B. R. 510, Fed. Cas. No. 9,098; Whitridge v. Taylor (1872) 66 N. C. 273.

A court of bankruptcy may issue citations to persons in another jurisdiction to appear before it in respect to matters arising in the administration of an estate in bankruptcy. Staunton v. Wooden (1910) 179 Fed. 61, 102 C. C. A. 355, 24 Am. Bankr. Rep. 736. The jurisdiction of courts of bankruptcy is confined to their respective districts, but extends to all matters and proceedings in bankruptcy. The jurisdiction is to be exercised within their respective districts. Each court, within its own district, may exercise the powers conferred, but those powers extend to all matters of bankruptcy without limitation. Lathrop v. Drake (1875) 91 U. S. 516, 23 L. Ed. 414.

A court of bankruptcy cannot issue process to be enforced in another territorial jurisdiction, nor make a summary order for the delivery of property which must be there enforced, but such an order can only be obtained by ancillary proceedings by the trustee in the court of the district where it must be executed. Staunton v. Wooden (1910) 179 Fed. 61, 102 C. C. A. 355, 24 Am. Bankr. Rep. 736; In re Waukesha Water Co. (D. C. 1902) 116 Fed. 1009, 8 Am. Bankr. Rep. 715; In re Williams (D. C. 1903) 120 Fed. 38, 9 Am. Bankr. Rep. 741; In re Steele (D. C. 1908) 161 Fed. 886, 20 Am. Bankr. Rep. 446; In re Alphin & Lake Cotton Co. (D. C. 1904) 131 Fed. 824, 12 Am. Bankr. Rep. 653.

An order of a bankruptcy court of the district of Massachusetts against the Bank of Commerce, located in New Mexico, was without efficacy there; the process of a bankruptcy court being restricted to the territorial limits of the district. In re Boston-Cerrillos Mines Corporation (D. C. 1913) 206 Fed. 794.

The right of extraterritorial jurisdiction in bankruptcy follows the jurisdictional title to property, and the bankrupt's estate, wherever located, only in so far as outside parties submit to or are found within the jurisdiction of the court, or where, in order to share in the administration of the estate, they submit to the jurisdiction of the court in the district where the proceedings are located. In re J. & M. Schwartz (D. C. 1913) 204 Fed. 326.

6. Jurisdiction dependent on resiidence or domicile.-Under this section, in order to confer jurisdiction, it is essential that the alleged bankrupt either had his principal place of business, or his residence or his domicile, within the division of the district in which jurisdiction is invoked. In re Lemen (D. C. 1912) 208 Fed. 80.

The residence or domicile of the bankrupt within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, for the prescribed

period of time before the filing of a petition by or against him, is an essential jurisdictional fact, without the existence of which the court will have no authority to proceed, as it is the fact which determines the court in which the proceedings are to be taken. Fogarty v. Gerrity (D. C. 1870) 4 N. B. R. 450, Fed. Cas. No. 4,895; In re Leighton (D. C. 1871) 5 N. B. R. 95, Fed. Cas. No. 8,221; In re Little (D. C. 1868) 2 N. B. R. 294, Fed. Cas. No. 8,391; In re Palmer (D. C. 1867) 1 N. B. R. 213, Fed. Cas. No. 10,680.

The jurisdictional fact of the bank-. rupt's residence or domicile within the territorial limits of the court for the prescribed length of time must appear affirmatively and distinctly in the proceedings, and not be left to presumption or conjecture. In re Plotke (1900) 104 Fed. 964, 44 C. C. A. 282, 5 Am. Bankr. Rep. 171.

The requirement of the statute as to residence or domicile within the district, as a basis of jurisdiction, cannot be waived by the bankrupt or the creditors. Neither consent nor failure to object can confer authority to proceed upon a court which would not have jurisdiction under the express language of the statute. Fogarty v. Gerrity (D. C. 1870) Fed. Cas. No. 4,895; In re Palmer (D. C. 1867) 1 N. B. R. 213, Fed. Cas. No. 10,680.

An alleged bankrupt, by pleading to the merits in its answer and otherwise submitting to the jurisdiction, held to have waived its objection that the proceeding was not brought in the division of its domicile. Clark-Herrin-Campbell Co. v. H. B. Claflin Co. (1914) 218 Fed. 429, 134 C. C. A. 229.

A bankrupt who has procured the dismissal of involuntary proceedings against him, on his sworn plea denying his residence within the district and asserting it to be within another district which he names, may be estopped to object to the jurisdiction of the court in the latter district, when fresh proceedings are commenced against him there by the same creditors. Long v. Lockman (D. C. 1905) 135 Fed. 197, 14 Am. Bankr. Rep. 172.

When the jurisdiction of a court of bankruptcy is invoked on the ground of residence or domicile, or the location of the principal place of business, it must be within the judicial district where the petition is filed. It is not enough that it should be within the same state. If a debtor resides or has his principal place of business in the northern district of New York, a petition filed by or against him in the southern district of New York will be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. In re Palmer (D. C. 1867) 1 N. B. R. 213, Fed. Cas. No. 10,680; Fogarty v. Gerrity (D. C. 1870) Fed. Cas. No. 4,895.

Residence and domicile are not the same, and an averment of residence

is not the equivalent of an averment of domicile for the purpose of supporting jurisdiction in the courts of the United States. Marks v. Marks (C. C. 1896) 75 Fed. 321. And see In re Watson (D. C. 1871) 4 N. B. R. 613, Fed. Cas. No. 17,272; Haskell v. Bailey (1894) 63 Fed. 873, 11 C. C. A. 476; Danahy v. National Bank of Denison (1894) 64 Fed. 148, 12 C. C. A. 75; Poppenhauser v. India Rubber Comb Co. (C. C. 1883) 14 Fed. 707; McDonald v. Salem Flour Mills Co. (C. C. 1887) 31 Fed. 577; Bartlett v. New York (1851) 5 Sandf. (N. Y.) 44; In re Garneou (1904) 127 Fed. 677, 62 C. C. A. 403, 11 Am. Bankr. Rep. 679; Anderson v. Anderson (1869) 42 Vt. 350, 1 Am. Rep. 334; Salem v. Lyme (1860) 29 Conn. 74; In re Lemen (D. C. 1912) 208 Fed. 80, 30 Am. Bankr. Rep. 638.

The meaning of the word "residence" as used in this section is fulfilled by relationship to the territory arising from location, which does not rise to the dignity of a domiciliary condition, and which, if continued for the requisite proportion of the six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition, is sufficient to confer jurisdiction. In re Lemen (D. C. 1912) 208 Fed. 80.

A court of bankruptcy has jurisdiction of a petition filed by a debtor who has had his domicile within the district for the preceding six months, although, during the greater portion of that time he has resided elsewhere, either in another state or in foreign countries, provided there was no abandonment of the original domicile, nor acquisition of a new one, and the debtor returned to the district, before the filing of the petition, with the intention of making his permanent home there. In re Williams (D. C. 1900) 99 Fed. 544, 3 Am. Bankr. Rep. 677; In re Walker (D. C. 1868) Fed. Cas. No. 17,061.

One who went from New York to acquire a residence in New Jersey to bring an action for divorce relinquished his residence and domicile in New York within this section. In re Lipphart (D. C. 1912) 201 Fed. 103.

Evidence held insufficient to show that an alleged bankrupt had changed his residence from Minnesota to Texas and had not resided in Minnesota for the greater part of six months next preceding the filing of the petition. In re Hurley (D. C. 1913) 204 Fed. 126.

For the purposes of jurisdiction in bankruptcy the domicile of a wife follows that of her husband during the continuance of the marriage relation, but a divorce leaves the wife at liberty to choose and fix her own domicile. Bennett v. Bennett (D. C. 1867) Fed. Cas. No. 1,318; Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co. v. Gorbach (1871) 70 Pa. 150. A minor may acquire a separate domicile from that of his father during the

latter's life-time, but only by the emancipation of the minor and a complete surrender of the parental control either to the minor himself or to some one standing in the place of the parent as to the choice of domicile. Woolridge v. McKennna (1881) 8 Fed. 650; Dresser v. Edison Illuminating Co. (1892) 49 Fed. 257. See In re Kingsley (D. C. 1908) 160 Fed. 275, 20 Am. Bankr. Rep. 427.

To give jurisdiction of proceedings in bankruptcy it is requisite that residence within the district should be bona fide; and the removal of a person from one district to another for the express purpose of filing a petition in bankruptcy therein, and with the intention of leaving the district as soon as he obtained a discharge, does not make him a resident so as to confer jurisdiction on the court. In re Garneau (1904) 127 Fed. 677, 62 C. C. A. 403, 11 Am. Bankr. Rep. 679.

But if there is an actual intention to take up a permanent residence in the district to which the removal is made, it is no sufficient reason for refusing to take jurisdiction that the party was primarily actuated by a desire to file his petition in bankruptcy in that particular court, or, generally speaking, to get a case into a federal court which otherwise would not have had jurisdiction of it. See Gardner v. Sharp (C. C. 1826) Fed. Cas. No. 5,236; Robertson v. Carson, 19 Wall. 94, 22 L. Ed. 178; Catlett v. Pacific Ins. Co. (C. C. 1826) Fed. Cas. No. 2,517; Briggs v. French (C. C. 1835) Fed. 'Cas. No. 1,871; Case v. Clarke (C. C. 1828) Fed. Cas. No. 2,490; Johnson v. Monell (C. C. 1869) Fed. Cas. No. 7,399.

7. Principal place of business.When a petition in bankruptcy is filed in the district within which the alleged bankrupt has had his principal place of business for the requisite length of time, jurisdiction is not dependent on the place of his residence or domicile, which, in this case is immaterial. In re Alabama & C. R. Co. (C. C. 1872) Fed. Cas. No. 124; Ex parte Hall (C. C. 1842) Fed. Cas. No. 5,919. But if the alleged bankrupt is not shown to have any place of business, or to have had a place of business within the district for the prescribed length of time, then jurisdiction must depend upon either residence or domicile. In re Plotke (1900) 104 Fed. 964, 44 C. C. A. 282, 5 Am. Bankr. Rep. 171; In re Lipphart (D. C. 1912) 201 Fed. 103, 28 Am. Bankr. Rep. 705.

When the same person is engaged in various occupations or pursuits, it becomes necessary to determine as a question of fact which is his "principal" business, or that in which the major part of his capital is invested, which engages the chief part of his time and efforts, or on which he principally depends for his income. In re Mackey

(D. C. 1901) 110 Fed. 355, 6 Am. Bankr. Rep. 577. See In re Foster (D. C. 1869) Fed. Cas. No. 4,962. Where a petitioner in voluntary bankruptcy resides in one district and is there employed as a clerk in a store, but is engaged in trade on his own account, as a general merchant, in another district, the court in the latter district has jurisdiction of his petition, the bankrupt's principal place of business being within its territorial limits. In re Brice (D. C. 1899) 93 Fed. 942, 2 Am. Bankr. Rep. 197.

The bankrupt may be said to have his principal place of business within the district, though the only business carried on there is that which he transacts as agent and attorney for another person. In re Baily (D. C. 1868) Fed. Cas. No. 753. Or though he merely works there as a clerk to the successors in the business in which he had previously failed. In re Belcher (D. C. 1868) Fed. Cas. No. 1,237. One employed at small salary as rate clerk and attorney in fact, and to indorse bank paper, has no "place of business" within this section. In re Lipphart (D. C. 1912) 201 Fed. 103.

In the case of a corporation organized under the laws of one state but which carries on business in another state or in several other states, it is not necessary that proceedings in bankruptcy should be instituted in the federal court in the state from which it derives its charter (though that court would have jurisdiction by reason of the "domicile" of the corporation), but may be maintained in that district, wherever it may be, in which the company has its chief or principal place of business. In re Munger Vehicle Tire Co. (1908) 159 Fed. 901, 87 C. C. A. 81, 19 Am. Bankr. Rep. 785; In re Alaska American Fish Co. (D. C. 1908) 162 Fed. 498, 20 Am. Bankr. Rep. 712; Dressel v. North State Lumber Co. (D. C. 1901) 107 Fed. 255, 5 Am. Bankr. Rep. 74; In re Magid-Hope Silk Mfg. Co. (D. C. 1901) 110 Fed. 352, 6 Am. Bankr. Rep. 610; Tiffany v. La Plume Condensed Milk Co. (D. C. 1905) 141 Fed. 444, 15 Am. Bankr. Rep. 413; Home Powder Co. v. Geis (C. C. A. 1913) 204 Fed. 568, 29 Am. Bankr. Rep. 580.

The whereabouts of the principal place of business of a corporation, for the purposes of jurisdiction in bankruptcy proceedings against it, is a question of fact, and the decision of it is not controlled either by the place of incorporation or by any provision in the charter of the company as to where its principal office shall be located. In re San Antonio Land & Irr. Co. (D. C. 1916) 228 Fed. 984; In re R. H. Pennington & Co. (D. C. 1915) 228 Fed. 388; In re E. & G. Theater Co. (D. C. 1915) 223 Fed. 657; In re Pennsylvania Consol. Coal Co. (D. C. 1908) 163 Fed. 579, 20 Am. Bankr. Rep. 872; In re Guanacevi Tunnel Co. (1912) 201 Fed.

316, 29 Am. Bankr. Rep. 229; In re Wenatchee-Stratford Orchard Co. (D. C. 1913) 205 Fed. 964, 30 Am. Bankr. Rep. 540; In re Beiermeister Bros. Co. (D. C. 1913) 208 Fed. 945.

In determining in what jurisdiction the principal place of business of a bankrupt corporation is located, doubt should be resolved in favor of that jurisdiction where it obtained its corporate existence, and where it is usually required to maintain an office. Where the assets and most of the creditors of a Missouri corporation were in that state, and it was required to keep an office there, and the only business transacted in New York during the last six months was trying to reorganize, it not being in active business, its principal place of business was not in New York, and the court there will not assume jurisdiction to declare it bankrupt. In re Tennessee Const. Co. (D. C. 1913) 207 Fed. 203.

It is immaterial that a corporation which maintains its principal place of business in a state other than that in which it was incorporated has not complied with the laws of the foreign state, as to filing its articles of incorporation, paying a license fee, or other requirements necessary to its lawful right to do business therein. In re Duplex Radiator Co. (D. C. 1906) 142 Fed. 906, 16 Am. Bankr. Rep. 324; In re Perry Aldrich Co. (D. C. 1908) 165 Fed. 249, 21 Am. Bankr. Rep. 244.

In order that a corporation shall have a principal place of business within a district of another state than that of its incorporation, so as to make it subject to bankruptcy proceedings in such district, it must have been actually doing business at such place during the greater portion of the preceding six months, and where a foreign corporation had in fact done no business in a district for more than three years, owing to the appointment of receivers for its property, the mere fact of its having filed a certificate in a public office, designating a place in the district as its principal place of business, is not sufficient to give the court in such district jurisdiction of proceedings against it. In re Thomas McNally Co. (D. C. 1913) 208 Fed. 291.

Though a corporation may have its "home office" in one state, where its officers are to be found, and where its directors meet, its records are kept, and its finances administered, this is not its principal place of business if its actual operations are conducted in another state, where its shops, factories, mills or other works are located. In re Alabama & C. R. Co. (C. C. 1874) Fed. Cas. No. 124.

A corporation engaged in the business of mining and selling coal whose lands and mining operations are all in the state by which it is chartered is not subject to bankruptcy proceedings in another state, although it may maintain its principal office there. In re

Tygarts River Coal Co. (D. C. 1913) 203 Fed. 178.

But if a corporation shuts down its factory, or ceases to do any active business at the place where its plant is located, but still maintains a head office in another state or district, where its executive and financial business is transacted, the latter becomes its principal place of business, so as to give jurisdiction to the federal court there. In re Munger Vehicle Tire Co. (1908) 159 Fed. 901, 87 C. C. A. 81, 19 Am. Bankr. Rep. 785; In re Marine. Machine & Conveyor Co. (D. C. 1899) 91 Fed. 630, 1 Am. Bankr. Rep. 421. Compare In re Little (D. C. 1868) Fed. Cas. No. 8,391.

But numerous decisions now hold that, where a corporation operates factories, mills, mines, or other works in one state, but maintains a head office in another state, from which supreme direction and control are exercised over all its business, and where its directors hold their meetings, its records and accounts are kept, its correspondence con⚫ ducted, and its banking business mainly done, it is the latter place, and not the former, which constitutes the company's principal place of business, and where proceedings in bankruptcy against it may be instituted. Burdick v. Dillon

(1906) 144 Fed. 737, 75 C. C. A. 603; In re Marine Machine & Conveyor Co. (D. C. 1899) 91 Fed. 630, 1 Am. Bankr. Rep. 421; In re Mathews Consol. Slate Co. (D. C. 1905) 144 Fed. 724, 15 Am. Bankr. Rep. 779, 16 Am. Bankr. Rep. 350; In re Pennsylvania Consol. Coal Co. (D. C. 1908) 163 Fed. 579, 20 Am. Bankr. Rep. 872.

Where a company having both its executive offices and its plant in one state ceases to manufacture any products, the fact that it continues to make sales of its finished goods through an agent in another state does not operate to transfer its principal place of business to the latter state. In re Elmira Steel Co. (D. C. 1901) 109 Fed. 456, 5 Am. Bankr. Rep. 484.

Where a company, incorporated in one state and doing business in another, sold most of its stock and gave up its place of business, and went into the hands of receivers appointed by a court of the state of its domicile, who took charge of the remaining property in the other state, all about six months before the filing of a petition in bankruptcy against it, it was held that a federal court in the latter state had no jurisdiction of the petition. In re Perry Aldrich Co. (D. C. 1908) 165 Fed. 249, 21 Am. Bankr. Rep. 244.

Where the same corporation enjoys a corporate existence by legislative recognition in two states at once, and successive petitions in bankruptcy are filed against it in the federal courts within each of those states, that court which first acquires jurisdiction by the filing of the petition will retain it, and

8. Length of duration of residence or domicile.-For the purpose of jurisdiction in bankruptcy founded on the residence or domicile of the debtor within the district, it is settled, first, that it is not necessary that the residence or domicile should have begun six months before the petition in bankruptcy, but it is sufficient if it commenced at such a time that it may be said to have included "the greater portion thereof," that is, the greater portion of the preceding six months, and second, that it must have continued in the particular district for at least one or more days over three months, for it is not sufficient that the debtor should have resided within the district for a longer time than he has resided in any other district; in addition to that, his residence must have continued more than three months; and if, during the period of the preceding six months, the debtor has neither resided, had his domicile, nor maintained a principal place of business in any one district for so long a period as three months, then there is no court in which a petition by or against him can be filed. In re Plotke (1900) 104 Fed. 964, 44 C. C. A. 282, 5 Am. Bankr. Rep. 171; In re Williams (D. C. 1903) 120 Fed. 34, 9 Am. Bankr. Rep. 736; In re Berner (1900) 2 Nat. Bankr. News, 330; Longley Bros. v. McCann (1909) 90 Ark. 252, 119 S. W. 268; In re Leighton (D. C. 1871) 5 N. B. R. 95, Fed. Cas. No. 8,221. And see In re Hurley (D. C. 1913) 204 Fed. 126, 29 Am. Bankr. Rep. 567.

A court of bankruptcy has jurisdiction of a voluntary petition for adjudication in bankruptcy, filed by a debtor who has had his domicile within the district for the preceding six months, although, during the greater portion of that time, he has resided abroad, provided there was no abandonment of the original domicile, nor acquisition of a new one, and the debtor returned to the district before the filing of the petition, with the intention of making his permanent home there. In re Williams (D. C. 1900) 99 Fed. 544, 3 Am. Bankr. Rep. 677.

Where a traveling gambler had resided in a particular district for only two months prior to the filing of a petition to have him adjudged a bank

rupt, the bankruptcy court of that district had no jurisdiction of such petition. In re Williams (D. C. 1903) 120 Fed. 34, 9 Am. Bankr. Rep. 736.

Under the provisions of this section and of section 18 (post, § 9602), a person who is beyond the territorial limits of a bankruptcy court at the time of the filing of a petition, but who has for more than a year prior to a few days before the filing of the petition resided within the district, may be adjudged a bankrupt on personal service and publication without the district, although he does not appear in the proceedings. Hills v. F. D. McKinniss Co. (D. C. 1910) 188 Fed. 1012, 26 Am. Bankr. Rep. 329.

The bankrupt established his domicile within the district some time in May, 1910. He continued to reside there until August 2d, when, being heavily involved, and his property having been attached, he absconded and has not since been heard from. His wife and family continued to reside within the district, and on August 17th, a petition in involuntary bankruptcy was filed against him. Held, that under the rule that a domicile once acquired is presumed to continue until it is shown to have been changed, there being no evidence of an intent to change the domicile, by objecting creditors, the bankrupt had acquired a domicile within the district for the greater portion of six months at the time of the filing of the petition, and the court therefore had jurisdiction to declare him a bankrupt. In re Oldstein (D. C. 1910) 182 Fed. 409, 25 Am. Bankr. Rep. 138. And see In re Filer (D. C. 1900) 108 Fed. 209, 5 Am. Bankr. Rep. 332.

9. Jurisdiction dependent on amount of debts.-When proceedings in bankruptcy are involuntary and are instituted by creditors, it is a jurisdictional requisite that the person or corporation proceeded against should "owe debts to the amount of one thousand dollars or over." Post, § 9588.

Under former bankruptcy laws, it was held that the jurisdiction, in so far as it depended on the amount of indebtedness, must exist at the time of the trial and adjudication, and that, although the debts might amount to the requisite sum at the time of filing the petition, yet if they were thereafter reduced by payments made, so as to amount to less than the jurisdictional sum, the court lost jurisdiction and could not make an adjudication. re Skelley (D. C. 1871) Fed. Cas. No. 12,921. But see In re Jacobson (D. C. 1909) 181 Fed. 870, 24 Am. Bankr. Rep. 927, holding that the statute should be construed as having reference to the amount of indebtedness at the time of the commission of the act of bankruptcy charged, on the ground that, when a debtor commits an act

In

of bankruptcy denounced by the statute, his creditors immediately acquire a vested right to avail themselves of it, to file a petition, and to have the estate administered by the court of bankruptcy.

Where a petition was filed against a partnership after its dissolution, and its indebtedness was not shown to reach the required amount, except by including some debts which accrued after the dissolution and which became obligations of the firm only on the ground of estoppel in favor of such creditors as had no notice of the dissolution, it was held that the court should not make an adjudication of bankruptcy. In re Pinson & Co. (D. C. 1910) 180 Fed. 787, 24 Am. Bankr. Rep. 804.

In computing the amount of indebtedness of an alleged bankrupt, the claims of preferred creditors must be included, if their preferences were given under such circumstances as to be voidable, since they will be entitled to prove their claims in the bankruptcy proceedings when they have surrendered their preferences or when the same have been voluntarily relinquished.

In re McMurtrey & Smith (D. C. 1905) 142 Fed. 853, 15 Am. Bankr. Rep. 427; In re Tirre (D. C. 1899) 95 Fed. 425, 2 Am. Bankr. Rep. 493; In re Norcross (1899) 1 Am. Bankr. Rep. 644, 1 Nat. Bankr. News, 257; In re Cain (1899) 2 Am. Bankr. Rep. 379.

The act of bankruptcy charged was the making of a general assignment by a debtor who, at the time, owed much more than the required amount. Some of the creditors assented to the assignment and released the debtor on receiving their proportional part of the assets covered by the assignment. But other creditors, refusing to assent, filed a petition in bankruptcy. The settlement with assenting creditors had then reduced the amount of unreleased indebtedness below the sum of one thousand dollars. Nevertheless the court held that it had jurisdiction and that an adjudication should be made, on the ground that the released debts should be regarded as still existing and unpaid, at least for the purpose of the present proceeding and in order to secure to the nonassenting creditors the rights and remedies with which they became vested upon the commission of the act of bankruptcy. In re Jacobson (D. C. 1909) 181 Fed. 870, 24 Am. Bankr. Rep. 927.

10. Jurisdiction of bankrupt's person. -It is not the petition in bankruptcy which confers upon the court jurisdiction of the subject-matter, but such jurisdiction is conferred by the statute, and does not depend upon the freedom of the petition from defects in form or substance. Jurisdiction of the person of the bankrupt is acquired by the filing