3. We agreed for value during the lifetime of the said Peter Shive. Verdick in favor of the Plentiff."

The court, without sending the jury back to their room to correct their verdict, changed the same at bar, under exception from the defendants' counsel, and asked them whether the following was their intended verdict, to wit:

"1. That the signatures are in the proper handwriting of Peter Shive.

2. That the certificates were delivered to John A. Greup in the lifetime of Peter Shive.

3. That the same were delivered to John A. Group for value." The jury assenting to this the court entered it as their verdict. This action was also assigned for error.

John D. Stiles, for plaintiffs in error, cited Farmers' Bank v. Whitehill, 10 S. & R. 110; McCorkle v. Binns, 5 Binn. 349; Lodge v. Phipher, 11 S. & R. 334; Travis v. Brown, 7 Wright 9; Greenl. on Ev. § 581. On the matter of the verdict, he argued that the judge should have sent the jury out to reform their verdict, and not altered it himself, citing Reitenbaugh v. Ludwick, 7 Casey 132, to show the practice in such cases.

John H. Oliver, for defendant in error.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

STRONG, J.-In this state the rule respecting proof of handwriting in civil cases, by comparison of it with other writings admitted to be genuine, or proved to be genuine beyond a doubt, appears to be this: The comparison can be made only by the jury, and it is not allowed as independent proof. It can be used only as corroborative. After evidence has been adduced in support of a writing, it may be strengthened by comparing the writing in question with other genuine writings, indubitably such. Beyond this our cases do not go: Bank v. Whitehill, 10 S. & R. 110; Travis v. Brown, 7 Wright 9. And this is a departure from the English rule, which excludes other writings entirely, when offered for the mere purpose of enabling the jury to judge of the handwriting by comparison, for reasons that must be admitted to have great weight. But even under our relaxed rule the evidence offered in this case and rejected was inadmissible. The question at the trial was whether Peter Shive had signed certain assign

ments of certificates of deposit, purporting to have been made to John A. Greup, the defendant in error. After he had given considerable evidence to show that the signatures were in the handwriting of Shive, and had rested his case, the plaintiff in error called a witness who testified to his belief that the signatures to the assignments were not those of Peter Shive. They then offered to establish the genuineness of several writings in which the name of Peter Shive had been written by John A. Greup, in order to submit them to the jury to compare with the signatures to the assignments. This being rejected, they renewed their offer in another form. They proposed to prove that the signatures to the assignments were in the handwriting of John A. Greup, and as the means of such proof they offered in evidence specimens of the handwriting of Greup, in which he had written the name of Peter Shive, to be submitted to the jury for comparison with the signatures to the assignments. This offer was also rejected.

Up to the time when these offers were made there was no evidence whatever that Greup had forged the name of Shive, or that the signatures were in Greup's handwriting. No witness had expressed such a belief, or intimated a suspicion to that effect. The evidence offered was not then corroborative of anything that had previously been proved, or of anything with which it was proposed to follow it. Assuming, as we do, what does not clearly appear, that the offer was to establish indubitably the genuineness of Greup's handwriting in the specimens, yet, when that was established, they could not have been received until ground had been laid for their introduction by other proof that Greup wrote the signatures to the assignments of the certificates. Were this not so, they would be primary and independent evidence of a fact, when the law declares them admissible only as corroborative. True, when the offers were made, it was alleged that Greup signed the name of Shive, but it was alleged without evidence, and there was, therefore, nothing more than an allegation to be corroborated. The belief of a witness that the signatures to the assignments were not in the handwriting of Peter Shive was not the first step toward proving that Greup wrote them. For myself, I doubt whether if there had been some evidence that the signatures to the assignments were written by Greup, it could have been corroborated by comparison with other specimens of his writing, admitted or clearly proved to be genuine. No case in our books has gone to

that length, and so broad a doctrine has never been asserted. Even then it would have been allowing the jury to draw an inference of one fact, from another fact, itself only an inferential conclusion. For the question in this case was whether Peter Shive wrote the signatures. It is, however, not necessary to decide this.

If the testimony was admissible in this case the plaintiffs in error might have gone on and submitted specimens of the handwriting of other persons A., B., C., and D., indefinitely, specimens selected by themselves, that the jury might determine from comparison whether some one of them had not written the signatures, and therefrom infer that Peter Shive had not. The danger of fraud in the selection of specimens, and the danger of surprise to the opposite party, are too great to warrant the allowance of any such instruments of proof. The 1st and 2d assignments of error are not sustained.

The 3d assignment is, that the court directed a verdict different from the finding of the jury. We do not understand such to have been the fact. The verdict is the one rendered in court, not that which had been sealed up and brought in. The paper brought in by the jury in this case was exceedingly unlettered, but it was a general verdict for the plaintiff below, and without asking an explanation from the jury the court might have moulded it into the form in which the verdict was recorded. The court simply asked an explanation, and it was given in open court. Then the jury declared that they meant to find what the record shows their verdict to have been. In all this we discover no error.

Judgment affirmed.

United States Circuit Court, Southern District of New York.

ARCHIBALD HOPKINS v. ALEX. F. WESTCOTT ET AL.

A person receiving a printed notice on his ticket or check at the time of delivering his goods to a carrier is to be charged with actual knowledge of the contents of the printed notice.

Where such a notice stated that the carrier would not be responsible "for merchandise or jewelry contained in baggage, received upon baggage checks, nor for loss by fire, nor for an amount exceeding $100 upon any article, unless specially

agreed for," &c., the words "any article" mean any separate article, not a trunk with its contents. The language bears that construction, and must be taken strictly against the carrier.

Therefore, a traveller who gave a single trunk to a carrier and received such a notice, was allowed to recover the value of separate articles in the trunk amounting to $700.

Baggage includes such articles as are usually carried by travellers. Books and even manuscripts may be baggage, according to the circumstances and the business of the traveller.

In this case a student going to college was allowed to recover the value of manuscripts which were necessary to the prosecution of his studies.

THIS was an action against an express company for loss of baggage. The following facts were agreed upon :

The defendants are carriers of baggage in the city of New York.

The plaintiff delivered to the defendants a railroad baggagecheck to enable them to obtain his trunk at the depot, and deliver the same at his residence in the city, no rate of compensation being named.

The defendants obtained the trunk, but lost it.

Upon the delivery of the check to the defendants, they delivered to the plaintiff a paper upon which the number of the check was indorsed, and which contained also the following printed matter: "The Westcott Express Company will not become liable for merchandise or jewelry contained in baggage received upon baggagechecks, nor for loss by fire, nor for an amount exceeding $100, upon any article, unless specially agreed for in writing on this check-receipt, and the extra risk paid therefor

And the owner hereby agrees that the Westcott Express Company shall be liable only as above." This printed matter, however, the plaintiff did not read at the time it was delivered to him, nor till after notice from the defendants that his trunk was lost.

The general custom of express companies is to charge forty cents for every trunk, and twenty-five cents in addition for every $100 of value beyond $100. Plaintiff was ignorant of this custom.

The defendant was a student at Columbia College, and was proceeding to New York for the purpose of prosecuting his studies at that institution; and certain manuscript books which formed part of the contents of his trunk, were necessary to the prosecution of his studies.

SHIPMAN, J.-It has been remarked by a learned and accurate

writer, "that a common carrier may qualify his liability, by a general notice to all who may employ him, of any reasonable requisition to be observed on their part in regard to the manner of entry and delivery of parcels, and the information to be given him of their contents, the rates of freight, and the like; as, for example, that he will not be liable for goods above the value of a certain sum, unless they are entered as such and paid for accordingly:" 2 Greenleaf's Ev. § 215. But in the case now before the court, the defence does not rest upon a general notice, constructive knowledge of which the plaintiff is to be charged with by proof that it was generally and widely promulgated. It rests on a special printed notice, put into the hands of the plaintiff at the time he delivered his check to the defendants. It can make no difference that the plaintiff did not choose to read it until after he had notice that his trunk was lost. He received it at the time he parted with his check; it was legibly printed, and he must be charged with actual notice of its contents. By its terms it qualified the duty or liability of the defendants, and limited their responsibility in case of loss to an amount not exceeding $100 for any article, unless the plaintiff should disclose such articles, and have the fact indorsed on the paper, as well as pay for the extra risk. It excluded all liability for merchandise and jewelry. Though, as will be seen in the sequel, this point is of no practical importance in this suit, in view of the construction which I shall give this notice, yet I am unwilling to leave it to be inferred that I entertain any doubt of the power of the carrier to qualify his responsibility by special notice actually given to the owner under circumstances like these. In The Orange County Bank v. Brown, 9 Wend. 115, Judge NELSON, speaking for the court, says of the carrier: "If he has given general notice that he will not be liable over a certain amount, unless the value is made known to him at the time of delivery, and a premium for insurance is paid, such notice, if brought home to the knowledge of the owner (and courts and juries are liberal in inferring such knowledge from the publication of the notice), is as effectual in qualifying the acceptance of the goods as a special agreement, and the owner must, at his peril, disclose the value and pay the premium." Here, in the case before us, we are not left to a general notice to be charged upon the plaintiff on the ground of its general publication, and which, though he had seen, he might have forgotten;