 Fed. 745, 1 Am. Bankr. Rep. 165. If the state law withholds the exemption from the bankrupt until he shall have complied with certain requirements as to the mode of claiming and securing its allowance, he must pursue the same course before he can make good his claim to the exemptions in the bankruptcy proceeding. Farish (D. C. 1868) 2 N. B. R. 168, Fed. Cas. No. 4,647; In re Jackson (D. C. 1869) 2 N. B. R. 508, Fed. Cas. No. 7,127.

In re

Property exempted in the bankruptcy court, but which bankrupt did not have set aside by state court as exempt, held subject to a fi. fa. levied on it more than three years after the adjudication in bankruptcy, where no discharge had been granted to the bankrupt. Baltimore Bargain House v. Busby (1915) 85 S. E. 875, 143 Ga. 734. A bankrupt, to whom personalty claimed as exempt has been set apart, may thereafter execute and file for record a declaration of homestead, as required by state law, and have the same set apart as exempt. In re Lehfeldt (D. C. 1915) 225 Fed. 681.

23. Valuation, selection, and delivery of property.-The trustee in bankruptcy, in valuing and setting apart the exemptions of the bankrupt, should