servers there in examining the possibility that some means may be found which is calculated to prevent any troop collision between the Chinese and Japanese in the Chinchow region and that liaison be established with the military commanders of both forces with a view to making the necessary arrangements. STIMSON 793.94/2924: Telegram The Minister in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State NANKING, November 27, 1931-4 p. m. [Received November 27-1:30 p. m.] The following supplements my November 26, 5 p. m., reporting the statement made by Koo: Regarding Chinchow, Koo said that information received by the Chinese Government led the Government to believe that preparations for an attack were being carried on by the Japanese but that the attack would be deferred until the conclusion of the Council meeting in order that Japan might be able to induce the delegates to pass a mild resolution of the sort proposed by the Italians. He said that the Chinese Government could not understand how General Dawes and the Council delegates could be misled regarding the futility of a general assurance from Japan that troops would be withdrawn, previous assurances of the sort accepted in the resolutions of September 30 and October 24 having been flagrantly violated. To the Chinese Government the issue seemed quite plain. The action of Japan in sending troops to occupy regions in Manchuria was either right or wrong. If the League believed it to have been wrong, a clear-cut denunciation should issue from the Council; if right, the Council should say so, in which case China would know where she stood. Koo said Chinese popular feeling now demanded affirmative action for recovery of occupied regions either in the form of time limit set by the Council for evacuation or as alternative declaration of war by the Chinese Government. Koo seemed very despondent. JOHNSON 793.94/2930: Telegram The Chargé in France (Shaw) to the Secretary of State 811. From Ambassador Dawes: Following report is from Sweet ser: "Sze called on Briand this noon to again urge the fixation of an actual date for evacuation even if that date had to be conditional. 'Telegram in two sections. He stressed the necessity of this for Chinese opinion and some discussion ensued as to whether any method could be found for giving satisfaction. One suggestion now being considered is that the President of the Council in his declaration after the adoption of the report might express the hope that Japanese troops would be withdrawn by the time the commission arrived. Should, however, the question of security not have been satisfactorily settled by then, the commission would naturally consider this question first of all. It was pointed out to Dr. Sze that as the whole emphasis of the Council's resolution would be placed on evacuation it would be natural for the commission to begin its work in Manchuria and in connection with that subject. Sze also expressed anxiety regarding the situation at Chinchow and presented a telegram from his Government that an imminent attack was feared and that small neutral detachments, if sent by only one member of the Council, seemed to be essential. Briand assured him that the Council members were giving very serious consideration to the Chinchow situation and informed him that the British and French representatives had last night sent telegrams in accordance with the form suggested yesterday. He also said that Shidehara had told the French Ambassador in Tokyo that after consultation with the Minister of War, strict orders had been given to the Japanese commanders in the field not to attack Chinchow. Sze's letter to the Secretary-General mentioned above was as follows: 'I have been instructed to bring to your immediate attention the following telegram which I have just received from my Government "An imminent attack on Chinchow is feared in view of the information just received from the highest and most reliable sources of a neutral power. The position at Chinchow justifies the most serious apprehensions and may give rise to grave events at any moment. We are informed that the reports from British observers show that there has been no concentration of Chinese troops nor any troop movements from within the Great Wall. In view of the constant allegations by the Japanese to the contrary it is urgent and essential that this information should be published. The whole work of suppressing bandits will be done by the Chinese police so that there would be no danger of complications for neutral detachments. We consider that such detachments should be sent even if by only one member of the Council to see that a neutral zone is respected and that such a zone should be established with all possible speed by neutral observers. Please lay these facts before the Council as a matter imperatively requiring immediate action in view of the alarming situation." I venture to suggest in the light of the facts revealed by this message that even the instructions given to the neutral observers on the spot may not suffice to avert a catastrophe unless the observers, if in their judgment the local situation so required, could have at their disposal small neutral detachments to organize and supervise the neutral zone effectively. I should be grateful if you would circulate this letter to the President and members of the Council other than the representatives of the parties.'' [Dawes] SHAW 793.94/2919: Telegram The Minister in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State PEIPING, November 27, 1931-7 p. m. [Received November 27-9:45 a. m.] 1015. American Consul General at Tientsin just telephoned that Chinese authorities have suggested to foreign consuls whose governments have troops stationed in Tientsin that a considerable area north of Japanese Concession be policed by foreign forces as the Japanese have demanded the withdrawal of Chinese police from there. The question is to be discussed by consular body tomorrow. Repeated to Nanking. For the Minister: ENGERT 793.94/2931: Telegram The Chargé in France (Shaw) to the Secretary of State [Paraphrase "] PARIS, November 27, 1931-8 p. m. [Received November 27-7:07 p. m.] 812. From Ambassador Dawes: This afternoon Matsudaira called. The Drafting Committee appears to be considering whether to increase the number of members on the proposed commission from three to seven. Matsudaira feels a larger commission would be unwieldy, and he is somewhat apprehensive lest some of the smaller powers without material interest in the situation should wish to be represented. In his opinion, the commission had best consist of three members, American, British, and French. He would have no personal objection to an Italian in addition, but he has not yet heard on this point from Tokyo. Reasons given in the Council for the larger number were the embarrassing problem which would arise in case of illness of one of the three members and the possibility also of having to form subcommittees for the purpose of covering a large area. Matsudaira commented on this that the smaller the commission is, the greater will its authority be. Matsudaira is discussing another point with the Drafting Committee, namely, the tentative wording of the resolution: "The two parties undertake to give the strictest orders to the commanders of the respective forces to refrain from any initiative which may lead to further fighting and loss of life.” 'Quotations not paraphrased. As it stands, the clause, Matsudaira says, would be subversive of the constitution of Japan, and he wishes the wording to be as follows: "The two parties shall refrain from any initiative which may lead to further fighting and loss of life.” Though the Council has not decided as yet concerning the number of members for the proposed commission, it is Matsudaira's impression that a commission of seven members is favored. He is quite certain that his Government will object to a large commission. This information he gives confidentially, because it embarrasses him to mention eliminating the smaller powers as such. [Dawes.] SHAW 793.94/2929: Telegram The Chargé in France (Shaw) to the Secretary of State PARIS, November 27, 1931-9 p. m. [Received November 27-8:36 p. m.] 813. From Ambassador Dawes: Following report from Sweetser: "Monsieur Briand when asked privately today his opinion of the effect of the American announcement said it had come just at the right moment. It had been, he added, decisive. At the meeting of the 12 members of the Council, other than the representatives of China and Japan, Briand read the Chinese note on Chinchow distributed this morning. Cecil said he had telegraphed his Government not only urging that observers be sent as had indeed already been done but suggesting also that they cooperate with French, Italian, American, or other observers who might be there. He then distributed the following note: "The British delegate has inquired of His Majesty's Government whether it would be possible to instruct His Majesty's Minister in Nanking to discuss with his colleagues arrangements for a regular concerted organization of observers with close liaison between the different nationalities and collation of reports and with sufficient observers held in readiness to proceed to localities which may be indicated as danger points. It seems essential that in case of need concerted action should be taken as rapidly as possible and the British delegate ventures to suggest to his colleagues that they might propose to request their Governments to send similar instructions.' Cecil estimated there were already nine observers in Chinchow: two British, two French, two Italian, one American, one German and one Spaniard. Since they had arrived, Briand remarked, the character of the news seemed to have changed; there were not so many alarmist reports as constantly appeared before. Both he and Cecil, however, Telegram in three sections. See statement quoted in telegram No. 798, November 25, 2 p. m., from the Chargé in France, p. 561. expressed disquietude on the possibilities in that region; it is evident the Council is watching it with alarm lest the diplomatic settlement which Briand again today thought was close at hand be made impossible. The question of sending troops, however, seemed even less likely today with Cecil's statement that he imagined this might present considerable military difficulty. Briand reported optimistically but not conclusively on his conversation with Sze this morning. The Chinese representative, he said, had not been very precise; his Government was under very heavy pressure; he must endeavor to have some kind of satisfaction for his public opinion; he again stressed the need of some kind of delay [date?] regarding evacuation. Briand showed how difficult it was to fix a delay [date?] in the circumstances and stressed the fact that the commission would give a good deal of elasticity to the situation. He urged that the commission would be of enormous advantage to China in that it would establish a real international stake in China's situation and provide for an actual method for making operative the Nine-Power Pact, especially with its phrase as to 'administrative' integrity. After all, he said, China's present situation is vague, obscure, ill and, [garbled?] as shown by the emergence of the famous fundamental points, which it had since been one of the successes of the present negotiations to push into the background. He thought it an enormous gain that Japan had announced it had no territorial or other ambitions and felt that if this gain could be solidified it would be very important to the whole future of the Far East. Indeed, he thought that the adhesion given by the United States to the Council proposals was due to its preoccupations from the very first moment lest Chinese territorial integrity be endangered. This would also of course have involved article X. Briand said he had told Sze that it might be possible to find some kind of formula which would help him either by connecting evacuation with the commission or by giving the commission instructions in this sense. He agreed strongly with a suggestion by Fotitch that the Council must continue to keep the matter within its own hands and not allow the creation of the commission to give the impression that it has given it no discretion. Cecil hoped that something definite of this sort might be put into the President's statement. In connection with the general public interest in the matter, Briand again expressed his surprise at the every large number of telegrams he had received from all parts of the world. These telegrams showed that public opinion was widely aroused but at the same time it realized the complexity of the situation. The commission idea had been particularly well received; it was recognized as capable of solving many difficulties. The Drafting Committee will meet tomorrow morning to consider Sze's suggested changes." [Dawes] SHAW |