fense systems would help. situations in the eastern mediterranean. We have come to refer to this scenario as the D-Day shoot-out. In summary, our analyses do not paint a bright picture of either our current or projected capability, but they have served to guide us in establishing our program to counter the disadvantages which we see in the current naval balance.

We have recognized from these studies that it would have been possible to retain a greater capability in the near term by retaining more forces. Nevertheless, in order not to mortgage the future for the present, it was necessary to get on with modernization. As the budget level which could be permitted by executive and congressional action, we were obliged to reduce our force levels to fund the needed modernization.

D. Probabilities

I have shown various comparisons of elements of naval capabilities and then referred to the results we obtained from analyzing various scenarios. The true measure of our capability can only finally be determined by fighting a war-anything short of that is judgmental. Therefore, the closest we can practically come to measuring capability is by the results of our war games and our fleet exercises. We are told by these results and by our professional judgment what the outcome will be. We cannot, however, be positive. We must still put probabilities on our estimate. With regard to these probabilities, I cannot be optimistic for the present when our fleet stands at its lowest level in almost four decades.

In arriving at my assessment of probabilities, I have considered results of systems analyses and this net assessment, results of fleet exercises, latest intelligence estimates of the Soviets' capabilities, personal discussions with the operational commanders and my own judg ments based on my years of naval service.

Systems analysis and net assessment can provide many insights into the capabilities of our forces. However, analysis and net assessment cannot include all of the many uncertainties which surround warfare. Likewise, fleet exercises in which we simulate the tactics and capabilities of Soviet forces may give us a good indication of how we would fare in actual conflict, but these also have limitations in their predictive value. In making my judgments concerning the overall capability of the Navy, I must take the quantitative evidence from analysis and exercises, adjust it for latest intelligence on opposing force capabilities, and take into account the judgment of our senior operational commanders. This is a process much like that of an oddsmaker predicting the outcome of a football game. Like the oddsmaker, we are trying to make judgments in the face of great uncertainty; and, as with the football oddsmaker, a usable prediction is possible, the product of informed judgment based upon analysis of the particular offensive and defensive capabilities of the opposing sides, comparisons of their past performances, recent capability changes and, of course, relevant experience.

In 1970 when I first became CNO, it was my judgment that we had of winning a sea control war at that time with the Soviets. I made that judgment based on my personal knowledge of several

analyses and recent experience of the fleet. One of the analyses was the major fleet escort study, of which I had been study director in 1967, that indicated a outcome for a sea war in the mid-1970's with a 21-carrier force level augmented by the construction of more than 15 new surface combatants a year. By 1970, carrier force levels had been reduced to 19 and we had been averaging less than 4 new surface combatants a year. A later analysis, the war at sea now study, found that fleet exercises were showing that we were vulnerable to Soviet cruise missile attack and that our ASW systems had difficulty in handling the modern Soviet nuclear submarines.

[Slide No. 31] In the years since 1970, our chances for success have diminished. Fiscal constraints and the urgent need to fund modernization programs required budgetary offsets in the form of force reductions. By 1973 the number of carriers had dropped to 16; surface combatant force levels had dropped by nearly 30 percent; submarine force levels had dropped 20 percent. These force reductions lead me to judge our current chances for success Further car

rier reductions will be offset by more capable aircraft in the form of the S-3 and F-14 and by completion of the CV conversions. The surface and submarine force levels will begin rebuilding and qualitative improvements will be realized as a result of DD-963 introduction, completion of the SSN 637 class and introduction of the SSN 688 class. we will see the confidence curve begin to improve as Harpoon is introduced to the fleet in limited numbers. - significant progress up the curve will be seen as our F-14 force levels fill out and as the first Sea Control Ship and Patrol Frigates become operational. —

It is well to note at this point that a simple comparison of force numbers while vital in identifying trends, is not a good way to estimate relative force capabilities. My probability estimates are based on the issue of keeping open the sea lines of communications for the prosecution of a land conflict in Europe and/or sustaining our import of critical raw materials and economic support shipping. Because the Soviets can obtain their objective by merely preventing us from using these sea lines of communications, they have much more flexibility in selecting the time and place of conflict, to optimize their force deployments and attack us where we are vulnerable. Maintaining control of the sea requires a much larger force than attempting to deny it. Conversely, I would assess that we would certainly have the capability to deny the Soviets use of the SLOC's should they attempt a conflict requiring such use in South America or Africa, south of the Mediterranean coastal nations.

Parametric comparisons of the two navies, and the results of recent analyses, have been summarized in this net assessment, and have highlighted our relative strengths and weaknesses. More recent fleet exercises continue to show the need for antiship missile defense, which is just beginning to reach the fleet. They also tend to show that our approach to solving the ASW problem has good promise of working. Based on my review of the more recent analyses which I discussed earlier and my review of fleet exercises, my discussions with the oper

ational force commanders, (a summary of their latest readiness reports is contained in Addendum IV) and latest intelligence estimates on Soviet capabilities in the 1980's, my judgment confirms that assumes we get the funding to pursue our modernization programs.

I believe my estimate of our force capability in fiscal year 1970 was accurate within 10 percent; that is, we might have had a Analyses conducted since that time, and subsequent fleet exercises have tended to demonstrate that my assessment was reasonably close. Further, I am quite confident in the shape of the curve. Our decision to drawdown forces in the mid years has resulted in a drop in our probability of winning, but the modernization programs which will be in the fleet by 1980-81 will clearly be more tailored to the threat at sea, with more emphasis on defeating the antiship cruise missile and a broader application of air ASW.

As I discussed previously, the most demanding conflict would be a major conflict at sea with the Soviets under conditions in which we must use the sea for our objective. Our relative capability in many other missions and scenarios is much greater than the Soviets, with or without opposition. Our concern is that they will soon have a usable capability worldwide except for those circumstances in which we choose to actively oppose them. — Finally, in peacetime presence roles, the United States can maintain carrier presence in a limited number of areas at one time. In most of these areas, U.S. presence is generally superior to that which is maintainable by the Soviets. However, there are certain areas close to their bases where the Soviets can maintain numerically superior,- superior forces. These areas include the Eastern Mediterranean, and if the Suez Canal is reopened, the Indian Ocean.

VIII. THE BUDGET AND THE REAL MEANING OF NET ASSESSMENT

The present is a watershed year for the Navy. As you saw on the various graphic representations, our program of modernization for which we have sacrificed current capabilities is at the point where we will start to receive a payback. Under these circumstances, it is feasible, we think, to forecast a confidence level in the 1980's-if the budgets planned for 1975–78 are appropriated.

In the past, as you are aware, the Navy has been frustrated in some of its efforts to gain a position of naval adequacy. I feel that the modernization and get-well programs we have planned will continue on schedule-if the budget for our programs can survive the next step-congressional approval-intact.

We stand now at our point of greatest weakness and in my estimate our greatest jeopardy. With the understanding help of Congress we can move from here into a position where our modernized, well equipped, and well trained forces will again be able to insure a military balance in support of our national interest. To do this takes authorization and appropriation of at least the amounts requested in the President's fiscal year 1975 budget, and, strong congressional support in the years beyond.

[Some of the slides referred to in Admiral Zumwalt's statement appear in graph form as follows. Other slides referred to are classified and were submitted to the committee.]