ruler may pursue any end that is not common to all. Contemporary bodies politic which incline toward the latter extreme may be designated as commonwealths; the rest are inferior kinds of states. Certainly, however, if the obedience of the masses of the people is not rendered ungrudgingly, the state is no commonwealth.

5

tion of

of common

wealths

It is easier to ascertain what theoretically constitutes a Classificacommonwealth than to determine which of the existing states and states in the world are commonwealths. For example, the constitutions of the twenty republics of Latin America were all formed more or less in conscious imitation of the North American model. But even the most ardent admirers of the Latin American genius will hardly contend that all these states should be put together in the same class. Hence they cannot all be equally commonwealths. Bryce, who among modern political scientists of the first rank made the closest study of the Latin American republics, divided them into three classes. The first consisted of those in which republican institutions, purporting to exist legally, were a mere farce, the government being in fact a military despotism, more or less oppressive and corrupt, according to the character of the ruler, but carried on for the benefit of the executive and his friends. As the most conspicuous example of this class Bryce specified the so-called republic of Haiti. The second class included countries where there was a legislature which imposed some restraint upon the executive, and in which there was enough public opinion to influence the conduct of both legislature and executive. In these states the rulers, though not scrupulous in their methods of grasping power, recognized some responsibility to the people and avoided open violence and gross injustice. Bryce cited Mexico, as it was under Diaz before the recent revolu

Relation

between kind of

state and form of

tions, as the best example of this class. Mexico, incidentally, possessed a constitution which declared most explicitly that the Mexican people recognized the rights of man as the foundation of the state and their preservation as the primary object of government. The third class of Latin American states, according to Bryce, were "real republics," that is, commonwealths, in which authority had been obtained under constitutional forms, not by armed force, and where the machinery of government worked with regularity and reasonable fairness, laws were passed by elected bodies under no executive coercion, and both executive and judicial work went on in a duly legal way.2 Bryce did not attempt to assign all the Latin American republics to their proper places in this classification, but it is evident that in his opinion the South American states within the southern temperate zone were "real republics." They are entitled to a place among the world's commonwealths.

3

It is evident that there is no fixed relation between the kind of state and the form of government. The majority of the Latin American republics must be excluded from the government class of commonwealths, notwithstanding the republican form of their governments and the democratic character of their written constitutions. These constitutions, to use Clemenceau's apt expression, too often have only a “chiefly theoretic authority.' Their democracy exists in name,

114

1 Constitution of 1857, Title 1, section 1, paragraph 1.

2 James Bryce, South America, 2d edition (1913), PP. 541-542.

3 Another well-informed observer of Latin American affairs, Professor W. R. Shepherd, has also divided these twenty republics into three classes. Although he has not explained the basis of his classification, it is apparently similar to that of Bryce. His classification follows, the best class being first: (1) Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Uruguay; (2) Bolivia, Colombia, Cuba, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Salvador, Venezuela; (3) Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay. See his Latin America, p. 94. This classification was published in 1914 and doubtless in certain cases would now, in the light of subsequent events, have to be altered.

4 See his South America To-day, Paris, 1911.

but not in fact. On the other hand, states which do not possess the republican form of government, if by republican is meant governments in which the executive head is elected by the voters or their representatives, may be commonwealths, like Norway and Denmark. There may even be a commonwealth, where there is little trace of popular government. Puritans have claimed that Cromwell's rule was of this character; proletarians have made the same claim for the rule of Lenin in Russia; and the bourgeoisie, for that of Louis Napoleon in France under the Second Empire. But in general autocratic "protectorates," military "dictatorships," and Caesarian "democracies," leave too much to be desired. Bryce in his masterly study of modern democracy pronounces the two best administered democracies in the modern world to have been two of the poorest, in wealth at least, the Orange Free State before 1899 and the Swiss Confederation.1 And in general the most favorable conditions for a commonwealth are, in his judgment, poverty and small size. It is not, however, the conditions that make the commonwealth, but the ideas that lie in the minds of the people. Theoretically, at least, these may be present to such an extent as to justify the classification of a state among the commonwealths, even if the state have a numerous population, an extensive territory, vast accumulations of wealth, and a government monarchical in form.

2

common

Certain writers indeed, including some of high authority, Ideal have been of the opinion that the most perfect common- wealths wealth would be found under the government of an absolute monarch. Among modern writers Hobbes is the principal authority for this notion. His arguments in favor of absolutism, and the grounds of his preference for monarchy over any other form of government, were

1 Modern Democracies, Vol. II, pp. 457-458. 2 Cf. Ibid., Vol. II. pp. 444-445.

Plato's Republic

elaborately set forth in his famous book, The Leviathan, published in 1651. Among the ancients of a similar way of thinking the most noteworthy is Plato. Like Hobbes, he was a supporter of absolutism, but he preferred aristocracy to monarchy. His ideas are worthy of special consideration.

The ideal commonwealth, according to Plato, was one in which the supreme power is vested in those best fitted by nature and education to govern the rest. Only philosopher-kings, he thought, were fit for such a responsibility. The number who would share in the supreme power would be few or many, depending solely on the number of those who might possess the necessary qualifications. The essence of his ideal commonwealth, or aristocracy, consisted not in the number of the rulers, or the form in which they might organize their government, but in the use of their great authority wisely and with single-minded purpose for the common welfare of the whole body politic. The proof that a particular state was an aristocracy would be the maintenance of the most harmonious relations between all the parts of the body politic, that is, between the several classes of people composing the whole community. Each class must perform its proper function as a member of the body politic as unconsciously and efficiently as the members of the human body perform their several functions. Whether or not the inferior classes, that is, the masses, understood the ends of the state and the true grounds for the obedience claimed for it by its rulers, the philosopher-kings, was a matter of small moment. Plato even suggested that the aristocrats who were to rule his ideal state might secure the consent of the governed for their enterprise by some "magnificent fiction," playing upon the credulity of their subjects, rather than appealing to their reason. It is evident that Plato's ideal commonwealth cannot satisfy the test of a modern commonwealth.

It is not enough that the state exist for the good of all the people. The consciousness of the purpose of its existence must also be widespread and deeply rooted in the minds of the people themselves.

But Plato's classification of states is still of value. Plato's classificaBesides the perfect aristocracy he distinguished four types tion of of imperfect states. First, there was timocracy, that type states of state in which the sense of honor was excessively keen. In such a state, he thought, an undue disposition prevailed to use force and violence in the conduct of public affairs. Rulers in a timocracy would rely for the maintenance of their authority too much upon main strength instead of wisdom, as in the true aristocracy. This is what we would term to-day a militarist state. Secondly, there was oligarchy, that type of state in which the love of money was excessively strong. In such a state, he thought, an undue disposition prevailed to favor the interests of the rich. Authority would repose too largely upon economic power. This is what we would now term a capitalist state. Thirdly, there was democracy, that type of state in which the desire for equality was carried too far. In such a state an undue disposition prevailed to favor the interests of the poor. Authority would repose too largely upon the mere force of numbers. This is what we would now term a proletarian state. Finally, there was tyranny, that type of state in which there was little regard for any interests except those of the rulers themselves. In an extreme form such a state would be no state at all, but anarchy. It should be observed that this classification of states is wholly independent of any classification of governments. The number who share in the government under any of these types might be few or many. The basis of the classification is the nature of the opinion which dominates the state. Such a classification is as significant to-day as it ever was, but the assignment of existing states to their