mark for 10 years next preceding the passage of the act. Wm. A. Rogers v. International Silver Co. (1907) 30 App. D. C. 97.

A mark which cannot be appropriated and registered as a technical trademark because it consists of words descriptive of the goods with which it is used may nevertheless be registered under this section, if the mark has been actually and exclusively used by the applicant for 10 years next preceding the passage of the act. Battle Creek Sanitarium Co. v. Fuller (1908) 30 App. D. C. 411.

Under this section, the user of a mark which was not susceptible of registration as a technical trade-mark would have no right during such 10 years' period to exclude another from using the word; and therefore an application for registration of such a mark will be refused on the ground that the applicant's use of the word during the 10-year period was not exclusive, if it appears that during that time another was also using the word as a trademark upon the same class of goods. Worster Brewing Corp. v. Rueter & Co. (1908) 30 App. D. C. 428.

or

The provision of this section prohibiting the registration of any mark which is "merely a geographical name term" is simply declaratory of the common law. McIlhenny v. New Iberia Extracts of Tabasco Pepper Co. (1910) 34 App. D. C. 430.

4. Trade-marks and trade-namesNature of trade-marks in general.-A trade-mark is a distinctive mark of authenticity, through which the products of particular manufacturers or vendible commodities of particular merchants may be distinguished from those of others, and may consist in any symbol or form of words; but, as its office is to point out distinctively the origin or ownership of the articles to which it is affixed, no sign or form of words can be appropriated which, from the nature of the fact conveyed by its primary meaning, others may employ with equal truth and with equal right for the same purpose. Elgin Nat. Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch Case Co. (1901) 21 Sup. Ct. 270, 273, 179 U. S. 665, 45 L. Ed. 365.

For other definitions of "trade-mark," see Blackwell v. Dibrell (C. C. 1878) Fed. Cas. No. 1,475; Shaw Stocking Co. v. Mack (C. C. 1882) 12 Fed. 707; Hostetter v. Fries (C. C. 1883) 17 Fed. 620; Davis v. Davis (C. C. 1886) 27 Fed. 490, 491; Galena-Signal Oil Co. v. W. P. Fuller & Co. (C. C. 1906) 142 Fed. 1002; Coca-Cola Co. v. Nashville Syrup Co. (D. C. 1912) 200 Fed. 157; Hughes v. Alfred H. Smith Co. (D. C. 1913) 205 Fed. 302; United Lace & Braid Mfg. Co. v. Barthels Mfg. Co. (D. C. 1915) 221 Fed. 456; Burke v. Cassin (1873) 45 Cal. 467, 13 Am. Rep. 204; Italian Swiss Colony v. Italian Vineyard Co. (Cal. 1910) 110 Pac. 913;

In re American Circular Loom Co. (1906) 28 App. D. C. 446; Sartor v. Schaden (1904) 101 N. W. 511, 125 Iowa, 696; Metcalfe v. Brand (1887) 86 Ky. 331, 5 S. W. 773, 9 Ky. Law Rep. 801, 9 Am. St. Rep. 282; Handy v. Commander (1897) 22 So. 230, 49 La. Ann. 1119; Rogers v. Taintor (1867) 97 Mass. 291; Smith v. Imus (1885) 24 N. W. 830, 57 Mich. 456 (rehearing denied Same v. Walker [1886] 26 N. W. 783, 57 Mich. 456); Helmbold v. Helmbold Mfg. Co. (N. Y. 1877) 53 How. Prac. 453; Ball v. Broadway Bazaar (1909) 87 N. E. 674, 194 N. Y. 429 (reversing judgment [1907] 106 N. Y. S. 249, 121 App. Div. 546); E. T. Fraim Lock Co. v. Shimer (1910) 43 Pa. Super. Ct. 221; Western Grocer Co. v. Caffarelli Bros. (Tex. Civ. App. 1908) 108 S. W. 413.

What may be adopted as trade-marks in general. McLean v. Fleming (1877) 96 U. S. 245, 254, 24 L. Ed. 828.

It is not essential to a valid trademark that its use shall have been long continued, or that the article on which it is used should be widely known, or should have attained great reputation. It is sufficient if the article with the mark upon it has become actually a vendible article in the market, with intent by the proprietor to continue its production and sale. Kathreiner's Malzkaffee Fabriken Mit Beschränkter Haftung v. Pastor Kneipp Medicine Co. (1897) 82 Fed. 321, 27 C. C. A. 351.

To constitute a commercial or trade designation, as contradistinguished from a descriptive term, the words, it would seem, must be used in commerce in an unvarying or stereotyped order. Field v. U. S. (1898) 90 Fed. 412, 33 C. C. A. 138.

To constitute a trade-mark, the mark or symbol used must be designed, as its primary purpose, to distinguish each of the articles to which it is affixed from like articles produced by others. If it is originally adopted for some other purpose, such as to designate the size, shape, and capacity of the article, so that any office it may perform as a designation of origin is merely incidental, no trade-mark right is acquired. Deering Harvester Co. v. Whitman & Barnes Mfg. Co. (1898) 91 Fed. 376, 33 C. C. A. 558 (affirming decree [C. C. 1897] 86 Fed. 764); Newcomer & Lewis v. Scriven Co. (1909) 168 Fed. 621, 94 C. C. A. 77 (writ of certiorari denied J. A. Scriven Co. v. Newcomer [1909] 29 Sup. Ct. 700, 214 U. S. 518, 53 L. Ed. 1065).

That an ornamental device was stamped on a single edition of an author's works published in this country, without any notice that it was intended as a trade-mark, and that a similar device was printed some years before on a few volumes of his works published in India, in connection with the publisher's name, while other editions printed in this country and in England

were without it, does not entitle it to protection as a trade-mark. Kipling v. G. P. Putnam's Sons (1903) 120 Fed. 631, 57 C. C. A. 295, 65 L. R. A. 873. It is not necessary to the validity of a trade-mark or trade-name that it shall be utterly devoid of aptitude, but it is enough that it leaves open to every one all words that are really descriptive of quality or character. Consolidated Ice Co. v. Hygeia Distilled Water Co. (1907) 151 Fed. 10, 80 C. C. A. 506.

The gist of a trade-mark is its association in the public mind with a product; it being the identifying mark of a trade. Pflugh v. Eagle White Lead Co. (1911) 185 Fed. 769, 107 C. C. A. 659, reversing decree Eagle White Lead Co. v. Pflugh (C. C. 1910) 180 Fed. 579, and writ of certiorari denied Eagle White Lead Co. v. Pflugh (1911) 31 Sup. Ct. 719, 220 U. S. 615, 55 L. Ed. 610.

A trade-mark signifies anything that has become in time adopted as the prima facie means of detecting the goods, wares, or properties of certain proprietors. Washington Medalion Pen Co. v. Esterbrook (C. C. 1869) Fed. Cas. No. 17,246a.

Trade-marks are an entirety, and are incapable of exclusive use at different places by more than one independent proprietor. Manhattan Medicine Co. v. Wood (C. C. 1878) Fed. Cas. No. 9,026.

A trade-mark is a mark by which the wares of the owner are known in trade; its object being, first, to protect the party using it from competition with inferior manufactures, and, second, to protect the public from imposition. Shaw Stocking Co. v. Mack (C. C. 1882) 12 Fed. 707.

A trade-mark consists of a word, mark, or device adopted by a manufacturer or vendor to distinguish his production from other productions of the same article. Hostetter v. Fries (C. C. 1883) 17 Fed. 620.

The term "mark" in the trade-mark law implies form rather than color, and it consists of some peculiar name, symbol, figure, letter, or device whereby one manufacturer distinguishes his goods from like goods sold by other persons. Fleischmann v. Starkey (C. C. 1885) 25 Fed. 127, 129.

Trade-marks may be characteristic of personal proprietorship as asserting to the public that some particular person has given his special skill to the production or selection of the articles covered, or trade-marks may designate some particular place of origin. Hill v. Lockwood (C. C. 1887) 32 Fed. 389, 393.

Act March 3, 1881, c. 138, providing for the registration of trade-marks, presupposes the existence of a valid trade-mark, which may be registered on compliance with the requirements of the law. Edison v. Thomas A. Edi

son, Jr., Chemical Co. (C. C. 1904) 128 Fed. 1013.

A trade-mark merely distinguishes and designates the business in which it is used, and it is the business which is to be protected, and not the trademark as a mere collocation of words or symbols. Thomas G. Carroll & Son Co. v. McIlvaine & Baldwin (C. C. 1909) 171 Fed. 125, decree affirmed Thomas J. Carroll & Son Co. v. McIlvaine & Baldwin (1910) 183 Fed. 22, 105 C. C. A. 314.

The owner of a trade-mark proper has an exclusive right to its use in connection with articles for which it was appropriated, and to which it has been applied, and a mark under which no such exclusive right can exist in the owner or appropriator cannot constitute a trade-mark proper. John T. Dyer Quarry Co. v. Schuylkill Stone Co. (C. C. 1911) 185 Fed. 557.

A trade-mark serves to protect the owner from unfair competition, and the public from being deceived and it is the design appearing upon the goods, and not the specifications filed in the patent office, that affects the public mind and protects the trade of the owner. Peter Schoenhofen Brewing Co. v. Maltine Co. (1908) 30 App. D. C. 340, 346.

Two trade-marks may be said to be appropriated to merchandise of the same descriptive properties, within the meaning of the trade-mark act, when the general and essential characteristics of the goods are the same. The test is whether there is such a sameness in the distinguishing characteristics of the goods as to be likely to mislead the general public. If there is, only one mark should be registered. Phoenix Paint & Varnish Co. v. John T. Lewis & Bros. (1908) 32 App. D. C. 285.

The trade-mark act is intended to limit the selection of marks for registration to mere arbitrary words or designs, the value of which will consist alone in their becoming fixed in the public mind through continued use on the goods of the owner, and not to permit marks to be registered which are such as will in themselves enhance the sale or value of the article to which they are applied. In re Central Consumers Co. (1909) 32 App. D. C. 523.

Whether a mark is or is not registerable as a trade-mark, because of alleged similarity to another, depends upon the special facts and circumstances of the case. Lang v. Green River Distilling Co. (1909) 33 App. D. C. 506.

For trade-mark purposes, there is no difference between inner and outer tubes of tires. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Republic Rubber Co. (1915) 43 App. D. C. 275.

A trade-mark may consist of a name or a device, or a peculiar arrangement of words, lines, or figures, or any.

peculiar mark or symbol not theretofore in use, adopted and used by one to designate goods as those which he manufactures or sells. It may be put either upon the article itself, or its case, covering. or wrapper, and is assignable with the business. Metcalfe v. Brand (1887) 86 Ky. 331, 5 S. W. 773, 9 Ky. Law Rep. 801, 9 Am. St. Rep. 282.

A trade-mark is a name, sign, or symbol which indicates or certifies that a given article or commodity is in reality what it claims or purports to be, and, while in a qualified sense it is property in the hands of its owner, it has no intrinsic value, being merely a certificate of the truth. Commonwealth V. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co. (Ky. 1909) 116 S. W. 766.

Where one transfers the right to use his trade-mark and formula without transferring the place of manufacture, or plant used, or the good-will of the business, and there is no exclusive right to manufacture the medicine in any one, and there is nothing in the trade-mark to indicate that the medicine comes from a particular manufactory, the only effect of the trade-mark is to indicate a class of goods which any one who knows how may manufacture. Chadwick v. Covell (1890) 151 Mass. 190, 23 N. E. 1068, 6 L. R. A. 839, 21 Am. St. Rep. 442; Covell v. Chadwick (1891) 153 Mass. 263, 26 N. E. 856, 25 Am. St. Rep. 625.

The office of a trade-mark is to point out distinctly the origin or ownership of the article; and, unless it does so indicate the ownership or origin, neither the person who has adopted the mark or device can be injured by its appropriation by others, nor can the public be deceived. Oakes v. St. Louis Candy Co. (1898) 146 Mo. 391, 48 S. W. 467.

To entitle one to restrain the use of a trade-name, he must show that he made use of it in a manner such as to reasonably apprise the public that he intended it as a distinctive appellation for his trade or place of business. Chadron Opera House Co. v. Loomer (1904) 99 N. W. 649, 71 Neb. 785.

Every manufacturer, and every merchant for whom goods are manufactured, has an unquestionable right to distinquish the goods that he manufactures or sells by a peculiar mark or device, in order that they may be known by his mark in the market and that he may thus secure the profits which their superior repute as his may be the means of gaining. His trade-mark is an assurance to the public of the quality of his goods, and a pledge of his own integrity in their manufacture and sale. Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v. Spear (1849) 4 N. Y. Super. Ct. (2 Sandf.) 599.

A trade-mark is not necessarily limited to a device or name used, such as "Sapolio," but may consist of any

marks, forms, or symbols which serve to designate the true ownership of the article, including the form of the package. Enoch Morgan's Sons Co. v. Troxell (N. Y. 1881) 23 Hun, 632.

A trade-mark may be wholly exclusive, or of a lesser degree of exclusiveness. Clinton Metallic Paint Co. v. New York Metallic Paint Co. (1898) 50 N. Y. S. 437, 23 Misc. Rep. 66.

Where manufacturers adopted the word "Excelsior" to indicate certain felt pads manufactured by them, and also a distinctive label having on it "Excelsior Felt Pads," the fact that their name was not on the label, or that they manufactured the goods for sale by retail dealers, cannot prevent them from acquiring a trade-mark in the name and label adopted. Volger v. Force (1901) 71 N. Y. S. 209, 63 App. Div. 122.

A trade-mark has been defined to be one's commercial signature. Star Co. v. Wheeler Syndicate (1915) 155 N. Y. S. 782.

To constitute a symbol or device a trade-mark, it is not necessary that the name or place of business of the manufacturers should appear thereon. Peurrung v. Compton (1892) 6 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 483.

A trade-mark capable of an exclusive use must be such as will identify the article to which it is affixed, and distinguish it from others. Phalon v. Wright (Pa. 1864) 5 Phila. 464.

A trade-mark is an arbitrary symbol affixed by a manufacturer or merchant to a vendible commodity, the purpose of which is to guaranty the genuineness of the product and to protect both purchaser and vender. Gowans v. Ahlborn Bros. (Pa. 1886) 4 Kulp, 31.

Whether one claiming a right to a trade-mark could register it in foreign countries under their laws is immaterial, but the question is whether his claim is in harmony with the law of the United States, and the court will not decide what trade-marks exist or do not exist in foreign countries. Avenarius v. Kornely (1909) 121 N. W. 336, 139 Wis. 247.

5. Trade-names in general.-The rules applying to the protection of trade-marks also apply to protect exclusive trade-names. Hartzler v. Goshen Churn & Ladder Co. (Ind. App. 1914) 104 N. E. 34.

A "trade-mark" has reference to the thing sold, while a "trade-name" embraces both the thing sold and the individuality of the seller. Eastern Outfitting Co. v. Manheim (Wash. 1910) 110 P. 23.

A "trade-mark" or "trade-name" is some symbol by which one man's manufacture is differentiated from another's, and all that is needed for a valid tradename is that it indicate the manufacture of the owner, whether there are other manufacturers or not. R. Guastavino Co. v. Comerma (C. C. 1910) 180 Fed. 920.

A trade-name may be such as indicates the purpose of the association, or may be arbitrary or fanciful, and such words or phrases are deemed "arbitrary" or "fanciful" when they do not by their usual and ordinary meaning denote the purposes of the association, but come to indicate their purpose by application and association. Creswill v. Grand Lodge K. P. of Georgia (1910) 67 S. E. 188, 133 Ga. 837.

"Trade-names" are names used in trade to designate a particular business, considered somewhat as an entity, or the place at which it is located, or the particular class of goods, but tradenames are not technically trade-marks. Hartzler v. Goshen Churn & Ladder Co. (Ind. App. 1914) 104 N. E. 34.

Nonexclusive trade-names are names which are publici juris in their primary sense, but which in a secondary sense indicate the goods or business of a particular trader; trade-names being acquired by adoption and user and belonging to the one first using them and giving them a value. Id.

A "trade-name" is a word or phrase by which a business enterprise, or specific article of merchandise from a specific source, is known to the public, and when applied to merchandise is generic or descriptive, and hence not susceptible of appropriation as a trade-mark. Northwestern Knitting Co. v. Garon (Minn. 1910) 128 N. W. 288.

A trade-name relates to a business and its good will, rather than to a vendible commodity. Ball v. Broadway Bazaar (1909) 87 N. E. 674, 194 N. Y. 429.

A trade-mark designates an article of commerce, is affixed thereto, accompanying the article, and may be infringed anywhere; while a trade-name applies to a business, and is, as a rule, local, the proprietor having an exclusive right to the name in his locality only. Ball v. Broadway Bazaar (1907) 106 N. Y. S. 249, 121 App. Div. 546.

The name "Liebig," as applied to extracts of meat, has been in common use in this country for many years to designate preparations supposed to have been made by Liebig's process, and is common property, which no longer designates, if it ever did, the product of a particular manufacturer. Liebig's Extract of Meat Co. v. Liebig Extract Co. (C. C. 1909) 172 Fed. 158, decree reversed (1910) 180 Fed. 688, 103 C. C. A. 654.

6. Specific devices, names, marks, or words as subject to use as trade-marks. -A plain metallic horseshoe, with no letters on it, is not a label. Lorillard v. Drummond Tobacco Co. (C. C. 1882) 14 Fed. 111.

A peculiar method of arranging soap in a box is not a trade-mark which can be legally registered. Davis v. Davis (C. C. 1886) 27 Fed. 490, 491.

Where plaintiffs designed a picture

for labels for cigar boxes, and delivered to the librarian of congress a description of the picture by the title of "Nosegay," which the librarian duly recorded, it was held that this was an attempted evasion of Act June 18, 1874, § 3, providing that no prints or labels designed to be used for any article of manufacture can be copyrighted, but authorizing them to be registered as trademarks, and that plaintiffs' design could not be protected as a copyright. Schumacher v. Wogram (C. C. 1888) 35 Fed. 210.

The device of a book on circulars and advertisements, with the words "Webster's Dictionary" printed thereon, is not sufficiently arbitrary to constitute a valid trade-mark. Merriam v. Famous Shoe & Clothing Co. (C. C. 1891) 47 Fed. 411.

A manufacturer of a single article who uses upon his packages a large number of different names, to designate difference in quality, shape, or size, or merely to meet the whims of customers, and which tend to produce confusion, rather than certainty, as to origin, cannot be protected in the exclusive use of such names as trade-marks. Albany Perforated Wrapping-Paper Co. v. John Hoberg Co. (C. C. 1900) 102 Fed. 157.

Where a manufacturer gave the name of the patentee, the date of the patent, and also an arbitrary name to the article, but not its own name as manufacturer, so that such arbitrary name merely identified the article with the patent, such marking did not constitute a trademark, but, on the expiration of the patent, another manufacturer has the right to mark the article with the same or a similar name, where it places thereon its own name as manufacturer, marked with sufficient prominence to clearly distinguish the article from those made by the original manufacturer. B. B. Hill Mfg. Co. v. Sawyer-Boss Mfg. Co. (C. C. 1901) 112 Fed. 144, decree affirmed (1902) 118 Fed. 1014, 56 C. C. A. 596.

A representation of a star cannot by its own meaning indicate the origin or ownership of such an article as lubricating oil, nor in view of its general use as a symbol can it be appropriated as a trade-mark except in connection with other devices or words such as to render the whole characteristic. GalenaSignal Oil Co. v. W. P. Fuller & Co. (C. C. 1906) 142 Fed. 1002.

Uncopyrighted post cards are not entitled to protection as trade-marks either singly or collectively, as they do not identify and distinguish the product of the manufacturer, but constitute the product itself. Bamforth v. Douglass Post Card & Machine Co. (C. C. 1908) 158 Fed. 355.

The fact that a trade-mark for a horseshoe nail is cut or stamped into the nail itself does not affect its validity. Capewell Horse Nail Co. v. Mooney (C.

A check figure impressed on the under or beveled face of the heads of horse nails, or on pictures thereof on packages, containing the same, as an arbitrary mark to designate the product of a certain maker, is a legitimate trademark. Id.

The manufacturers of a peculiar style of type, unpatented, which is marketable only on account of its utility, cannot restrain another from producing type of the same character. Keystone Type Foundry v. Portland Pub. Co. (C. C. 1910) 180 Fed. 301, decree affirmed (1911) 186 Fed. 690, 108 C. C. A. 508. The representation of a star as a mark for beer has become publici juris, so as to destroy the right of its registration as a trade-mark. Star Brewery Co. v. Val Blatz Brewing Co. (1911) 36 App. D. C. 534.

The mark "Deacon Brown," printed in script type is not registerable as a trade-mark for beverages, being the name of an individual, and not printed in a particular or distinctive manner. In re Artesian Mfg. Co. (1911) 37 App. D. C. 113.

Labels for shoes bearing the words "Boy Scouts," in conjunction with figures representing boys in scout uniform, cannot be registered as trademarks. In re Excelsior Shoe Co. (1913) 40 App. D. C. 480.

A generic term may be used as a trade-name or a part of a corporate or firm name, unless its use is reasonably certain to bring about unfair competition, in which case its use will be enjoined. Travelers' Ins. Mach. Co. v. Travelers' Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn. (1911) 134 S. W. 877, 142 Ky. 523, judgment modified (1911) 136 S. W. 154, 143 Ky. 216.

A mere mark or symbol which can be used by one with as much propriety as another cannot become a trade-mark. Scott v. Sewell (La. 1884) 2 McGloin, 7.

A union label or symbol, not indicating by what persons the articles are made, but only that they are made by some member of one of such unions, the right to use the device belonging equally to each of all the members, and continuing only while the person remains a member, is not a legal trade-mark. Weener v. Brayton (1890) 152 Mass. 101, 25 N. E. 46, 8 L. R. A. 640; Cigar Makers' Protective Union v. Conhaim (1889) 40 Minn. 243, 41 N. W. 943, 3 L. K. A. 125, 12 Am. St. Rep. 726.

Adoption and use of a name or device adapted to point out the true source or origin of the manufactured article, gives a property interest therein which the courts will protect. Filley v. Fassett (1869) 44 Mo. 168, 100 Am. Dec. 275. The phrase "What is it?" is not an

original, arbitrary name, so as to entitle the user to be protected in the exclusive use thereof. Oakes v. St. Louis Candy Co. (1898) 48 S. W. 467, 146 Mo. 391.

A trade-mark exists in the title of a newspaper. Grocers' Journal Co. v. Midland Pub. Co. (1907) 105 S. W. 310, 127 Mo. App. 356.

The brands used by a miller are quasi trade-marks and are objects of the law's protection on analogous principles. Sessinghaus Milling Co. V. Hanebrink (Mo. 1912) 152 S. W. 354.

Labels are protected as trade-marks. Wirtz v. Eagle Bottling Co. (1892) 50 N. J. Eq. (5 Dick.) 164, 24 Atl. 658.

Injunction will lie at the suit of a physician to restrain the unauthorized use of a fac simile of his signature in advertising a medicine. Mackenzie v. Soden Mineral Springs Co. (1891) 27 Abb. N. C. 402, 18 N. Y. Supp. 240.

7. Arbitrary or descriptive character of marks or words-In general.-"Tycoon," as applied to tea, held not subject to appropriation; it appearing that the word was in common and general use. Corbin v. Gould (1890) 10 Sup. Ct. 312, 133 U. S. 308, 33 L. Ed. 611.

Registration of the words "Old Crow" as a trade-mark in connection with whisky held valid under this section. W. A. Gaines & Co. v. Rock Spring Distilling Co. (1915) 226 Fed. 531.

The word "Eureka," first used in a compounded fertilizer, will be protected. Alleghany Fertilizer Co. v. Woodside (C. C. 1871) Fed. Cas. No. 206.

The word "Centennial" is general property, and cannot be used for a trade-mark. Hartell v. Viney (C. C. 1876) Fed. Cas. No. 6,158.

A name alone is not a trade-mark when it is applied to designate, not the article of a particular maker or seller, but the kind or description of thing made or sold; but the mark should distinguish the production from other productions of the same article. Hostetter v. Fries (C. C. 1883) 17 Fed. 620; Leclanche Battery Co. v. Western Electric Co. (C. C. 1885) 23 Fed. 276.

Arbitrary terms, such as "Tin Tag" or "Wood Tag," branded upon or given to goods to distinguish them, may constitute valid trade-marks, but the person so using them would have no right to the exclusive use of tin or wood as a material to designate the goods. Lorillard v. Pride (C. C. 1886) 28 Fed. 434.

Proper designation of an article cannot be appropriated as a trade-mark; and it is quite immaterial who gives the proper name to a new article. Colgan v. Danheiser (C. C. 1888) 35 Fed. 150, 151.

The words "Social Register," applied to a list of persons resident in a certain locality, compiled with reference to personal and social standing, constitute a valid trade-mark, and their use by the publisher of a competing list will be