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limiting the liability of shipowners, and the result was an award finding the Thirlmere to be wholly at fault, and condemning her to pay the loss caused by the sinking of the Johnson. As their proportion of the ascertained value of the Thirlmere, the owners of the Johnson for ship and freight were allowed the sum of £6557 9s. 6d., but from this amount there was deducted about £1500 for certain expenses. In the proceedings in question, the owners of the nitrate of soda which was on the Johnson also recovered their proportion of the value of the Thirlmere. On account of the loss of the Andrew Johnson, the Boston Marine Insurance Company paid to her owner the sum of $30,000 less $2825.49, the amount of a premium note with interest, and out of the sum received by the owner of the Andrew Johnson for the ship and freight from the value of the Thirlmere, the owner of the Andrew Johnson, in April, 1896, remitted to the insurance company as its share thereof the sum of $11,456.05, and to correct some mistake in calculation the sum of $35.60 was also subsequently paid by the shipowner to the insurance company.

The present suit was commenced on July 20, 1887, by a libel in personam against the owner of the Andrew Johnson to recover the due proportion of the sum paid on the bond. Those joined as libellants were eleven in number; that is, all the members composing the firm of Gibbs & Company, the consignors of the nitrate of soda, and the members of the firm of Antony Gibbs & Sons, the consignees. The original libel is not in the record. Exceptions to it were filed on the ground that it did not state the nature of the action and that it did not state a cause of action. On June 6, 1888, the district judge overruled the exception to the want of clearness in the averments of the libel, but maintained the exception of no cause of action. Although the learned judge found that the bottomry bond had not been avoided by the loss of the Andrew Johnson and her cargo, and therefore that the payment made at Hamburg was necessary, he yet concluded that as the Andrew Johnson and her cargo had proven a total loss, nothing having been alleged in the libel as to a recovery by reason of such loss, the libellants were precluded from

Opinion of the Court.

enforcing their claims in personam against the owner of the Johnson in consequence of the provision of the acts of Congress limiting a shipowner's liability for the acts and contracts of the master to the value of the ship and freight. 35 Fed. Rep. 779. As a result, on the 27th of June, 1888, an order was entered sustaining the exception of no cause of action, and directing that, unless the libel were amended, it be dismissed with costs. An amended libel was filed in July, 1888, to which an exception of no cause of action was again sustained, with leave further to amend. On January 4, 1889, the libel was for the second time amended, and this was also excepted to, on the ground of ambiguity, and that it did not state a cause of action. On the 24th of October, 1890, the libel was again amended by averring the loss of the Johnson, the fact that it had occurred by collision with the Thirlmere, the institution of proceedings against the Thirlmere by the owner of the Johnson, and the recovery in those proceedings on the ground that the collision had been caused solely by the fault of the former vessel. In June, 1891, respondent filed exceptions and an answer to this amended libel. The answer, among other things, averred as follows:

"This respondent admits that the owners of the ship Thirlmere, having taken appropriate proceedings under the statutes of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, obtained a decree limiting their liability for said collision to a certain sum, which they thereupon paid into the court, and which said sum was distributed between the libellants and the respondent herein, and other parties and their attorneys, in part satisfaction of the damages by each of them sustained by reason of said collision, but this respondent denies that he received the said sum of £6557 9s. 6d., and avers that the amount received by him was much less than said sum."

No allusion was made in the pleadings of the respective parties to the fact that the owner of the Andrew Johnson had received the benefit of any insurance upon the vessel.

After the taking of proof the cause was heard on the exceptions and merits on November 23, 1893. At the outset

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of the hearing the trial court overruled all the exceptions to the third amended libel but that of no cause of action, and referred this latter exception to the merits. Before the case was finally submitted the respondent moved the court to be allowed to amend his answer so as to plead two additional and distinct defences:

"First, to as much of the libellant's claim as arises out of the limited liability proceedings in the English court as to the Thirlmere, the defence of laches on the part of the libellant in not sooner bringing that matter before the court.

"Also as to the same portion of his claim, the defence res judicata, because passed on by the English court."

This request was refused and exceptions to the refusal were noted. The court, on the merits, held that the bottomry bond, at the time of its payment, was a valid obligation; that in view of the fact that the bond embraced not only the cargo on the Johnson, but also the cargo on the Mary J. Leslie, that the words "said vessel" in the defeasance clause must be considered as referring to the cargo on both vessels, and, therefore, the obligations of the bond were not avoided by the loss of the Johnson and her cargo; that the owners of the Johnson having recovered from the Thirlmere, up to the value of the latter vessel, damages for the collision, were not discharged from personal liability under the acts of Congress, inasmuch as the sum recovered from the Thirlmere was greater than the amount sought to be enforced in personam against the owner. 59 Fed. Rep. 621. In conformity to the opinion of the court, an interlocutory decree was entered on April 3, 1894, referring the matter to a special commissioner to ascertain and report the amount the libellants were entitled to recover. On April 10, 1894, the respondent again applied to the court for leave to amend his answer by setting up the two additional defences of laches and res judicata, and the request was again denied. On June 5, 1894, the report of the commissioner was filed, finding the libellants entitled to the principal sum of $6091.73, and on July 16, 1894, a final decree for that sum with interest and costs was duly entered. By the final decree seven of the libellants, that is to say, those who composed the firm of

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Antony Gibbs & Sons, were dismissed on the ground of a want of interest, the court having found that the bond was paid by the consignees for account of the consignors, and they, therefore, were alone interested in the suit. On appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals, the judgment of the trial court was reversed. The appellate court concluded that the words "said vessel" in the defeasance clause of the bond were free from ambiguity, and left no room for construction, and, therefore, that the loss of the Andrew Johnson with her cargo had operated to avoid the bond according to its tenor, and that the payment made of the amount by the consignees was hence unnecessary, and gave rise to no legal claim against the master or owner of the Johnson. 35 U. S. App. 138. In consequence of the allowance of a writ of certiorari, the cause is here for review.

In the discussion at bar many minor questions have been pressed upon our attention, but the pivotal controversy rests upon the ascertainment of the true meaning of the bottomry bond, and the obligations, if any, which arose from its payment. We forego the present consideration of the more unimportant questions in order to at once approach the fundamental issues in the cause. The libellants assert that from the terms of the bond as a whole, it manifestly results that the cargo of the Leslie was liable despite the loss of the Johnson and her cargo; that hence the consignees of the cargo, on the Leslie, were obligated to pay the bond, and that on their doing so there arose a legal duty on the owner of the Johnson to pay the proper proportion thereof, which obligation, it is claimed, can be enforced despite the loss of the ship, since the owner had recovered and retained the amount awarded against the Thirlmere. On the other hand, the respondent asserts that the words of the bond providing for its avoidance in case of the loss of "said vessel" are free from ambiguity and give no room for construction, and that even if this be not the case in consequence of the loss of the Johnson, the consignors who paid the bond are not entitled, under the limited liability acts, to recover any proportion thereof.

There can be no doubt that, considered in themselves and

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alone, there is no ambiguity in the words found in the clause of the contract providing that "if during said voyage an utter loss of the said vessel by fire, enemies, pirates, the perils of the sea or navigation, or any other casualty, shall inevitably happen, . this obligation shall be void." But the question presented involves not the interpretation of this language apart from the whole agreement, but is, on the contrary, the ascertainment of the meaning of the entire contract. The fallacy which underlies the assertion as to want of all ambiguity in the bond arises, therefore, from presupposing that in order to establish want of ambiguity in a contract a few words can be segregated from the entire context, and that because the words thus set apart are not intrinsically ambiguous, there is no room for construing the contract itself. In other words, the confusion of thought consists in failing to distinguish between the contract as a whole and some of the words found therein. If the erroneous theory were the rule, then, in every case, it would be impossible to arrive at the meaning of a contract, in the event of difference between the contracting parties, since each would select particular words upon which they relied, and thus frustrate a consideration of the whole agreement. The elementary canon of interpretation is, not that particular words may be isolatedly considered, but that the whole contract must be brought into view and interpreted with reference to the nature of the obligations between the parties, and the intention which they have manifested in forming them. Boardman v. Reed, 6 Pet. 328; Canal Co. v. Hill, 15 Wall. 94.

This general rule of construction should especially guide a court of admiralty in interpreting a contract of bottomry and respondentia.

In the exercise of their jurisdiction with respect to such bonds, courts of admiralty are not governed by the strict rules of the common law, but act upon enlarged principles of equity, per Story, J., in The Virgin, 8 Pet. 538, 550; and the same learned justice, in the case of Pope v. Nickerson, 3 Story, 486, said: "A court of admiralty in cases within its civil jurisdiction acts as a court of equity, and construes in