Statement of the Case.

which he gave and bequeathed to his wife, "for the maintenance of her and my three children, Charles, Julian and Silas Bent, all of my real and personal property." But this will was not presented until March, 1867, when it was approved and admitted to probate. Beaubien, one of the original grantees, had left six children surviving. Maxwell married one of them, and between April 4, 1864, and January 1, 1870, purchased the interests of the other five for a consideration of not more than $3500 each. On April 9, 1866, the death of Alfred Bent was suggested, and his minor children and heirs, Charles, Julian and Alberto Silas, were by order of the court substituted as complainants in place of their father. On April 12, the mother of these minors, Guadalupe Bent, was by the court appointed guardian ad litem and commissioner in chancery for such minors, with full power to execute deeds or carry into execution all sales or transfers made of their interest in and to the real estate described in the suit to Lucien B. Maxwell. A settlement with Maxwell was concluded by Aloys Scheurick, acting for his wife, his wife's sister and her husband, and the widow as guardian ad litem for the minor children of Alfred, which was acceptable to all the parties, by which Maxwell was to pay the sum of $18,000 for the conveyance of the interest of the Bent heirs. This compromise was advised by their leading counsel. In May the two sisters, by separate deeds, conveyed their interests to Maxwell, and during the same month Guadalupe Bent, as guardian ad litem and reciting the order of April 12, also executed to Maxwell a conveyance of the interest of the minors. Each of these conveyances purported to be for the sum of $6000. At the next term of the court, about four months after the execution and delivery of these deeds, and on September 10, 1866, a further order or decree was entered, which read as follows:

"Whereas an interlocutory decree was rendered at a former term of this court in the above cause, decreeing one fourth of the land mentioned in the petition herein to the complainants. in this cause, and appointing commissioners to divide and set apart the portion so decreed, and whereas said interlocutory decree was never carried into effect, and whereas since the

Statement of the Case.

time of the rendition of said decree a mutual agreement has been made between the parties to this cause, settling and determining all the equities to the same:

"It is therefore hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed by the mutual consent and agreement of the said complainants as well as of the said defendants in this cause, that the interlocutory decree above mentioned, together with all orders made under and by virtue of the same, be set aside; and, by the mutual consent and agreement of the said parties, it is hereby further ordered, adjudged and decreed that the said Lucien B. Maxwell, one of the defendants in this cause, pay to the said complainants the sum of eighteen thousand dollars, to be divided among them per stirpes, that is, to the said Aloys Scheurick and Teresina Bent, his wife, one third part, and to Alexander Hicklin and Estefana Bent, his wife, another third part, and to Charles Bent, Julian Bent and Alberto Silas Bent, the children and heirs of Alfred Bent, deceased, the remaining third part, to be equally divided among the said last named and to be paid into the hands of Guadalupe Bent, widow of the Alfred Bent, deceased, and guardian ad litem for said children for the purposes of the said division.

"And upon the further consent and agreement of the said parties, it is hereby further ordered, adjudged and decreed, that the said Alexander Hicklin and Estefana Bent, his wife, the said Aloys Scheurick and Teresina Bent, his wife, and the said Guadalupe Bent, guardian, ad litem, for Charles Bent, Julian Bent and Alberto Silas Bent, children and minor heirs of the said Alfred Bent, deceased, within ten days from the day of the date of this decree, make, execute and deliver to the said Lucien B. Maxwell good and sufficient deeds of conveyance of all their right, title, interest, estate, claim and demand of, in and to the lands in controversy in this cause; the said Guadalupe Bent, guardian ad litem as aforesaid, in the name of Charles Bent, Julian Bent and Alberto Silas Bent, minor heirs as aforesaid, and the said Alexander Hicklin and Estefana Bent, his wife, and the said Aloys Scheurick and Teresina Bent, his wife, in their own names. And by further consent and agreement between the said parties, it is hereby further ordered, adjudged

Counsel for Parties.

and decreed, that the costs of this suit shall be paid, each of the said parties to pay the separate costs in the same made by themselves."

In April, 1870, Maxwell, claiming to have the full title to the entire grant, conveyed all except a few acres to the Maxwell Land Grant and Railway Company. In August of that year Maxwell and the Maxwell Company filed a bill in the District Court against the appellants Guadalupe Thompson and her husband, (the former being the widow of Alfred Bent, who had since intermarried with George W. Thompson,) and the three minor children of Alfred Bent, which, after reciting in a general way the history of the grant and the proceedings in the former suit, alleged that it was doubtful whether the order and decree of September, 1866, fully expressed the agreements of the parties, or fully cancelled and discharged all claims that the infant heirs of Alfred Bent had in the land, and prayed that the defendants be adjudged to have no interest in or title to the premises, equitably or otherwise, and that the plaintiffs' title be quieted. Subsequently the bill was amended, and thereafter, the defendants having answered and proofs having been taken, a decree was entered sustaining the prayer of the bill and quieting the title of the plaintiffs in the premises. This decree was affirmed on appeal by the Supreme Court of the Territory, but on further appeal to this court was reversed, 95 U. S. 391, and the case remanded to the territorial courts for further proceedings. Subsequent proceedings having been had therein a new decree was entered by the District Court in favor of the plaintiffs, which on appeal to the Supreme Court of the Territory was affirmed, and from such decree of affirmance this appeal has been taken.

Mr. John G. Carlisle for appellants. Mr. S. D. Rouse, Mr. James O'Hara, Mr. Caldwell Yeaman, Mr. E. T. Wells, Mr. R. T. McNeal, Mr. John G. Taylor and Mr. Logan Carlisle were with him on the briefs.

Mr. Frank Springer and Mr. A. B. Browne for appellees. Mr. A. T. Britton was with them on the brief.

Opinion of the Court.

MR. JUSTICE BREWER, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.

It is the settled law of this court, as of others, that whatever has been decided on one appeal or writ of error cannot be reëxamined on a second appeal or writ of error brought. in the same suit. The first decision has become the settled

law of the case. Supervisors v. Kennicott, 94 U. S. 498, and cases cited in the opinion; Clark v. Keith, 106 U. S. 464; Chaffin v. Taylor, 116 U. S. 567; Northern Pacific Railroad v. Ellis, 144 U. S. 458; Great Western Telegraph Company v. Burnham, 162 U. S. 339, 343.

Whenever a case comes from the highest court of a State for review, and by statute or settled practice in that State the opinion of the court is a part of the record, we are authorized to examine such opinion for the purpose of ascertaining the grounds of the judgment. N. O. Water Works Co. v. Louisiana Sugar Refining Co., 125 U. S. 18; Kreiger v. Shelby Railroad, 125 U. S. 39; Egan v. Hart, 165 U. S. 188. We take judicial notice of our own opinions, and although the judgment and the mandate express the decision of the court, yet we may properly examine the opinion in order to determine what matters were considered, upon what grounds the judgment was entered and what has become settled for further disposition of the case.

We, therefore, turn to the former opinion and the mandate to see what was presented and decided. The ground upon which the reversal was ordered was that the bill as presented, especially after the amendment, was technically a bill of review, and as such could not be maintained for three reasons: First, because the decree sought to be reviewed was a consent decree; secondly, because the bill was filed on behalf of an assignee of the original defendant; and, thirdly, because it sought a modification of the decree upon a matter of fact not appearing upon the record, without alleging any newly discovered evidence unknown to the parties before that decree. The opinion by Mr. Justice Bradley gives a full history of the litigation, the substance of the allegations in the bill of com

Opinion of the Court.

plaint, and points out why, especially after the amendment, it must be regarded as a bill of review. The amendment put into the prayer these words: "That for the aforesaid errors of law, apparent on the face of the said decree of 10th September, 1866, the same may be reviewed and reversed in the points. herein complained of." But after demonstrating that the bill as it stood must be deemed a bill of review, and not sustainable, the opinion proceeds:

"Nevertheless, the general purpose which it evidently had in view — the quieting of the title to the land in question is one towards which a court of equity is always liberally disposed, as tending to promote the peace of society and the security of property. And if, instead of seeking to reverse the decree of September, 1866, (which, for like reasons of public policy, as applicable to the security of judgments that have passed into rem adjudicatam, is not allowable,) the bill had sought to carry that decree more effectually into execution, it would have been free from legal objections, and equally conducive to the object in view."

And then, after quoting from Lord Redesdale, it adds:

"The bill in this case, as originally filed, before it was converted by amendment into a bill of review, and abating the allegations of error in the original decree, approximated to the character of such a bill as might have been sustained. The proofs show a case which, in our judgment, supports the conclusions of the decree, to the effect that the terms of compromise made by the adult parties to the suit (including the mother and guardian of the infant heirs of Alfred Bent) were advantageous to the said infants, and were so considered and accepted by the court in their behalf. But, so far as the present decree undertook to reverse and modify the decree of September, 1866, we think it is clearly erroneous. Still, although we feel obliged to reverse the present decree, we do not think that the bill should be absolutely dismissed. And, as the whole question between the parties has been fully litigated on the proofs, it would be unreasonable to require that these should be taken over again.

"Our conclusion is, that the present decree must be reversed