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SECTION IX

STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM

The subcommittee has, for the past few years, been conducting an inquiry into the strategy and tactics of world Communism. This often directly concerns the activities of American citizens. Where it does not, it is still necessary for us to understand the nature of this international colossus because the interconnecting links between Communists all over the world are indissoluble. Communism in the United States is an extension of Soviet power as it operates in Moscow, Red China, or in any other areas of the world.

During the year, we encountered many manifestations of this interlocking conspiracy. Particularly, those concerning three vital nations in the world struggle-Japan, Hungary, and Poland-are set forth herein. The interrelationship of these events and their bearing on the progress of the Communist organization in the United States is apparent.

JAPAN

On May 30, 1956, when Tokyo announced that Sergei Tichvinski would be recognized as chief of a new Soviet mission to Japan and when he was beginning to be heralded as the first post-war Soviet Ambassador to Japan, the subcommittee was in touch with a former Soviet secret police officer who had known Tichvinski for many years. Under oath, Yuri Rastvorov, the lieutenant colonel in the Soviet secret police mentioned above, described Tichvinski as a member of the Soviet secret police (MVD) since 1938 and a man who was engaged in recruiting Japanese from among the prisoners of war in China to become Soviet spies in their homeland. He described the spectacle of a recruiting agent who had trained a multitude of agents and returned them to their homeland and then followed them with all the panoply of official rank to superintend their betrayal of their homeland.

Rastvorov had been an agent of the secret police for 11 years and was stationed in Japan as Second Secretary of the Japanese mission in Tokyo when he defected in January 1954, and asked asylum in the United States. He first testified before the subcommittee on February 8.

Tichvinski, Rastvorov said, is regarded in high Soviet echelons as very capable and intelligent. He speaks Chinese, Japanese, and English fluently. About 1940 he was assigned to China where he operated for 10 years under diplomatic cover, with occasional visits to Hong Kong, southeast Asia, and to Moscow, where Rastvorov met him in 1946 while Tichvinski was lecturing to the intelligence directorate on the China situation.

Panyushkin, ambassador to China at that time, also was chief of MGB intelligence and Tichvinski was one of his chief agents, with personal contacts among several very important people in Chiang's

government, Rastvorov said. Panyushkin came to the United States as ambassador in 1947 and here also was head of MGB intelligence, with the rank of major general. He later became head of the entire MGB intelligence operation.

Tichvinski, himself, was in the United States in 1950, 1952, and At the fifth session of the U. N. General Assembly in 1950 and at the first part of the seventh session in 1952 he served as adviser to the Soviet delegation on the political committee. At the second part of the seventh session, in 1953, he had the designation of deputy secretary-general of the Soviet delegation to the General Assembly. About 1952, Rastvorov said, Tichvinski was made deputy chief of the Far East intelligence directorate in MGB headquarters, Moscow, with the military title of full colonel (p. 798). Rastvorov next heard of him probably in 1953, in England where he was head of MVD intelligence and using a diplomatic cover. Tishvinsky arrived in Japan May 13, ostensibly as head of a Soviet mission for disposing of fishing problems (p. 815).

Rastvorov commented:

Paying great attention to Japanese problems and anxious to reestablish diplomatic relationship with Japan, the Soviet Government probably decided that Tichvinski, being very experienced diplomatically and at the same time a very capable, experienced intelligence officer, was qualified for this job (p. 798).

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There is no question that Mr. Tichvinski has been given the task of reestablishing contact with the Japanese Communist Party. He replaced Mr. Greschnov who temporarily was the head of the MVD intelligence group in Tokyo after the Soviet Intelligence Service was forced to recall all their intelligence personnel as a result of my defection. The Soviet Intelligence Service needed very much to replace Mr. Greschnov with a more capable and experienced intelligence officer who could renew intelligence operations in Japan, and that is one of the reasons Mr. Tichvinski has been sent to Japannot only for the purpose of attempting the establishment of diplomatic relations with Japan but for intelligence purposes directly (p. 801).

Rastvorov said that, in addition to the recruiting of Japanese war prisoners by MVD, the camp authorities used several thousand for informers and these also could be considered as potential agents (p. 799).

Congressman Walter Judd, testifying on May 31, recalled that there were about 400,000 Japanese in Manchurian prison camps at the end of the war. The Chinese sent some of them home and retained those they thought they could do something with, he said. He observed:

There isn't any question but what the Communists movement is growing in Japan, largely through these returnees and through former Communists who had been thrown into jail by the Japanese during the war.

One of the first things our State Department did, when they went over there after the end of the war, was to insist

that these people be let out, in accordance with our democratic
way of life. They immediately began propagandizing again.
With the Japanese prisoners who came back from the
prisoner-of-war camps, there is a strong body of disciplined,
organized Communist workers in Japan. If they have direct
guidance and sponsorship, and to some extent protection,
through the Soviet Embassy, obviously there is a great
menace to our good ally, the Government of Japan.

One of the Japanese prisoners upon whom the Soviet intelligence officers concentrated their efforts was Fumitaka Konoye, a son of Prince Konoye, Rastvorov told the subcommittee. The son died October 20, 1956, in a Soviet prison camp.

"The son of Prince Konoye, in spite of persistent attempts to recruit him, did not collaborate, and refused to act as an agent of the Soviet intelligence in Japan," Rastvorov testified.

He said the man was promised repatriation if he would collaborate but, when he refused, was tried as a war criminal and undoubtedly received a long term in prison. He testified:

Mr. RASTVOROV. To continue, I learned from Vashkin (chief of Soviet intelligence in Japan in 1946) and others that the Soviet Government refused to free the son of Prince Konoye, and decided to keep him in the Soviet Union in order to avoid revelation of all that had happened to him in connection with attempts to recruit him. The Soviets realized the reaction of the Japanese people and people of the free world if (the son of) Prince Konoye revealed his experiences, so he was sentenced as a war criminal and, I assume, reduced to living conditions which would shorten his life, following the principle that "dead men tell no tales."

Mr. MORRIS. That is an assumption on your part, that they deliberately shortened his life?

Mr. RASTVOROV. Yes; that is my assumption on this particular case, based on my personal experience in the MVD.1

Rastvorov told the subcommittee that he had agents in the Japanese Foreign Office (p. 14). He also told of these instances of MVD corruption of Japanese officials: A Japanese employee of the Japanese Embassy in Moscow married a Russian girl; her sister was arrested and the wife, to protect her sister, agreed to work as a Soviet agent and, when her husband later became cipher clerk in Czechoslovakia, forced him to become an agent (p. 16); a girl agent in Moscow was used to seduce a Japanese Embassy official who became a Soviet agent and later worked as a Soviet agent in Tokyo (p. 18).

In Tokyo, during the war, the head of the Tass Bureau, Samilov (Sonini) was a staff officer of Soviet military intelligence (GRU), Rastvorov said. He added that another member of the Tass Bureau in Tokyo, Captain Egorov, was an GRU agent (p. 18).

He also said that Colonel Damnitskii, head of a trade mission in Tokyo, used his official post for intelligence purposes, and that several of Rastvorov's fellow officers came to Japan in 1953 as Soviet representatives to a meeting on economic affairs. He also reported that

1 Testimony, December 18, 1956.

Otroshenko, then chief of the Soviet Far East intelligence directorate, came to Japan as an official of the Foreign Office to participate in negotiations with Prince Kuni to restore diplomatic relations between the two countries. Otroshenko, he said, checked activities of MVD while he was in Tokyo (p. 16).

Another intelligence officer who came to Japan, Rastvorov said, was Colonel Smirnoff, who was in the United States, probably with an Embassy connection, during World War II. Smirnoff accompanied a Soviet skating team to Japan as an official of a cultural mission (p. 17).

Rastvorov said that, in 1946, he participated, with Col. Ivan Vashkin, then chief of Soviet intelligence in Tokyo, in an unsuccessful effort by the Soviet to take over the Russian church in Japan.

He said that Maj. Gen. G. G. Karpov, head of the religious section of MVD and also chairman of the Religion Committee of the Council of Ministers of the U. S. S. R., proposed to send two Soviet priests to take over the church, following the death of Bishop Sergei. There were some pro-Soviet worshippers in the congregation and Rastvorov and Vashkin tried to use one of them, Bilayev, to persuade the congregation to invite these two priests to Japan. However, the majority of the congregation could not be persuaded and, besides, the occupation forces under General Douglas MacArthur refused to let the priests enter the country (pp. 783-784).

Japan, like most countries outside the Soviet orbit, has, in addition to the open Communist Party, an under-cover or illegal group, Rastvorov said. Members of this illegal group, he explained, are not known to the open Communists, do not participate in front organizations and have contact with the Central Committee of the Communist Party only through the chief resident of the MVD intelligence group in Tokyo.

He named the following as chief residents of MVD in Tokyo, with whom he worked: Colonel Kotelnikov, Colonel Shibaev (temporarily in 1951), Kasparov (who was in the United States in the early forties) and Nosenko (p. 13).

He said MVD has no contact with the open Communist Party, but only with the illegal group who are the "most devoted people, the most trusted people." Through them, he said, are sent instructions and money (p. 14).

Between 1950 and 1954, the liaison between Soviet intelligence and the Japanese Communist Party was a man whose code name was Ron, Rastvorov said. This man transmitted money to Japanese Communists.

The subcommittee heard all this evidence of Soviet conquest of Japan by infiltration with great concern. For, as that cornerstone of influence in Asia gravitates toward Moscow and Peiping, the power of the Soviet Empire more and more threatens all of Asia, and brings the power of its legions closer and, with a more formidable array of strength, to the shore of the United States.

SPOTLIGHT ON POLAND AND HUNGARY

In the course of the year, the subcommittee found itself in a position to furnish the Congress and the people of the United States with an informed estimate and interpretation of the world-shaking events

which have recently transpired in Communist Poland and Hungary. Seweryn Bialer, who defected from the Polish Communist Party as late as January 31, 1956, testified at length for the subcommittee. He had been (1) chief of the political division at the headquarters of the Polish Militia, (2) a chief propagandist and lecturer for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Poland, specializing in antiWestern and anti-American propaganda, (3) first secretary for the party in two important, Polish, Communist schools, (4) ideological adviser for the Communist paper, People's Tribune, (5) professor at the Institute of Social Sciences for the Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party, and (6) research worker at the Institute of Economic Sciences for the Polish Academy of Science. He was assistant chief of the official delegation of the Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party which was sent to discuss Polish problems with the Russian Communist Party leaders in Moscow in November and December 1954 (pt. 29, June 8, 1956.) It was as if the subcommittee had been granted the opportunity to obtain a glimpse through the eyes of an expert behind the Iron Curtain of the Polish and the Russian Communist Party.

Mr. Bialer appeared before the subcommittee on June 8, 11, 29, and October 30, 1956. On June 28 the workers of Poznan, Poland, suddenly broke into a marching demonstration demanding "Bread. Bread. Down with dictatorship. We want freedom." Soldiers and police joined the marchers. Fifteen thousand demonstrators stormed the prisons and freed the prisoners. Demands were raised that the Russian Konstantin K. Rokossovsky, Minister of Defense in Poland, be withdrawn.

During the closing days of October, Budapest, Hungary, became the scene of full-fledged civil war. The hated Premier Rakosi was forced to resign. Communist security officers were hanged from lampposts. The statue of Stalin was overturned. The demand was raised for the withdrawal of Russian troops. In savage reprisal the city was invaded by Russian tanks. "In the space of 11 days" said one reporter on the scene "I have seen Hungary pass from a Soviet satellite state, through independence, to become an occupied country." What was behind all this? The subcommittee wanted to know.

By way of background Mr. Bialer described the speech made by N. Š. Khrushchev, secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union before approximately 200 activists of the Polish Communist Party in Warsaw in April 1955. Khrushchev stressed the need of heavy industry and armaments as against consumers' goods, in the following terms:

It is true that you do not have good ladies' hats. It is true that there is probably not enough food in Poland. But you must remember, we must have, first of all, heavy industry. The more steel we produce for the Soviet bloc, the more sleepless nights Mr. Dulles will have in Washington. *** He turns in his bed when he learns about it." (p. 1569.)

Khrushchev then dealt with the question of coexistence with a frankness which was markedly absent during his discussions with American statesmen and the press. An extensive campaign was organized within

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