to, or mortality of, the animals, from whatever cause arising." "The
carrier shall not be liable for loss or damage occasioned by causes
beyond his control, by the perils of the sea, or other waters;" "by
barratry of the master or crew;""by collisions, stranding or other
accidents of navigation, of whatsoever kind, even when occasioned
by the negligence, default, or error in judgment of the pilot, master,
mariners or other servants of the shipowner." Held, that by the
terms of this contract, whether governed by the law of this country
or by the law of England, the carrier was not exempted from respon-
sibility for the loss of sound cattle, forcibly thrown or driven over-
board, in rough weather, by order of the master, from unfounded
apprehension on his part, in the absence of any pressing peril to the
ship, and with no apparent or reasonable necessity for a jettison of
the sound cattle, and no attempt to separate them from those which
had already been injured by perils of the sea. Compania la Flecha
v. Brauer, 104.
2. A. & S. owned a tract of land in a township numbered 5 which was
within the limits of the Union Pacific Railroad grants and was
acquired from that company after the execution of its mortgages, its
deed reserving to the company the exclusive right to prospect for
coal and other minerals on the lands. A. & S. contracted to sell this
tract to R. & H., representing that they had a good and indefeasible
estate in fee simple in it, and agreeing to furnish an abstract of title.
R. & H. agreed to buy the tract for a sum named, to be paid partly
in cash and partly by notes secured by mortgage on the property.
The deed, mortgage, notes and money payments were accordingly
made and exchanged in supposed compliance with the agreement,
but no abstract of title was furnished. In the deed and mortgage
the land was by mistake of the scrivener described as township No.
6 instead of township No. 5. A. & S. had no interest in or title to
land in township No. 6. No patent was ever issued by the Govern-
ment for land in township No. 5. R. & H., on learning the facts,
demanded the return of the money paid, and of the notes, claiming
to rescind the contract of sale. A. & S. tendered a deed of the land
in township No. 5. Subsequent to the tender, the Union Pacific Com-
pany released the land from claim under the coal reservation, but not
as to other minerals. Held, that R. & H. were not bound to accept
the deed tendered, and were entitled to have the contract rescinded,
and to receive back the money paid by them. Adams v. Henderson,
573.
See ADMIRALTY, 2;
EQUITY, 1.
CORPORATION.
See MASTER AND SERVANT.
When a given state of facts is such that reasonable men may fairly differ
upon the question as to whether there was negligence or not, the
determining the matter is for the jury. Warner v. Baltimore & Ohio
Railroad Co., 339.
1. The illegal acts described in subdivisions 1 and 2 of Rev. Stat. § 3169,
for the alleged violation of which the plaintiff in error was prose-
cuted, refer to offences committed by officers or agents acting under
authority of revenue laws. Williams v. United States, 382.
2. The Chinese Exclusion Acts have no reference to the subject of reve-
nue, but are designed to exclude persons of a particular race from
the United States, and an officer employed in their execution has no
connection with the Government revenue system. Ib.
3. When an indictment properly charges an offence under laws of the
United States, that is sufficient to sustain it, although the prosecut-
ing representative of the United States may have supposed that the
offence charged was covered by a different statute. Ib.
4. The transactions referred to in the two indictments were of the same
class of crimes or offences, and there was no error in consolidating
them at the trial. Ib.
5. The affidavit and the bank book referred to in the opinion of the court,
were not admissible in evidence against the accused, as, on the face
of the transactions, there was no necessary connection between them
and the charges against him. Ib.
6. The estimate placed upon the character of a government employé by
the community cannot be shown by proof only of the estimate in
which he is held by his coemployés. Ib.
7. It was highly improper for the prosecuting officer to say in open court
in the presence of the jury, under circumstances described in the
opinion of the court, that while Mr. Williams was investigating the
Chinese female cases, there were more females sent back to China
than were ever sent back, before or after. Ib.
8. This was an indictment for murder alleged to have been committed
on an American vessel on the high seas. After the crime was dis-
covered, Brown, a sailor, was put in irons and the vessel was headed
for Halifax. Before it reached there Brown charged Bram with the
commission of the crime, saying that he had seen him do it. Bram
was then also put in irons. On the arrival at Halifax, Power, a
policeman and detective in the government service at that place,
had a conversation with Bram. Bram was indicted at Boston for
the commission of the crime, and on his trial Power was offered as
a witness for the Government. He testified that he made an exami-
nation of Bram, in his own office, in the city hall at Halifax, when
no one was present besides Bram and himself; and that no threats
were made in any way to Bram, nor any inducements held out to
him. The witness was then asked: "What did you say to him and
he to you?" To this defendant's counsel objected. The defendant's
counsel was permitted to cross-examine the witness before the court
ruled upon the objection, and the witness stated that the conversa-
tion took place in his office, where he had caused the defendant Bram
to be brought by a police officer; that up to that time the defendant
had been in the custody of the police authorities of Halifax; that the
witness asked that the defendant should be brought to his office for
the purpose of interviewing him; that at his office he stripped the
defendant and examined his clothing, but not his pockets; that he
told the defendant to submit to an examination, and that he searched
him; that the defendant was then in custody and did everything the
witness directed him to do; that all this took place before the defend-
ant had been examined before the United States consul, and that the
witness did not know that the local authorities had at that time taken
any action, or that the defendant was held for the United States - for
the consul general of the United States. The witness answered ques-
tions by the court as follows: "You say there was no inducement to
him in the way of promise or expectation of advantage?" "A. Not
any, your honor." "Q. Held out?" "A. Not any, your honor."
"Q. Nor anything said, in the way of suggestion to him that he
might suffer if he did not- that it might be worse for him?"
"A.
No, sir, not any." "Q. So far as you were concerned, it was entirely
voluntary?" "A. Voluntary, indeed." "Q. No influence on your
part exerted to persuade him one way or the other?" "A. None
whatever, sir; none whatever." The defendant then renewed his
objection to the question, what conversation had taken place between
Bram and the witness, for the following reasons: That at the time
the defendant was in the custody of the chief of police at Halifax;
that the witness in an official capacity directed the police authorities
to bring defendant as a prisoner to his office and there stripped him;
that defendant understood that he was a prisoner, and obeyed every
order and direction that the witness gave. Under these circumstances
the counsel submitted that no statement made by the defendant while
so held in custody and his rights interfered with to the extent de-
scribed was a free and voluntary statement, and no statement as
made by him bearing upon this issue was competent. The objection
was overruled, and the defendant excepted on all the grounds above
stated, and the exceptions were allowed. The witness answered as
follows: "When Mr. Bram came into my office, I said to him: Bram,
we are trying to unravel this horrible mystery.' I said: Your posi-
tion is rather an awkward one. I have had Brown in this office and
he made a statement that he saw you do the murder.' He said: 'He
could not have seen me; where was he?' I said: 'He states he was
at the wheel.' 'Well,' he said, 'he could not see me from there.' I
said: 'Now, look here, Bram, I am satisfied that you killed the cap-
tain from all I have heard from Mr. Brown. But,' I said, 'some of
us here think you could not have done all that crime alone.
If you
had an accomplice, you should say so, and not have the blame of this
horrible crime on your own shoulders.' He said: 'Well, I think, and
many others on board the ship think, that Brown is the murderer;
but I don't know anything about it.' He was rather short in his
replies." "Q. Anything further said by either of you?" "A. No;
there was nothing further said on that occasion." The direct exami-
nation of this witness was limited to the interview between the wit-
ness and the defendant Bram. Held, (1) That this statement made
by the accused to a police officer, was evidently not a voluntary con-
fession and was not admissible in evidence against him; (2) That
the objection to its admission, having been twice presented and regu-
larly allowed, it was not necessary that it should be renewed at the
termination of the testimony of the witness. Bram v. United States,
532.
9. The objection that the indictment recited that it was presented upon
the oath of the jurors when the fact was that it was presented
upon the oath and affirmation of the jurors is without merit. Ib.
10. The objection that neither in the indictment, nor in the proof at the
hearing of the pleas in abatement was it affirmatively stated or shown
that grand juror Merrill, before being permitted to affirm, was shown
to have possessed conscientious scruples against taking an oath is also
without merit. Ib.
11. As the evidence against Bram was purely circumstantial, it was
clearly proper for the Government to endeavor to establish, as a cir-
cumstance in the case, the fact that another person who was present
in the vicinity at the time of the killing, could not have committed
the crime. Ib.
12. The objection to a question asked of a medical witness, whether, in
his opinion, a man standing at the hip of a recumbent person and
striking blows on that person's head and forehead with an axe would
necessarily be spattered with, or covered with, some of the blood, was
also properly overruled. Ib.
13. The defendant, who was employed as a postal clerk at station F in
the city of New York, was indicted under Rev. Stat. § 5467. The
indictment contained three counts; the first two under the first part
of § 5467; the third count under the last clause of that section. The
evidence showed that the Government detectives prepared a special
delivery letter, designed as a test or decoy letter, containing marked
bills, and delivered it, bearing a special delivery stamp, to the night
clerk in charge of branch station F of the post office in that city. The
defendant was not a letter carrier, but a clerk employed at that office,
whose duty it was to take charge of special delivery letters, enter
them in a book kept for that purpose and then place them in course
of transmission. The letter in question was addressed to Mrs. Susan
Metcalf, a fictitious person, 346 E. 24th street, New York city, ficti-
tious number. The letter was placed by the night clerk with other
letters upon the table where such letters were usually placed, and the
defendant, entering the office not long after, took this letter, along
with the others on the same table, removed them to his desk, and
properly entered the other letters, but did not enter this letter. On
leaving the office not long after, the omission to enter the letter hav-
ing been observed, he was arrested, and the money contents of the
letter, marked and identified by the officers, were found upon his per-
The officers testified upon cross-examination that the address
was a fictitious one; that the letter was designed as a test letter, and
that they did not intend that the letter should be delivered to Mrs.
Susan Metcalf or to that address and that it could not be delivered to
that person at that address. Held, that the evidence was sufficient to
sustain a conviction under the third count of the indictment. Hall v.
United States, 632.
Where imported foreign goods are entered at a custom house for con-
sumption, the payment by the importer of the full amount of duties
ascertained to be due upon the liquidation of the entry of the mer-
chandise, as well as the giving notice of dissatisfaction or protest,
within ten days after the liquidation of such duties, is not necessary
in order to enable a protesting importer to have the exaction and
classification reviewed by a board of general appraisers and by the
courts, under the provision in section 14 of the act of June 10, 1890,
c. 407, 26 Stat. 131, 137, "that the decision of the collector as to the
rate and amount of duties chargeable upon imported merchandise,
including all dutiable costs and charges, and as to all fees and exac-
tions of whatever character (except duties on tonnage), shall be final
and conclusive against all persons interested therein, unless the owner,
importer, consignee, or agent of such merchandise, or the person pay-
ing such fees, charges, and exactions other than duties, shall within
ten days after, but not before,' such ascertainment and liquidation of
duties, as well in cases of merchandise entered in bond as for con-
sumption, or within ten days after the payment of such fees, charges
and exactions, if dissatisfied with such decision, give notice in writing
to the collector, setting forth therein distinctly and specifically, and in
respect to each entry or payment, the reasons for his objection thereto,
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