of the defendants, bought at a tax sale held by the late corporation of Washington, so called, the property in controversy in this case and paid the price bid for it by him at such sale and received from the corporation of Washington a deed to said property, which was by him duly filed for record and recorded in the land records of the District of Columbia more than twenty years prior to the commencement of this suit; that thereupon the said property was assessed to the said William Douglas on the tax books of the city of Washington, and the taxes thereon from that time until the beginning of this suit paid by the said William Douglas or his successors in title, the defendants in this case; that at a period of time more than twenty years before the commencement of this suit the said property was rented on behalf of the defendants to a person who took the same and held possession thereof as tenant of the defendants for the purposes of a stone yard, paying rent therefor from the date of making such arrangements with the defendants, and that, although the said property was not inclosed by a fence, yet the person so renting the same, either upon the whole or a part thereof, during his occupancy, deposited stone used by him in his business, and that such use and possession of said property was continued by the occupant thereof actually, exclusively, continuously, openly, notoriously, adversely and uninterruptedly for a period of twenty years next before the commencement of this suit, then the jury is instructed that the defendants are entitled to recover." Held, that the instructions as given were substantially correct, and there was evidence in the case upon which to found the one given at de- fendants' request. Holtzman v. Dougias, 278.
See JURISDICTION, A, 17; B.
1. Attorneys and counsellors specially employed to render legal services for the United States cannot, under existing legislation, be compen- sated for such services in the absence of the certificate of the Attorney General required by Rev. Stat. § 365; and if he fails or refuses to give such certificate, Congress alone can provide for compensation. United States v. Crosthwaite, 375.
2. One who receives a commission as special assistant to a District Attor- ney for particular cases, or for a single term of court, or for a limited time, is not an Assistant District Attorney within the meaning of Rev. Stat. § 365, and therefore the certificate of the Attorney General prescribed therein is a prerequisite to the allowance of compensa- tion. Ib.
CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.
1. To entitle a supervisor of elections to a valid claim against the Govern-
ment, he must make it appear that the services performed were re- quired by the letter of Rev. Stat. § 2020 and § 2026, or were such as were actually and necessarily performed in the proper execution of the duties therein prescribed, and that his charges therefor are covered by Rev. Stat. § 2031, or, if not fixed in the very words of that section, that by analogy to some other service, he is entitled to make a corre- sponding charge. Dennison v. United States, 241.
2. If the services were only performed for his own convenience, or were manifestly unnecessary or useless, even if they be such as he judges proper himself, they cannot be made the basis of a claim against the Government.
3. It is held that the applicant, a chief supervisor, should have been allowed for drawing instructions to supervisors, and, in the absence of proof to the contrary, for the full amount of his claim for auditing claims of and drawing pay rolls of supervisors, and certifying the same to the marshal; and all the other claims, enumerated in the opinion of the court, are disallowed. Ib.
4. When a consul of the United States, in his regular accounts and settle- ments with the Treasury, charges himself with fees received by him as consul for which he is not obliged to account, and pays the same into the Treasury with each settlement, and retires, and makes his final settlement with the Treasury on the same basis, he cannot, in an action commenced in the Court of Claims three years after his retire- ment, recover back such payments, but they will be regarded as wholly voluntary payments. United States v. Wilson, 273.
1. The statute of New York of 1885, c. 448, providing that deeds from the comptroller of the State of lands in the forest preserve sold for non- payment of taxes shall, after having been recorded for two years, and in any action brought more than six months after the act takes effect, be conclusive evidence that there was no irregularity in the assessment of the taxes, is a statute of limitations, and does not deprive the former owner of such lands of his property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. Turner v. New York, 90.
2. In this case, which was an indictment for murder, the verdict being "guilty as charged;" and judgment of condemnation to death thereon being affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State; and this court hav- ing determined, on a former petition by the petitioner, that it had no jurisdiction to review that judgment, Craemer v. Washington State, 164 U. S. 704; and the time appointed for execution having passed, pend- ing all these proceedings, it was within the power of the state court to make a subsequent appointment of another day therefor, and to issue a death warrant accordingly, and a judgment to that effect in- volved no violation of the Constitution of the United States. Craemer v. Washington State, 124.
3. The State's attorney of Vermont, under the statutes of that State, filed an information in the proper court against H., charging that on a day and at a place named he “did, at divers times, sell, furnish and give away intoxicating liquor, without authority, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State." At the same time he filed specifications as fol- lows: "In said case the State's attorney, for a specification, specifies, and says as follows: That he will rely upon, and expect to prove in the trial of said cause, the fact that the respondent, within three years be- fore the filing of the information in the said cause, sold, furnished and gave away intoxicating liquor to the following named persons, or to some one of them, that is to say," giving the names without the resi- dences. "And the undersigned State's attorney states that he has also specified the offences against said respondent with all the certainty as to the time and person, and he is now able from all the information he has in said cause; and the State's attorney reserves the right to amend these specifications if he shall have further evidence pursuant to the statute. And the State's attorney further specifies and relies upon the selling, furnishing and giving away of intoxicating liquor by the respondent within three years before the filing of said information, to some person or persons now unknown to the State's attorney, and claims the right to add the names of such persons, when ascertained, to the specifications, and to make such other amendments in these speci- fications as the law and discretion of the court may admit." This specification is not required by any statute, and forms no part of the
information. It is, however, provided by statute that "when a speci- fication is required, it shall be sufficient to specify the offences with such certainty as to time and person as the prosecutor may be able, and the same shall be subject to amendment at any stage of the trial; and when the specification sets forth the sale, furnishing or giving away to any person or persons unknown, the witnesses produced may be inquired of as to such transactions with any person, whether named in the specification, or not, and as the name of such person may be dis- closed by the evidence it may be inserted in or added to the specifica- tion, upon such terms as to a postponement of the trial, for this cause, as the court may think reasonable." It did not appear from the record that the specification was asked for by the respondent, nor whether the offences of which he was convicted were for selling, furnishing or giving away; or whether to either of the sixty-six persons named in the specification, or to some person or persons not named. Held, that this was due process of law, within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. Hodgson v. Vermont, 262.
4. The words "due process of law" do not necessarily require an indict- ment by a grand jury in a prosecution by a State for murder. The Amendment undoubtedly forbids arbitrary deprivation of life, liberty or property, and in the administration of criminal justice requires that no different or higher punishment shall be imposed on one than is imposed on all for like offences, but it was not designed to interfere with the power of the State to protect the lives, liberty and property of its citizens, nor with the exercise of that power in the adjudica- tions of the courts of a State in administering the process provided by the law of the State. Ib.
5. The grants made to the plaintiffs in error by the acts of February 26, 1856, and February 27, 1856, of the legislature of the Territory of Minnesota, to maintain dams and sluices in the Mississippi River, etc., etc., were subject at all times to the paramount right of the pub- lic to divert a portion of the waters for public uses, and to the rights in regard to navigation and commerce existing in the General Govern- ment, under the Constitution of the United States; and under those grants the plaintiff in error took no contract rights which have been impaired in any degree by the acts of the legislature of Minnesota respecting the public waterworks of the city of St. Paul. St. Anthony Falls Water Power Co. v. St. Paul Water Commissioners, 349.
6. If, after a regular conviction and sentence in that State, a suggestion of a then existing insanity is made, it is not necessary, in order to constitute "due process of law," that the question so presented should be tried by a jury. Nobles v. Georgia, 398.
7. By the constitution of Kentucky of 1891 it is provided that “lotteries and gift enterprises are forbidden, and no privileges shall be granted for such purposes, and none shall be exercised, and no schemes for simi- lar purposes shall be allowed. The General Assembly shall enforce this
act by proper penalties. All lottery privileges or charters heretofore granted are revoked." Held, (1) That the provision when applied to a previously existing lottery grant in the State of Kentucky was not inconsistent with the contract clause of the Constitution of the United States; (2) That a lottery grant is not, in any sense, a con- tract within the meaning of the Constitution, but is simply a gratuity and license, which the State, under its police powers, and for the pro- tection of the public morals, may at any time revoke, and forbid the further conduct of the lottery; and that no right acquired during the life of the grant, on the faith of or by agreement with the grantee, can be exercised after the revocation of the grant and the forbidding of the lottery, if its exercise involves a continuance of such lottery; (3) That all rights acquired on the faith of a lottery grant must be deemed to have been acquired subject to the power of the State to the extent just indicated; nevertheless, rights acquired under a lottery grant, consistently with existing law, and which may be exercised and enjoyed without conducting a lottery forbidden by the State are, of course, not affected, and could not be affected, by the revocation of such grant; (4) That this court when reviewing the final judg- ment of a state court upholding a state enactment alleged to be in violation of the contract clause of the Constitution, possesses para- mount authority to determine for itself the existence or non-existence of the contract set up, and whether its obligation has been impaired by the state enactment. Douglas v. Kentucky, 488.
8. The sixth section of the act of September 27, 1890, c. 1001, 26 Stat. 492, authorizing the establishment of Rock Creek Park in the District of Columbia, does not violate the provisions of the Constitution of the United States, and is valid. Wilson v. Lambert, 611.
9. It is not necessary to decide whether the act of 1883 conflicts with the Constitution in that it lays taxes upon earnings arising from trans- portation of persons and property between different States. McHenry v. Alford, 651.
10. The objection that the act of 1883 violates the Fourteenth Amend- ment is untenable. lb.
See JURISDICTION, A, 3, 4, 5; STATUTE, A, 2.
See CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, 4.
1. A contract, made at New York to carry cattle on the deck of a steam-
ship from New York to Liverpool, contained these provisions: "On deck at owner's risk, steamer not to be held accountable for accident
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