yard Co. (1910) 110 P. 913, 158 Cal. 252.

Under Civ. Code Cal. § 991, the name "Los Angeles Van, Truck & Storage Company" could not be the subject of exclusive trade-mark, since it referred to the description of the business. Dunston v. Los Angeles Van & Storage Co. (Cal. 1913) 131 Pac. 115.

The question whether the word "Hygeia" had come to have a meaning descriptive of character and quality, so that it could not be used as a trademark, is for the court to determine. Hygeia Distilled Water Co. v. Hygeia Ice Co. (1898) 40 A. 534, 70 Conn. 516.

The word "Snowflake," as applied to bread or crackers, is a mere descriptive phrase of appearance or quality, and will not answer for a trade-mark. Larrabee v. Lewis (1881) 67 Ga. 561, 44 Am. Rep. 735.

Words descriptive of an effect to be produced by the article, as "Health Producing Corsets," cannot be used as trade-marks. Ball v. Siegel (1886) 116 Ill. 137, 4 N. E. 667, 56 Am. Rep. 766. The words "Svenska Snusmagasinet," meaning "Swedish snuff store," being merely descriptive of the business there carried on, cannot constitute a tradename as against other Swedes engaged in the snuff business. Bolander v. Peterson (1891) 136 Ill. 215, 26 N. E. 603, affirmed (1890) 35 Ill. App. 551.

Right to the exclusive use of words, such as "cheese cutter," as a tradename, which are merely descriptive, cannot be gained by prior use. puting Cheese Cutter Co. v.. Dunn (Ind. App. 1909) 88 N. E. 93.

Com

The term "travelers' insurance" may properly be applied to that class of insurance business which specializes in the insurance of the lives of travelers, though the insurance company also has other branches of insurance. Travelers' Ins. Mach. Co. v. Travelers' Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn. (1911) 134 S. W. 877, 142 Ky. 523, judgment modified (1911) 136 S. W. 154, 143 Ky. 216.

The term "travelers' insurance" is a generic term, the exclusive use of which as a part of the name of an insurance company cannot be acquired. Id.

The word "rye" cannot of itself be appropriated, but when used in connection with the word "Bonnie," even though that be a surname, the trademark becomes specific. Bonnie & Co. v. Bonnie Bros. (1914) 169 S. W. 871, 160 Ky. 487.

One cannot claim, as a trade-mark, the exclusive use of the word "Fruit" as applied to vinegar. Alden v. Gross (1887) 25 Mo. App. 123.

The right to use the trade-name "Electric Lump Coal" held not exclusive. McGrew Coal Co. v. Menefee (1912) 144 S. W. 869, 162 Mo. App. 209.

The French word "brassière," which means simply "brace," as applied to

an article of women's wear, but includes the idea of "restraint" and "to be under constraint," is not subject to exclusive appropriation as a trademark for a combined corset cover and bust supporter, even by a manufacturer first so using it in the United States. Charles R. De Bevoise Co. v. H. & W. Co. (1905) 60 A. 407, 69 N. J. Eq. 114.

The adjective "nonfluid" and the noun "oil," when used in their proper sense, cannot be exclusively appropriated as a trade-mark since they are merely descriptive. New York & N. J. Lubricant Co. v. Young (N. J. 1910) 77 A. 344.

The words "wire glass," as applied to a special kind of glass, are merely descriptive, and where there is no showing that after expiration of the patents the name was generally used to designate complainant's product in distinction to that of other manufacturers, the words cannot be exclusively appropriated. Mississippi Wire Glass Co. v. Continuous Glass Press Co. (N. J. 1911) 81 A. 374.

The designation of complainant's products as "nonfluid oils" held to be descriptive and not a trade-name. New York & New Jersey Lubricant Co. v. O. W. Young (N. J. 1915) 94 A. 570.

The phrase "Ferro-Phosphorated Elixir of Calisaya Bark," applied to a medicine the principal ingredients of which were iron, phosphorus, and elixir of calisaya bark, will not be protected as a trade-mark. Caswell v. Davis (1874) 58 N. Y. 223, 17 Am. Rep. 233, reversing (1867) 35 How. Prac. 76, 4 Abb. Prac. (N. S.) 6.

The term "Cherry Pectoral" cannot be claimed as a trade-mark for a medicine, as the first word describes one of the ingredients and the word "Pectoral" the class of diseases for which the medicine is intended. Ayer v. Rushton (N. Y. 1877) 7 Daly, 9.

The words "Rye and Rock" form a description of the article, and therefore are not a trade-mark. Van Beil v. Prescott (1880) 46 N. Y. Super. Ct. (14 Jones & S.) 542, affirmed (1880) 82 N. Y. 630.

The words "Silicon" and "Electro-Silicon" are properly the subject of a trade-mark, not being, in a scientific sense, descriptive of the article thus designated, although silicon is one of its component parts. Electro-Silicon Co. v. Hazard (N. Y. 1883) 29 Hun, 369. The words "Compressed Yeast" indicate the character and composition of an article, and are not the subject of a trade-mark. Fleischmann v. Newman (1888) 2 N. Y. Supp. 608, judgment affirmed Fleischman v. Same (1889) 51 Hun, 641, 4 N. Y. Supp. 642.

The word "Hygieniques," as applied to suspenders, is not descriptive, in the ordinary sense. and may become the subject of a valid trade-mark. Bailly v.

Nashawannuck Mfg. Co. (1890) 10 N. Y. Supp. 224.

The name "Bromo-Caffeine," applied to a preparation of bromide of potassium, caffeine, and other ingredients, is descriptive of the general characteristics and composition of the article, and a trade-mark cannot be acquired in such name. Keasbey v. Brooklyn Chemical Works (1893) 67 Hun, 648, 21 N. Y. Supp. 696, judgment reversed (1894) 142 N. Y. 467, 37 N. E. 476, 40 Am. St. Rep. 623.

"B. T.

Soap." "B. T.

Plaintiff sold soap marked: Babbitt. Trade-Mark. Best Defendant sold soap marked: Butler's. Trade-Mark. Best Soap." The size and shape of the cakes differed, the wrappers being of the same color and about the same size, but different in general appearance. Held, that no mark could be acquired in the words "Trade-Mark" or "Best Soap." Babbitt v. Brown (1893) 68 Hun, 515, 23 N. Y. Supp. 25.

Where plaintiffs called their mixture after the place it was made, and did not use the word "Angostura" as descriptive of the article till 1875, three years after its use by defendants, who testified that their article was so called from its chief ingredient, Angostura, or cusparia bark, plaintiffs had no trade-mark in the words "Angostura" or "Angostura Bitters." Siegert v. Abbott (1893) 72 Hun, 243, 25 N. Y. Supp. 590.

"Clinton Hematite Red," and "Metallic Clinton Paint," indicate a paint pigment made from Clinton hematite ore, and may not be exclusively appropriated as a trade-mark for such product. Clinton Metallic Paint Co. v. New York Metallic Paint Co. (1898) 50 N. Y. S. 437, 23 Misc. Rep. 66.

Plaintiffs adopted and used, as a trade-mark, the name "Filo-Floss," to designate their silk floss. Neither the word "filo" nor the combination "filofloss" were used to designate any peculiar quality or character, except as it has come to be associated with the plaintiffs' manufacture. Held, that the words constituted a valid trade-mark. Rawlinson v. Brainard & Armstrong Co. (1899) 59 N. Y. S. 880, 28 Misc. Rep. 287.

The term "air-cell," used in connection with the manufacture of fireproof material, is descriptive merely, and hence not the subject of a valid trademark. New York Asbestos Mfg. Co. v. New York Fireproof Covering Co. (1899) 62 N. Y. S. 339.

The word "Favorite" in the label on a letter file, designating it as the best, favorite, and cheapest letter and invoice file, is not subject to exclusive appropriation as a trade-mark. Cooke & Cobb Co. v. Miller (1902) 62 N. E. 582, 169 N. Y. 475, affirming judgment (1900) 65 N. Y. S. 730, 53 App. Div. 120, 8 N. Y. Ann. Cas. 58.

The "Car Advertising Company," was not entitled to restrain defendant from

using the name "New York City Car Advertising Company," the expression "car advertising" being a general term appropriately descriptive of the business. Car Advertising Co. v. New York City Car Advertising Co. (1907) 107 N. Y. S. 547, 57 Misc. Rep. 105.

"Chantecler," as the name of a play in which a barnyard fowl is represented by each part, is not of such a descriptive character as to preclude its exclusive appropriation. Frohman v. William Morris (1910) 123 N. Y. S. 1090, 68 Misc. Rep. 461.

The words "egg carrier and tray manufacturing company" are descriptive in their primary sense, and cannot be appropriated for the exclusive use of the manufacturer. Elbs v. Rochester Egg Carrier Co. (1912) 134 N. Y. S. 979.

The word "Security" on tires held not a valid trade-mark, being descriptive rather than calculated to show that they were those of a particular manufacturer. Buffalo Rubber Mfg. Co. v. Batavia Rubber Co. (1914) 153 N. Y. S. 779, 90 Misc. Rep. 418.

The name "Barlow's Indigo Blue," representing an article of bluing manufactured by a certain person, is a valid trade-mark. Wiltberger V. Walker (Ohio, 1883) 9 Wkly. Law Bul. 42.

The name "Simmons" cannot be appropriated as a trade-mark, when it has become descriptive of medicine prepared under a formula and is used by many people in connection with such medicines. C. F. Simmons Medicine Co. v. Mansfield Drug Co. (1893) 93 Tenn. (9 Pickle) 84, 23 S. W. 165.

The words "Liver Medicine," being purely descriptive, cannot be appropriated as a trade-mark. Id.

The use of the words "Microbe Killer" on a label does not constitute a trademark; they being in common use and of fixed meaning. Alff v. Radam (1890) 77 Tex. 530, 14 S. W. 164, 19 Am. St. Rep. 792, 9 L. R. A. 145.

12.

Quality.-A word used to distinguish a known quality of goods cannot be adopted as a trade-mark and appropriated by a single person as against a general public. Columbia Mill Co. v. Alcorn (1893) 150 U. S. 460, 14 Sup. Ct. 151, 37 L. Ed. 1144 (affirming judgment [C. C. 1889] 40 Fed. 676); Adams & W. Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis Wire-Goods Co. (C. C. 1877) Fed. Cas. No. 72; Burton v. Stratton (C. C. 1882) 12 Fed. 696; Wilcox & Gibbs Sewing Mach. Co. v. Gibbens Frame (C. C. 1883) 17 Fed. 623; Burke v. Cassin (1873) 45 Cal. 467, 13 Am. Rep. 204; Sohl v. Geisendorf (Ind. 1871) Wils. 60; Gilman v. Hunnewell (1877) 122 Mass. 139; Smith v. Walker (1885) 57 Mich. 456, 24 N. W. 830; Snodgrass v. Welle (1882) 11 Mo. App. 590; Godillot v. Hazard (N. Y. 1875) 49 How. Prac. 5.

Letters or figures affixed to merchandise by a manufacturer for the purpose of denoting its quality only cannot be

appropriated by him to his exclusive use as a trade-mark-as the letters "A. C. A.," used on ticking. Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v. Trainer (1879) 101 U. S. 51, 25 L. Ed. 993; Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v. Spear (1849) 4 N. Y. Super. Ct. (2 Sandf.) 599.

Complainants have no trade-mark in the word "Tycoon" for a certain kind of tea, it appearing that the word was in common and general use, as descriptive of a certain class of teas, for many years before complainants' adoption of it. Corbin v. Gould (1890) 133 U. S. 308, 10 Sup. Ct. 312, 33 L. Ed. 611.

There can be no valid trade-mark in a word placed upon an article, not for the purpose of indicating origin, manufacture, or ownership, but merely as designating quality, class, grade, or style. Columbia Mill Co. v. Alcorn (1893) 14 Sup. Ct. 151, 152, 150 U. S. 460, 37 L. Ed. 1144, affirming judgment (C. C. 1889) 40 Fed. 676.

The word "Kaiser," used in connection with a brand of beer, is not indicative of class, grade, style, quality, or locality, and may therefore be lawfully appropriated as a trade-mark. J. & P. Baltz Brewing Co. v. Kaiserbrauerei, Beck & Co. (1896) 74 Fed. 222, 20 C. C. A. 402.

The word "imperial" is so far a designation of quality as to be incapable of adoption as a trade-mark for beer. Showalter, Circuit Judge, dissenting. Beadleston & Woerz v. Cooke Brewing Co. (1896) 74 Fed. 229, 20 C. C. A. 405. The word "Aluminum," as applied to an article of manufacture composed in part of that metal, cannot be monopolized as a technical trade-mark. American Washboard Co. v. Saginaw Mfg. Co. (1900) 103 Fed. 281, 43 C. C. A. 233, 50 L. R. A. 609.

The word "Queen," used to designate ladies' shoes, is not essentially one which signifies quality, so as to preclude its appropriation as a trade-name; nor does the addition of the word "Quality" to the name, after it has become identified with the goods of such manufacturer, deprive the owner of the right to injunction against the use by another of the word "Queen" as a name for similar shoes, where it appears that the sole purpose of the defendant in adopting it was to obtain the advantage of the reputation which complainant's goods had acquired under that name. Thomas G. Plant Co. v. May Co. (1900) 105 Fed. 375, 44 C. C. A. 534.

Where the general purpose of a tradename is to identify the origin or ownership of the articles to which it is attached, the right to the exclusive use of such name is not affected by the fact that the words also denote quality, and carry with them a claim of excellence incident to the goods of such origin or ownership. Id.

The words "Stoga Kip," as applied to boots, indicate neither ownership nor origin, but quality, and are not the sub

Walker v.

ject of valid trade-mark. Reid (C. C. 1877) Fed. Cas. No. 17,084.

If the primary object of the trademark be to indicate origin or ownership, the mere fact that the article has obtained such a wide sale that the mark · has also become indicative of quality is not of itself sufficient to debar the owners of protection, or make it the common property of the trade. Burton v. Stratton (C. C. 1882) 12 Fed. 696.

Where hay knives have been advertised and sold for years as "Lightning Hay-Knives," and the word "lightning" has been registered as a trade-mark by the manufacturers of these knives, they may enjoin the sale of "Lightning Pattern Hay-Knives"; the word "Lightning" not being merely descriptive of the quality or characteristics of the knives. Hiram Holt Co. v. Wadsworth (C. C. 1889) 41 Fed. 34.

The use of the word "Rose," in connection with the word "Vanilla," as a trade-mark, is no ground for enjoining a rival maker of similar products, containing those well-known flavors, from using those words in describing his goods. Clotworthy v. Schepp (C. C. 1890) 42 Fed. 62.

The word "Cottolene," designating a substitute for lard composed of cottonseed oil and the product of beef fat, is not so descriptive of the substance and quality of its component parts that it cannot be used as a trade-mark. N. K. Fairbank Co. v. Central Lard Co. (C. C. 1894) 64 Fed. 133.

While there can be no valid trademark as denoting quality when used merely to indicate grade, ingredients, or properties, there may be a valid trade-mark as indicating quality when used to indicate the merit or excellence of an article as associated with or comDennison ing from a certain source. Mfg. Co. v. Thomas Mfg. Co. (C. C. 1899) 94 Fed. 651.

The words "Toothache Gum," to designate a preparation for the relief of toothache, designated quality, rather than the origin or ownership of the article, and were therefore not subject to appropriation as a technical trademark. Devlin v. McLeod (C. C. 1904) 135 Fed. 164.

Where the primary purpose in adopting an arbitrary mark was to indicate and identify the origin of the goods, one is not debarred from protection because it has incidentally come to indicate also their quality. Capewell Horse Nail Co. v. Mooney (C. C. 1909) 167 Fed. 575, decree affirmed (1909) 172 Fed. 826, 97 C. C. A. 248.

In a trade-mark interference case involving the question of the prior use of the word "Eureka" as a trade-mark for pressing boards, the mark was not a grade mark merely, but a valid trademark. Case v. Murphey (1908) 31 App. D. C. 245.

The mark must denote origin or own

.

ership of the goods, and not the kind or quality. Scott v. Sewell (La. 1884) 2 McGloin, 7.

Right to use words distinguishing known quality of article. Snodgrass v. Welle (1882) 11 Mo. App. 590.

A shoe dealer, who had selected certain shoes and applied the name "Delsarte" thereto, was not entitled to use such trade-mark for any kind of shoes it might make or sell, since its prior use of the word was to indicate the particular quality or character of the shoes selected by it, and not as a fancy name. Medlar & Holmes Shoe Co. v. Delsarte Mfg. Co. (1900) 46 A. 1089, 68 N. J. Eq. 706, affirmed (1905) 61 A. 410, 68 N. J. Eq. 706.

Where words such as "Galen," "Lake," "Cylinder," "Wayne," and "New York," were used by both plaintiff and defendant for designating quality only, and not to distinguish the goods of plaintiff from those of others, they were not subject to exclusive appropriation as a trade-mark. Stokes v. Landgraff (N. Y. 1853) 17 Barb. 608.

The term "Club House," as applied to certain gin, does not indicate ownership or origin, but is merely intended to imply a superior quality of gin, and hence is not susceptible of use as a trade-mark. Corwin v. Daly (1860) 20 N. Y. Super. Ct. (7 Bosw.) 222.

The words "Gold Medal" as a trademark do not indicate ownership or origin, but quality, and so they cannot be appropriated as a trade-mark. Taylor v. Gillies (1874) 59 N. Y. 331, 17 Am. Rep. 333, affirming (1874) 5 Daly, 285.

Plaintiff's predecessors had used the word "Royal" to indicate a flavoring extract of certain grade, and defendants afterwards applied the same designation to extracts which they manufactured. Held, that plaintiffs could not prevent defendants from using the word "Royal," which merely indicated the quality of the goods. Royal Baking Powder Co. v. Sherrell (1883) 93 N. Y. 331, 45 Am. Rep. 229.

The words "Maryland Club Whisky," arbitrarily chosen for a particular whisky and not in themselves indicating any particular kind, quality, or composition of whisky previously well known to the trade, are a proper subject for a trademark. Cahn v. Gottschalk (1888) 2 N. Y. Supp. 13, 14 Daly, 542.

The term "Black Package Tea" is not exclusively appropriable, since it manifestly refers either to the quality of the article or the color of the package in which it is sold. Fischer v. Blank (1893) 138 N. Y. 244, 33 N. E. 1040.

Words or names which describe the product or ware to which they are applied, by indicating its kind, quality or ingredients may not be exclusively appropriated as trade-marks therefor. Clinton Metallic Paint Co. v. New York Metallic Paint Co. (1898) 50 N. Y. S. 437, 23 Misc. Rep. 66.

The adoption of words descriptive of a kind of business, or quality and class of goods sold, such as the words "Misfit Parlors," does not constitute a tradename, so as to entitle the person so adopting it to enjoin its use by a competitor. Cohn v. Kahn (1882) 8 Ohio Dec. 472, 8 Wkly. Law Bul. 154.

The word "Asepsin," newly coined and used as the name of a chemical salt obtained from the wintergreen plant, and alleged to contain antiseptic qualities, is a proper subject for trade-mark. Lloyd v. William S. Merrill Chemical Co. (Ohio, 1891) 25 Wkly. Law Bul. 319.

The doctrine that a name cannot be a trade-mark or trade-name only applies when the name is used to describe the kind or quality of the thing sold, and not the article of a particular maker or seller. Avenarius v. Kornely (1909) 121 N. W. 336, 139 Wis. 247.

13. Devices and symbols.-The insignia of the Carthusian monks-a globe, cross, and seven stars-with the words "Gde. Chartreuse" underneath, could be registered as a valid trade-mark, as could also a label bearing the inscription "Liqueur Fabriquée à la Gde. Chartreuse," with the same ecclesiastical symbols and a facsimile of the signature of a former procureur of the order. Baglin v. Cusenier Co. (1911) 31 Sup. Ct. 669, 672, 221 U. S. 580, 55 L. Ed. 863, reversing decree (1908) 164 Fed. 25, 90 C. C. A. 499.

The symbol of the keystone of an arch is susceptible of exclusive appropriation as a trade-mark. Buzby v. Davis (1906) 150 Fed. 275, 80 C. C. A. 163, 10 Ann. Cas. 68.

An illustration of a crown used by brand, stencil plate, etc., upon vessels and labels for paints, may be a lawful trade-mark. Smith v. Reynolds (C. C. 1872) Fed. Cas. No. 13,098.

The word "Star," and the symbol of a star, adopted and used during many years to mark and designate one's goods, in combination with the words "Star Shirts," and other words describing the articles, constitute a valid trademark. Hutchinson v. Blumberg (C. C. 1892) 51 Fed. 829.

The use of a conventional diamondshaped figure gives no trade-mark right in the word "Diamond," where the product has not been sold or become known under that name. Pittsburgh Crushed-Steel Co. v. Diamond Steel Co. (C. C. 1898) 85 Fed. 637.

The representation of a horse on packages of salve for galls or abrasions of the skin of horses and cattle is generic in character, and its registration as a trade-mark cannot give a monopoly, and exclude others from using any representation of a horse on medicine of the same character, but the exclusive right is limited to the representation of a horse of the same or substantially similar appearance, style, or position. Bickmore Gall Cure Co. v. Karns Mfg.

Co. (C. C. 1903) 126 Fed. 573, decree reversed Same v. Karns (1905) 134 Fed. 833, 67 C. C. A. 439.

That the eagle is the national emblem does not prevent its appropriation for use as a private trade-mark, especially when there is but slight resemblance in the figure of the eagle so used to that of the national emblem. U. S. v. Steffens (D. C. 1877) Fed. Cas. No. 16,384.

The use of the red cross symbol as a trade-mark, beginning prior to the year 1905, is not against public policy, in view of the proviso in this section declaring the use of such marks permissible if they antedated that year. Deitsch Bros. v. Loonen (1912) 39 App. D. C. 114.

The representation of a rim of a wheel with a tire thereon is not, even though the tire be disclaimed, registerable as a trade-mark, since no manufacturer should be prevented from representing to the public the manner in which his goods are used. In re Motz Tire & Rubber Co. (1913) 40 App. D. C. 487.

The emblems, particularly the lion, prescribed by British statutes for the certification of sterling silver by assay offices, are insignia of Great Britain, within the provision of this section denying registration to any mark comprising the flag or coat of arms or other insignia, or any simulation thereof, of any foreign nation. In re Gorham Mfg. Co. (1913) 41 App. D. C. 263.

An application for registration as a trade-mark of a winged foot, which before its adoption by the applicant, was for years a well-known emblem of an athletic club, is defeated by the enactment, during its pendency, of a statute prohibiting the registration of any distinguishing mark, character, or emblem adopted by any institution, organization, club, or society incorporated in any state prior to the date of adoption and use by the applicant. Given v. New York Athletic Club (1914) 42 App. D. C. 558.

Where one adopted the brands "O. F. C.," and "Carlisle," and later used an autograph signature in connection therewith as a test of genuineness, such script was no part of the trade-mark, and that it consisted merely of the symbol "O. F. C." and the word "Carlisle." George T. Stagg Co. v. Taylor (1894) 95 Ky. 651, 27 S. W. 247.

A paper carton constructed by superimposing on the cardboard carton blank, a sheet of waxed paper of the size and shape of the blank, so that, when folded, it will form a unit box, and bundle packages, may not be exclusively appropriated by a manufacturer as devised to mark and indicate its product. National Biscuit Co. v. Pacific Coast Biscuit Co. (N. J. Ch. 1914) 91 A. 126.

A small metallic frame, containing a portrait fastened to a pin, is not a valid trade-mark, when so attached to and sold with a cigar as to be readily detached and used separately as a per

sonal ornament, since an article having a distinct commercial value of its own cannot be made a trade-mark for another article by being attached to and sold with it. Hoeb v. Bishop (1889) 10 Ohio Dec. 595, 22 Wkly. Law Bul. 151.

The letter "K," inclosed with two circles, between which at the top was written the abbreviation "No.," and at the bottom the abbreviation "Yds.," with no indications of the origin or ownership of the goods manufactured, could not constitute a trade-mark. Ferguson v. Davol Mills (Pa. 1868) 2 Brewst. 314.

The design or emblem of a keystone slightly raised over the keyhole of an ordinary padlock may be adopted as a valid technical trade-mark. E. T. Fraim Lock Co. v. Shimer (1910) 43 Pa. Super. Ct. 221.

14. Numerals. - After the number "600" had long been used by manufacturers to indicate the number of degrees of heat at which oil had been subjected to fire test, and various letters had been used with it to indicate other qualities or grades or special uses, one manufacturer could not appropriate the symbol "600W" as a trade-mark, so as to exclude other manufacturers from using such numbers, either alone, or in combination with other letters of the alphabet. Vacuum Oil Co. v. Climax Refining Co. (1903) 120 Fed. 254, 56 C. C. A. 90, writ of certiorari denied (1903) 24 Sup. Ct. 846, 191 U. S. 574, 48 L. Ed. 308.

A series of numbers used by a manufacturer of labels in its catalogues, not primarily to indicate origin, but to designate the color, shape, and size of the label, each kind being given a different number, do not in themselves constitute good trade-marks. Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Scharf Tag, Label & Box Co. (1905) 135 Fed. 625, 68 C. C. A. 263, writ of certiorari denied (1906) 26 Sup. Ct. 762, 201 U. S. 648, 50 L. Ed. 904.

Numerals, used to designate styles of shoes, rather than the manufacturer, cannot be made the subject of a trademark. Wolf Bros. & Co. v. HamiltonBrown Shoe Co. (1908) 165 Fed. 413, 91 C. C. A. 363, writ of certiorari denied (1909) 29 Sup. Ct. 696, 214 U. S. 514, 53 L. Ed. 1063.

That a trade-mark was an ornamental device which added to the appearance of the article, and also came to represent quality, did not prevent it from operating as a valid trade-mark. Capewell Horse Nail Co. v. Mooney (1909) 172 Fed. 826, 97 C. C. A. 248, affirming decree (C. C. 1909) 167 Fed. 575.

A trade-mark in the symbol "," as ordinarily printed, cannot be acquired for cigarettes made of two kinds of tobacco, half and half; but held, that plaintiff had acquired a right to it in a particular form, size, color, and style, under which it was registered. Kinney v. Allen (C. C. 1877) Fed. Cas. No. 7,826.

Where complainant had used certain