dagger work of the Communists. We think we have to get somebody who stole documents or wrote something in code to the Soviet Union. I don't think those are dangerous ones. Those are the little fellows. The really dangerous ones are the ones nobody ever suspected. I remember when John Peurifoy was chairman of security or head of security in the Department in 1947 and 1948, and I was on a subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations in the House that investigated the Department. We got rid of 131 unsuitable people, about half of whom were Communists or Communist suspects, and we didn't have a headline. But he said to me one day, "Walter, what worries me is how many more there are like Hiss, whom I never even suspected. I used to lunch with Hiss, once in a while. It makes me wonder if the fellow I have my lunch with now is one."

If you go down through their history and watch what they have recommended over the years, you find it turned out to be favorable to the Soviet Union. I am sure they will never be found to be carrying Communist cards. They would be fools to have meetings in the back end of an alley or a restaurant somewhere. They are clever, and their real danger is their ability, at the lower echelons, to write position papers, which come up to their superiors and become policy papers. Then those policy papers go to the action agencies, like the State Department, the Pentagon, and the National Security Council. If you allow me to write the papers on which my superiors make their decisions, I think I could have a good deal to say about what my superiors will think.

Chairman EASTLAND. Then you think some of these people that are pro-Communist are still in the State Department, and still in the Pentagon?

Mr. JUDD. Why, yes. I don't mean pro-Communists in the sense that they are in the Party, but they advocate policies that work out to the good of the Party. On the law of averages, a mere moron once in a while would make a decision that would be favorable to the United States. When policies are advocated by any group which consistently work out to the Communists' advantage, that couldn't be happenstance. Chairman EASTLAND. Do I understand that you think that the recommendations of these individuals have influence with the real policymakers in the State Department and in the Pentagon?

Mr. JUDD. Oh, there is no slightest doubt of it.

Mr. MORRIS. You think, Congressman, that influencing our policy to our disadvantage would come from the bottom and not from the top?

Mr. JUDD. Oh, I am sure it is not from the top. You talk to some of those people at the top and they are distressed themselves at the miscarriage of orders that are supposed to be against the Communists and yet it doesn't work out.

As John Peurifoy said, some of these people are not on our side. Who are the people?

Angus Ward is the former American consul at Mukden, Manchuria, who, with his staff, was officially kidnaped by the Chinese Communists in October 1948, and held under arrest for 14 months. Walter Judd is the former Far Eastern medical missionary, present Member of Congress from Minnesota and long-time member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, whose accurate judgments on matters. Chinese has long been fully established.

Both witnesses spoke from first-hand knowledge of China and Washington. Both described in startling detail how American policy has been obfuscated, suffocated, and confused by pro-Communists operating below the surface in the United States Government.

Mr. Ward told the following story of how one official was able to put blinders on a Cabinet member, as well as on the Commander in Chief of the Allied Expeditionary Force in Europe.

HOW TO FOOL THE MEN ON TOP

Mr. WARD. *** In January 1948, I was ordered back to the Department from Mukden on consultation. At that time I saw Secretary of State Marshall, Under Secretary Lovett, and a number of others. * * *

I was displeased with one outstanding factor, and that was that there seemed to be a reluctance on the part of those officials with whom I spoke, under the level of Under Secretary of State, to have affairs of China discussed frankly.

In illustration of this, I may mention that I met the late
Secretary of Defense Forrestal at a luncheon, and the fol-
lowing day he requested of the State Department that I call
on him for the purpose of discussing affairs of China.

An appointment was set up for one afternoon at 2 o'clock.
At about noonday, I was called into the office of one of our
State Department officials-

Mr. MORRIS. A superior of yours?

Mr. WARD. Yes, yes. And I was informed that what Mr. Forrestal was interested in learning was the extent of the demoralization among the Chinese Nationalists, the extent of corruption, and matters of that kind.

I had had several talks with this official previously, and while we had mentioned these matters, my principal remarks to him were the exposition of my thoughts on the ways in which we could help the Nationalist Government of China to better its chances in the war against the Communists and thereby better its chances of survival.

Naturally, I was completely perplexed when I was informed that Secretary of Defense Forrestal was not at all interested in this phase of my previous remarks.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, Ambassador, were you in effect either actually or impliedly being directed by your superior in the State Department to talk to Secretary Forrestal only about that aspect of your experience in China?

Mr. WARD. That was my interpretation; that was the only interpretation I think could be given to it, that I was called to the office and given this message. At any event, I kept this appointment and because I could not send a message to him, Secretary Forrestal, saying I could not keep it just a few hours before the appointment, I saw the Secretary.

General, now President, Eisenhower was present, and I had to give a most unsatisfactory talk.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, did you learn subsequently, Ambassador, that as a matter of fact Secretary Forrestal did not want to hear only about that particular aspect of your experiences in China?

Mr. WARD. Correct.

Mr. Judd added this anecdote.

Mr. JUDD. I think the State Department is a good deal better than it was. But I still think it has a long way to go. I will probably get in trouble, but I have said this to the Secretary personally, so there is no reason not to say it here.

A man down in the Department told me just about Inauguration Day in 1953, that the old cliques were saying, "Well, we were kind of worried when there was to be a change down here, but we have things under control now." I said, "What do you mean?"

"Well, they say they are going to give Mr. Dulles the Jimmy Byrnes treatment."

"What is that," I asked.

"Keep the Secretary of State out of the country."

He said, "Look at Jimmy Byrnes. He came in as Secretary and they sent him to Potsdam and Moscow and then sent Byrnes and Connally and Vandenberg to Paris for 6 months." They were over there right while the postwar pattern of appeasement was being established. They kept them out of the country.

"SEE JOHN CARTER VINCENT ABOUT CHINA”

I would like to say another thing to show how these men work against our policy from within. This is what General Hurley said his directive was:

"When President Roosevelt sent me to China in 1944 as an Army officer and personal representative, he specifically directed me to prevent the collapse of the Nationalist Government, to keep the Chinese Nationalist Army in the war, to sustain the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, and as far as possible to unify all of the anti-Japanese forces in China."

He told me that when I was out there in 1944. When he first went out there, he hoped that the Communists would cooperate, because he went through Moscow and Molotov told him that Russia wasn't interested in these Communists in China, so he naturally believed it. But General Hurley soon got wise to the situation, and the thing he couldn't under

stand was why his own subordinates in the Embassy were advocating the very opposite of the thing he had been sent out by President Roosevelt to do.

The sequel of the story is this. Along sometime during the latter part of March 1945, Hurley came back to this country and had a showdown regarding these subordinates. One day he called me up and asked me if I wouldn't come down to see him the following morning. I said yes, and he told me an office number in the old State Building. I went down, and it was the office of Mr. John Carter Vincent. We sat in Mr. Vincent's office and he told me what the President had instructed him to do. He was quite elated and he said:

"We have had a showdown, and the President has reaffirmed his directive to me. My job is to help the Gimo and the Nationalist Armies to stay in the ring. My job is not to undermine him and build up the Communists. As a result, all of these folks who have been working against my efforts as the President's personal representative and Ambassador are being sent back to the United States."

He also made a statement to the press along those lines, and went back to China. Within 2 weeks or so, President Roosevelt died.

Now, here is the rest of the story that you can confirm. On the morning of April 13, when President Truman, the new President, came to his office in the White House for the first time as President of the United States, naturally, the press was there from a great many papers and so on. And pictures were taken of the new President, the first morning in his office. What was the first piece of business for President Truman, shown on a memorandum pad on the President's desk, written right on there and readable in the press photo? What does the memorandum pad say? What was the first piece of business for the new President? "See John Carter Vincent about China."

Who was high enough in the administration-within 2 weeks after Roosevelt had reconfirmed the policy to support the Government of China, to help the generalissimo win, reestablish order in his country, build up and overcome the great difficulties which then existed-who was high enough to see that the first piece of business for the new President was, "See John Carter Vincent about China"? John Carter Vincent, whose policy as he himself has avowed in my presence, was "I worked at nothing for years, except to get a coalition between the Communists and the National Government."

"THE FOUR JOHNS"

Vincent, as Mr. Judd explained, was one of the "four Johns" in the State Department and Foreign Service, who were leaders in undermining the policy laid down by President Roosevelt. The others were John Stewart Service and John Paton Davies, who have since

been dismissed from the Department, and John K. Emmerson, who has not been dismissed.

Then there was a man named Raymond Ludden.1 Not only these men from the State Department, but also a man named Stelle

Mr. MORRIS. Is that Charles Stelle?1

Mr. JUDD. Charles Stelle, and also John K. Fairbank and his wife, Wilma Fairbank. They were working for the FEA, the Foreign Economic Administration, as I recall, down in Kunming.

FOUR WAYS TO STEER FOR THE ROCKS

As Mr. Judd explained it, there are four ways by which unknown bureaucrats, working below decks, can steer the American ship of state toward Communist objectives.

(1) By consistently giving false information to superiors.

(2) By "tipping" the press to "inside" information, which indicates that our real policy is not what officials say it is, and thus prepares public opinion for pro-Communist change.

(3) By slowing down the operation of policies which would damage the Communist cause.

(4) By weaving words into policymaking documents, which set events in motion that favor that cause.

Mr. Judd supported his testimony with examples drawn from his own knowledge.

HOW TO CHANGE THE COURSE BY TELLING LIES ABOUT THE

CAPTAIN

Another thing is, the leaks to the press. All of you have seen in the press for 6 months 2 repeated stories, especially from certain columnists, that the United States is going to recognize Communist China after the next election, and the United Nations Assembly will meet and admit Communist China to the United Nations. I asked 2 or 3 times down at the State Department, if this is true. It has been denied completely and emphatically by everybody at the top.

Finally, one came out a few weeks ago in a Kiplinger letter. It said that at one of these recent conferences with foreign visitors it was tentatively agreed that this would be done. It would be denied officially, the letter said, but the fact is that the United States is going to recognize Communist China and not veto its entrance into the United Nations.

I called up key men and said, "Has there been a change?" They said, "No; we saw the story, too. There is not a word of truth in it."

Now, the newspaper reporters didn't think that up. Somebody in the Department told them that. This is a thing that

1 The Department of State Biographical Register for 1956 shows that Mr. Emmerson was stationed in Beirut in 1955 as counselor to the United States embassy in Beirat. Lebanon. It also lists Mr. Stelle as having been appointed in 1952 to the departmental policy planning staff in Washington. The subcommittee is informed that Mr. Ludden is presently with the Department's office of personnel.

2 Mr. Judd testified on May 31, 1956.