THE LAW QUARTERLY REVIEW. EDITED BY SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK, BART,, D.C.L., LL.D. VOL. XX. WITH A GENERAL INDEX TO VOLS. XVI-XX. LONDON: STEVENS AND SONS, LIMITED, 119 & 120 CHANCERY LANE. 1904. LAW QUARTERLY REVIEW. No. LXXVII. January, 1904. NOTES. GLAMORGAN Coal Co. v. South Wales Miners' Federation [1903] 2 K. B. 545, 72 L. J. K. B. 893, C. A. is the latest of the line of cases which begins just fifty years ago with Lumley v. Gye (1853) 2 E. & B. 216. From these cases we may now deduce, though with different degrees of certainty, the following conclusions. (1) If X, knowing that N has entered into a contract with A, induces N to break that contract, X has prima facie committed a wrong for which A, if he suffers damage thereby, has a right of action-Quinn v. Leathem [1901] A. C. 495, 70 L. J. P. C. 76, and the principal case. (2) Though I's conduct is prima facie actionable on the general principle that a violation of legal right committed knowingly is a cause of action, and it is a violation of legal right to interfere, without justification or excuse, with contractual relations recognized by law (Quinn v. Leathem [1901] A. C. p. 510, judgment of Lord Macnaghten, and see Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor (1889) 23 Q. B. D. 614, judgment of Bowen L. J.), yet there may be just cause, or, what is the same thing, legal justification for X's interference. (3) It is not yet possible to define the circumstances which may constitute a justification for procuring a breach of contract ([1903] 2 K. B. at p. 573, judgment of Romer L. J.). It must in each case be a question for the Court whether the circumstances found to exist are sufficient for that purpose. The mere fact that X holds N's contract with A to be a violation of a prior contract with X is not in itself a justification of X's inducing N (by threat at any rate) to violate N's contract with A: Read v. Friendly Society of Co-op. Stonemasons [1902] 2 K. B. 732, 71 L. J. K. B. 994, C. A. (4) There seems to be a distinction between X inducing N to break a contract with A, by threats, by payment or otherwise, and I giving advice to N which leads him to break a contract with A (see [1903] 2 K. B. at p. 572, judgment of Vaughan Williams L. J.), The difference may be thus illustrated. N is under a contract with A to go out to India and manage A's business there. I wishing to obtain N's services offers him a higher salary than that which is promised by 4, and thereby induces N to break his contract with A and enter into X's service. Y is a doctor whom N consults as to the effect on his health of a residence in India. Yknowing of N's contract with A tells him that he will die within a month if he goes to India, and that he will be wise at all costs to break his contract with A. N in consequence declines to go out to India. I's conduct is clearly actionable. F's conduct almost certainly is not. I induces N not to go out to India; Y, being bound by professional duty to do so, gives N his opinion as to the probable effect on N's health of performing his contract to go to India. Probably it is safe to say that in this class of cases disinterested advice, honestly given, is privileged. (5) It is clear that malice, in any reasonable sense of that much abused term, is not material to the cause of action. (6) If X and Y combine together to induce N, whether by threats or by payment, to break a contract with 4, they are, unless there is something in their position which justifies their interference, liable to an action for conspiracy: Quinn v. Leathem, and the principal case. There is certainly some instruction to be derived in the Lumley v. Gye class of cases-though at present no one can say just how much—from the analogy of privileged communications in cases of defamation. But it is not therefore necessary to use the oldfashioned perplexing language about presumption of malice, rebuttal of presumption, and express malice, which has long been abandoned by most writers on the subject, and was deprecated by Lord Blackburn in 1882 (see Capital and Counties Bank v. Henty, 7 App. Ca. at p. 787); and we regret that this language is revived in the dissenting judgment of Lord Justice Vaughan Williams in the case on which we have commented in the foregoing note. Gillan v. National Labourers' Union [1903] 2 K. B. 500, 72 L. J. K. B. 907, C. A. continues the line of decisions which are defining, gradually and piecemeal, the application of Quinn v. Leathem, or rather of the various principles enounced or intimated in that case with varying degrees of confidence and in different language by several noble and learned persons. It is an actionable wrong for (at any rate) two or more persons to prevent a man from getting employment, and to induce others to refuse to work with him, merely in order to put pressure on him to pay a debt: and if the creditor is a trade union, and such acts are done by the union officials for the purpose of collecting the union's debts, the union may well be liable. Per Romer L. J., such things are no less actionable if done (assuming that in fact they can be done) by one person alone; this seems to be good sense, and one does not see why it should not be good law. We have said here more than once that these points will never be cleared up till we leave off talking about conspiracy and malice. The Court would not commit itself in any general terms to saying what would amount to a justification in other words, it admits that the rule and the exceptions are still imperfectly known. The postponement of the coronation processions and the naval review in June, 1902, gave rise to some interesting questions. In Krell v. Henry [1903] 2 K. B. 740, 72 L. J. K. B. 794, the defendant had agreed to hire rooms in Pall Mall for the days only of June 26 and 27, the plaintiff having announced that they were to let for viewing the coronation processions, but there were no words about that purpose in the letters forming the agreement. Darling J. and the C. A. held that the transaction was really a licence to use the rooms for viewing the processions, assuming that they would take place on those days; that their taking place was the foundation of the contract; the C. A. held, correcting Darling J. in this point, that the failure which happened had the effect of discharging both parties. The case was both argued and decided on the authority of Taylor v. Caldwell, 3 B. & S. 826, 32 L. J. Q. B. 164; the decision extends that authority somewhat, for here (1) nothing was destroyed, (2) there was nothing to prevent the performance of any of the express terms of the contract. Whatever may be the best technical way of classifying such cases, the real question must be whether the contract was unconditional or not. Suppose that here the parties' desires had been the other way, that the defendant had said: 'I have come from Australia' (as in fact some people did) 'on purpose, and if I cannot see the procession I will see London, and the use of the rooms will be convenient for me;' and the plaintiff had said: 'As there is to be no show, I want to use my rooms for business and don't want strangers coming in.' This will help us to see the justice of the Court's conclusion. Accordingly the defendant was not liable for the balance of the agreed sum beyond the deposit he had paid: a counter-claim for the return of the deposit was abandoned, wisely, as is shown by the next case in the December Law Reports, Civil Service Co-operative Society v. General Steam Navigation Co. [1903] 2 K. B. 756, 72 L. J. K. B. 933, C. A., which arose out of the hiring of a steamer for the naval review. It was there held to be settled by authority that, when a contract is avoided by failure of its principal subject-matterwhich failure, we must now understand, may or may not consist |