DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR

FISCAL YEAR 1975

THURSDAY, MARCH 7, 1974.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

WITNESSES

HON. JOHN W. WARNER, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

ADM. ELMO R. ZUMWALT, JR., U.S. NAVY, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

GEN. ROBERT E. CUSHMAN, JR., U.S. MARINE CORPS, COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

REAR ADM. EDWARD W. COOKE, U.S. NAVY, DIRECTOR OF BUDGET AND REPORTS, OFFICE OF THE NAVY COMPTROLLER

REAR ADM. JAMES B. WILSON, U.S. NAVY, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF PROGRAM APPRAISAL

BRIG. GEN. C. S. ROBERTSON, U.S. MARINE CORPS, FISCAL DIRECTOR, HEADQUARTERS, MARINE CORPS

BRIG. GEN. E. R. REID, JR., U.S. MARINE CORPS, LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANT, HEADQUARTERS, MARINE CORPS

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

Mr. MAHON. The committee will come to order.

We will begin our hearings this morning with the consideration of the budget for the Department of the Navy. We are interested in the program for the Navy, which of course includes the Marines.

Mr. Secretary, we are pleased to have you before us again. We feel comfortable in your presence.

Secretary WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MAHON. We are happy to have you before us, again, Admiral Zumwalt.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Thank you, sir.

Mr. MAHON. We find your enthusiasm contagious. We want to do a good job defense wise in serving the best interests of the Nation.

Mr. SIKES. If I might interrupt for just a moment, some of his enthusiasm and capability undoubtedly are due to his backup witnesses. The principal one is seated in the room today-Mrs. Zumwalt. [Applause.]

Mr. MAHON. We are pleased to have you and Admiral Cooke and the Commandant of the Marines.

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U.S. AND SOVIET NAVAL CAPABILITIES AND COMPARISONS

Admiral Zumwalt, I want you and the Secretary to explore with us briefly the matter of the problem which confronts the Navy. For decades the Navy sailed the seven seas and was almost unopposed, certainly by an unfriendly force. Now the Soviet Union, which has vast resources of manpower and resources otherwise, is moving into the oceans and seas. We have a real competitor.

To some extent they have weapons which are superior to ours. There is no doubt that the Soviet Union is here to stay. So, we have to share the oceans with the Soviets, whether we like it or not.

How do you look upon this situation? The power of the Soviet Union will not go away. They will be more or less equal to us if they want to be. They have the technology, the manpower and resources otherwise to be our equal.

What do you look forward to in the next decade or so with respect to the Navy? Shall we just build more ships and submarines and whatnot, and then let them build more and more? Of course, we have the SALT agreement, and we are working on others.

Mr. Secretary, will you philosophize with us on that problem? Secretary WARNER. Mr. Chairman, we welcome the opportunity to address this very important issue in general terms.

As you fully appreciate, the primary responsibility of those of us in the Department of Defense is to deal with capabilities as opposed to intentions. We leave to the diplomats what the intentions might be.

We clearly recognize that the Soviet Union is building a naval capability. Going back in history, you can go all the way back to 1715 when they first started their navy. It failed to distinguish itself, in my judgment, up until the the present day. Both in World War I and World War II, the main elements of the Soviet fleet were either dispersed or sunk in the opening salvos of both of those conflicts.

As near as we can tell, it was approximately 1958, during the Lebanon situation, that the Soviet Union took a new view of the importance of seapower. In 1962, during the Cuban missile crisis, this new awareness was strongly fortified. During that period of time the seeds for their present day navy were planted.

As a consequence, they have undertaken a construction program which is probably matched in history only by the one the United States achieved during World War II.

Admiral Zumwalt, I am certain, will give greater detail. Nevertheless, we can show you with precision how their fleet units now are occupying every corner of the world's oceans.

Again, our responsibility is capabilities. What their intentions are we leave primarily to others. It is our responsibility to construct our Navy along those lines we think can best serve the national defense posture of this country.

Our allies are beyond our shores, in contrast to the Soviet Union where their allies are contiguous. A substantial percentage of our raw materials must be imported into this country, again in contrast to the Soviet Union where I believe only 2 raw materials, rubber and tin, need be imported. We are an island nation. We are dependent on the sea lanes for our survival. If those sea lanes are to remain open it is incumbent upon the U.S. Navy to provide the protection needed.

At this time I would like to turn to the admiral.

Mr. MAHON. To some extent, Mr. Secretary, as Dan Flood would say, you have restated the question. My question really is: How do you envision that over the long pull we will be able to live with the Soviet Navy, which will be roughly comparable to our own?

Secretary WARNER. We have no alternative but to live with that for the foreseeable future, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MAHON. Do you think we can do that without too much difficulty?

Secretary WARNER. Mr. Chairman, we can only do that, in my judgment, if we continue with those naval building programs in the years to come, not only in 1975 but on out, until such time as we have rebuilt the U.S. Navy to that point where it can ensure the protection needed.

Mr. MAHON. I am just assuming that we will rebuild the U.S. Navy and the Soviet Union, which has the economic power and know-how, will build a comparable navy, more or less, from their standpoint. Of course, their needs are different from ours.

How do you envision that we will be able to live with this situation? Can we roam the Indian Ocean and the Atlantic and the Pacific and what-not, in light of the fact that the Soviets are capable of doing the same thing and will be doing the same thing? What does this lead us to?

Secretary WARNER. Mr. Chairman, it leads us, in my judgment, to the point where this country must continue to maintain a Navy which is roughly equivalent, not necessarily in numbers of units, but equivalent, in capability to that of the Soviet Union.

Mr. MAHON. But if our Navy is equivalent to the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union does not necessarily have to be mistress of the seas, but we have to be because of the facts which you have outlined. Where does that leave us? Do we have to be greatly superior to the Soviet Union in order to maintain freedom of the seas so we can fight wars in various areas of the world?

Secretary WARNER. Mr. Chairman, I would recommend that the U.S. Navy be kept at a level of capability which can maintain an edge in every respect over the Soviet Navy.

Mr. MAHON. All right; Admiral, what is your comment in regard to this question?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Sir, I question the basic assumption, because I believe that the Soviet Union does not have the economic capability that this country has. I believe it has a much smaller gross national product. I think it is a tragic thing that we have permitted them to begin to spend a larger number of dollars for defense. If we calculate their expenditures in terms of what it would take us to build the same hardware, they are now spending more money per year than we are for defense. We have let them have roughly 4 million military personnel as opposed to our roughly 2 million military personnel, with a larger gross national product on our side.

Further, sir, there is a remarkable asymmetry between the two superpowers, with the Soviet Union always having been conceded primacy in Eurasia of ground and air forces, and the free world traditionally having had superiority at sea, which we are in the process of surrendering.

I think it is a very important issue to be brought forward.

Mr. MAHON. You say we have let them. They can more or less do as they please unless we want to engage them in war. If they want to build up a navy, we cannot say, “No, no."

Admiral ZUMWALT. No, sir. But we have permitted ourselvesMr. MAHON. You mean we have not built up our military power sufficiently, and it is in that sense that you say we have let them? Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MAHON. Because they can do as they please in building a navy, and we can do as we please as to what we want to do about it.

Admiral ZUMWALT. We have failed to do enough, Mr. Chairman. We are at the smallest fraction of the gross national product for defense since 1950, as you know, the smallest fraction of the Federal budget for defense since 1950.

Mr. WHITTEN. I do not want to interrupt unless it is agreeable, but I differ with the admiral very much on the gross national product in this country. The more you waste, the more you are in debt, the more you buy that is no good, the greater the national product. That is admitted by the Secretary of the Treasury and others. I think it is a very poor guide rule.

There are other factors on which I would like to take issue with the admiral if we are to have a chance.

Mr. MAHON. You will have a chance to interrogate him on that. Mr. FLYNT. At this point in the record, I would like to say I agree with Mr. Whitten on that. We have the most unrealistic formula for establishing this so-called GNP, gross national product. It is the only country on earth that I know of that includes its debt servicing as part of the gross national product. It is just like trying to accumulate a piece of property on mortgages instead of on deeds.

Mr. MAHON. I am getting a little weary of hearing people say that the defense budget is a certain percentage of the gross national product. I am interested in percentages. I am interested in an adequate Navy. I am not interested in comparisons of constant dollars and gross national product.

I would like to talk in terms of what we need as a Navy, and not the gross national product.

Mr. SIKES. I think the admiral intends to get to that if he can have an opportunity to make a statement.

Mr. MAHON. Proceed, admiral.

Mr. WYMAN. As a member of this committee, I want to say on this record at this time that I do not think this country has an edge. I think the Soviet Union has an edge. I think this results from the failure of this country to provide enough ships and enough submarines, and I think that failure is derived from the failure of the Bureau of the Budget, now the Office of Management and Budget, to grant the requests that have been submitted to it by our Armed Forces, regardless of the cost. So, let us have that on the record, too.

MOTION AND VOTE TO CLOSE HEARINGS

Mr. MAHON. We will suspend a moment. We are now in open session, and in order to comply with the rules of the House, we have to take action in open session with respect to closing a meeting.

I recognize the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, I move that the hearing with the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations and Commandant of the Marine Corps scheduled for Monday, March 11, 1974, be closed because of the classification of the matters to be discussed.

Mr. MAHON. The rules require a roll call. The clerk will call the roll. Mr. PRESTON. Mr. Mahon?

Mr. Davis?

Mr. DAVIS. Aye.

Mr. PRESTON. Mr. Wyman?

Mr. WYMAN. Aye.

Mr. PRESTON. Mr. Edwards?

Mr. EDWARDS. Aye.

Mr. MAHON. The motion is agreed to.

We were talking about the comparison of our Navy with the Soviet Union Navy.

In comparing the naval strength of the United States vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, do you take into consideration the capability of our allies, the Western European nations?

Mr. SIKES. Did the admiral have an opportunity to complete his statement?

Mr. MAHON. I am afraid not; but will you answer that question? Admiral ZUMWALT. Sir, I think it flows into the next point I was getting ready to make, which is that there is a basic asymmetry between ourselves and the Soviet Union. They have essentially all they need, as the Secretary said, within their land empire. We cannot survive without critical imports from overseas. In order for them to be in a position to put us at hazard, they merely have to deny us the control and use of the seas. They merely have to cut our sea lines. In order for us to avoid being at hazard, we have to have the greater Naval capability and be able to use and control the sea lines.

If our allies are with us, then there are additional Naval forces with us but we pick up additional liabilities, for example, in a NATO war, because that is a tougher war. When our allies are not with us, as in the Jordan crisis and in the recent Yom Kippur war, we do not have the responsibility for defending Europe but we lack the presence of our allies to help us, and we lack their airfields.

In both cases the capability of the Soviet Union to perform its mission; namely, cutting our sea lines, is growing dramatically. In both cases, our capability to control and use the seas is decreasing dramatically.