British government is want of diligence in not preventing these vessels from leaving British waters on their work of mischief. Professor Bluntschli has done justice to the British government in this respect:

Il ne faut d'ailleurs pas perdre de vue que tous ces effets désastreux sont en premier lieu imputables, non pas au gouvernement anglais, mais aux croiseurs eux-mêmes. Personne n'accusera le gouvernement anglais d'avoir donné mission de détruire les navires de commerce américains, ou d'avoir, par ses agissements, entravé ou endommagé la marine américaine. Ce que l'on peut lui reprocher à bon droit, (en supposant que les faits cités plus haut doivent être considérés comme avoués ou prouvés,) ce n'est pas un fait, mais une omission contre le droit. Sa faute ne consiste pas à avoir équipé et appareillé les corsaires, mais à n'avoir pas empêché leur armement et leur sortie de son territoire neutre. Mais cette faute n'a qu'un rapport indirect, et nullement un rapport direct, avec les déprédations réellement commises pas les croiseurs. 1

American citizens have suffered by the acts of American citizens. Great Britain is to make good the injury. Why? Because, in order to commit these acts, the wrong-doers began by violating her laws, and her government was not quick enough in preventing them. But who were the American citizens who did these things and brought these injuries and losses on American citizens? Private individuals? No! Eleven States, heretofore an integral portion, and now again an integ ral portion, of the North American Union-in other words, an integral portion of the body who are the plaintiffs against Great Britain in this memorable suit. And, to make the anomaly of the position more complete, but for concessions voluntarily made, Great Britain would have been enabled to say, first, that she was not, and could not be, liable to another nation for losses sustained through breaches not of international but of her own municipal law; next, that if she, on the one hand, was liable for injury done to American citizens, because her government by greater diligence might have prevented them, she, on the other hand, might have claimed to be recouped by States, now forming an integral part of the Union, as having been the actual wrong-doers through violation of her law, whatever sum she was obliged to pay as compensation. For, had the Confederate States possessed, or had they succeeded in acquiring an independent nationality, Great Britain would have had a perfect right to insist on being indemnified for a pecuniary loss incurred through a violation by them of her neutrality and of her law. The nationality of those States is now again united with and merged in that of the United States, now plaintiffs against Great Britain. And though, the compensation being asked for losses suffered by individual. American citizens, and not by the Government of the United States, Her Majesty's government were, in my humble opinion, right in not taking their stand on such an objection, I cannot but think that, looking to all these circumstances, this tribunal, in the exercise of the equitable and unfettered jurisdiction with which it is invested, might well decline to add interest to the amount of the loss actually sustained. Even if interest should be given, it seems to me that, as the United States might have had, as far back as the year 1869, an arbitration for the purpose of having these identical claims adjudicated upon, an arbitration having been offered by Great Britain and accepted by the Executive of the United States, and having only failed because rejected by the American Senate, all claim to interest, as from that date, should, as matter of equity, be disallowed by the tribunal.

At all events, I can see no reason why, under all these circumstances, anything more than the lowest rate of interest anywhere prevailing in the United States should be allowed, and I cannot concur in the rate of 6 per cent. adopted by the tribunal.

1 "Revue de droit international, 1870,” p. 473.

Conclusion.

I have now traveled through the wide range of this inquiry, partly in order to place the facts, over which a cloud of prejudice has been raised, in their true light; partly to explain the reasons which prevent my concurring in the award which the majority of the tribunal have thought it right to pronounce.

The result is that, while I differ from the grounds on which the decision of the tribunal in the case of the Alabama is founded, nevertheless, owing to the special circumstances to which I have herein before called attention, I concur in holding Great Britain liable in respect of that ship.

With respect to the Florida, on the best judgment I can form upon a review of all the facts, the charge of want of due diligence is not made out. I cannot concur in thinking that anything was left undone by the government of Her Majesty which could be reasonably expected of them, or the omission of which can justly subject them to the charge of want of due diligence and care. I cannot agree that the law of Great Britain should have been changed because of the breaking out of the civil war. First, because the existing law was adequate to all that could reasonably be expected; secondly, because, at all events, there was at the time no reason for believing it other than sufficient; lastly, because even if the law might have been improved and the hands of the Executive strengthened with advantage, the United States could have no possible right to expect any amendment of the British law so long as their own remained unaltered.

As to the Shenandoah, I cannot express too strongly my dissent from the decision of the majority.

Not concurring in the decision as to the Florida and Shenandoah, I cannot, of course, concur in awarding the sum which is to be paid on account of the damage done by them.

Even if this were otherwise, I should still hold the amount awarded greater than it should have been.

Lastly, under the very special circumstances out of which these claims have arisen, it appears to me that the allowance of interest was uncalled for and unjust.

But while the award of the tribunal appears to me to be open to these exceptions, I trust that, by the British people, it will be accepted with the submission and respect which is due to the decision of a tribunal by whose award it has freely consented to abide.

The United States, on the other hand, having had the claims of their citizens for losses sustained considerately weighed, and compensation awarded in respect of them, will see, I trust, in the consent of Great Britain to submit these claims to peaceful arbitration, an honest desire on her part to atone for any past errors or omissions which an impartial judgment might find to have existed-and will feel that all just cause of grievance is now removed-so that, in the time to come, no sense of past wrong remaining unredressed will stand in the way of the friendly and harmonious relations which should subsist between two great and kindred nations.

GENEVA, September 14, 1872.

A. E. COCKBURN.

V.-REPLY OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE, ACKNOWLEDGING THE RECEIPT OF THE REPORT OF THE AGENT OF THE UNITED STATES, AND COMMENTING UPON THE OPINION OF THE ARBITRATOR APPOINTED BY HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY.

Acknowledging the receipt of the report.

SIR: I have received your report of the date of September 21, with the accompanying protocols and award and opinions of the arbitrators. I congratulate you most cordially upon the termination of your arduous and ably-conducted labors and upon the success which has attended the arbitration. The President directs me to convey to you and to the counsel who attended the tribunal on the part of the United States, and to the other gentlemen who were engaged with you at Geneva, the expression of his thanks and high appreciation of the great ability, learning, labor, The President's ap and devotion to the interests, the dignity, and honor of the proval. nation which each in his appropriate sphere has made so successfully conducive to the very satisfactory result which has been reached. This result may be summarily stated thus: The United States claimed that Great Britain had, during the recent rebellion in this country, failed, by act and by omission, to fulfill toward this Government the duties due from one state to another, and that she was liable in damages to make good the losses resulting directly from the acts of several vessels which had been fitted out and had been allowed to depart from her ports in violation of such duties. The United States also deemed it important to obtain from the tribunal an expression of opinion whether certain claims for indirect or remote losses, which had been advanced at the time of their occurrence, and had been the subject of much diplomatic correspondence, as well as of public discussion, and which had not been eliminated in the previous negotiations from the matters of difference between the two governments, did or did not constitute good foundation for demand or award of damages between nations.

Great Britain denied that she had failed of any duty toward this Government, or that she was liable to make good any losses resulting, either directly or indirectly, from any such acts.

The questions at issue between the two governments were by the treaty referred to the decision of the High Tribunal which convened at Geneva.

direct claims.

The arbitrators, having the case and the counter case of both governments and the argument of the counsel of the United States The action of the before them, at their session on the 19th of June stated arbitrators on the m that, "after the most careful perusal of all that has been urged on the part of the Government of the United States in respect of these claims, they have arrived, individually and collectively, at the conclusion that these claims do not constitute, upon the principles of international law applicable to such cases, good foundation for an award of compensation or computation of damages between nations." At the

next meeting of the arbitrators you stated that that "declaration made by the tribunal, individually and collectively," * * was "accepted by the President of the United States as determinative of their judgment upon the important question of public law involved."

Effect of this judg

At the next meeting, the agent of Her Britannic Majesty read a stateEntry of judgment ment that Her Majesty's government, being informed of on the indirect claims. the statement made by you at the previous meeting, assumed "that the arbitrators will, upon such statement, think fit now to declare that the said several claims are, and from henceforth will be, wholly excluded from their consideration, and will embody such declaration in their proctocol of this day's proceedings;" which declaration, at this request of the agent of the British government, was made, thus excluding, by the act of the tribunal, from future consideration claims which, until then, had been the subject of controversy. This conclusion may be regarded as decisive of the non-admissibility of claims for such remote or consequential losses as the foundation of a demand for compensation in damage as between nations, under the principles of international law. These controverted claims being thus eliminated, the tribunal proceeded to the consideration of the other claims, and of the case, counter case, and arguments on either side, and on the 14th of September declared that Great Britain had, with respect to three of the vessels and four of their tenders, of which complaint had been made, failed to fulfill duties toward this Government, and awarded the payment to the United States of the sum of $15,500,000 in gold, as the indemnity to be paid by Great Britain to the United States for the satisfaction of all the claims referred to the consideration of the tribunal.

ment.

The award of the tribunal.

Your report bears testimony to the high character, the patient labor, the learning, impartiality, and dignity of bearing of the ality, and bearing of the eminent persons named as arbitrators by the friendly powby Italy, Switzerland, ers which complied with the joint request of this Government and that of Her Britannic Majesty.

The dignity, impartiarbitrators appointed

and Brazil.

Mr. Adams receives the thanks of Her Bri

the President.

Mr. Adams, on this as on all occasions of his public service, fulfilled the expectations to which his appointment gave rise. It is tannic Majesty and of gratifying to know that his course, and the ability displayed by him, have received the acknowledgment of Her Majesty's government, to which the President has united his acknowledgment. I find on reference to the protocol No. 32, accompanying your report, and containing a record of the proceedings of the tribunal opinions of Sir Alex of arbitration on the 14th of September, that after the signature of the decision and award of the tribunal by the four assenting arbitrators, and after the same had been delivered to the agents of the two governments, Sir Alexander Cockburn, the arbitrator named on the part of Great Britain, having declined to assent to that decision, made a statement of his own, which the tribunal ordered to be recorded as an annex to the protocol.

The dissenting

ander Cockburn.

This

read or made known to

It does not appear by the protocol that the document which was thus opinion ordered to be annexed was read at the time. Indeed, your his colleagues. report on the subject shows that that paper was presented at the last moment of the final sitting of the tribunal, and that the contents thereof were not made known to the other members of the tribunal or to the agent or counsel of the United States.

I cannot doubt that if you had had the opportunity to become ac quainted with the contents of this extraordinary document should have been ob you would have felt it your right and duty to object to the reception and filing of a paper which would probably not

If the contents had been known

jected to.

have been officially received by the tribunal had an opportunity been afforded to invite their attention to some of its reflections on this Government, its agent, and counsel.

It is not my intention to discuss or to comment upon the tone and character of this very remarkable paper, professedly submitted to one of the highest tribunals the world has witnessed, sitting to decide some of the gravest and most important questions ever submitted to peaceful decision.

But in this paper (which is officially published in a supplement of the London Gazette, dated September 24, 1872) Sir Alexander Sir A. Cockburn proCockburn professedly and avowedly speaks of himself on two occasions as sitting on this tribunal as in some sense. Great Britain. the representative of Great Britain."

66

fesses to speak as the representative of

The Government of the United States here has no occasion to pass judgment on this attitude of the arbitrator named by Great Britain. I take the fact as I find it. I perceive that Sir Alexander Cockburn, while advancing as public law opinions which are "published by authority" of the British government, professes to be in some sense the representative of that government. It is in this sense that he speaks in the expression of his reasons for dissenting from the decision of the other members of the tribunal, and, therefore, the Government of the United States may rightfully take him at his word as speaking for Great Britain.

The positions which he thus maintains in behalf and as the representative of his government deserve to be noted for their value in possible future questions.

Resume of the positions he maintains as the representative

He holds that whatever restrictions the neutral in the of Great Britain. exercise of his territorial rights imposes on the one belligerent, he must impose on the other also.

As the discussion grows out of the case in which one of the belligerents is a legitimate Government, in treaty-amity with the neutral, and the other a rebel in arms against that legitimate Government, it is to be assumed that the proposition applies with especial force to such a case.

He maintains as a rule that the government of a country can only be held responsible for the breaches of neutrality committed by its subjects when it may reasonably be expected to prevent them. Such a rule seems to favor neutral right in the same degree that it diminishes neutral obligation, which it measures by the vague standard of what is reasonable.

He maintains the right of the subjects of a neutral to supply to the belligerent any objects available for warlike purposes, including as well ships of war (even armed ships) as arms and munitions, provided the same be done animo commercandi and not animo adjuvandi.

A rule so unqualified, and subject only to the belligerent right of blockade and of capture for contraband, is a very broad assertion of neutral right.

In discussing the question of due diligence, and doing so with the actual case in his mind, he reduces as far as he may the standard of diligence in favor of the neutral.

He insists on the right of the neutral when called upon to restrain its subjects to proceed in conformity with the spirit of its legal institutions, according to its established system of official routine, with such legal advice as the government is accustomed to receive.

He maintains that the neutral government is not to be held responsible for error in judgment, nor for declining to seize a vessel at the instance of the belligerent on merely suspicious circumstances, seemingly