H.R. 3512 and H.R. 3066: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Domestic Monetary Policy of the Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred First Congress, First Session, November 9, 1989U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990 - 144 lappuses |
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1.–5. rezultāts no 17.
2. lappuse
... , borrower and lender in the United States . The dilemma has been very well stated in your opening state- ment . The dilemma created by this concentration of power is that the independence which the Federal Reserve must have in order 2.
... , borrower and lender in the United States . The dilemma has been very well stated in your opening state- ment . The dilemma created by this concentration of power is that the independence which the Federal Reserve must have in order 2.
3. lappuse
... independence which the Federal Reserve must have in order to insulate monetary policy from political pressures also removes the Fed from the normal processes of accountability that apply to every other agency of the Federal Government ...
... independence which the Federal Reserve must have in order to insulate monetary policy from political pressures also removes the Fed from the normal processes of accountability that apply to every other agency of the Federal Government ...
5. lappuse
... independence , any attempt by the administration to meddle in monetary policy would and should evoke a strong reaction from the members of the FOMC . If Chairman Greenspan raised this issue because he fears that the President through ...
... independence , any attempt by the administration to meddle in monetary policy would and should evoke a strong reaction from the members of the FOMC . If Chairman Greenspan raised this issue because he fears that the President through ...
7. lappuse
... independence is inseparable from its budget- ary independence and that publishing its budget in the Govern- ment Budget would require the Fed to keep two sets of books at the cost of millions of dollars . H.R. 3512 will not reduce the ...
... independence is inseparable from its budget- ary independence and that publishing its budget in the Govern- ment Budget would require the Fed to keep two sets of books at the cost of millions of dollars . H.R. 3512 will not reduce the ...
8. lappuse
... independence . The bill will not require the Federal Reserve to maintain two sets of books . Although the Fed does not use the Federal fiscal year or Government accounting principles for its accounts , the Fed would not be required to ...
... independence . The bill will not require the Federal Reserve to maintain two sets of books . Although the Fed does not use the Federal fiscal year or Government accounting principles for its accounts , the Fed would not be required to ...
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4th term Accounting Office administration Agency Audit Act amendments appointed authority to audit Banking Agency Audit BARNARD bill Board of Governors budget deficit Byron Dorgan Chairman Greenspan Chairman NEAL Comptroller conduct of monetary Congress consumers democracy democratic Directors disclosure disinflation dollars DOMESTIC MONETARY POLICY Dorgan economy ETTLESON FCAS Fed's Federal Advisory Council Federal Open Market Federal Reserve Act Federal Reserve banks Federal Reserve Board Federal Reserve System financial audits financial institutions fiscal policy FOMC GAO audit goal going Government Gramley growth H.J. Res Hamilton hearings inflation rate interest rates issue LEACH Lee Hamilton legislation Liberty Lobby MCCOLLUM ment MILLER monetary policy decisions Open Market Committee operations Paul Volker President Professor Tobin proposed provision Public Citizen recession reports require Reserve's responsibility secrecy Senate SOCOLAR SUBCOMMITTEE ON DOMESTIC subsection targets testimony Thank thing tion transactions Treasury vote zero inflation