We rode for about 20 minutes. Each time I turned around to emphasize a point, he would put his hand to my face and say, "Keep your eyes on the road." And we Mr. MORRIS. Did he do that so that you could not see his face, or did he do that because he was afraid for his personal safety in driving? Mr. GREENGLASS. No. It was obvious to me that he just didn't want me to get a good look at him. We drove up around York Avenue under the Queensborough Bridge, down around First Avenue, and continued to drive that way for about 20 minutes. Then I was told to park in the same place I had picked him up, and when I did so, he got out of the car, went up the block a bit, and Julius Rosenberg came back and said to me, "It is all right." I offered him a drive home, and he said, "No," that he was going to have a drink with this gentleman, and he left. And that was the end of it (pp. 1098, 1099). On four other occasions Greenglass transmitted atomic information to the Russian through Julius Rosenberg. In addition, Rosenberg instructed him to find and if possible to recruit other scientists and engineers at Los Alamos and Greenglass amassed a list of no less than 20 or 25 names. It was at this same time that Greenglass met Gold as already described. Greenglass confirmed the Gold account in detail, and even remembered a small point that Gold had mentioned, namely, that Gold had scolded Greenglass for writing down the names of possible espionage recruits. He had been instructed by Rosenberg to do so, Greenglass said. Clearly, Harry Gold was the more cautious, if not the more methodical, spy. The list he gave Rosenberg was not exhaustive, Greenglass said. His interrogation continued as follows: Mr. MORRIS. Now, did this list of 20 to 25-did that exhaust, do you think, the reservoir of potential scientists who would turn over; who would work for Rosenberg? Mr. GREENGLASS. Let me I will answer that. I frankly Mr. GREENGLASS. My ken, my line of vision, my knowledge. Mr. GREENGLASS. While they were in my ken, there were Now, there were well-known names I have heard of, but it was something I never checked of my own accord, and so I never put the names down, you see. Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I think at this point I should mention here that Mr. Greenglass has gone into rather extensive details in some cases about the identity of these people, and also given us a description of the number of people involved there (p. 1101). Rosenberg also boasted to him about Soviet espionage agents and recruiting methods, Greenglass testified. Mr. GREENGLASS. *** he did say that not only are there agents in the Russian Embassies, in the satellite countries, the satellite country embassies, but also in the embassies of the western democracies, Russian agents. This is a direct quote. Senator JENNER. Did he make any reference about the colleges? Mr. GREENGLASS. Well, in trying to get me back into the apparatus after I had quit Los Alamos, when I left the Army. I could have very well stayed on in a very nice job, but I wanted to come home for one reason: I wanted to disentangle myself. Julius constantly wanted me to go to schools where I had friends, scientists, people I knew, going to these schools. In the University of Chicago I knew two or three people, some in MIT. He wanted me to go to these schools, develop my contacts, get my degree, and then continue in the service of the Soviet Government. When I said, "Well, how am I going to do all this?" well, he said, "Some of it you will do on the GI bill of rights." But I realized that it was insufficient to raise a family on. I had a wife and a child at the time. "So the Russians will pay you to go to school." And I said, "This is very interesting." And he said, "Yes. I do it all the time. I have a number of people that I send to school and I pay" (p. 1095). Greenglass' last act of espionage occurred in September 1945 when he gave Rosenberg a 12-page report on shop talk he had picked up about the atom bomb (p. 1102). Out of the Army at last, Greenglass entered into a business partnership with his brother and Julius Rosenberg, buying and selling Government surplus property. After a short time, Greenglass left this business and opened a machine shop, then dropped this as well. He was now becoming steadily more disaffected from Communism, but he had not yet made a clean break. In 1949 he went to work for the Armour Engineering Corp., in its research and development department. He still saw Rosenberg occasionally, and one day the latter told him that he should consider leaving the country, because Scotland Yard had been "talking to the man who spoke to the courier who spoke to you." As the months rolled by, Rosenberg became more determined and if possible still more ruthless. Greenglass testified: While walking along the drive with Julius Rosenberg, he said, "Do you think we will beat the FBI?” And I said, "I don't know." He said, "Well, you know, if I get word that it is too hot, I mean I felt cold all over. And he said, "Well, the Russians will send in division after division against a position and they will all be killed, and they won't bat an eyelash as long as something is being done to I couldn't be that ruthless. That was one of the things I In June 1950, Greenglass was arrested by the FBI, and like Gold, became a witness for the prosecution against his sister and brotherin-law. As he told the subcommittee: It is a hard thing to be called a murderer by people, but it is a much harder thing-and I don't know whether it is a very intelligent thing-but to deliberately martyr yourself for a completely erroneous ideological cause, is, in my point of view, the most hypocritical and ridiculous thing a person can do (p. 1110). Senator Jenner, in commenting upon the testimony of Gold and Greenglass, declared: I might add that it is refreshing to see witnesses like Mr. Gold and yourself appear here in public. You are paying society for the crimes that you have both committed. In your testimony here, you may be setting an example that will break this vicious conspiracy which is out to overthrow and destroy our country. You have given this committee, particularly, certain information that I think is very valuable, in view of the fact that you never were a Communist, and yet, you were doing Communist work. I think, by your story, many men and women will learn through your horrible experience what it might mean to the future. And as one individual, I think both of these men in their cooperation have shown great courage, and I want to thank them in behalf of the committee (p. 1111). With the conclusion of Greenglass' testimony, the subcommittee felt that one strand in the tangled network remained to be unraveled. The Russians whom Gold and Greenglass had met "Paul Smith," Semen Semenov, Anatoli Yakovlev, etc., had long since returned to the Soviet Union. But what about "Tasso" Black, the chemist who had introduced Gold to industrial espionage, and had tried so hard and so unsuccessfully to recruit him into the Communist Party? The subcommittee found him-now graying and fiftyish, still a chemist and still living in New Jersey. He too had long since broken with Communism, and after an initial period of understandable reluctance, based upon the fear of losing his job, the subcommittee learned from him the instructive details of THE STORY OF TASSO BLACK. Appearing before the subcommittee in public session on May 17, 1956, Black testified that he had been born in Bloomsburg, Pa., on July 5, 1907. As a young man in Manhattan during the depression he had joined section 2, unit 2-B of the Communist Party in 1931, hoping it could arrange for him to go to the Soviet Union to work. He remained in the Party about 2 years, transferring to units in Jersey City and later in Newark, but left the Party in 1933 because of its continued failure to produce the desired entree to the Soviet Union. Still afire with enthusiasm for the Workers' Paradise, he went to Amtorg Trading Corp., the Soviet trading company in New York City, to inquire about employment in Russia. At Amtorg, he met Gaik Övakimian who (unknown to Black) was at that time a principal agent of the Soviet secret police in the United States. Ovakimian told the young enthusiast that, to obtain a recommendation for work in the Soviet Union, he would have to produce evidence of his usefulness. He was therefore instructed to obtain information concerning certain American industrial processes. approximately three occasions, he turned this material over to Ovakimian in restaurants in the Times Square area of New York City. Sometime in 1934, Ovakimian turned Black over to another agent, whom Black knew as "Paul Peterson," under whom he proceeded to work until approximately 1938. Peterson's first task seems to have been to train Black for some future assignment of an espionage nature. He told Black how to detect surveillance and what to do about it; how to collect and condense information, and write reports; how to microfilm documents and how to arrange clandestine meetings. Meanwhile Black had met Gold under the circumstances described above supra, p. 50). Black told the subcommittee of a series of assignments he received from his Soviet superiors in the latter part of the 1930s. At one point he was instructed to join the Trotskyist faction of the Socialist Party of America, and become friendly with the leading Trotskyists. This in turn led to an order to quit his job and proceed to Coyoacan, Mexico, where Trotsky was living, in connection with the planned assassination of Trotsky. By this time, however, Black's enthusiasm for Communism had cooled slightly, and Black did not carry out the instructions. Black testified that his contacts with the Soviets became increasingly fewer as the 1940's wore on. As late as 1950 he received a telephone call which he recognized as a code instruction to meet an agent at a prearranged rendezvous, but he did not keep the appointment. Since that time, he has cooperated fully with the FBI, making a full disclosure of his activities in Soviet espionage. Following Black's appearance before the subcommittee, his employer reported that the hostility of his fellow employees was making it necessary to discharge Black. Recognizing how supremely important it is for former Communists to feel that they can speak freely about their past without being subjected to social and economic reprisals, the subcommittee prevailed upon Black's employer to reconsider his decision in the matter, and Chief Counsel Robert Morris traveled personally to New Jersey to speak to the employees and explain to them that, whatever his past derelictions, Black was now doing his best to help his country and should not be made to suffer on that account. The employees thereupon relented in their opposition to Black, and the episode closed on this encouraging note. THE STORY OF DR. ANDRIYVE In the course of David Greenglass' testimony about his conversations with Julius Rosenberg the following appears: Mr. MORRIS. Now, did Rosenberg tell you anything about a proximity fuse? Mr. GREENGLASS. Yes. In one of our earlier talks. You must understand that he had nobody to confide in who had been involved in this. There were some, of course, but they were scattered all over the United States, and it was difficult to talk to them when he wanted to talk to them. I was near at hand and right under his feet every day. He could see me whenever he wanted to. And one day he said that he had stolen the proximity fuse, the actual fuse itself; he had walked right out Mr. MORRIS. From where? Mr. GREENGLASS. From Emerson Radio Corp., where he was an inspector for the Signal Corps. He took the fuse, put it in his briefcase, and walked through the guard. Of course, everybody knew him. He was the Government man in the place. Mr. MORRIS. And he told you that? Mr. GREENGLASS. Yes (pp. 1105, 1106). On May 16, 1956, through the testimony of one E. Andriyve,' the subcommittee obtained a revealing glimpse of the other end of the Soviet espionage pipeline the receipt of such technical information in Moscow, and the ways in which it was delivered. During 1944, Andriyve was employed as a researcher in the Signal Corps Military Research Institute in Moscow. One of his jobs was to examine certain technical documents, 90 percent of American origin, which he received from the secret police section of the Institute. In his own words: So, the batch of the documents would be given to me practically every day for perusal, examination, and determination of their nature, that is, technical nature, with the task to determine how should they be channeled among the Soviet institutions dealing with this particular type of science or engineering. That means a part of the documents had to do with high power, superhigh frequency, and ultrahigh frequency tubes that are used for radar. I would classify them to be sent to the factories and institutions which dealt with tubes. The other part would deal with telephone communications and field conditions. I would classify them to be sent along to the Signal Corps Institute, who dealt with telegraphy. Still other documents would deal with purely scientific matters which had, at least to our viewpoint at that time, no immediate technical application. I would classify them separately and to be sent to some pure science organization, and so on. That was the type of work I had been doing there for over Under further questioning he described the documents as follows: 1 A name assumed to avoid reprisals. His true name is known to the subcommittee. |