of introducing testimony to show an earlier date of invention than the prima facie date thus established, they have sought to show that the invention itself is not patentable, and for this purpose have cited an earlier patent, granted to one Smith in 1858.

It appears that both of the applications, before the declaration of the pending interference, were rejected by the examiner upon reference to this same patent. Traut appealed to the Examiners-in-Chief, and from that tribunal obtained a reversal of the examiner's decision.

The Commissioner undoubtedly has power, in virtue of the general authority vested in him by the law, to review this decision of the board-ex parte Stephen Hull, Commissioner's Decisions, 1869, page 68; but it is equally clear that this power to arrest the issue of a patent allowed by the board should never be exercised except in cases in which it is beyond question that the judgment of the board is erroneous or opposed to the general policy of the Office. Such is not the case in the present instance, as is sufficiently shown by the fact that the Smith patent is owned by Disston, who, nevertheless, ignores its existence absolutely in the circumstantial account which he, in connection with Morss, gives in their preliminary statement regarding the origin of the invention now in controversy. This statement is utterly irreconcilable with the theory that the invention is the same with that covered by the reference to which they now ask the further attention of the Office. The decision of the Examiners-in-Chief, awarding priority to Traut, is affirmed.

W. B. AND W. O. BARTON.-EX PARTE.

APPEAL FROM THE BOARD OF EXAMINERS-IN-CHIEF IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF W. B. AND W. O. BARTON FOR LETTERS PATENT FOR AN IMPROVEMENT IN WOOD PAVEMENTS.

(Decided March 28, 1872.)

Changes of Form-When patentable.

A change of form may in certain cases confer structural advantages, and so bring the invention within the requirements of the law and the official practice, and be patentable.

LEGGETT, Commissioner:

The alleged invention in this case is fully and definitely set forth in the claims, which are as follows:

1. A wooden pavement composed of blocks, each block being two geometrical figures in vertical cross-section, the lower portion an oblique-angled parallelogram, and the upper part or portion of trapezoidal shape, substantially as shown and described.

2. The combination, in paving-blocks, of the side shoulders D and E, and the bevels e e' of their lower ends, so that each block will have a bearing upon shoulders D of the adjacent blocks on one side, and upon the bevels e of the adjacent blocks on the opposite side, substantially as shown and described.

3. In combination with the side shoulders and bevels mentioned in the foregoing claim, we also claim the end-bevels of the blocks, so constructed as to form an arch across the street, substantially as described.

This case has been held under consideration for a long time, not be cause of any doubt of there being much difference between it and any of the references cited to defeat it as between other similar devices which have been patented, but because of the doubtful policy of granting patents upon such slight differences as have been regarded as patentable in this class. Wood pavements have received much attention for several years past, and, as they are now beginning to be regarded with favor in many sections of the country, there is among inventors a diligent effort being made to devise the very best form of block, having in view stability and durability. The result has been the patenting of many different forms, and the rejection by the Office and by the country of many more. Some would-be inventors seem to think that a mere change of form should be enough to secure a patent, whether such change in form secures any new or improved result or not. The case in band, however, seems to present some radical differences from the devices cited as references. There is a combination of square shoulder and sloping locks not elsewhere found; also of side and end locks. The square shoulder gives a positiveness of lock not secured by the sloping lock; yet applicant's device has the advantage of the square shoulder on one side and the sloping lock on the other. Applicant's block also has the end so beyeled as, when put in position, to secure the proper arch from curb to curb.

Upon a careful examination of this case and of the references, and upon a review of previous actions of the Office in pavement casesespecially my predecessor's decisions in the cases of Samuel Toomey, C. D., 1869, p. 109, and of L. I. Follansbee, C. D., 1870, p. 127-I must decide the applicants entitled to a patent.

The decision of the Board of Appeals is reversed.

A. F. JONES.-EX PARTE.

APPEAL FROM THE BOARD OF EXAMINERS-IN-CHIEF ON THE APPLICATION OF A. F. JONES FOR LETTERS PATENT FOR IMPROVEMENT IN FLEXIBLE SIDES FOR BELLOWS AND AIR-PUMPS.

(Decided March 29, 1872.)

A claim for a flexible material for sides of bellows, consisting of an inner-woven porous fabric of relatively smaller dimensions, for taking the strain, and an outer nonporous rubber material for confining the air, is not met by a reference in which textile and rubber fabrics are interwoven; or by one in which the rubber is placed in a plastic state upon the woven fabric; or by one in which a rubber pipe of impervious material is placed with a woven pipe of strain-resisting material.

LEGGETT, Commissioner:

The invention claimed in this case consists in making the sides of bellows, air-pumps, &c., where strength, flexibility, and imperviousness to

air are required, of two separate fabrics-the inner of woven or porous fabric, for strength, and the outer of rubber or non-porous material. These fabrics are not united, except at their edges, where they are fastened to the frame of the bellows. The application was rejected by the primary examiner by reference to the patents of Gately, for imperviousbelt machine; of Gates, for rubber-coated belts; of Day, for rubberhose; of Hull, for elastic webbing; of Allison, for vat for transporting petroleum; of Waters, for non-porous barrels; and several others of the same class. After a careful examination of these references, I am unable to discover such resemblance of the inventions described in these patents, or in any of them, to the device of the applicant, either to the thing itself, its use, or the result attained, as to warrant the rejection. In all the references except the vats and barrels, and the hose described in Day's patent, the rubber and woven fabric are either interwoven, or else the rubber in a plastic state is placed upon the woven fabric as a coating; but neither of these devices would accomplish the result aimed at by the applicant. It is well known that leather, rubber-cloth, or any similar material, when made impervious to air and used for the sides of a bellows or any similar instrument for any considerable length of time, will, by its continuous flexions under strain, crack and become worthless. The object of the applicant is to provide against this defect. None of the devices upon which he has been rejected will or can do it.

Applicant's combination of two separate flexible walls-the inner of a porous woven fabric and of slightly smaller dimensions, taking the strain and wear, while the outer is of rubber, impervious to air, aud relieved from strain in the use of the bellows, except that of resisting the pressure of the air-secures the result at which he aims; and, so far as shown by the references, it is new, unless Day's patent hose is a sufficient answer. This hose consists of a rubber pipe drawn inside of a pipe made of woven fabric. The woven fabric is intended to give strength, while the rubber pipe is impervious to water, and the whole makes a flexible water-tight hose. In the matter of two fabrics, flexibility, and strength, there is considerable analogy; but the construction and use of the two are so different and so remote from each other that it can hardly be possible that one could ever have suggested the other. I think there is no such analogy as to justify the citation.

The decision of the Board of Appeals is reversed.

JOHN L. MASON.

Extension.

APPLICATION OF JOHN L. MASON FOR THE EXTENSION OF LETTERS PATENT GRANTED TO HIM MARCH 30, 1858, FOR AN IMPROVED

LATHE CHUCK.

(Decided March 29, 1872.)

Interest of assignees in extended term-Practice in determining title in extended term.

Where an assignee who holds the original term of a patent, and the right to the extension of the same, assigns "all his right, title, and interest," such assignment must be held to convey all the interest of which he has become possessed, including the right to the extension, even though the instrument does not name the extension in terms.

The omission from an assignment under a patent of the corporate seal of the company executing the deed is not necessarily a fatal defect, since, if the transaction is bona fide on the part of the assignee, a court of equity would compel the making of a good assignment. The Office, therefore, may take notice of the imperfect instrument if satisfied as to the good faith of the assignee, and for proof upon this point may properly refer to the corrected assignment entered of record after the day of hearing in the case in which the question as to the sufficiency of the original assignment arises.

A supplemental "statement," filed after the day of hearing in a contested extension case, and containing the averments required by the rules as to the applicant's interest in the extension sought, while it cannot be considered upon its merits, may properly be used, so far as it goes to show that there was no fraudulent intent in the defect which it was designed to remedy. Applicant's title to the extension being otherwise established, it might be a hardship amounting to a wrong to refuse the extension because of the technical defect in the original statement.

LEGGETT, Commissioner:

The extension in this case has been persistently opposed, principally upon the ground that applicant has dispossessed himself of the extend. ed term, so that, if the extension should be granted, Mason could derive no benefit from it.

The question of title is the main question raised and discussed. The testimony and the records of the Office show that, August 26, 1859, Mason assigned all his interest in the original and extended term of the patent to Mitchell & Bennett. November 3, 1859, Bennett assigned "all his right, title, and interest" to Mitchell. This assignment does not name the extension in terms; but Bennett, being an assignee when he sold all his right, title, and interest, must be held to have conveyed all the interest he derived from Mason. Mason's original grant from the Government said nothing of an extended term; hence, when he conveyed all his interest in the patent, such conveyance would not pass a right to the extension except it was so specified in terms; but the as

signment to Mitchell & Bennett did name the extended term, hence Bennett's right to the extension, if granted, is exactly the same as that to the original term, and is so expressed in the instrument giving him title; so, when he conveys "all his right, title, and interest," he conveys his right to the extended as well as to the original term, even though the word "extension" is not used in his conveyance. These remarks are applicable to several of the assignments on record of this patent.

November 3, 1859, Mitchell executed a mortgage of the patent, including extension, to Mason to secure several notes given at the time of the original purchase of the patent by Mitchell & Bennett. July 9, 1862, Mitchell sold and assigned the patent to Sanderson, conveying all his "right, title, and interest;" and the next day, July 10, 1862, Sanderson in like terms conveyed it to Mitchell, Boyd & Barclay. On the same day Mitchell, Boyd & Barclay reconveyed the same to Sanderson by way of mortgage, to secure the purchase money. This mortgage was afterward released. July 27, 1862, Mitchell, Boyd & Barclay sold and assigned to the Sheet-Metal Screw Company.

Boyd, coming into possession of one of the notes given to Mason by Mitchell, and secured by the mortgage given to Mason, November 3, 1859, commenced suit on the note, foreclosed the mortgage, and the patent was sold by order of the court on the 15th day of April, 1863, and was bid in by Barclay. The Mitchell note, indorsed by Mason, upon which this suit was brought, was for the sum of $530.39. The patent was sold under the foreclosure of the Mason mortgage to Barclay, as the highest bidder, for the sum of $350. The amounts of these sums become important in the determination of title. On the same day that Barclay bid in the patent, (April 15, 1863,) Boyd also conveyed to Barclay all his interest in said patent, though neither the proofs nor the records show what interest he had to convey; and again, on the same day, Barclay conveys all his right, title, and interest to Boyd. This seems to leave all the title, legal and equitable, in Boyd, except, possibly, an equity of redemption in the Sheet-Metal Screw Company; but Boyd, on the 3d of January, 1864, sells and conveys all his right, title, and interest to the Sheet Metal Screw Company, thereby leaving in said company the entire title. January 27, 1872, the Sheet Metal Screw Company sells all its interest in said patent to the Consolidated Fruit-Jar Company; and February 19, 1872, the Consolidated FruitJar Company sells and assigns all its right, title, and interest back to Mason again.

There are two assignments which I have omitted to mention, because I cannot see how they in any way affect the title. One of these was the transfer by Mason, November 20, 1865, of the mortgage of November 3, 1859, to Baylis. I am disposed to regard this mortgage as dead at the time of this transfer, and hence think it could have carried no rights, legal or equitable; for on the 15th day of April, 1863, the patent was sold, under a foreclosure of this same mortgage, upon one of the