Admiral COOKE. I will look at that and provide it for the record. [The information follows:] I believe that there are no programs which fall into that category. Mr. SIKES. Any other staff questions? Very well, gentlemen, thank you very much. The hearings have been very productive. MONDAY, APRIL 1, 1974. DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE WITNESSES DR. JOHN L. McLUCAS, SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE Mr. MAHON. The committee will begin its consideration of the budg et request of the Department of the Air Force for fiscal year 1975. I believe you are requesting, Mr. Secretary, for fiscal year 1975, new obligational authority totaling $26 billion plus. The fiscal year 1975 request is $3.7 billion more than that appropriated in the regular bill for fiscal year 1974. Also pending before Congress is an Air Force supplemental request for fiscal year 1974 totaling $1.9 billion. The committee will report the supplemental bill to the House this week. Mr. Secretary, we are pleased to have you before us. We are pleased to have you, General Brown, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, before us again. We will place your prepared statements in the record and ask you to briefly summarize their main points after which we will have a period of interrogation. Mr. Secretary, I wish you would place your biographical sketch in the record at this point too. DR. JOHN L. McLUCAS, SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE Dr. John L. McLucas became Secretary of the Air Force on July 19, 1973. He had been Acting Secretary of the Air Force since May 15, 1973, and Under Secretary of the Air Force since March 1969. Prior to his appointment as Under Secretary, he was president and chief executive officer of MITRE Corp., of Bedford, Mass., and McLean, Va. Dr. McLucas was born in Fayettevile, N.C., on August 22, 1920. He attended public schools in McColl and Latta, S.C., graduating from Latta high school in 1937. He received a bachelor of science degree from Davidson College in 1941, a master of science degree in physics from Tulane University in 1943, and his doctorate in physics from Pennsylvania State University in 1950. During World War II, he served as an officer in the U.S. Navy from 1943 to 1946. After 1 year at the Air Force Cambridge Research Center in Cambridge, Mass., he enrolled at Pennsylvania State University. From 1950 to 1957, he was vice president and technical director of Haller, Raymond & Brown, Inc., an electronics firm at State College, Pa. In 1958 he was made president of HRB-Singer, Inc. He joined the Department of Defense in May 1962 and served as Deputy Director of Defense Research and Engineering (Tactical Warfare Programs). Two years later, he was appointed as Assistant Secretary General for Scientific Affairs at NATO Headquarters in Paris, France. In 1966 he became president of MITRE Corp., where he remained until his appointment as Under Secretary of the Air Force on March 17, 1969. He was elected a fellow of the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers in 1962; an associate fellow of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics in 1971; and a member of the National Academy of Engineering in 1969. He received the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service in 1964, and first bronze palm in 1973; and the Air Force Exceptional Service Award in May 1973. He is a member of the Chief Executives Forum, American Physical Society, Operations Research Society of America, and of several honorary societies, including Sigma Pi Sigma and Sigma Xi. He is a former member of the Defense Science Board, Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, and the Young Presidents Organization. STATEMENT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE I. INTRODUCTION MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE: I welcome this opportunity to submit my first budget statement to this Committee and appreciate the essential role that Congress plays in maintaining the kind of Air Force needed for national security. As Secretary of the Air Force, I look forward to working with this Committee. While our major goal remains one of maintaining an effective Air Force with a high state of readiness, there have been a number of significant developments in the security environment occurring during the last year which have directly affected Air Force requirements. The Air Force budget for FY 1975 has been shaped to reflect these new developments. - - Combat experience noted both in Southeast Asia and the Middle East has demonstrated the need for continually updating tactical capability through both qualitative improvements in existing forces and the introduction of new weapon systems. The ramifications of the recent conflict in the Middle East clearly point up the importance of certain conventional capabilities, such as improved detection and targeting, electronic warfare, precision attack munitions, and the value of aircraft shelters. Southeast Asia experience and the Middle East crisis have also emphasized the great importance of maintaining highly capable strategic airlift and aerial refueling forces. We must begin immediately to build up our munitions, missile, and aircraft inventories to meet war reserve levels demonstrated by the Middle East crisis as needed. In addition, the Mid-East crisis reemphasized the need to accelerate development of improved tactical systems and to enhance our strategic airlift capacity by modifying Air Force and Civil Reserve Air Fleet airlift aircraft. To begin working toward these goals, a FY 74 Readiness Supplemental of $1.1 billion is required. The FY 75 budget continues these efforts and, together with the FY 74 Supplemental, will enhance the readiness of the force. A supplemental request for $800 million has been submitted to provide the funding for approved pay, subsistence, and postal increases. The Air Force portion of the FY 74 supplementals that were forwarded with the FY 75 Budget Request totals $1.9 billion. (This is summarized in Table I on page 37 at the end of this report.) While the requirements for general purpose and mobility capabilities are being fully considered in our planning, strategic deterrence remains of paramount importance as we seek genuine détente and security. We must always be prepared to maintain essential equivalence in strategic forces so that potential adversaries do not have significant military advantage over us. In my mind such strength increases the likelihood of success across the range of important foreign policy initiatives now underway. We must remain prepared so that we can negotiate from strength, help maintain international stability, and defend vital national interests. Our FY 75 budget (summarized in Table I) provides a balance between our general purpose and strategic forces, and includes the necessary procurement and development programs to support this balance. To maintain adequate strength, I am convinced that we should continue to modernize Air Force strategic and tactical forces at the level reflected in the FY 75 budget request. In the personnel area, our key goal is continuing an AllVolunteer Force. To date, we are very encouraged with the results the All-Volunteer policy is working well for us. Although I will identify some problems in the personnel area, morale is high, and we continue to maintain an excellent state of readiness. In all of our endeavors to provide adequate security for the country, we cannot do our job without Congressional support and the support of the public. We are convinced that with hard work, innovative attitudes, integrity, and a sense of national responsibility, we will continue to earn that support. I have the utmost confidence in the Air Force's contribution to the security of the country. II. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT Technology is increasingly a major determinant of military capability. A vigorous research and development program is required to maintain an overall military balance in the modern world and to minimize the possibility of technological surprise. Indeed, a strong research and development effort is an essential ingredient of deterrence. Our FY 75 Air Force research and development budget request is $3.5 billion. Although this amount is about 7% over the level of the last two years in terms of real purchasing power, the security environment clearly supports the need for an increase. The B-1 strategic bomber is our primary aircraft development and our most important research and development program. In the tactical area, we have given priority to a group of programs called PAVE STRIKE which will improve anti-armor and close air support capabilities in dense SAM and air defense environments. Also, we are continuing prototype development of the Lightweight Fighter and the Advanced Medium STOL Transport aircraft. (A summary of our R&D funding request is at Table II.) B-1 Strategic Bomber. In discussing the B-1 program, I want to comment briefly on the strategic balance. The SALT I agreement was based on approximate strategic nuclear parity between the Soviet Union and the United States. In the agreement, Soviet quantitative advantages were balanced by American qualitative advantages. These American technological advantages will tend to decrease if the Soviets deploy Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs), get better accuracy, and improve warheads. The Soviets are presently demonstrating some of these advances in a rapidly paced ICBM test program involving four new strategic missiles. We hope that SALT II will make further progress toward maintaining essential equivalence of future forces. However, we need to be sure U.S. deterrent forces are essentially equivalent to those of the Soviet Union, whether the negotiations are successful or not. This means that we must develop additional qualitative capabilities today to be able to continue to offset Soviet quantitative advantages as they seek to improve the quality of their forces. To be sure, the mix of strategic forces -- our intercontinental missiles, submarine-launched missiles, and strategic bombers provides assurance against the possibility that an enemy could neutralize our deterrent by developing a way to attack effectively a single element of our strategic forces. At the same time, we must be sure that the effectiveness of each element of the TRIAD is sufficient in quality and quantity to maintain credible deterrence. In the quest to maintain effective, credible deterrence in the face of a changing world and growing Soviet strategic capabilities, the role of the bomber has acquired increasing importance. Bombers can help provide suitable options for highly selective, discriminate, and controlled responses, thus enhancing overall deterrence by providing the President a known capability to respond at a variety of levels, well short of all-out nuclear war, without degrading our secure, second-strike capability. Bombers can be launched, redirected, or recalled over a period of hours and used again. Thus, they demonstrate visible, controlled intent and provide the National Command Authorities time to consider courses of action. They are crucial to deterrence of enemy attack and to the limitation of escalation should an enemy attack. The manned bomber is a unique and proven element of the TRIAD. However, we must insure that the strategic bomber force maintains into the 1980s its present high prelaunch survivability against enemy offensive forces and its ability to penetrate projected improvements in enemy air defenses. The B-52 has served us well, but its basic design was established in the early fifties. The B-1 basic design incorporates technology and design advances made since that time which increase its prelaunch and en route survivability, and ensure its penetration ability. Together, the characteristics possessed by the B-1 will enhance deterrence by insuring that a potential enemy knows with high confidence that selected targets can be destroyed by the United States in any of the circumstances in which conflict could occur. As you know, in order to insure a prudent pace of development without increases in FY 74 funds or technical risk, last July we extended the B-1 development schedule. In August, we asked Dr. Bisplinghoff and a group of experts to review the technical and management aspects of the B-1 program. In November, they reported their findings. After further intensive study by the Air Force, we find we agree with the main conclusions of the Bisplinghoff group, namely, the program should be structured to provide better transition to production, and thereby accomplish additional development tasks before a production decision is made. Accordingly, in FY 75, we plan first flight of air vehicle number one in the fall and continued manufacture of air vehicles two and three. We also plan to begin working on a fourth aircraft starting in November 1974 and possibly a fifth aircraft in FY 76, funded with research and development funds, which will incorporate the production design. |