When killing in self-defence is justifiable. United States v. Mingo, 1.
LAPSE OF TIME.
LIMITATIONS, 1, 2.
DANGEROUS WEAPON, 1, 2; MALICE, 2, 3.
The rule laid down in Barnard v. Adams, (10 Howard, 270,) that the ship-
owner is entitled to a commission upon the amount contributed for in gen-
eral average, is not founded on a local usage, but upon the law merchant;
and a particular local usage in contravention thereof is not binding on
those, who have entered into no contract with reference to such usage.
Sturgis v. Cary, 382.
LEGISLATURE.
LIEN, 7, 8; LIMITATIONS, 3.
DISTRICT COURT; EVIDENCE, 6; JURISDICTION, 4.
1. There is no maritime lien created by a general average loss, and conse-
quently the admiralty has not jurisdiction in rem. Beane et al. v. The
Mayurka, 72.
2. A maritime lien is a jus in re, constituting an incumbrance on the prop-
erty, and existing independent of the process used to execute it. It is not
divested by the death of the owner of the vessel, and the representation,
by his administrator, of the insolvency of his estate. The Young Me-
chanic, 402.
3. The statute of Maine conferred on mechanics and material-men, such a
lien on domestic vessels, as the general admiralty law had previously al-
lowed to them on foreign vessels. Ib.
4. The master has not a lien on the ship, for his advances and disbursements
abroad. The Larch, 427.
5. A part owner, though ship's husband, has not a lien on the share of his
tenant in common for advances and disbursements. Ib.
6. If he had such a lien in equity, it would not enable a Court of Admiralty
to take an account and enforce it. lb.
7. Under the local law of Maine, a subcontractor, who performs labor in
building a vessel, may have a lien on such vessel. Purinton v. The Hull
of a New Ship, 416.
8. It is competent for the legislature to confer a lien in such a case. Ib.
9. The local law of Maine does not give to material-men, a lien on one ves-
sel for the price of materials furnished for it and another vessel, though
both are of the same size and model, but only, in such case, for what
was used in the vessel proceeded against. The Kiersage, 421.
10. Where a local law, conferring a lien, declared: "And in all cases such
lien shall cease, immediately after such vessel shall have arrived in any
port out of this Commonwealth," it was held that the lien was lost when
the vessel bound from Newburyport to Boston put into Portsmouth on ac-
count of a fog, and to get provisions. The Sam Slick, 480.
11. Privileged liens are stricti juris, and are not to be extended argumenta-
tively to cases not within the law which confers them. Ib.; The Kiersage,
CONFLICT OF LAWS; LIEN, 2, 3.
1. To avoid the bar of the statute of limitations, set up in the answer, upon
the ground of a concealed fraud, the bill must allege that the fraud was
discovered within twenty years, and must show when and how it was dis-
covered; and the evidence must satisfactorily support these averments.
Moore v. Greene, 202.
2. The statute of limitations bars equitable relief founded on a good legal
title fraudulently suppressed or destroyed, in twenty years after the dis-
covery of the fraud, in analogy to the statute bar operating in Courts of
Law; for a Court of Equity will not relieve against fraud, after the lapse
of such a time since its discovery, as would have barred the title at law, if
no fraud had existed. Ib.
3. Though the Court may think the legislature would have excepted a case
out of a statute of limitations, if it had been foreseen, the Court cannot
except it. The Sam Slick, 480.
BANKRUPTCY, 1, 2; DEED, 2; STATUTES, (Construction of,) 8, 9.
1. Though malice is not presumed merely from the fact of killing, yet the cir-
cumstances attending the homicide may be such that the law deems it ma-
licious.. United States v. James H. Armstrong, 446.
2. When the extenuating circumstance can be apprehended by the Court, it
is their duty to declare, as matter of law, whether it is sufficient to mitigate
the offence; but when the case is such, that the Court cannot foresee what
the jury may find the provocation was, only a general and hypothetical in-
struction can be given. Ib.
3. That general instruction, in this case, was, that if the prisoner struck a fa-
tal blow with a deadly weapon, it was not every actual assault which would
extenuate the offence. The provocation must be such as to account for the
act by reason of the infirmity of human passions in men in general, and
without attributing to the prisoner a cruel and relentless disposition. Ib.
4. If the prisoner relies on an assault by the deceased, as extenuating his
crime, he must show such assault by some satisfactory evidence; the jury
have no right to conjecture, without evidence, that it may have been made.
lb.
5. There is no Act of Congress which makes punishable an unlawful stroke
on the sea, without malice, followed by death on shore. But the guilty
person may be convicted of an assault with a dangerous weapon. Ib.
DUTIES, 5, 6; REVENUE LAWS.
If two fight with deadly weapons in a mutual combat, begun in hot blood,
and death ensue, it is manslaughter. United States v. Mingo, 1.
BANKRUPTCY, 1; DEED, 1; ESTOPPEL, 2; INSURANCE, 8; STATUTES,
(Construction of,) 1, 7; TRESPASS.
In a suit in rem against the vessel, to recover the value of the goods lost or
damaged, the master is an interested witness; but a release from some of
the part owners renders him competent. The Peytona, 21.
BILL OF LADING; COMBINATION; EVIDENCE, 4; FALSE REPRESEN-
TATION; FISHING, 1-4; JURISDICTION, 6; LIEN, 4; SHIPPING ARTI-
CLES, 3.
In an action of covenant, the plaintiff having been wrongfully prevented by
the defendants from completing a work, the measure of damages is the dif-
ference between the price agreed to be paid for the work, and what it
would have cost the plaintiff to complete it. Myers v. The York and Cum-
berland Railroad Company, 28.
MERGER.
FOREIGN JUDGMENT.
MISDEMEANOR.
INDICTMENT, 3.
There is a distinction between the correction of a mistake in a written con-
tract, and in the execution of a power; in the latter case, Courts interpose
more willingly. Oliver v. The Mutual Commercial Marine Ins. Co., 277.
EVIDENCE, 4; INSURANCE, 1, 3-5; PATENT, 5.
If a mortgagor induces a third person to purchase a mortgage by promising
in writing to pay with interest the whole sum advanced, the assignee of the
equity of redemption will be allowed to redeem only, by paying what the
assignor must have paid. Holbrook v. The Worcester Bank, 244.
NATURALIZATION.
JURISDICTION, 2.
NAVIGATION.
COLLISION, 7.
NAVY AGENT.
NAVY PENSION AGENT.
There is no such distinct office known to the Constitution and laws of the
United States as Navy Pension Agent; and it is competent for the Secre-
tary of the Navy to require the Navy Agents to pay these pensions.
Having done so, the sureties of the Navy Agent are responsible for the
faithful performance of that service. United States v. Cutter, 617.
NEW HAMPSHIRE.
RECOGNIZANCE, 1.
1. A verdict in an action on the case for an injury to the plaintiff's mill, by
causing the water to flow back thereon, will not be set aside for excessive
damages, unless the Court can see that the jury fell into some important
mistake of computation, or departed from some rule of law given to them
for their guidance, or made deductions from the evidence plainly not war-
ranted by it. Palmer v. Fiske, 14.
2. Errors of judgment of the engineer appointed by the defendant, in not
delineating on the plan certain objects which might have tended to support
the defence, do not afford ground for a new trial. Ib.
3. Evidence must be not only in fact newly discovered and not cumulative,
but the party must have used due diligence to discover it before the trial,
to induce the Court to grant a new trial. lb.
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