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Company had neglected to make such publication, but it did so immediately upon receiving a copy of the decision.

In Cist against the Michigan Central Railroad Company (10 I. C. C. Rep., 217), decided in April last, it was held that a passenger fare charged by defendant over its branch line from a point in Canada to a point in the United States, amounting to about 3 cents per mile for a distance of 35.3 miles, and including a 6-cent bridge charge by an independent company, was not unreasonable upon the facts of the case. Further rulings were that when a railroad company makes a reduction from regular passenger fares which are not found unreasonable, it may lawfully require that a person desiring to avail himself of such reduction shall purchase a ticket, and that all persons not holding such special reduced rate ticket shall pay the reasonable ordinary fare; and that while the regulating statute may be applied to the reasonableness of a rate from a point in Canada to a point in the United States, it is clear that no law of the United States can apply to a discrimination between places in a foreign country.


In the case of the Chamber of Commerce of Chattanooga against the Southern Railway Company and other carriers, decided in March of this year (10 I. C. C. Rep., 111), the Commission reinvestigated the case brought by the Board of Trade of Chattanooga against the East Tennessee, Virginia & Georgia Railway Company and others. The carriers having refused in that case to obey the order of the Commission, suit for its enforcement was instituted in the circuit court of the United States for the eastern district of Tennessee, under section 16 of the act to regulate commerce. The circuit court rendered a decision enjoining the carriers from further disobedience of the order and, on appeal by the carriers, that decision was affirmed by the circuit court of appeals for the sixth circuit. The case having been taken to the Supreme Court by the carriers, that court reversed the courts below and rendered a decree remanding the case to the circuit court with directions that the petition of the Commission be dismissed "without prejudice to the right of the Commission to proceed upon the evidence already introduced before it or upon such further evidence or pleadings as it may allow to be made or introduced to hear and determine the matter in controversy according to law" (181 U. S., 1). The decision of the Commission was based upon evidence before the Commission and the court in the former case, and also upon additional evidence taken in this case. In the former case the Commission decided that freight rates from New York and other eastern points were unlawfully higher for the shorter distance to Chattanooga than for the longer distance through Chattanooga to Nashville. The lines involved in that case were those constituting the rail and water routes from New York and

other eastern points through Charleston to Chattanooga and Nashville. The lines in the case now under discussion were those just mentioned, and also lines reaching Chattanooga and those reaching Nashville through Cincinnati.

The facts appearing in this case were not materially different from those disclosed in the former proceeding, but in the meantime the law from which the Commission derives its authority had received repeated and binding construction by the Supreme Court of the United States. The theory upon which the former ruling of the Commission was based had been declared unsound, and it was obviously the duty of the Commission to test the facts presented in this case by the law as it had been interpreted for its guidance. The Commission said, if the facts do not show a violation of the regulating statute, as that statute has been construed, it should so decide, whatever appeared to be the injustice suffered by Chattanooga, since the making of an order which would not be enforced by the courts would be useless and unwarranted. In the light of decisions by the Supreme Court the Commission could not seriously doubt that the traffic in question was carried to Nashville and Chattanooga under substantially different circumstances and conditions. This being so, maintaining a higher rate for the shorter haul to Chattanooga could not be regarded as unlawful under the fourth section of the act, or otherwise condemned merely because the lower rate was granted to Nashville. The whole case, therefore, came to be a question of the unreasonableness of the Chattanooga rates. While there was more or less evidence of a persuasive character, standing by itself, that the rates were unreasonably high, the force of this evidence was materially modified, if not overcome, by the kindred fact that the rates were no higher than the rates to Atlanta, Rome, and a large number of other places with which Chattanooga was grouped.

It seemed clear that a reduction of the Chattanooga rates, without a like reduction of the rates to Atlanta and the other points with which Chattanooga is grouped, would give Chattanooga an advantage to which that town was not entitled. In that case Atlanta and other distributing points would be in much the same position with reference to Chattanooga that Chattanooga was with reference to Nashville. Moreover, it appeared clear that the Chattanooga rates could not be independently considered even as respected their reasonableness. They are embraced in and connected with a system of equalized rates which have been applied for many years throughout an extensive region and closely related to the rates in a still larger area comprising the greater part of what is known as southern territory. To deal intelligently with a rate question of such magnitude seemed to require a wider survey than was permitted by the record. Impressed with this view we felt justified in deferring final judgment until the situation could be investigated in its larger relations and a more confident basis found for

declaring this comprehensive system of rates to be unlawful. We did not find that the rates to Chattanooga were reasonable, we only said that they were not shown to be otherwise, and that upon the facts presented and the law as it had been interpreted, no violation of the act had been established. A dissenting opinion was filed by Commissioner


In the case of Gardner & Clark, of Danville, Va., against the Southern Railway Company, decided in June of the present year (10 I. C. C. Rep., 342), it appeared that the carrier had had in force since April 25, 1903, rates per 100 pounds on bananas in carloads from Charleston, S. C., which were 43 cents to Danville, Va., and 35 cents to Lynchburg, Va., the transportation to the latter point by defendant's line being through Danville. The lower rate to Lynchburg was forced upon defendant by competition of bananas coming from Baltimore. The 43-cent rate was not found to be unreasonable by the Commission. Upon these facts the higher rate to Danville was held to be not in violation of the act to regulate commerce. Prior to April 25, 1903, the carrier had in effect rates per 100 pounds on bananas in carloads from Charleston, which were 43 cents to Danville and 20 cents to Lynchburg. The rate of 20 cents to Lynchburg was 13 cents below the rate which was justified by competition from Baltimore and elsewhere. Such relation of rates was declared by the Commission to be in violation of sections 3 and 4 of the act to regulate commerce, and the complainants upon the shipments made at the 43-cent rate to Danville were held to be entitled to recover reparation to the extent of 13 cents per 100 pounds, such excess amounting upon complainants' shipments to $130. On 17 carloads of bananas defendant allowed complainants to ship between May 1, 1902, and April 25, 1903, from Charleston to Lynchburg and unload half of the carloads at Danville, paying the Lynchburg rate plus the local rate on the half carloads carried from Lynchburg to Danville. This was in disregard of defendant's regulations, and resulted in charges below those applicable under defendant's published tariff. The complainants claimed reparation upon the basis of the Lynchburg rate and the defendant carrier upon the basis of its tariff rate, but the Commission held that neither was entitled to recover. The decision of the Commission was complied with.

In the case of the Pratt Lumber Company against the Chicago, Indianapolis & Louisville Railway Company, decided in January last (10 I. C. C. Rep., 29), it appeared that this carrier charged on lumber to Boston and Boston points a higher rate from Sheridan, Ind., a noncompetitive point on its road, than from Indianapolis, although the latter point is a longer-distance point by its line, which runs north from Indianapolis, through Sheridan, to Michigan City, Ind., and connects at that point with the lines to Boston and other Eastern locali

ties. Indianapolis is a competitive point, and numerous lines run from that city both east and west. It further appeared, however, that the short lines from Sheridan to the East run through Indianapolis, and via these lines Sheridan is the longer-distance point. Indianapolis took 93 per cent of Chicago rates to the East, and Sheridan, though claimed by plaintiff to be in what is termed 93-per cent territory, was charged 100 per cent, or the Chicago rate, by the defendant carrier. The rates to Boston and Boston points at the time of the complaint were 27 cents per hundred pounds from Sheridan and 25 cents from Indianapolis, but during the pendency of the proceeding they were reduced to 26 and 24 cents, respectively. The Commission held that the circumstances and conditions were substantially and materially different from those applying on traffic from Indianapolis, and that no undue discrimination resulted to Sheridan because by defendant's indirect route the rate was 2 cents less from Indianapolis than from Sheridan.


A case brought by the Railroad Commission of Kentucky against the Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company was decided by the Commission in March last (10 I. C. C. Rep., 173). It appeared that the defendant carrier was party to a contract with the Bourbon Stock Yards Company for the exclusive delivery of live stock in the city of Louisville only to that stock-yards company, and when live stock coming over its lines was consigned to the Central Stock Yards, a competitor of the Bourbon Yards at Louisville, the Louisville & Nashville refused to transfer such live stock to the Southern Railway for delivery to the Central Yards. The Central Yards are situated just outside the corporate limits of Louisville upon the line of the Southern Railway and can only be reached by that railway. It further appeared that the Southern Railway made the Central Stock Yards its live-stock depot, but that it and all other lines except the defendant, the Louisville & Nashville, allowed the shipper to designate the stock yards at which he desired delivery to be made, and the car upon arriving at Louisville would be switched to that destination. The Louisville & Nashville declined to do this, and insisted upon making delivery, according to the terms of its contract, at the Bourbon Yards. We found that the Louisville & Nashville ought, in fair consideration of all interests, to deliver to the Southern Railway live stock consigned to the Central Yards, but the question raised for determination was whether the Commission could, by its order, require this to be done. After citing and applying decisions of the Federal courts we held: First, that the Louisville & Nashville in making and carrying out its exclusive contract with the Bourbon Stock Yards Company was not

acting in violation of the act to regulate commerce. Second, that the act to regulate commerce does not confer upon the Commission authority to make an order affirmatively requiring a railway carrier to deliver carloads of interstate freight to a connecting carrier. Third, that upon the facts of the case it was not an unlawful discrimination between commodities for the defendant to deliver carloads of dead freight to the Southern Railway for consignees in Louisville and to refuse delivery of live stock to the Southern Railway at Louisville when consigned to the Central Stock Yards. This ruling, following a decision of the Federal court, was upon the ground that the character of the service in the transportation of live stock differed so materially in fact from the transportation of dead freight that a refusal to treat both commodities alike did not constitute an actual discrimination, and there was the further consideration that a discrimination under the third section to be undue must ordinarily be such that the prejudice arising out of it against one party is a source of advantage to the other, and that could hardly be said of the discrimination shown in this case. Fourth, that the Commission has no regulating authority beyond that conferred by the terms of the act to regulate commerce, and its jurisdiction does not extend to enforcing provisions in the constitution of the State of Kentucky. This ruling resulted from the complainant's contention that certain provisions of the Kentucky constitution were adopted in the aid of interstate commerce and should be so treated in disposing of this case.

A case brought by the Glade Coal Company against the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, decided in April last (10 I. C. C. Rep., 226), was based upon refusal of the carrier to furnish cars to the complainants during a specified period and upon a difference in charge between coal shipped in carloads when the coal is loaded by tipple and when it is loaded from wagons. Upon the facts we found that the defendant's refusal to furnish cars to the complainants between February 25 and March 26, 1903, on a certain sidetrack at Meyersdale, Pa., and another sidetrack at Keystone Junction, while furnishing and offering to furnish cars to competitors of the complainants at other points, was under the circumstances disclosed by the evidence, undue and unlawful discrimination against the complainants, for which they were entitled to reparation. It further appeared that the carrier made. certain charges for the transportation of coal shipped in carloads when the coal was loaded by tipple and exacted a higher charge when it was loaded in some other way, and solely for that reason. This was held not to be justified by the difference in cost to the carrier between different methods of loading or by other facts appearing in the case; and that this rendered the higher rates thus made unreasonable and unduly discriminatory both as against the complainants and as against all

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