Two of these witnesses testified that they experienced tortures and saw torture cells and chambers maintained by the Hungarian secret police that would make our concepts of medieval cruelty seem mild by contrast. These hearings and contemporaneous world developments exposed a gaping weakness of the Soviets which the West has made no effort to exploit. Events in Hungary caused a shattering setback to the prestige of Communism but the weakness, at least until it is exploited or until it causes some loss of Soviet power, remains a potential one. YUGOSLAVIA The subcommittee noted that Tito's Yugoslavia fluctuated, on the political surface, between stanch support of the Soviet Empire and occasional criticism of Soviet policy. While, in the field of foreign policy, Tito supported virtually all of the objectives of the Soviet Union, there were times it appeared as if he were pursuing an independent course. Even though the United States had given the Yugoslav Government under Tito a billion and a quarter dollars in military and economic aid, there was little relaxation in its rigors as a Communist state and Tito himself never abjured his communism. The Yugoslav Embassy in Washington has 12 officials with diplomatic status and 18 employees who are Yugoslav nationals. Its U. N. delegation has 6 persons with diplomatic status and 6 employees. There are also consulates in San Francisco, Chicago, and New York with nine officials. There is another Yugoslav official in Pittsburgh. Because of this extension of the Yugoslav Government organization into the United States, it is necessary for us to understand the real nature of the Yugoslav state for purposes of internal security alone. The subcommittee has heard the testimony of Bogdan Raditza, former chief press officer for Tito's Yugoslavia, and Slowodin Draskovich, former Minister of War in pre-Tito Yugoslavia. Mr. Draskovich was asked to testify about the four Yugoslav newspapers in the United States. He is editor of the Serbia Struggle, published in Chicago, and he said that, "Two of them, Narodni Glasnik (People's Herald) and Slobodna Rec (Free Voice), had exactly the line of the Communist Daily Worker. They were willing to denounce Tito until he was visited by Bulganin and Khrushchev in May and June of 1955. Then they changed the tune." The third paper, Narodna Volyna, follows a special line, pro-Communist but separatist, and the fourth, Enakopravnost (Equal Rights), is generally Communistic. Narodni Glasnik, he added, is the principal one of the group with 30,000 to 40,000 circulation. Mr. Draskovich also warned that our support of Tito had a demoralizing effect on our real allies, the people behind the Iron Curtain and particularly the people in Yugoslavia. He also testified: I think the main merit of Tito to Communism is that he opened the gates of Asia to Moscow. Tito sent a Yugoslavian delegation to India. The main message they had to carry there was the message of different Communism. After visiting a number of Indian and Burmese officials, those people achieved tremendous success. I remember the name of one of the men, the governor of the State of Madras, Mr. Prakasha, who said to Djilas, then delegate of Tito, "You have the great merit of proving to us Asians that Communism need not be imperialistic." So the basis of the triumphal visit of Khrushchev and Bulganin in November of 1955 in India was laid by Tito's delegate in 1953, and by the subsequent visit of Tito to those countries and Egypt in 1955. If Khrushchev and Bulganin went to pay their respects to Tito, it was because he had achieved what Stalin could not do convince India that Communism is not imperialistic. Mr. Raditza answered a question put to him by the chairman about military aid in this fashion: Military [aid], I am sorry to say, is wasted. *** Economically, the country is still in the same poverty-stricken situation as it was before the money was poured into it * In connection with the subject matter of this section of its report, the subcommittee makes the following conclusions and recommendation which have resulted from its activities and deliberations in 1956. CONCLUSIONS Soviet activity in furtherance of the Communist conspiracy is worldwide in scope. The United States has a legitimate interest in this worldwide Soviet activity because of its impact on the security of our country. Witnesses brought here from other parts of the world have given testimony before the subcommittee of great value in helping us to understand the nature and scope of Communist activities which threaten our internal security. The world Communist organization continues to practice deceit, cruelty, oppression, and subversion as instruments of policy under the firm doctrine that the end justifies the means. RECOMMENDATION The Congress should by law authorize its investigating committees, after consultation with the Attorney General, to bring into the United States aliens whose testimony is desired as witnesses and whose admission will not endanger the national security. SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS TO THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY UNITED STATES SENATE EIGHTY-FOURTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION FOR THE YEAR 1956 SECTION X 85270 DECEMBER 31, 1956 Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON: 1957 COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman ESTES KEFAUVER, Tennessee ALEXANDER WILEY, Wisconsin JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina JOHN L. MCCLELLAN, Arkansas THOMAS C. HENNINGS, JR., Missouri PRICE DANIEL, Texas WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana HERMAN WELKER, Idaho JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland ROBERT MORRIS, Chief Counsel SECTION X AMERICANS WHO ARE HELPING THE SOVIET CONQUEST OF ASIA Five years ago, the subcommittee found in its investigation of the Institute of Pacific Relations, that IPR was a lever, if not the lever, by means of which the Kremlin pointed America's Far Eastern policy in a pro-Communist direction. In the course of the investigation, we took testimony from Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, who was Chief of Staff to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in the latter years of World War II. General Wedemeyer gave this description of John Stewart Service, John Paton Davies, John K. Emmerson, and Raymond Ludden, who were assigned to him by the State Department as political advisers: If I had followed their advice, communism would have run rampant over China much more rapidly than it did.1 "What other Americans replaced them?" asked Senator Jenner, in a subcommittee hearing on September 27, 1954. "What are they doing to aid and comfort the bloody cause of Red China?" The subcommittee has been filling the record with answers to these questions ever since they were raised. As Senator Jenner stated: They are shocking and sordid, even in this, the most sordid era in the whole history of our country. The story has several parts. It begins slowly, as the members of this group assemble in the Far East. Like their predecessors from the State and Treasury Departments, most of them got there at the expense of the American taxpayer. One served in the Information and Education Branch of the United States Army. The subcommittee has already shown that I and E was grievously penetrated by underground Communists during World War II. One One was in the United States Information Service. They formed a little cluster in Shanghai around a once 1 Hearings on the Institute of Pacific Relations, p. 831. |