Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir.

The point is that, for example, in the Lebanon crisis of 1958, the President was able to make the decision to go into Lebanon and to be reassured by his military advisers that there was no conventional force that the Soviets could bring to bear that could prevent that.

On the other hand, in the recent Middle East crisis, the Soviets were able to bring about 96 ships to bear as opposed to our 63 at the maximum point for each, and in addition to the submarines and surface ships that were in trial, had the capability to bring aircraft bear from Crimea, Syria, Egypt, and other places.

I believe, therefore, that in any future crisis, we would

lieve that is an option

Mr. McFALL. By the phrase

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir, that is what I mean.

I be

Mr. McFALL. You were not intending to describe different options that we would have available to us?

Admiral ZUMWALT. No, sir, but what I am thinking of in that sentence is such things as the fact that I would

I think those are examples of option

SOVIET ACCESS TO INDIAN OCEAN VIA SUEZ CANAL

Mr. McFALL. That same sort of situation will face us in the Indian Ocean as soon as the Suez Canal is opened, is that right?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir, the Indian Ocean, of course, is not as dangerous as the eastern Mediterranean, because it is further away from the Soviet Union, but the opening of the Suez does give the Soviets the capability to surge larger numbers more rapidly into the Indian Ocean and, therefore, our relative power goes down.

Mr. McFALL. Are they picking up airfields all around the Indian Ocean?

I think I asked a question something like that the other day. They are not in India. They do have, I think you said, rights to go ashore with their ships in India, but do not have any base rights there. Do they have base rights all around the Indian Ocean?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir, they are building an airfield in Somalia, where a naval port has been built. They are improving the airfield on the Island of Socotra, just south of the Red Sea, and have access to the port of Aden, in the PDRY, of which Socotra is a part. They have aided the Iraqis and Egyptians, and we believe up until the time of these latest negotiations certainly had access to their airfields. I believe they have to this day in Iraq. I am not so sure that they will anv longer in Egypt.

In India we do not have any evidence that they have access, but my own personal view is that the Soviets, who never do something for nothing, would not have built this huge naval base at Visakhapatnam on the east coast of India

Mr. McFALL. Would this give them the military ability to deny the world oil from that area?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir, there is no doubt in my mind that the Soviets see that as a very important capability that they want to

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have so they can use it for purposes of pressure on us and Western Europe and Japan.

Mr. McFALL. They would not need an Arab oil boycott. They could have a boycott of their own launched militarily if they so decided. Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, or use their power to force the Arabs to boycott or use their power to force the Arabs to double and triple their prices.

Mr. MCFALL. What sort of Navy do we need to prevent that?

Admiral ZUMWALT. I think it is the question of having the kind of capability that gives us greater – -confidence that we can prevail in a conventional war at sea so the Soviets will feel deterred from letting it come to that wherever it breaks out. Both sides would have to worry about its being enlarged to all the oceans. in the near years.

When you look at it in that context,

Mr. McFALL. Thank you.

Admiral ZUMWALT. May I add one thing. I think the 5-year program we have as put forward in the 1975 budget and planned for the out years would give us the capability

Mr. DAVIS. I do not want to get into anything that was discussed this morning. Did we have any discussion of the role of our NATO Allies with comparable naval capability?

Mr. SIKES. Very briefly. We just touched on it.

Mr. DAVIS. All of the discussion here, Admiral, has been pretty well strictly United States versus U.S.S.R. In your overall thinking, have you pretty well discounted the assistance of at least one-time traditional navy powers who are friendly to the United States?

Admiral ZUMWALT. No, sir. We examined this. This is the way it comes out, sir.

We worry, first, about having adequate power to deter the Soviet Union in a bilateral confrontation

Then we assume that there are two eventualities if war actually

came.

One, that the Allies would stay out and it would remain bilateral. We have a certain set of calculations to do.

Alternatively, if we assume that it enlarges and NATO comes in, we have another set of calculations to do.

We believe the additional liabilities we pick up by having to reinforce Europe are just about a trade-off with the additional assets we pick up as a result of getting NATO navies added to our own. In other words, it is a tougher job to fight a war in which you have to reinforce Europe, and you need even more forces, than it is to fight a war in which you do not have to worry about the reinforcement of Europe.

BRITISH NAVY

Mr. DAVIS. What do the British have in the way of a navy? Admiral ZUMWALT. They have one carrier. I will have to provide the numbers of specific ships, but it is a very modest fleet now. The French have 2 or 3 carriers. All their navies are good, but quite small in comparison to our own. The Italians have a respectable set of ships. The Dutch have a few good ships. The Germans have a small number of good ships.

[The information follows:]

The British have the following number of major surface combatants and submarines:

Mr. DAVIS. Is there anything in the Warsaw Pact countries in the way of naval capability that would compare with the potential of the British, French, and Italian Navies?

Admiral ZUMWALT. No, sir. The additional forces that the Russians would pick up from the Warsaw Pact are appreciably less than the additional forces we would pick up from NATO, but the job we pick up is tougher than the job we have with them standing aside.

Mr. DAVIS. Are the British, for instance, capable of adding substantially to our capability to keep the sea lanes in the Eastern Atlantic, for instance, open?

Admiral ZUMWALT. No, sir. They can contribute to our ability to resupply our focres in the United Kingdom or to keep supplies flowing to the United Kingdom, but I do not think they have enough capability to participate in the sea lanes in the broad ocean areas; just in the immediate vicinity of the United Kingdom

Mr. DAVIS. Do the British have any substantial capability in the Norwegian waters to which you referred?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir. They have a total of 66 destroyers of all kinds, old and new, and about 29 subs. That would give them some capability in the immediate approaches to the United Kingdom. Mr. SIKES. Are all these conventionally powered submarines? Admiral ZUMWALT. No, sir. Some few are nuclear.

Mr. SIKES. Do the NATO Allies have a substantial number of small, fast coastal-type ships?

Admiral ZUMWALT. No, sir. I will correct this for the record, if I am wrong, but I think we will find the Warsaw Pact is ahead of the NATO nations with regard to small craft.

Mr. SIKES. Do any of the NATO countries have cruise missiles? Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir. Some of them are installing the French Exocet missile, and they will shortly have access to our Harpoon.

HOMEPORTING PROGRAM

GREECE

Mr. SIKES. Let me ask you about homeporting.

What is the status of homeporting? Do we have a formal agreement with the Greek Government at this time?

Secretary WARNER. May I open on the subject, and then Admiral Zumwalt may provide details.

We have a formal agreement with respect to Phase I of homeporting in Greece. That relates to destroyers.

Phase II involves the carrier and the Sanctuary, which is a hospital ship. This phase still remains to be worked out. We are hopeful it can be achieved.

Mr. SIKES. Have any difficulties arisen since the new Government took power?

Secretary WARNER. I would say that because of the changes in their Government in the last year or so, we have had a delay.

Mr. SIKES. You do not know how long that delay will be? Secretary WARNER. We are hopeful now of initiating Phase II Again, this will require coordination through our Department of State in a government-to-government exchange.

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Secretary, last year during hearings on the fiscal year 1974 budget request, we discussed with you and Admiral Zumwalt the Navy's homeporting program. We also discussed the planning and operation of the program quite extensively with Admiral Gaddis during the O&M hearings. Much of the discussion centered around the program in Greece. It was generally developed that the Navy proceeded with the implementation of the homeporting program in Greece without having a formal agreement with the Greek Government. Has a formal agreement with the Greek Government been signed?

Secretary WARNER. Implementation of the homeporting program involves getting clearance with the executive branch and notification of Congress before going to the Government of Greece for formal agreement.

The Government of Greece, in January 1972, granted approval "in principle" for homeporting elements of the 6th Flect in Greece. This approval was quickly followed by specific approval for homeporting Commander Task Force 60 and staff in Athens in July 1972 and Destroyer Squadron 12 (six destroyers) and Staff in September 1972. In January 1973, the Greek Navy and the U.S. Navy entered into a formal agreement-technical arrangement-which "granted homeporting facilities to the U.S. Navy within the Kingdom of Greece in order to serve the purpose of the North Atlantic Alliance." The arrangement contains provisions for the follow-on homeporting of an aircraft carrier, air wing and hospital ship subject to consent of Greek authorities prior to implementation.

Mr. SIKES. Does this agreement spell out in detail where our ships, planes, and personnel are to be homeported and what facilities will be made available by the Greek Government?

Secretary WARNER. The present technical arrangement spells out in detail the area to be used by the ships-six destroyers-presently homeported in Athens. It is referred to as the "Homeporting Area" and permits the U.S. Navy to provide facilities for its ships and personnel within the designated area. The "homeporting area" is, in fact, the location in Elefsis, Greece, about 15 miles from Athens, at which the Navy has leased a pier from the Greeks for the destroyers. In addition, the technical arrangement allows the Navy to lease additional facilities, such as offices and warehouse space, in the Athens environs for administrative purposes. The technical arrangement does not designate a homeporting area or shore facilities for units to be homeported

in Athens the aircraft carrier and hospital ship, but it does contain a provision tht stated: the homeporting area and shore facilities associated with the implementation of Stage 2 (Phase II—carrier, air wing and hospital ship) will be the subject of an agreed amendment to this technical arrangement.

Mr. SIKES. It was recently reported that the new Greek Government has indicated it may seek revisions to the agreement. Has there been any discussion with the Greek Government in the recent past concerning changes in the homeporting program in Greece?

Secretary WARNER. There have been continued discussions with Greek government officials, primarily at the service-to-service level— U.S. Navy/Greek Navy/Greek Air Force, regarding amendments to the present technical arrangement to accommodate homeporting the carrier, air wing and hospital ship in Athens. These discussions center on our use of the Greek Air Force NATO airfields at Elefsis and Souda Bay and the location and scope of anchorage facilities near Megara. The requirement for use of these, or similar, facilities/locations has existed since we initiated discussions with the Greeks on homeporting in early 1972. So, in that regard, there have been no discussions in the recent past with the Greek Government regarding changes to the program. It is important to note that, although discussions on expanded Navy use of the Souda Bay airfield are being considered concurrent with discussions on use of other facilities to support homeporting, the Souda Bay facility is required to support Sixth Fleet operations and we would be discussing use of this facility whether or not we were homeporting. Discussions on use of Souda Bay airfield center on changes to an existing agreement.

Mr. SIKES. What changes in the program are being requested by the Greek Government?

Secretary WARNER. The new government has taken some time to review the status of the initiative and their commitment to homeporting. The possibility does therefore exist that they may desire to change some items but, if so, they have not communicated that desire to the Navy. During their review of the program, we have had a temporary halt in our discussions on homeporting, but we expect to re-commence discussions in the near future.

Mr. SIKES. What is the current status of the homeporting program in Greece?

Secretary WARNER. Phase I of the Athens homeporting program, which included the homeporting of Commander Task Force Sixty (CTF-60), destroyer squadron and the establishment of a U.S. Navy Fleet Support Office in Athens, Greece, was implemented during the summer and fall of 1972. Phase I includes approximately 2.000 Navy personnel and 550 sponsored dependent families (1,350 individuals) who are located in Athens. All facility requirements have been provided through lease procedures with the major facility being a destroyer pier.

Phase 2-the final phase-includes the homeporting of an aircraft carrier, a carrier air wing and the dependent support ship U.S.S. Sanctuary (AH-17). The target date for the implementation of the