opinion in strict conformity to established principles of international law:

The Nashville appears to be a confederate vessel of war; her commander and officers have commissions in the confederate navy; some of them have written orders from the navy department, Richmond, to report to Lieutenant Pegram" for duty” on board the Nashville, and her crew have signed articles to ship in the "confederate navy." Her having captured and burnt a United States merchant-vessel on the high seas cannot, under these circumstances, be considered (to adopt Mr. Adams's words) as "voluntarily undertaken by individuals not vested with powers generally acknowledged to be necessary to justify aggressive warfare;" nor does it at all approximate within the definition of piracy; nor is it an unauthorized act of violence; and if (as Mr. Adams suggests) Her Majesty's government is called on in this case "either to recognize a belligerent, or to denounce a wrong-doer," Her Majesty's government must, upon the facts and documents now appearing, adopt the former course.

With reference to the allegation that some of her officers are to be put in command of vessels now fitting out in British ports for hostile purposes against the United States, we can only say that if reasonable evidence can be procured that such vessels are being so fitted out, in contravention of the foreign-enlistment act, all parties concerned therein should be legally proceeded against, with the view to their being personally punished, and to the forfeiture of the vessels.

We may add (generally) that it will be competent to Her Majesty, as a neutral power, either to designate the particular ports to which alone the national ships of the belligerents are permitted to resort; to limit the time for which, or to define the circumstances under which, they may so resort thereto, or to make and publish such general regulations with reference thereto as she may think proper; but subject to such limitations, Her Majesty cannot interfere with the national ships of one party resorting to her ports in respect of hostile acts done on the high seas to the ships of the opposite party.1

Sir Hugh Cairns and Dr. Deane, being consulted by the United States consul as to the possibility of recovering chronometers seized as prizes on the taking of the Harvey Birch, advised":

It appears from the affidavit of Captain Nelson that the Harvey Birch was taken possession of and burnt on the high seas, outside the limit of British waters, and that the armed ship Nashville carried the flag of the Confederate States.

From the statement in the newspaper above referred to, the commander of the Nashville seems to have held a commission under the Confederate States and in the navy of those States.

'The British government has considered the Federal and Confederate States entitled to be treated as belligerents, each possessed of the rights of war, one of which rights is the capture and destruction of vessels belonging to the enemy by the commissioned vessels of the belligerents.

If, therefore, the Nashville was a commissioned vessel belonging to the Confederate States, we are of opinion that Captain Nelson has no legal rights in this country against the Nashville or her commander.2

There is nothing in what was done in relation to the Nashville after her arrival at Southampton which could give occasion for any complaint. As soon as it was found that she was about to undergo repairs at that port, instructions were given by the government to exercise the utmost vigilance to see that nothing was added to her equipment or her power as a vessel of war.3 Mr. Adams, naturally anxious to prevent any attempt of this nature, found, on applying to Earl Russell, that he had been anticipated by the spontaneous action of the government, Nothing was done to the Nashville beyond necessary repairs, and she eventually left England on the 3d of February, 1862, the same in point of equipment and strength as she had been on leaving Charleston.

4

On the 15th of December the United States steamer Tuscarora arrived also at Southampton, and having taken in 150 tons of coal proceeded 'to keep watch on the Nashville, evidently, as the sequel showed, for the

purpose of seizing her on her departure from British waters. From a telegram of Captain Patey, senior officer of Her Majesty's ships at Southampton, to the admiralty, it appears that on the night of the 9th of January "the dock-master reported having discovered in the dock two officers and three men from Tuscarora, who stated they were on shore under orders watching Nashville, and to signal should she get under weigh. Dock-master removed them from the dock.” 1

Earl Russell, having become acquainted with this state of things, wrote on the 10th to Mr. Adams :

I have just been informed that armed men were found last night watching the Nashville in Southampton docks, and that they were discovered by Mr. Hoge, the dock superintendent, close at the Nashville's bows.

I think it necessary to state to you that, except in case of stress of weather forcing them to land, Her Majesty's government cannot permit armed men in the service of a foreign government to land upon British ground.

I therefore request that you will inform the captain of the Federal steamer in Southampton waters that he must refrain from acts of this kind, which may lead to a collision between his men and the British authorities.

I have also to inform you that no act of hostility can be permitted between the Federal steamer and its enemy within British waters, and that orders to that effect will be issued to the board of admiralty.

In the case of the Nashville leaving British waters, the Federal steamer of war will not be permitted to start from British waters in pursuit of her till after the expiration of twenty-four hours,

The same rule will be applied to the vessels of the so-called Confederate States. On the 10th Captain Wilcox, of Her Majesty's ship Dauntless, writes to Captain Craven, the commander of the Tuscarora, as follows:

Having observed preparations for departure in the United States steamer Tuscarora, under your command, and also in the Confederate States steamer, Nashville, I beg to acquaint you that I have received instructions to prevent any hostility taking place in British waters; and I beg to bring to your notice the usual law of nations which requires that twenty-four hours should elapse before the departure of one belligerent ship in pursuit of the other.

Relying upon your good judgment in this matter, and the friendly feeling existing between the two governments, I have, &c.3

Captain Craven answered, giving, it will be observed, no pledge :

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication this evening. I am not aware that I have given cause for your assuming that I meditate an act of hostility in the waters of Great Britain.

Claiming the right of free access to, and egress from, the waters of a nation believed to be in amity with the United States, and sincerely desirous of avoiding all semblance of offense, I am, &c.4

It was not without some difficulty that Captain Patey obtained the required pledge. On the 25th of January he reports to the admiralty:

The Nashville's necessary defects have been made good, and she has been coaled; and, judging from the frequent movements of the Tuscarora up and down the Southampton Water, including one trip through the Needles and round the Isle of Wight, that the ship is in all respects ready for sea, I am induced to bring this matter under the notice of their lordships, because it appears to me, from the course pursued, and avowedly so made known to me by the captain of the Tuscarora, in a conversation which I have hall with that officer, he will do his utmost to render the rule of twenty-four hours which the Nashville may be inclined to take advantage of null and void, by constantly keeping up his steam, and having slips on his cable, so that the moment Nashville moves Tuscarora will precede her, and at once claim priority of sailing, returning in this port again within the lapse of twenty-four hours; it hence follows that the Nashville is closely blockaded in a neutral port, and this is, no doubt, the special object of the Tuscarora's visit to Southampton.

I would also beg to point out to their lordships the possibility of the Tuscarora and Nashville coming into collision in a narrow channel, and at night, and the probability of Tuscarora, supposing that the other ship had purposely run into her, opening

fire on her, and hence bringing on a grave difficulty in the matter. Under all the circumstances of this peculiar case, I think it my duty to make this communication to their lordships, that they may take such steps as may by them be deemed necessary, respectfully submitting that the commanders of the Tuscarora and Nashville, respectively, should be called upon to give me a written notice of the date and hour they intend to proceed to sea, and that, having received such notice from either one, the other should be immediately notified of the fact, and that he would not be allowed to follow until twenty-four hours had elapsed.1

The following summary of facts, forwarded by the admiralty to the foreign office on the 31st, is printed in the British Appendix:

November 21, 1861.-Nashville arrived at Southampton, and taken into dock for calking and other repairs.

December 15.-Tuscarora arrived, and anchored off entrance to river Itchen.

December 23.-Captain Patey reported no repairs had been made in the Nashville, beyond what were absolutely necessary, and that she had not been in any way equipped more completely as a man of war.

January 10, 1862.-Captain Patey reported that dock-master at Southampton had on previous night found two officers (one with side-arms) and three men, belonging to Tuscarora, under Graving Dock fence on pier between docks. They stated that they were stationed there by their captain's orders to watch Nashville, and to make a signal to their own ship should Nashville attempt to get under way. Dock-master removed these persons.

January 10.-Captain Patey also reported that Tuscarora had received one hundred and fifty tons of coal, and had kept her steam up since her arrival, with a spring on her cable, apparently ready for sea.

January 11.-Captain Wilcox, of Her Majesty's ship Dauntless, stationed in Southampton Water, informed captains of Tuscarora and Nashville that he had observed preparations for their departure, and had instructions to prevent any hostilities in British waters, and brought to their notice that the law of nations requires that twenty-four hours should elapse before the departure of one belligerent ship from a neutral port in pursuit of another. Captain Patey, as senior officer at Southampton, also informed captains of Tuscarora and Nashville that he had received orders to detain one vessel until the other had twenty-four hours' start, Captains of two vessels answered, they would conform to law; and Captain Craven (of Tuscarora) claimed right of free access to and egress from "waters of a nation believed to be in amity with the United States," trusting that strict impartiality would be observed between the two vessels. In reply, Captain Patey referred to fact of Captain Craven having sent officers and men into docks to watch Nashville, and also pointed out that a boat, apparently armed, from the Tuscarora had been observed pulling in and out of the docks without landing during the night. Captain Craven gave assurance that this would not be repeated. January 13.-Tuscarora left anchorage at 4 a. m., and proceeded to anchor one mile west of Calshot Light-ship. Returned at 4 p. m. to former anchorage at entrance of

Itchen River.

January 15.-Tuscarora at 2 p. m. weighed, and passed Calshot.

January 16.-At 2 p. m. returned to original anchorage.

January 20.-At 8 p. m. proceeded down Southampton Water and anchored outside Calshot Castle.

January 22.-At 10 a. m. returned to anchorage at mouth of Itchen River.

January 25.-Captain Patey reported Nashville coaled and necessary repairs completed, and Tuscarora ready for sea; also, that, in conversation with him, Captain Craven, of Tuscarora, had avowed that he would do his utmost to render rule as to twenty-four hours' start null and void, by constantly keeping up steam, and having slips on her cable, so that the moment Nashville might move Tuscarora would precede her, and claim priority of sailing, returning again within twenty-four hours, and so actually blockading Nashville in a neutral port.

January 26.-Under instructions, Captain Patey obtained written promises from captains of Tuscarora and Nashville not to leave their then positions without giving twenty-four hours' notice.

January 27.-In order to prevent any hostile proceedings between the two vessels in British waters, a messenger was dispatched in the morning to Southampton with instructions to Captain Patey to require Nashville to depart by 12 o'clock at noon on Tuesday, the 28th January, and Tuscarora on following day at same hour; but at 1 p. m., and before receiving these last-mentioned instructions, Captain Patey telegraphed that captain of Tuscarora had notified him that that ship would put to sea on the following day, namely, on 28th January, at 11 a. m. To this telegram an answer was at once sent that Tuscarora was accordingly to be allowed to proceed first; and, under the circumstances, Captain Patey did not think it necessary to acquaint the captain of

1 British Appendix, vol. ii, p. 114.

Tuscarora of the orders he (Captain Patey) received subsequently, (on the afternoon of the 27th,) requiring the ship to quit Southampton.

Southampton.

January 28.-Captain of Tuscarora reported by letter to Captain Patey The Nashville at that he should defer departure, in consequence of inclemency of weather, until 29th, or first fine day. Captain Patey, in answer, told Captain Craven that he saw nothing in the state of the weather to prevent Tuscarora proceeding, and requested she would lose no time in doing so, observing that, having received from Captain Craven a written notification of his intention to proceed on the 27th, at 11 a. m., he (Captain Patey) had not deemed it necessary to convey to Captain Craven the instructions he had received for Tuscarora to leave Southampton at noon on the 28th.

January 28.-Captain Patey directed by telegraph not to take any steps, at present, to compel Tuscarora's departure.

January 29.-At 8.10 a. m., Tuscarora proceeded down Southampton Water.

January 30.-Captain Patey, by telegraph, reports Tuscarora, at 2 p. m., remains in Yarmouth Roads, and he asks for instructions as to Nashville's departure. Informed, in reply, that the time of Nashville's departure will date from hour Tuscarora shall really go to sea, in accordance with notice.

ADMIRALTY, January 30, 1862.1

This summary was forwarded by Earl Russell to Mr. Adams, with this observation:

I think you will see from this summary that Her Majesty's government have reason to complain of the conduct of the commander of the Tuscarora, as an attempt to carry on hostilities in the waters of a neutral.

I have the honor also to inclose a copy of the London Gazette,2 containing the rules which I mentioned to you in a previous letter.

On the 1st of February, the Tuscarora, having left Lymington, to which place she had previously shifted her berth, six miles to the west of the Needles, is seen steaming to the westward. The Nashville is accordingly informed that she can leave on the ensuing day. The next day the Tuscarora is at Portland. On the 3d, she is at her former station in Cowes Roads. The Nashville having in the mean time given notice to leave on the 3d, notice was given to the captain of the Tuscarora not to leave for twenty-four hours. But so suspicious did the move. ments of this vessel appear to the commanders of Her Majesty's ships, that it was thought necessary for a ship of war to accompany the Nashville past the Tuscarora, and for a watch to be kept on the latter by the Dauntless.

It thus appears that the captain of the Tuscarora systematically endeavored to elude the twenty-four hours' rule by keeping up his steam and having slips on his cable, and by making a series of false starts. Indeed, he preceded the Nashville only to return at the moment of the latter's departure, and he was therefore not permitted to leave for another space of twenty-four hours. Nevertheless this officer, who had himself been treated with scrupulous impartiality and attention, but had given to Her Majesty's government just cause of complaint, having been baffled in his endeavors to elude the necessary regulations of neutrality, did not leave Southampton without complaining that "a just and rigid impartiality did not appear to have been extended to him,"3 in connection with the escape of the pirate Nashville." It is true that Mr. Adams admits, in a dispatch of the 7th of February, 1862, that "he (Captain Craven of the Tuscarora) will doubtless lay the blame on the action of the people and government of this country; my own opinion is, that if he had been a little more cool and quiet, he would have fared better."+

66

These proceedings of the commander of the Tuscarora have been referred to by M. Calvo in his recent work as a clear violation of neutrality.

2

Again at Bermuda.

The Nashville, on leaving Southampton, recrossed the Atlantic and arrived at Bermuda on the 20th of February, 1862.1 The regulations issued by the British government on the 31st of January previous, limiting the stay of the armed vessels of the belligerents and the supplies to be obtained by them in British ports, did not arrive in that colony until nearly a fortnight later, and were unknown to the governor at the time of the Nashville's visit. There was no ground therefore for placing any restriction on the coaling of the Nashville, and she is stated by the United States consul to have taken in 150 tons.3 She left the following day, and apparently went straight to Charleston. Measures were taken by the governor to insure the observance of neutrality during her visit, and as at the time of her departure several merchant-vessels were in sight, some of which might have been United States ships, the admiral in command desired the commander of Her Majesty's ship Spiteful to proceed to sea and watch that the Nashville did not interfere with any vessels of whatever nationality until beyond the limit of British territorial jurisdiction.*

Here the career of the Nashville, as a vessel of war, seems to have closed, and on her return to Charleston she was converted into a merchant-vessel under the name of the Thomas L. Wragg5

It is idle to say that any responsibility can attach to Her Majesty's government in respect of this vessel.

THE CHICKAMAUGA.

The Chickamauga.

The claim put forward in respect of this vessel is founded on a single act of coaling at Bermuda. I must express my suprise that the time of this tribunalshould have been occupied with a claim so groundless and frivolous as this.

This vessel was originally called the Edith. She was a double-screw steamer, and was employed in running the blockade. She was purchased by the confederate government, and being found to be fast, was converted into a vessel of war, and named the Chickamauga.

6

The case of the United States "invites the attention of the tribunal of arbitration" to the facile manner in which this and other vessels were permitted to adapt themselves to circumstances. Why our attention should be thus invited I am at a loss to imagine. Is it meant to be suggested that Great Britain could, or ought to have, prevented vessels, originally built as trading-vessels, from being converted into ships of war, or should have refused to recognize them as ships of war, when so converted and commissioned, because their original destination had been of an humbler character? Either supposition is obviously absurd.

Having run out from Wilmington on the night of the 28th of October, 1864, and succeeded in evading the blockading ships, she destroyed several trading-vessels belonging to the United States. On the 7th of November she put into Bermuda. Her commander, Lieutenant Wilkinson, applied to the lieutenant-governor for leave to coal and repair

7

1 British Appendix, vol. ii, p. 178.

2 British Counter Case, p. 108.

3 United States Documents, vol. vi, p. 213.

4 British Appendix, vol. ii, p. 178; vol. v, p. 2.

5 United States Documents, vol. vi, p. 73.

Page 414.

7 British Appendix, vol. ii, p. 135.