COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman

ROBERT MORRIS, Chief Counsel
J. G. SOURWINE, Associate Counsel
WILLIAM A. RUSHER, Associate Counsel
BENJAMIN MANDEL, Director of Research

SECTION VIII

TASS NEWS AGENCY

The subcommittee undertook as part of its inquiry into Soviet activities in the United States, an inquiry into Tass, the Soviet News agency. As a result of this study we are able to present a rather comprehensive picture of that agency's nature.

Tass, the telegraph agency of the Soviet Union, is registered with the Department of Justice as operating for the purpose of "gathering and transmitting American news to the U. S. S. R." Tass is presented to the American public as "The Associated Press of Russia". Tass has been, in fact, a most potent arm and cover for Soviet military intelligence, at least in other lands.

Since the American section of Tass is part of an international intelligence network the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee called upon two former agents of the Soviet military intelligence (Ismail Ege and Yuri Rastvorov) to outline the nature and scope of this organization.

Ismail Ege, formerly known as Ismail Gusseynovich Akhmedov, appeared as a witness before the subcommittee on February 23, 1956. He is by training and experience fully equipped to describe the activities of Tass and to evaluate these activities in terms of military intelligence. He was trained at the Leningrad School of Military Communications. He served as lieutenant in the 11th Radio Battalion of the Caucasian Red Army. He saw military service on the borders of Turkey and Iran as well as Finland. He graduated from the general staff war college of the Red Army in September 1940. He was appointed deputy chief of the fourth section of Soviet military intelligence. This section had the job of procuring from foreign countries data on technical devices having military significance. Ege held the rank of major. He was later appointed chief of the fourth section. He broke with the Soviet Government in June 1942 while serving as press attaché at the Soviet Embassy in Ankara (pp. 58, 59, 60).

Ege worked with Tass while he was an intelligence officer. He used an alias. By instruction of Major General Panfilov, Soviet deputy chief of Military Intelligence, Ege was appointed under the name of Georgi Petrovich Nikolayev as vice president of the Tass Bureau in Berlin in 1941. He filled out a multitude of forms under this false name, with a fictitious record of his birth, parents, education, and general background. His military intelligence ties were not disclosed, but his documents reflected that he had graduated from the Institute of Journalism in Tbilisi (pp. 63, 64).

Tass furnished an ideal cover for intelligence operations, according to Ege. "We had Tass cards," he declared. "We had social standing as Tass correspondents. We were being invited to social parties, to

conferences, to press conferences. We had access to press members of other agencies, like Reuters, AP, UP, Wolff, and any other news agency * * *” (p. 67). According to Ege, "Tass is better to use as a cover than the Embassy." He explained that "foreign counterintelligence organizations know that a man with a diplomatic passport of the Soviet Embassy is sometimes a spy anyway So they organize surveillance of him*** But sometimes it doesn't come to the minds of the people that a little Tass correspondent is a colonel of the Red Army and getting information on espionage" (p. 71).

Tass operates under certain distinct advantages in the United States, Ege pointed out, because of (1) lack of restrictions, (2) freedom of speech, and (3) because "many people cannot imagine or think how Tass*** was extensively used as a cover for military espionage" (p. 66).

"About 80 to 85 percent of Tass correspondents are Soviet agents working for some kind of Soviet intelligence agency," Ege said (pp. 68, 69).

Yuri Rastvorov, formerly second secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Tokyo and simultaneously lieutenant-colonel of the Soviet Intelligence Service (MVD), who defected in January 1954, also estimated that of Tass personnel, "about 85 or 90 percent of them belong to (the) intelligence service, military or political intelligence service" (p. 18).

Mr. Ege was asked what kind of information he was instructed to secure. He answered: "We were ordered to get information on military data and on organization of troops, concentration, their location, their method of training and besides this, to get data, classified data, in (the) political field ***” (p. 66).

Ege described the methods by which Tass agents transmitted intelligence reports to Moscow. They used the diplomatic pouch, and when it was urgent, they used the radio. Cipher rather than code was preferred (p. 69).

From his experience and contact with high-ranking Soviet intelligence officers and with the director of Soviet intelligence, Ege knew that Tass was used in the United States for intelligence purposes.

Within the Soviet Union itself, Tass has specific functions as an instrument of the Communist dictatorship. It supplies the Government and the Soviet press with "retouched" information. Ege testified that "Tass gathers commercial information" which is "analyzed and disseminated" to the MVD and Communist Party headquarters. Information supplied is "prejudiced" and "nonobjective" and calculated to mislead its Russian readers (p. 68).

As part of the Soviet intelligence apparatus, Tass recruits its personnel only from tried and trusted members of the Communist conspiracy. Among the intelligence (MVD) personnel employed by Tass and known to Ege were:

Tarasov, real name Udin, president of Tass in Berlin (p. 65).
Sergei Kudryavtsev, Tass Berlin (p. 65).

Verkhovtsev, Tass Berlin (p. 65).

Lakayeva, Tass Istanbul (p. 1020).

Vishnyakov, chief of the Tass bureau at Ankara, Turkey, also Tass correspondent at Vichy, France (p. 70).

Mikhaylov, Tass correspondent in Turkey, a graduate of the Frunze Military Academy (p. 70).

Morozov, Tass correspondent in Turkey, colonel in the Red Army, real name Medvedev (p. 70).

Alkayeva, working for Tass in Germany, an operative for Soviet Naval Intelligence (p. 70).

Augusta Okorokova, in France with Vishnyakov and in Ankara as a translator and typist (p. 70).

This list was supplemented by Mr. Rastvorov who listed:

Colonel Samoilov, chief of Tass section in Tokyo, and officer of Soviet Military Intelligence, real name, Sonini (p. 18).

Captain Egorov, Tass representative in Tokyo, member of Soviet Military Intelligence (p. 18).

The subcommittee noted also:

Nikolai Zheveinov, New York Tass correspondent in 1944, alias Martin, recalled from Canada after being involved in the spy ring exposed by the Canadian Royal Commission (p. 37).

Reflecting on the nature of Tass activities is an incident described by John Rudy, public relations director of the National Federation of American Shipping. He recalled that a week after the Korean war started a girl employee of Tass phoned his office and asked, "How many American ships were in waters near Korea?" Mr. Rudy stalled off her questions, saying he did not have such information at his fingertips and that most of it was secret. A few days later the same voice called back with even more persistence. She wanted to know about private vessels not under Military Transportation Service. How many were in Korean waters? What types were they? What tonnage? What cargoes? Speed? When built? How many ships did the United States have abuilding? How many ships were being built abroad?

Mr. Rudy later consulted the Navy and was instructed not to give out such information under any circumstances.

Later another Tass employee, according to the evidence, called asking about military supplies being moved to Europe. On another occasion a girl from Tass called Mr. Rudy's secretary to try to get shipping information, whereupon Mr. Rudy warned his whole office so that no information was forthcoming (pp. 32, 33).

Testimony of members of the Tass staff in the United States fully bears out the above pattern showing the intimate interlocking relationship between Tass, an agency of the Soviet Government, and the Communist Party, U. S. A.

HARRY FREEMAN

Harry Freeman was born in the United States. He is deputy manager of the New York office of Tass, and aid to the Russian acting manager, Leonid Velichansky. Freeman served a long apprenticeship with the Communist Party, U. S. A. From March 1927 to September 1928, he was a member of the staff of the Daily Worker, official Communist Party organ. When asked about his membership in the Communist Party, he invoked the fifth amendment for the period prior to August 1941 (p. 34).

In 1941, Tass announced to its employees a rule "against participation in political activity." Freeman invoked the fifth amendment as to whether he had then resigned from the Communist Party (p. 34). When asked if he had associated as a Tass newsman with "people whom you have known to be active in Soviet espionage," Freeman at first made a denial. Later he invoked the fifth amendment regarding his dealings with the following persons: (1) Hede Massing, who has testified responsively before this committee regarding her activities as a Soviet espionage agent; (2) Paul Massing, her former husband; (3) Gerhardt Eisler, a representative of the Communist International; (4) John Abt, who has declined to deny sworn testimony on grounds of privilege that he was a member of an underground ring of the Communists operating in Washington; (5) Louise Bransten, who has refused to deny sworn testimony she was a member of the Communist party who cooperated with Soviet espionage agents; (6) Arthur Ewert, a representative of the Communist International; (7) Cohen (an alias), a representative of the Communist International; (8) Robert F. Hall, Communist Party organizer and Daily Worker correspondent; (9) Charles Recht, counselor for the Soviet Embassy; and (10) Alexander Trachtenberg, a Communist Party leader who heads the International Publishers, a Red publishing house. Freeman admitted his contact with the following persons who have invoked the fifth amendment regarding their Communist Party membership: (1) Edwin S. Smith; (2) Howard Fast, Daily Worker columnist; and (3) James Allen, editor and writer on foreign affairs. He admitted having furnished Tass credentials to Latin America for the former United Nations employee, Ursula Wasserman, who has been identified as a Communist Party member (pp. 35, 36, 40, 41, 42).

As a Tass correspondent, Freeman has attended both White House and State Department press conferences. In the Communist hierarchy Freeman has reached sufficient status to be photographed at a formal dinner beside former Soviet Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov, according to the Saturday Evening Post of January 20, 1951 (p. 38). Freeman estimated that the Tass daily quota of words sent to Moscow was between 5,000 and 6,000; that Tass transmitted monthly about 175,000 words through the usual commercial communications channels (p. 31).

Considering the services rendered by Tass in the United States, its expenses are comparatively insignificant. Its registration statement submitted to the United States Department of Justice for the 6 months ending September 30, 1955, showed total operational expenses of $151,575. Of this sum $38,743.09 was paid to RCA Communications, Western Union, Associated Press, United Press, Washington News Service, New York Telephone Co., Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co., and the Federated Press, a Communist-controlled news service, which recently suspended operations.

HAYS JONES

Hays Jones identified himself as a writer in the commercial department of Tass. He said he had been a rewrite man for the past 12 years (p. 44). Jones invoked the fifth amendment regarding his Commu