claims for relief remains for review. Five of these claims are based on section 706 of the Administrative Procedures Act: To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. The reviewing court shall (1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or (2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, 5 U.S.C. S 706. - (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of (B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, (D) without observance of procedure required (E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute; or (F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent Claims 4, 7, 9, and 12 invoke § 706(2)(A), claims 7 and 12 invoke $ 706 (2) (C), claims 11 and 12 invoke § 706 (2) (D), and claim 11 invokes $ 706 (2) (E). The "substantial evidence" standard of subsection (E) is only applicable to administrative actions or findings that are based on a hearing record. Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 140-141 (1978). The rulemaking procedure utilized by FmHA in this case was the informal notice and comment method under 5 U.S.C. S 553 (c), not the formal hearing method under 5 U.S.C. SS 556 and 557. Since the administrative actions now at issue were not based on a hearing record, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2) (E) is not applicable to this case, and plaintiffs' complaint will be dismissed to the extent it is based on that subsection. A federal court reviewing agency action pursuant to 5 U.S.C. S 706 (2) (A) will normally consider only the administrative record on which the action was based. Arkla Exploration Co. v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 734 F.2d 347, 357 (8th Cir. 1984). Supplementary material can be admitted and considered for the limited purpose of explaining the record. Id. The court can consider additional evidence only if the record and the supplementary material do not provide an Independent Meat Packers adequate basis for judicial review. Association v. Butz, 526 F.2d 228, 238-239 (8th Cir. 1975). If the supplemented record does provide an adequate basis for review, the issues are ripe for summary judgment. Bank of Commerce of Laredo v. City National Bank of Laredo, 484 F.2d 284, 288-289 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 905 (1974). It is apparent that issues raised by a review of agency action pursuant to subsections (C) and (D) of 5 U.S.C. S 706 (2) will as a rule involve only questions of law, and so also will be ripe for summary judgment, unless the record before the court is wholly inadequate. The administrative record was filed with this court on January 21, 1986 (Docket No. 263). The record consists of the following: 1. A set of documents referred to as the "pretermination 2. The proposed regulations as published on November 30, 1984, at 49 FR 47007. 3. More than 250 written comments submitted to FmHA concerning the proposed regulations. These comments are discussed below. 4. A letter from Administrator Vance Clark dated October 5. The final regulations as published on November 1, The vast majority of the comments submitted to FmHA are letters from private individuals, presumably farmers. Almost all of these are form letters, apparently composed, printed, and distributed by various parties, and then signed and submitted individually. The letters vary somewhat in tone and content, but all express strong opposition to some provisions of the proposed regulations. The provisions targeted by the letters, however, are not at issue before this court, either because the conflict concerning them has been resolved as outlined above, or because they were not challenged in the supplemental complaint. Of the remaining comments, six are short letters from FmHA officials directed at matters not at issue in this case. A seventh letter, from James D. Reifsteck, Chief, FmHA Farmer Programs, Illinois, criticizes one aspect of the proposed text of FmHA form 1924-26, which is at issue. Mr. Reifsteck's criticism of subsection II (D) of form 1924-26 is quite brief, but is relevant to one aspect of plaintiffs' tenth claim for relief. Another letter is signed by a Richard D. Long, Assistant Inspector General for Analysis and Evaluation. It is not clear whether Mr. Long is attached to FmHA or some other agency, but in any event his letter does not address any provision challenged by the supplemental complaint. "The Office of the Inspector General" also submitted an unsigned eight page critique of the proposed regulations. This comment is aimed mainly at technical and stylistic changes. One of the suggested changes would have clarified the subsection that describes the effect of a borrower's failure to return, by the specified time, a completed form 1924-26. The critic would insert the statement that the borrower would thereby "forfeit the right to administrative appeal." The suggested language is certainly more clear than that of the proposed rule, but it was not adopted in the final version. Indeed, the final version omits any direct statement at all of the fact that failure to file the form results in losing the right to appeal the adverse action. The approach of FmHA to such matters can perhaps be inferred from the note pencilled in beside this suggestion: "We don't want to use the word 'forfeit." Another suggestion made by the comment was to replace a subsection in the proposed rules with a new version beginning with the following sentence: "The applicant or borrower has a right to know the specific reasons for intended adverse actions." A comment pencilled in beside this suggestion reads: "Stay away from words like 'right.'" Although other aspects of the suggested replacement paragraph were incorporated in the final version, this first sentence was not adopted. A letter by two New Mexico attorneys addresses an issue not before this court. Another letter is by Martha Miller, an attorney for the plaintiffs in the Curry v. Block litigation. In Curry, a statewide class of Georgia FmHA borrowers challenged FmHA loan servicing practices. See Curry v. Block, 541 F.Supp. 506 (1982), aff'd. 738 F.2d 1556 (11th Cir. 1984). Three of Ms. Miller's criticisms touch on matters currently at issue. She points out that FmHA failed to publish proposed versions of FmHA forms 1924-14, 1924-25, and 1925-26 along with the proposed rules, rendering any comment on their contents impossible. This point is one aspect of plaintiffs' eleventh claim for relief. Ms. Miller requested that FmHA. publish the proposed texts of the forms for comment, but FmHA apparently did not do so. Two of her criticisms of the proposed procedure for determining the eligibility of borrowers for loan deferrals stem from the unavailability of retroactive deferrals and the incorporation of subjective factors in the eligibility determination. These criticisms are quite brief and not specific, but appear |