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54. All companies forming a line for long-haul traffic are properly made defendants in petition charging violation of fourth section.

55. By the words "same line" a physical line is meant, not a mere business arrangement; and one piece of road may be part of several lines.

56. The fact that the tariff for the long-haul traffic is made by a fast-freight line does not justify a violation of the section.

57. The real and actual, not the possible, competition are the circumstances which should be considered when such greater charges are in question. 58. Under the circumstances stated, the fact that a line is long and circuitous, and is obliged to make concessions in its charges in order to share in traffic, will not make out the dissimilar circumstances and conditions indicated by the fourth section.

59. One may complain on public grounds, though having no personal interest. Jackson v. The St. Louis. Arkansas and Texas Railway Company. (1 I. C. C.

Rep., 184.)

He also complained Defendant answered

60. Petitioner complained of a certain rate as excessive. of unjust discrimination in respect to that rate. that its rate was not what petitioner supposed, but was a certain charge very much less and also denied the alleged unjust discrimination. Petitioner did not further appear in the case, and did not respond at the hearing. Held, That it must be assumed on these facts that he was satisfied with the answer.

Leonard v. The Union Pacific Railway Company.

(1 I. C. C. Rep., 185.) 61. When issues of fact are made by the pleadings and no proofs are offered, no relief can be granted on such issues. 62. The complaint charged unjust discrimination in rates. The answer admitted the discrimination, denied that it was unjust, and assigned reasons for making it. On the case being brought to a hearing on the pleadings and submitted without evidence, it was held that, since it was impossible to say that there might not be facts to support the discrimination, the case must be dismissed, but without prejudice.

Keith et al. v. The Kentucky Central Railroad Company et al. (1 I. C. C. Rep., 189.)

63. The common carrier of live stock is subject to the legal duty to provide reasonable and proper facilities for receiving and discharging from its cars such live stock as is offered for transportation, free of all except the customary transportation charges. It does not fully discharge this duty by receiving on and discharging from its cars live stock at a depot access to which must be purchased.

64. A railroad company as carrier of live stock had undertaken to give to a stock-yards company an exclusive right at one of its stations, and to require all stock at that station to be received and delivered on the platform of the chutes of that company; the company being authorized to charge lottage therefor. Complainants established by the track of the railroad company chutes of their own, through which they demanded the right of receiving and delivering the stock of themselves and their customers. The conveniences furnished by them being suitable, it was held that their demand must be complied with.

65. Where suit is pending involving to some extent the question presented by petition to the Commission, the pendency thereof will not be deemed sufficient reason for the Commission declining to make an order, when it is seen that the judgment of the court when rendered will not necessarily cover the ground of the petition; but leave will be given either party to apply for a modification of the order should a modification be necessary to make it conform to the judgment when rendered. Allen et al. v. The Louisville, New Albany and Chicago Railroad Company. (1 I. C. C. Rep., 199.)

66. Rates named by a carrier do not violate the fourth section when it appears that on its own line the charges are greater for the longer distance and the through charges by the shorter line are only made greater by the fact that the connecting road which has the shorter line makes higher rates than the connecting road which has the longer line. 67. Cases stated showing no violation of the long and short haul clause.

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68. Where the purpose of a complaint is to compel a reduction of through rates from a western point over several roads to a seaboard city, all the roads constituting the line should be parties.

Smith v. Northern Pacific Railroad Company. (1 I. C. C. Rep., 208.) 69. The sale of "land explorers' tickets" and "settlers' tickets at less than the regular rates charged to passengers at the usual ticket offices, as practiced by the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, is unjust discrimination.

70. Discrimination in rates charged passengers who enjoy the same accommodations is not justified by proof that the carrier's present or future business will be thereby stimulated, or that the settlement of the country will be promoted, or that those receiving the more favorable rates are persons of small means, who are about to locate permanently in the Northwest. 71. The rule under which passenger transportation should be conducted requires absolute equality of payment from all persons enjoying the same accommodations. 72. When one makes complaint under the act to regulate commerce, and sets up a personal grievance which he fails to prove, the Commission may nevertheless, if a violation of law by the defendant appears, retain the case and take the necessary steps to bring such violations of law to an end.

The Boards of Trade Union of Farmington, Northfield, Faribault, and Owatonna v. The Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway Company. (1 I. C. C. Rep., 215.)

73. Rates must not only be reasonable in themselves, but they should be so relatively reasonable as to protect communities and business against unjust discrimination. 74. When the same carrier operates parallel lines, and for any cause accepts low rates on one of them, it should provide sufficient corresponding advantages to the patrons of the other line to preserve the substantial equality contemplated by the statute.

75. Low charges upon one of two routes operated by the same carrier should not be made up by relatively high charges upon the other, when the result disastrously affects the business of communities situated upon the latter line.

In re Procedure in Cases at Issue. (1 I. C. C. Rep., 223.)

76. Proceeding to be in the simplest form consistent with reasonable certainty. No replication required. When facts are not agreed upon, depositions may be taken on notice, and the work should be entered upon immediately after answer. Assignments for hearing made on request of either party. Parties will be heard orally or upon briefs, as they prefer.

In re Procedure concerning questions of Law. (1 I. C. C. Rep., 225.) 77. Dilatory proceedings considered objectionable, and a single speedy hearing desired in every case; all proper questions will then be entertained, whether jurisdictional or relating to the merits of the controversy.

In re Joint Tariffs and Schedules. (1 I. C. C. Rep., 225.)

78. Schedules of joint tariffs required to be filed with the Commission by section 6 of the act need not be duplicated by each company which unites in making them. On receipt of a written statement from each corporation asknowledging the authority of the association, committee, or other traffic combination to issue tariffs in its behalf, schedules filed by such association, etc., will be credited to each road in the organization which so requests.

The Manufacturers and Jobbers' Union of Mankato r. The Minneapolis and St. Louis Railway Company and others. (1 I. C. C. Rep., 227.)

79. When, after trial, but before decision, the defendant concedes the relief sought, and reduces its tariff to the rates claimed by the petitioner, no order is made or opinion announced by the Commission; a report of the facts is made to complete the record of the case.

Raymond v. Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway Company.
Rep., 230.)

(1 I. C. C. 80. Rates will not be declared unreasonable and unlawful under the first section of the act without other testimony than that afforded by compari


81. Rates and charges not unreasonably high of themselves can be so adjusted in their relations to each other as to give the undue preference and produce the unreasonable advantage which the third section of the act to regulate commerce makes unlawful.

82. If a railway company in establishing charges on different divisions and branches of its road so adjusts them as to divert trade and business to one locality which naturally, under an equitable adjustment of charges, would go to another, such preference is not excused by the fact that some of such charges are not entirely voluntary, but result from competition between carriers.

Evans v. The Oregon Railway and Navigation Company; Reed . The Same Defendant. (1 I. C. C. Rep., 325.)

83. In determining what is a just and reasonable rate for a particular commodity (for example, wheat) the Commission will take into consideration the earnings and expenses of operating, rates charged upon the same commodity upon other roads as nearly similarly situated as may be, the diversities between the railroad in question and such other roads, the relative amount of through and local business, the proportion borne by the commodity in question to the remainder of the local traffic, the market value of the commodity and its gradual reduction, the reductions made by the carrier upon other articles which are consumed and necessarily required by the producers of the article in question, and all other circumstances affecting the traffic of itself and as related to other considerations entering into the charges of the carrier. 84. Upon the facts shown by the evidence in the present case: Held, That the rate on wheat from Walla Walla City to Portland should not exceed 23 cents per hundred pounds when transported by the defendant railroad for the remainder of the present grain season, extending to the 30th of June, 1888.

W. O. Harwell, H. B. Montgomery, and J. W. Ponder, committee on transportation of the Board of Trade of Opelika, Ala., v. The Columbus and Western Railroad Company and the Western Railway of Alabama. (1 I. C. C. Rep., 236.)

85. The mere fact that a point is situated upon a navigable stream held not sufficient of itself to justify the lesser charge for a longer haul to such a point. 86. Competition by water, to be sufficient to justify an exception under section 4 of the act, should be actual, of controlling force, and in respect to traffic important in amount.

87. Discrimination under section 2, and prejudice and advantage under section 3, when water competition is brought forward as a justification, require the same measure of proof.

88. Parties affected are entitled to be notified in case a change in rates is asked. No order correcting the unjust discrimination now made, for want of proper parties and distinct allegations. Amendments allowed and revision of tariffs recommended to defendants.

89. Through rates and through bills of lading given on other commodities, and to other points similarly situated, should be given to Opelika on cotton, no excuse being shown for refusing same.

William H. Councill v. The Western and Atlantic Railroad Company. (1 I. C. C. Rep., 339.)

90. The Commission will not go into the question of money damages when the claim presented is in its nature an action of trespass, for the reason that defendant is constitutionally entitled to a trial by jury in such a case. 91. The Commission is not authorized to award the counsel and attorney's fees, which may be given by a court under the eighth section of the act. 92. Colored people may properly be assigned separate cars on equal terms. Such a separation of the races does not create undue prejudice or unjust preference.

93. Complainant, a colored man, paid the same fare as other first-class passengers, and it was only fair dealing and common honesty that he should have the security and convenience of travel for which his money had been taken.

94. Colored people who buy first-class tickets must be furnished with accommodations equally safe and comfortable with other first-class passengers. The Commission finds that the car furnished complainant was only second-class in comforts for travel, and that he was thereby subjected to undue prejudice and unreasonable disadvantage, in violation of the act to regulate commerce.

Thomas J. Reynolds v. The Western New York and Pennsylvania Railway Company. (1 I. C. C. Rep., 347.) 95. A road being in the hands of a receiver, a complaint was instituted against the company owning it, and in the complaint the receivership was mentioned, but the company was stated as having come into possession of the road, and the receiver was erroneously called the president of the company. The petition was served on him, and an answer was filed by the company. Under the circumstances it was held proper to allow the petitioner to amend his complaint so as to show the existence of the receivership.

In the matter of the Express Companies.

(1 I. C. C. Rep., 349.)

96. The mere fact that a common carrier does other business besides the transportation of passengers or property, or performs a further service than that of transportation in respect to the articles carried, held not sufficient to exclude the carrier from the operation of the act, so far as applicable to its business.

97. The act to regulate commerce is highly remedial in purpose and scope, and should receive a liberal construction, with the object of making the beneficial result desired by Congress operative to the greatest available extent.

98. The relation of express companies to interstate commerce considered, with the extent and method of their participation therein. The bringing them within the provisions of the act found practicable, and on some accounts desirable.

99. Express business, conducted as a branch of the business of the railroad company, held to be subject to the act.

100. Express business, conducted by an independent organization, acquiring transportation rights by contract, held not to be described in the act with sufficient precision to warrant the Commission in taking jurisdiction thereof.

Riddle, Dean & Co. v. The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company. (1 I. C. C. Rep., 372.)

101. In deciding upon applications for the amendment of complaints the Commission acts upon the principles recognized in courts of justice. 102. An amendment which proposes to substitute for the original cause of complaint something quite distinct and different will not be allowed. If the party desires to make a new case, he should do so by a new complaint.

Riddle, Dean & Co. v. The Pittsburgh and Lake Erie Railroad Company. (1 I. C. C. Rep., 374.)

103. Where, according to its usual experience, a railroad company has sufficient equipment to meet the demands upon it, and to move without unreasonable delay the freights offered, but by reason of unusual circumstances for which the company is not in fault freights have accumulated to an exceptional extent, and are then offered in extraordinary quantities, the company is not chargeable with any violation of law because of its proving unable to respond at once to all calls, and to furnish cars as rapidly as shippers demand them.

104. Nor does it violate any law by refusing to allow its cars to be sent off its line to distant points when the business offered on its own line keeps them fairly occupied.

105. Where, by reason of extraordinary circumstances, a railroad company can not promptly meet all calls for cars, it should furnish them ratably and fairly to all shippers in proportion to the freights offered by them,

respectively, until the emergency has passed and it is again enabled to move promptly all the freights tendered.

106. Upon the facts in this case the charge of unjust discrimination as between shippers and also between different classes of traffic is held not made out.

Thomas J. Reynolds v. Western New York and Pennsylvania Railway Company, and G. Clinton Gardner, receiver of the Buffalo, New York and Philadelphia Railroad Company. (1 I. C. C. Rep., 393.)

107. Classification of railroad ties should correspond with that of other rough lumber. Raising of same from sixth to fifth class unjustifiable. 108. Rates established by a common carrier in order to keep upon its line material for which the road has use, or to keep the price low for its own advantage, can not be justified.

109. Producer of railroad material is entitled to sell it when he wishes in the best available market. Common carriers are forbidden to attempt to prevent this by applying disproportionate or unreasonable rates.

110. Special classification of lumber should be extended to railroad ties at the points in question.

B. S. Crews et al., committee, etc., v. The Richmond and Danville Railroad Company. (1 I. C. C. Rep., 401.)

111. It is not a ground of complaint against a railroad company that it equalizes its rates as between small and large towns, even though the effect may be prejudicial to the large towns which before had been specially favored.

112. The spirit and purpose of the act to regulate commerce requires that when the circumstances and conditions will fairly admit of it, the charges to all points for a like service should be made relatively equal. 113. When the reasonableness of rates is in question, the charges made on long through lines can not, for reasons which are stated in the opinion, form a just basis for comparison with local rates for relatively short distances. 114. A carrier is not made responsible for rates made by a connecting road because merely of its giving them in connection with its own rates to parties desiring to make through shipments.

115. A carrier is not compellable by law to give to the merchants of a town on its line the privilege of shipping their goods from the point of purchase to their own locality, and again from thence to the place to which the goods may be sold by them, at the same rate which would have been charged had there been but one shipment from the point of purchase to the point of ultimate delivery.

116. The fact that a refusal to give the through rate as for one shipment operates prejudicially to the town desiring the privilege and favorably to another town does not make the refusal operate as unjust discrimination when the carrier applies the same rule to all towns and accords the privilege to none.

117. Discrimination must consist in the doing for or allowing to one party or place what is denied to another; it can not be predicated of action which in itself is impartial.

William II. Heard v. The Georgia Railroad Company. (1 I. C. C. Rep., 428.) 118. Passengers paying the same fare upon the same railroad train, whether white or colored, are entitled to equality of transportation in respect to the character of the cars in which they travel and the comforts and conveniences supplied.

119. Separation of white and colored passengers paying the same fare is not unlawful, if cars and accommodations equal in all respects are furnished to both and the same care and protection of passengers observed.

120. By requiring the petitioner, who had paid a first-class fare, to ride in a half car set apart for colored passengers, with accommodations and comforts inferior to the car for white passengers in the same train who paid the same fare, and without the protection against annoyances furnished to white passengers, the Georgia Railroad Company subjected him to undue and unreasonable prejudice and disadvantage, in violation of the third section of the act to regulate commerce,

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