resides permit and justify. But the coercion or restraint of a trespasser on legal rights or social institutions is a matter which stands on its own merits. It throws no appreciable light on the security or insecurity of property owned and held in accordance with law. Our observer will probably conclude that law-abiding men who have. honestly acquired interests in property in the Far West or Southwest can, if they choose to adopt the proper means, protect their interests there as effectually as elsewhere. Whatever views they may be disposed to take concerning property already in possession, it may be considered as a foregone conclusion that legislation restricting the acquisition of land in large quantities by aliens (whether in an individual or corporate capacity) will assuredly be carried out. A comprehensive bill dealing with this subject is, at the time of writing, before Congress, and is, in substance, practically certain to pass both Houses. It is scarcely necessary to say that restrictions on the future acquisition of land by aliens need excite no apprehension as to the observance of the foreign investor's rights in the property of which he has become the legitimate owner prior to the passage of the bill referred to. CHAPTER XVI. STATE CONTROL. Is there any truth in the forecast that, within a measurable limit of time (say five or ten years), the railroads of this country will be taken over by the Government, and managed in the future as part of one great national system composed of railroads, post-office and telegraphs? If such a result should be accomplished, on what conditions would the transfer be made; and in what manner and to what extent would the interests of the foreign investor be affected thereby? There are not wanting competent judges who hold that the three best known forms of inter-communication above referred to form a natural trio, and are peculiarly susceptible of successful and harmonious combination. Great economies, say the partisans of this school, could be effected if these three branches could be made to play into each others' hands. Fewer buildings would be needed for post-offices and telegraph stations. A smaller staff would suffice for the combined work, and the services of each member would be more adequately utilized. By the opposite school it is contended that the advantages above referred to are out-weighed by the defects inherent in State control. The State, they say, cannot and does not make money go as far or produce as much as an individual, firm or company. When the Government takes to ship-building, it does not turn out as good ships as private builders. It spends more money over its work, and is a longer time about it. It is not as judicious a purchaser of raw material. It does not get as good a day's work out of its employees. Government buildings, they say, are unduly tedious and costly undertakings; and, in short, having regard to existing results which appeal to the mind of the average observer, railroads are not satisfactory matter for State management. Whichever of these views be the more reasonable, it is plain that the immense capital invested in railroads greatly complicates the problem. The money that has been expended in them is locked up in a specially permanent sense.* It cannot, like many other forms of capital, be withdrawn and shifted at pleasure to more productive or promising enterprises. What has been laid out in tunnelling hills, bridging rivers, and making rough places smooth is virtually an irrevocable outlay. If railroads are to be acquired by the Government, somebody must provide the purchase money. On the one hand, the taxpayer's money cannot be extravagantly dispensed, without a violation of duty on the part of the Government. On the other, the proprietor's rights cannot be confiscated or prejudiced, without conflict with the Federal Constitution. Nor is a basis of compensation equitable to all interests concerned such a very simple matter. A basis of original cost is of course out of the question. In respect of an economically constructed and successful railroad, it would be unfair to the proprietor. In the case of an extravagantly constructed and unsuccessful railroad, it would be resisted by the tax-payer. The capitalized value of a going concern is a calculation of some complexity. America certainly would not pay for the acquisition of its * "Railroad Transportation," Hadley, pp. 40, 41, railroads on the scale adopted by the English Government when it assumed the telegraphs. The division of power vested in the Federal Government and the several States might, in readily conceivable cases, give rise to much difficulty. Public opinion is not sufficiently unanimous on the subject-even from an economical point of view-to afford any reasonable expectation that so vast a change will be carried through within the immediate range of the investor's vision. There remains the political aspect of the question, on which the public mind is even more distinctly divided than on its economical aspect. It is quite true that in many European countries State control has answered the purposes of its projectors with a reasonable degree of success. But in those cases it has been more or less congenial to the idiosyncrasies, habits and political bias of the people. As has been ably pointed out in recent treatises on the subject,* bureaucracy is not uncongenial to the French people. But it may be doubted whether, on the whole, republican government in France of the type recently developed could do better for the general interests of the people than the existing railroad companies. In Prussia, under the strong hand of Prince Bismarck, the assertion of State control must be regarded, not strictly as an economical experiment, but as part of a political machinery tending, in his judgment, toward the consolidation of national unity and the permanent development of military efficiency. In Belgium, until recently, the Government was itself a large proprietor, and took a hand in active railroad competition. In England, if the experiment be tried at all, it will *". Railroads, their Origin and Problems," C. F. Adams, Jr. "Railroads and the Republic," J. F. Hudson. probably be adopted as part of the programme of State socialism; not necessarily because it is economically advantageous, but because it may be thought expedient to adopt this course as the price of party support. In America none of these special conditions are found to exist in any very cogent or convincing form. The control of railroads would subserve no theory of national consolidation or military organization, for the excellent and satisfactory reason that the Country can dispense with such cumbrous drawbacks to the progress of her internal prosperity. The liability of the rate-payer to meet in the last resort any deficit that may arise from defective government administration appreciably limits the desire of the public for government intervention in private enterprise in all civilized countries. As time goes on, the "machine" becomes more distasteful, and bureaucracy is altogether too intrusive and paternal to commend itself to the instincts of the American people. The average American citizen who has entered himself in the race for wealth is self-reliant in originating enterprises, and strenuous in conducting them. He is apt to resent any interference with the conduct of his chosen business which is not justified by proprietary interest therein. In short, he would like the Government which he elects for his own benefit to confine itself within reasonable limits to the restraint of transgressions against law and trespasses on social rights, and to leave the enterprising citizen to fight out his own battle with the laws of supply and demand. He is conscious that to invest his Government with a new and untried sphere of action, in which political influences may be brought to bear on private concerns, is to say the least of it a dangerous experiment. He has already suffered a |