4. With respect to Issue IV, the standard of review is whether the District Court abused its discretion in finding that the Committee had shown a need for the requested grand jury material sufficient to satisfy F.R.Crim. P. 6(e) (3) (C) (i) . SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT Standing to suppress the use or disclosure of information obtained from wiretaps made pursuant to Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 is limited by that statute to persons falling with its definition of "aggreived persons." Appellant, Judge Alcee L. Hastings, does not fall within that category, because he was neither a party to the interceptions, nor one against whom the interception was directed, nor one on whose premises the conversation was intercepted. Accordingly, appellant may not be heard to challenge the request of the appellee, the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States House of Representatives, for transcripts of the wiretaps and supporting materials which relate to allegations that Judge Hastings improperly disclosed facts derived from those wiretaps. Appellant's claims of "generic" standing and his claim that he may vicariously assert the alleged claims of third parties not before this Court are without any legal support, and are clearly prohibited by the applicable statute. Title III authorizes disclosure of intercepted conversations and information derived therefrom to the appellee, because Members and staff of the Committee on the Judiciary, acting pursuant to its mandate to conduct an impeachment inquiry concerning Judge Hastings, fall within the definition of "investigative officer" contained in Section 2510 (10) of the Act. The broad power to impeach vested in the House satisfies the statutory requirement that the disclosure be appropriate to the proper performance of the official duties of such officers disclosing and receiving the information. Finally, with respect to the Title III request, the district court was correct in finding good cause, as required by Section 2518 (8) (b) of that statute, for the disclosure to the Committee of applications and orders relating to the authorization and supervision of the relevant wiretaps. The need for disclosure is Moreover, the established by the breadth of the impeachment authority vested in the House and its Committee, which is limited only to investigations of "high crimes and misdemeanors" of the appellant, as determined by the Congress itself. district court's in camera inspection of the Title III interceptions and the authorizing and supervising documents failed to disclose any violation of Title III in the authorization and conduct of the interceptions. The Committee's request for grand jury material relating to Judge Hastings' conduct in connection with the electronic surveillance in question is based, inter alia, upon Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6 (e) (3) (C)(i). The Court below, after conducting an in camera inspection of the wiretap materials, correctly found that the Committee's need for the grand jury materials outweighs any need for continued secrecy. A particularized need has been established, in that without access to the specifically described and limited transcripts and exhibits, the Committee's impeachment inquiry may not meet the appropriate degree of completeness and fairness which is essential for public confidence in the conduct by the House of its unique Constitutional function. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION This Court's jurisdiction to review the District Court's final order authorizing disclosure of grand jury materials and electronic surveillance materials is based on 28 U.S.C. Section 1291. See, e.g., In Re Request for Access to Grand Jury Materials Grand Jury 81-1, Miami (Hastings), No. 87-5857 (11th Cir. decided Nov. 24, 1987) (slip op.) (appeal from order granting access to grand jury materials); In Re Applications of Kansas City Star, 666 F.2d 1168 (8th Cir. 1981) (appeal from order granting access to electronic surveillance materials). ARGUMENT I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT APPELLANT HAS NO Appellant has neither statutory nor constitutional standing to suppress the information obtained from the wiretap in question. Likewise, he has no standing to oppose the disclosure of the requested Title III materials to the Committee. Standing under Title III is restricted to those persons who fall within the definition of "aggrieved persons." 18 U.S.c. Section 2510 (11) defines an aggrieved person as one "who was a party to any intercepted wire, oral, or electronic communication or a person against whom the interception was directed." courts also have held that this definition includes persons on whose premises the conversation is intercepted. See United States v. Scasino, 513 F.2d 47, 48-51 (5th Cir. 1975). The Judge Butzner examined the relevant documents pertaining to the wiretaps in question and determined that appellant was not a party to an intercepted conversation, was not a person against whom an interception was directed, and that no interception occurred on his premises. (App. 39) Based on these findings, the Court correctly concluded that appellant had no standing to challenge the validity of the wiretap or to oppose the disclosure of the requested Title III materials to the Committee.2 Appellant, in his brief, appears to argue initially that he has standing to assert his position relative to disclosure of the 2The Committee also asserted below that the power of impeachment which U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 2 vests in the House of Representatives, as well as the Necessary and Proper Clause, Article I, Section 8 and the Speech or Debate Clause, Article I, Section 6 entitle it to the Title III and grand jury information it seeks herein. The District Court held that these constitutional provisions "undeniably support the Committee's request" (App. 42). The Committee continues to assert these constitutional provisions as alternative grounds in support of the affirmance of the District Court's decisions. grand jury materials sought by the Committee. We do not disagree: This is a non-issue because the Committee does not contest Judge Hastings' right to be heard on the issue of disclosure of the grand jury materials. The Committee does, however, contend that Judge Hastings lacks standing to oppose use or disclosure of the Title III materials. By intention or inadvertence, Judge Hastings has confused the issue of standing as it relates to disclosure of grand jury materials with the issue of Title III standing. These are separate matters, each governed by specific provisions of a relevant rule or statute. Appellant's notions of "generic standing", "vicarious standing", "someone must have standing" and the like have nothing to recommend them other than their novelty. They are in direct conflict with the applicable legal standards as written and as interpreted. Judge Hastings has claimed that he has standing as an "aggrieved person" because he would have become "a person against whom the interception was directed." He argued that 18 U.S.C. 2517 (5) requires a "post-hoc application for authorization" before evidence discovered incidental to the purpose of the initial wiretap can be used. Presumably, in such a "post-hoc application," Judge Hastings would have been the focus of the investigation and as such, a person against whom the interception was directed. Judge Hastings' position is not well founded either in fact or in theory. In the first place, even if Judge Hastings had been a focus |