reserved to the states. Many states, acting under the police powers, have prescribed the weights under which packages of certain commodities must be sold. The specific question has never been judicially determined. Certain language in the opinion in Dwight & Lloyd Sintering Co. v. American Ore Reclamation Company (C.C.A.) 263 F. 315, 316, approaches nearest to any expression of the courts of the meaning of this provision of the Constitution that has come to my attention. In that case the dispute arose over the meaning of the word 'ton.' It was held there that * ** [Congress has not exercised its power under the Clause except as to the standard Troy pound weight, therefore the state might define a ton.] The reasonable interpretation of this opinion is that the court recognized the right of the federal government to fix a standard of weights and measures such as a 'ton' * ** "If Congress can legally say how many pounds shall constitute a ton, it would seem it could fixe a standard of sizes for hampers and baskets for different uses. "The purpose of this [standard container] act was to avoid the difficulties caused by the use of varying weights and measures in the several states. *** It is my view that the provision is constitutional. However, this court should be reluctant to hold the act unconstitutional if the court's mind were not entirely clear. * * *” Thus, it can be seen that the court's opinion is in fact based upon an inference from a precedent not explicit in its own holding. As such, it may not be persuasive precedent and is therefore of limited value in the resolution of the problem considered herein. Nor is the legislative history of the Standard Time Act of 1918 very illuminating. The sole Committee Report (H. Rept. No. 293, 65th Cong., 2d Sess.) does cite the statements of a witness before the Committee that "[the bill] is a standard for the measurement of time, and under the power of the Constituion we feel that Congress can act *** " but no statement endorsing these remarks is found in the report. In fact, the reasons set out by the Committee for recommending the legislation are quite unrelated to specific Constitutional powers, being (1) increased food production as a result of daylight saving time; (2) increased comfort and convenience to labor; and (3) the conservation of fuel supplies and concomitant economy in the war effort. The debates in both Houses of Congress (e.g. 56 Cong. Rec. 3549, 3564-3583, 3594-3595, 3632, 3635) do not invoke any particular power under the Constitution, and insofar as reasons for the bill are urged, it could be inferred that the commerce power, and the war power, are the tacit grounds for that act; throughout are references to the necessity of proper scheduling for the railroads, but more particularly the desirability of daylight saving time for the prosecution of the war. The memorandum No. 7345 of the former General Counsel to Commissioner Splawn of March 29, 1948, based its opinion on the precept that "time," as a concept, usually connotes the measurement of time, since otherwise it is but an intellectual experience. From this it follows that the establishment of a "standard," as was done by the Act of 1918, is in fact as well as in name a particular measurement of duration, a fortiori within the concept of "standard weights and measures." State court cases are cited and quoted (State v. Badolati, 241 Wis. 496, 6 N.W. 2d 220 (1942); McFarlane v. Whitney, 134 S.W. 2d 1047 (Tex., 1940)) to show the importance of a standard of time measurement. Treatises on the Constitution are also cited, but the conclusion from them is indefinite; the Clause was adopted at the Constitutional Convention without debate. While I am generally in agreement with the observations therein, and while not disagreeing with the statement (Memorandum, p. 15) that "It is not certain that the framers of the Constitution had time in mind when they drafted the provision empowering Congress to fix the standard of weights and measures," I would add that there exists some material tending to show that the framers of the Constitution were aware that the measurement of time could be embraced within the Standards of Weights and Measures clause. Thomas Jefferson, as Secretary of State, was requested and directed by the House of Representatives to report on the desirability of Federal standards of weights and measures. His report of July 4, 1790, to the Speaker of the House (American State Papers, Misc. Vol. I, pp. 13-20) contains much historical and, for its day, advanced scientific data regarding all standards of measurement then in use. For example, this statement tends to support the argument (supra, p. 5) of definition (pagination references infra are to pages of the original Report, found in the Library of Congress's Rare Book Collection): "To obtain uniformity in Measures, Weights and Coins, it is necessary to find some measure of invariable length, with which, as a standard, they may be compared." [p. 1]. Then, in his general discussion of standards, he evolves a definition of a "second of mean time": ***The motion of the earth round its axis, though not absolutely uniform and invariable, may be considered as such [standard] for every human purpose. It is measured obviously, but unequally, by the departure of a given meridian from the sun, and its return to it, constituting a solar day. Throwing together the inequalities of solar days, a mean interval, or day, has been found, and divided, by very general consent, into 86,400 equal parts. "A pendulum, vibrating freely, in small and equal arcs, may be so adjusted in its length, as, by its vibrations, to make this division of the earth's motion into 86,400 seconds of mean time." [P. 10.] Nearly six years later Congress sought to act upon his Report. In so doing, it is submitted that a time standard, to wit a "second of mean time", was sought to be established. The "second of mean time" was part of the means for establishing a standard linear measure, as Jefferson pointed out. The bill, passed by the House of Representatives May 19, 1796, authorized and directed the Secretary of State to cause "certain experiments to be made to ascertain uniform standards of weights and measures for the United States." This included an experiment, described in detail, for establishing a standard "foot" by the use of an oscillating cylinder over a period of "one second of mean time." This was undoubtedly an adoption of Jefferson's description of a means to establish such a standard; the Report of the Senate Committee (unnamed) considering the House bill refers to the proposals of the Secretary of State's report on measures and weights. It does not appear that the bill passed the Senate, although the Senate bill bears the date of May 31, 1796, and was to be amended to strike the provision for conducting the experiment, and the appropriation of $1000 for the purpose, in favor of an adoption, but this Senate version as well describes the method of obtaining a standard foot (with the "one second of mean time") in the event that the standards themselves were destroyed.2 Support for the designation of particular parallels of longitude as time zone boundaries by Congress under the Standard of Weights and Measures Clause is also found in Jefferson's report, where he stated at pp. 13-14: "2. The uncertainty arising from the difference of length requisite for the second Pendulum, or the second rod, in different latitudes, may be avoided by fixing on some one latitude, to which our standard shall refer. That of 38°, as being the middle latitude, of the United States, might seem the most convenient, were we to consider ourselves alone; but connected with other nations by commerce and science, it is better to fix on that parallel which bids fairest to be adopted by them also. The 45th, as being the middle term between the equator and pole has been heretofore proposed in Europe; and the proposition has been lately renewed there, under circumstances which may very possibly give it some effect. This parallel is distinguished with us also, as forming our principal Northern Boundary. Let the completion of the 45th degree then give the standard for our union, with the hope that it may become a line of union with the rest of the world." It has been implicit herein that the Standard of Weights and Measures Clause is not confined in meaning to coinage or money. Such appears to have been the understanding of Jefferson from the beginning. His Report discusses at pages 19 through 32 the history and characteristics of particular weights and measures then in use, and includes a portion of the weights and measures sought to be established by the British House of Commons. In fact, he refers at length to reports of committees of that body on weights and measures of 1758 and 1759, which reports are relied upon in his own exigesis. However, he states at p. 27 that "The Secretary of State is not informed whether there have been any and what alternations of these measures, by the laws of particular States." This hiatus was filled by Secretary of State John Quincy Adams' 245-page report to the Speaker of the House of Representatives in 1821 (H. Doc. 109, 16th Cong., 2d Sess., House Documents, Vol. 8, Library of Congress Serial No. 55) wherein he set forth, at pp. 96-117, the various weights and measures prevailing and prescribed in the States and the District of Columbia since their founding. Enforcement of Federal weights and measures standards, as incorporated into the proposed bills now before Congress, also appears to be presaged by Jefferson's Report. On p. 44 he stated "*** After a given term, for instance, it [the new system] might begin in the custom-houses, where the merchants would be 2 The bills, and the committee report, are found in the Library of Congress' Rare Book Collection under the designation QC 89 .Us A15. come familiarized to it. After a further term, it might be introduced into all legal proceedings; and merchants and traders in foreign commodities might be required to use it in their dealings with one another. * * *” John Quincy Adams' Report referred to above also contained explicit references to time measurement. The French Revolution's adoption of the metric system is treated at great length, and its adoption of decimal-based hours, weeks, and years is castigated for the reason that this "mensuration of time" is "quite inconsistent with one of the principal expedients of perpetuating the identity of the new weights and measures" (p. 59). As shown on p. 60, Adams was referring to the meter-constant. He also states, at page 61, that the French "attempt to decimate the year in its number of days was equally useless and absurd." Accordingly, Adams did not recommend its adoption.3 Adams' Report was termed "luminous and scientific" by the Committee on Commerce of the House of Representatives in its Report No. 449, March 21, 1836, (24th Cong., 1st Sess.) which recommended transmission of copies of standard weights and measures to each State. Other than these authorities, it is also possible to reason independently, as was done in memorandum No. 7345 of my predecessor to Commissioner Splawn (p. 15), that the absence of qualifying words and exceptions in the Standard of Weights and Measures Clause indicates that Congress is empowered to fix the standard of all weights and measures. It may also be observed that much of the difficulty experienced by many who consider this subject may be traced to the intangible quality of a time measurement. Yet Congress has legislated with respect to standard electric and light units of measurement; see 15 U.S.C. Sec. 221 et seq. (28 Stat. 102, 1894), repealed by 64 Stat. 370, 1950, now 15 U.S.C. Sec. 223-224. And, of course, Congress has established several other standard measurements, without regard to "commerce": 15 U.S.C. Sec. 205 (R.S. 3570, derived from Act of July 28, 1866, 14 Stat. 339, 340), establishes equivalents between United States and metric system linear measurements which "shall be recognized in the construction of contracts and in all legal proceedings * * *"; 15 U.S.C. Sec. 206 (27 Stat. 746, 1893) establishes the standard gauges for sheet and plate iron and steel; 15 U.S.C. Sec. 231-242 (37 Stat. 250-251; 38 Stat. 1186-1187; 39 Stat. 530-531), as amended by 68 Stat. 301, 1954, establishes standard barrels; and 15 U.S.C. Sec. 252-256 (39 Stat. 673-674) in nature similar to the Federal Standard Container Act referred to above, but a separate act, establishes standard baskets for small fruits and vegetables. No cases pertinent to this inquiry are reported under these statutes. Thus, as heretofore stated, I believe that Congress is empowered under the Standard of Weights and Measures Clause of the Constitution to prescribe a uniform system of time. ROBERT W. GINNANE, Mr. GOFF. Copies of this memorandum have been made available and I believe you each have one. In its current annual report, this Commission has reiterated its prior recommendations that the scope of the Standard Time Act be broadened by providing that the standard time of the zone shall be the exclusive measure of time and by adding more definite standards, requirements for observance, penalties for violation, and provisions for administration and enforcement. H.R. 4702 has been drawn to accomplish these purposes. Before commenting on the particular provisions of this bill, I believe it appropriate to observe that the Commission is not unanimous concerning the propriety of its initiating comprehensive legislation on these matters. I might be very specific there to say disagreement 3 It might be noted, however, that the French system was once given at least perfunctory consideration by Congress. The French Revolutionary Government caused an emissary to be sent to the United States with metric models in the hope that its fraternal republic would also adopt them; the French Minister so informed Secretary of State James Otis on "15 Thermidor" (August 2. 1794). Otis ordered 300 copies of the accompanying report distributed to the Senate (American State Papers, Misc. Vol. I, pp. 115-116) of the 3d Congress, 2d Session. was only on whether we should initiate. There wasn't any difference of opinion as to whether something ought to be done. It is just that our jurisdiction covers only those carriers which we regulate and a couple of Commissioners felt that some other agency should initiate it, but we are unanimously in favor of something being done about it. We are agreed, however, both as to the need for some additional time legislation and for a redetermination by Congress as to whether the Commission is the most appropriate agency to administer present or future legislation relating to standard time. The general intent of this bill-to provide a uniform system of time standards and measurement for the United States-is stated in section 3. It is desirable expressly to recognize that the time zones designated for the United States are parts of the international system of 24 zones stretching from Greenwich east and west around the world, as is done in section 4. Section 5 of the bill would provide three new standard time zones. Of the five existing zones, four (eastern, central, mountain, and Pacific) would be retained and the fifth (Alaska) would be subdivided and replaced by three new zones (designated as Yukon, AlaskaHawaii, and Bering, respectively). The intent is to cover Alaska and Hawaii adequately. In addition, a new zone to the east (the "Atlantic standard time zone"), would be created. It is not intended that this zone will embrace any mainland area. Rather, this zone will be used during the summer months to describe that portion of the eastern standard time zone designated as an "advance time subzone"-a term which will be explained at a later point. Section 6 follows the present act and authorizes the "agency" designated as administrator to define the limits of the zones and to modify them from time to time. The proviso would continue existing boundary determinations until changed. Provision is made for the continued observance of daylight saving time until the administering agency has had an opportunity to define the limits of subzones provided for in the act or for 1 year. Section 7 includes a number of general principles which the Commission has found useful in determining the zone boundaries in the past. This section also provides that, in fixing the boundaries, the designated agency shall not include in any zone a point or area for which the standard time would be more than 30 minutes slower or 1 hour faster than sun time. This is intended to be a desirable limitation on the discretion of the administering agency in designating zone boundaries, and is designed to insure that areas embraced within the zones will be governed by at least a reasonable approximation of sun time. The principal features of the bill are contained in section 8. This section would authorize the administering agency, where desirable in the public interest, to establish within any zone a single subzone which would be governed by an "advanced" standard of time (the equivalent of daylight saving time) during the longer summer days. That portion of each zone which is not designated as an advanced time subzone would maintain standard time throughout the year. Accordingly, this section introduces a measure of flexibility into, and stands midway between, prior legislative proposals which would impose either year-round nationwide standard time or nationwide standard time coupled with a provision for mandatory nationwide daylight saving time during a portion of the year. Under section 8, in those zones or portions of zones where no popular demand for a faster standard of time is manifested, none will be provided. Section 8 would also accomplish another important objective. In place of the present chaotic situation in which individual States, and, indeed, individual communities, act independently in determining the date on which they will transfer to and from daylight saving time, it would provide uniform switchover dates. Thus, section 8 specifies that the period of advanced time will be between the last Sunday in April and the last Sunday in October. Finally, enactment of this section would result in a much needed simplification of zone designations. At the present time, the designations "eastern time" and "central daylight saving time" each refer to the time standard applicable to the 75th degree of longitude. Similarly, the designation "central time" and "mountain daylight saving time," and "mountain time" and "Pacific daylight saving time," refer to the time standards of the 90th and 105th degrees, respectively. This situation results in needless confusion and would be remedied by the instant bill. Thus, and notwithstanding the fact that the bill provides for advanced standards of time, the name-designations of areas governed by the time standard of the same degree of longitude remain unchanged throughout the year. This is accomplished by temporarily transferring to the standard time zone "immediately to the east" those areas encompassed within advanced time subzones. Sections 9, 10, and 11 would authorize the administering agency to conduct necessary proceeding, to issue subpenas, to employ the staff necessary to perform its duties under the act, and to receive and hear petitions as to the time zones. The present act contains no provisions for its administration. Sections 12 and 13 contain important provisions making the standard time of the zone the exclusive measure of time for the transaction of all public business by the Federal or State Governments and by all persons in their business relations with the public, except for scientific purposes or for other purposes expressly exempted by the administering agency under a provision designed to foster and protect the public interest. Provisions for the execution and enforcement of this bill, entirely absent from the present act, are provided in sections 14 to 17. These include injunctive relief, civil forfeitures, and fines for willful violations. Section 18 affirmatively indicates that States are not prohibited from enacting and enforcing statutes which adopt the Federal standards. This provision gives recognition to the fact that effective enforcement will best be achieved by State and local action, and is intended to provide a strong inducement to the administering agency to accord careful consideration to the desires of the States in fixing zone boundaries. Up to this point, our comments have been directed to the Commission-sponsored bill, H.R. 4702. Our remarks, however, are equally |