a request if he thinks he has a special problem, but no person has the option to disobey or delay carrying out an order. Mr. MAHON. Clarify the last few statements for the record. [The information follows:] As previously stated, there is no option with regard to whether or not to carry out an order. Every legal order must be obeyed. Each individual does have the clearly stated right in U.S. Navy regulations to obtain a hearing before his commanding officer. In the Navy this hearing is called a request mast. Here a man can voice his protest or feelings about a specific problem, but this procedure does not provide the option of whether or not to carry out an order. Mr. FLYNT. I want very briefly to return to the Constellation and Kitty Hawk cases. There was an instance in which I became involved. At one time it looked like I would have to make my own investigation on it, but, fortunately, it was made. A young man was in his bunk-is that what you call it in the Navy? Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir. Mr. FLYNT. Minding his own business. Mr. SIKES. You do not have hammocks any more? Mr. FLYNT. Five people came in and beat the living daylights out of him. He had to go to sick bay to stop the bleeding and to have some very severe lacerations bandaged. Of course, when he got there, they asked him what happened, and he told them. Then other questions were asked. The same people came back and told him that that was just a sample of what he was going to get if he told on them again. They proceeded to beat him up again. Then he went to his division officer. It has been reliably reported to me that this division officer told him, "If I were you, I wouldn't say anything further about this." That is when I got into it. Within about 24 hours he was allowed to talk to either his XO or the skipper of the ship. Finally, some disciplinary action was initiated. I am very much concerned that even though that disciplinary action was initiated, nothing whatsoever has been done. This is the reason I bring this up. I do not think you can have a Navy or any type of fighting organization where the life and safety of one individual is totally disregarded as far as his fellow personnel are concerned, and when he comes in to report it he is advised, "I wouldn't say anything further about this if I were you." Admiral ZUMWALT. I am not familiar with the case to which you refer. Mr. FLYNT. Your office is. Admiral ZUMWALT. It has to be an extremely unusual circumstance. It is very difficult to understand how an officer could have given that answer. It is not only not the normal case, it is an absolute aberration if it happened. I think it is important to remind ourselves that every one of our ships has remained combat-effective throughout the South Vietnam war. Every one of our ships performed very capably during the recent special deployments in response to the Yom Kippur crisis; 99.9 percent of our naval personnel are performing above and beyond the call. What we are talking about here are symptoms involved in an organization which is trying truly to make itself representative of this country at large with regard finally, after decades, to solving its racial imbalance. Mr. FLYNT. That situation on those two ships at one time approached the point where the hoodlums were just about running the ship. That is about the same situation that I would describe if you turned over the operation of an insane asylum to the inmates. I do not think people who have no regard for discipline and for the good of the service ought to be allowed in effect to take over an entire aircraft carrier. Admiral ZUMWALT. I do not believe so, either. I believe disciplinary action will continue to be taken in all such instances. If any come to my attention where it is not. I will certainly look into it, and I will look into this case. I think it is important, again, to make the general case that you were citing an extremely isolated incident in a Navy which continues to have a proud record. Mr. FLYNT. Thank you, Admiral. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. And thank you, Mr. Chairman. FIGHTING CAPABILITY OF MARINE CORPS Mr. MAHON. Let us have a couple of questions here, and in a few minutes let us move into your statements. I think first I would like to recognize General Cushman. Has the Marine Corps improved its fighting capability during the past year, or has the fighting capability degraded? General CUSHMAN. No, sir. I think we have improved, for these reasons: We have maintained a stable personnel strength level which makes leadership an easier job. When leaders know their people and personnel turbulence is reduced, unit effectiveness is naturally increased. We have brought the AV-8A Harrier aircraft into the force, and have two squadrons operating now, and a third one on the way. We have completed the issue of our new amphibian tractor to both active and reserve units. We have conducted with the Navy an extensive series of amphibious exercises. This is a return to the basics of our profession, our primary mission, which we had to neglect while we were in Vietnam. I think the quality of our people is improving. We have restricted the number of mental group IV's to half of what it was when I came aboard as commandant. This is beginning to show an effect on the disciplinary problems in terms of unauthorized absentees and that sort of thing. I believe, all in all, that we have improved our combat capability. Mr. MAHON. Make sure that in your response you list the new weapons that have come into your inventory during this period. General CUSHMAN. Yes. [The information follows:] During the past year we have added the following new weapons to our inventory: LVTP-7 (amphibious tractor). LVTC (command). LVTR (recovery). M-109A1 155-millimeter howitzer. M-48A3 tanks were provided to our Reserve Forces. AN/GSQ-184 (formerly the integrated observation system (IOS)). AV-8A (Harrier). UH-1N. Mr. MAHON. We will have further questions for you as we move along. I would say, Mr. Secretary and Admiral Zumwalt and General Cushman, we like to feel comfortable in these hearings with our military friends. We, of course, cannot be just "yes" people and say your budget is so-and-so, and you are all good people, and no hearing is necessary. It is incumbent, as I see it, on the Congress as one of the branches of the Government to look with some degree of skepticism with respect to all requests for funds. I think people expect us to play that role. I think you yourself play it in connection with requests that come to you from people within the service. You have to probe the require ments. Sharp questions do not necessarily mean any opposition at all or any lack of friendship with our military forces. We all realize the tremendous debt of gratitude we owe the military forces and the importance of the military forces to our country. Each of you has a long statement. You have summary statements; have you not? Secretary WARNER. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Mr. MAHON. Is there anyone who would like to ask a general question before we go into the summary statement of the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations? [No response.] Secretary WARNER. Might I, in reply to your statement of a moment ago, state that we in the executive branch fully respect and understand the responsibility of the Congress and the legislative branch. In no manner do we regard your questions as sharp or unfair or otherwise. It is our explicit duty to support each and every element of the Department's budget as it is submitted to the Congress. STATEMENT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY Mr. Chairman, Gentlemen: It is a pleasure for me to appear before this Committee today to present the Navy and Marine Corps budget and program for Fiscal Year 1975. Accompanying me are Admiral E. R. Zumwalt, Chief of Naval Operations, and General R. E. Cushman, Commandant of the Marine Corps. Collectively we will report to you on the financial implications of our program and also, as custom dictates, on the current posture of the Navy and Marine Corps team, its strengths and weaknesses as we perceive them today, and the challenges which we foresee in the years ahead. I will leave it to the Service Chiefs to provide the principal comment on the operational matters affecting our forces, while I point my remarks towards the allocation of the resources which these forces require. maintenance Resources are allocated to support objectives, and our national maritime objectives remain today as they have been in the past: of a credible, sea-based strategic nuclear deterrent, and the capability to control the sea lines of communications in areas vital to our national interests. In this latter objective I include a meaningful ability to influence events at the terminals of these lines that is, projection of power ashore when and where necessary. - I believe that at no time in our nation's history has the maintenance of a strong and effective Navy and Marine Corps team fully capable of achieving these maritime objectives I been so important as it is today. In many respects we are an island nation which, from its inception, has relied upon the expanse of the adjoining oceans for our primary means of protection. Despite the advancements in military technology, this protection remains essential. Moreover, within our generation, this nation's dependence on the sea has expanded to include our economic security. For example, the United States now imports in whole or in part 69 of the 72 materials designated by the Department of Commerce as critical to its industrial base and over 99% by weight of these materials is carried by shipping over the adjoining seas. Similarly, exports critical to our balance of payments and a high level of domestic employment require continuing freedom of the seas. From a resource-rich and largely self-sufficient nation 60 years ago, we have moved to a position where our ability to safeguard the sea lanes is now doubly important. - 17 I say Paradoxically, the only nation which can mount a military challenge to our maritime objectives on a sustained basis is the Soviet Union. "paradoxically" because the Soviet Union is by geography and history a major land power, self-sufficient in virtually all the strategic materials required to support a modern industrial state. Yet within the past 15 years the Soviet Union has built combat capable fleets which range the world's oceans. Providing and structuring naval forces to meet the potential threat that this Soviet fleet poses to our sea lines of communications has been a major challenge to U.S. naval leadership over the past decade. But it is not just with respect to the Soviet Union that we must size our combat forces. We must also look to the changing international order, to its alliances and its economic realities, and consider the more diverse challenges which this change presents. The fundamental mission of the Navy, indeed that of all the Armed Forces of the United States, is to deter armed conflict. To achieve this objective, it must be clearly perceived within the international community that U.S. and allied military forces are, as a minimum, in overall balance with those of the Soviet Union and its allies. It must also be perceived that U.S. naval forces themselves are sufficient to deter actions which would restrict our freedom to use the seas for self-protection or for free access to our economic markets and interests abroad. This country, the world's largest consumer of energy and raw materials, cannot recede to any position whereby we could be held hostage to the capabilities of other nations. These complex and interrelated factors necessarily must be weighed with an awareness of a national divergence of views regarding the spending priorities in our country, and the reality of the strongly competing demands for the tax dollar resulting therefrom. In short, our long-term resource allocation decisions and recommendations are influenced by three factors: The necessity to size our maritime capability in such a way as to balance the projected maritime capability of the Soviet Union, and most particularly that facet of it which could be directed at our sea lines of communications; Simultaneously, to build into this naval force the force levels and flexibilities required to protect United States interests and safeguard a stable world maritime commerce; constraints. Thirdly, to accomplish these tasks within reasonable fiscal - These considerations are fundamental to all our planning. For example, as we move into the 1980 time frame we should see if our building programs hold course a gradual but steady increase in the number of surface combatant ships in our fleets. The large aircraft carriers, their embarked air wings, and their powerful supporting task groups will still be the essential elements of our offensive capability. Supporting and complementing their capability will be less heavily-armed and less costly ships such as the Sea Control Ship and the Patrol Frigate which can be procured in the numbers - required to provide an effective and balanced naval force. With respect to the Marine Corps, our program reflects essentially a level end strength combined with very significant modernization in tank and anti-tank capabilities. The recent Middle East war confirms the necessity for these and other efforts toward modernization. By initiating the changes which I have described, by providing for them in the FY 75 Budget, I believe that the Navy and Marine Corps are moving in step with the times to hold expenditures to a minimum while still meeting the potential challenges. In addition to these longer range goals, however, the FY 75 Budget also addresses a number of immediate concerns: The level of force readiness and the pace of force modernization; The continued viability of the All-Volunteer Force, and the effectiveness of our personnel programs and policies; |