information with respect to the commission of Insofar as the fifth factor is concerned, disclosure of the investigation and the expense of trial have already occurred. Moreover, since Judge Hastings is seeking public disclosure of the material, he does not appear to assert this interest.3 only remaining interest concerns encouraging uninhibited testimony in other grand jury proceedings. b. The Committee's need for the materials The Balanced against this sole remaining secrecy interest is the weighty constitutional responsibility of the Congress to conduct a full and fair investigation in a matter of grave significance to the entire Nation. The Committee's need for the grand jury material is particularly compelling here, since the testimony before the grand jury was virtually contemporaneous with the underlying events. The grand jury records contain the freshest recollection of the key witnesses in this case. The Committee's 3The Committee seeks access to the materials for its own use in discharging its constitutional responsibility in this matter, and therefore takes no position with respect to Judge Hastings' suggestion that disclosure also be made to him and the public. It should be noted, however, that Judge Hastings has already been provided with substantial access to the grand jury material pursuant to the Jencks Act and F.R.Crim.P. 16 in the course of his criminal prosecution. After the grand jury's functions are ended, disclosure is wholly proper where the ends of justice require it. U.S. Socony v. Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 234 (1940). Further, as secrecy needs become attenuated, as here, the burden on the party seeking access to show justification is reduced. Douglas Oil, supra. The nature of the requesting party is also relevant. It has been recognized that "the need for secrecy is less where disclosure is sought by a public body for use in fulfilling a public function rather than for a private person for use in private litigation." 8 Moore's Federal Practice, paragraph 6.05[2] at 6-105 (1987). Finally, without full access to the grand jury materials, the public may not have confidence that the Congress considered all relevant evidence. To deny access to these materials would be nothing short of denying Congress and the public right to information that will shed light on the truth. - the These considerations are very much the same as those which underlay the decision to release the same grand jury material to the Investigating Committee of the Judicial Council. As the Eleventh Circuit stated: A thorough investigation is essential not only to ensure the integrity of federal judges, but also to instill public confidence in the judiciary... The Committee must be able to represent to the Council, and the Council must be satisfied, that all available evidence of possible materiality has been sifted: for the Committee to examine matters extensively and find nothing may be as much a part of its duty as to look at evidence whose incriminating nature is known in advance. In re Petition to Inspect, supra, 735 F.2d at 1273 (Emphasis in original.) C. No content-based limitation on access is Judge Hastings has also argued that the Order is improper in that the Court must identify those parts of the grand jury materials for which the Committee has a particularized need. (Motion at 14.) Such an exercise is neither required nor possible in the present case. What the Eleventh Circuit held with respect to the Judicial Council's request applies with equal, if not greater, force here: To all appearances the grand jury had focused solely on the alleged bribery incident for which Judge Hastings was indicted and upon which the complaint is based. Only by examining all of the record can the Committee determine the true state of the evidence for or against the charge. No content-based limitation on the requested access is feasible given the Committee's mission: the Committee is interested in both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence that might have been revealed before the grand jury, and the Committee and the Council alone - not the district court can properly determine what is and is not significant. In re Petition to Inspect, supra, 735 F.2d at 1273 (Emphasis added). Although the House of Representatives is not restricted in the matters it may consider as grounds for impeachment, and is free to vote Articles of Impeachment on any matter constituting "Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors," given the background against which the impeachment Resolution was introduced, it is fair to assume that all of the facts before the grand jury will be of critical interest to the Committee. Since there is no reason to believe the grand jury materials include matters unrelated to allegations of misconduct against Judge Hastings and his co-defendant, the entire record is related to the proper object of the Committee's inquiry. 2. The Procedures of Rule 6(e) Do Not Apply to Judge Hastings asserts that the manner in which the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee requested the grand jury materials (by ex parte letter to the Court) "bypasses established procedures and precedent for obtaining access to the materials contained in the August 5, 1987 order." (Motion at 13.) The argument rests upon the erroneous assumption that the request was based upon the authority of Rule 6, which provides for both disclosure (Rule 6(e)(3)(C)) and the procedure to be followed when disclosure is sought "preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceedings." (Rule 6(e) (3) (D)). Since the Chairman's letter request and the Court's Order of August 5, 1987 did not derive from the court's authority under the federal rules, the notice provisions of Rule 6(e) simply do not apply. To the extent this court relies on the alternate authority for disclosure, F.R.Crim.P 6(e)(3)(C)(i), discussed infra, the absence of notice to Judge Hastings and the U.S. Attorney is a moot issue, since by virtue of the voluntary stay 4Requesting grand jury material by means of a letter from the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee to the District Court for use in impeachment inquiries is consistent with prior practice. See In re Report and Recommendation of June 5, 1972 Grand Jury, 370 F. Supp. 1219, 1221, n. 4 (D.D.C.). and instant proceedings, Judge Hastings has been afforded notice and the opportunity to present objections. 3. The terms of the Order of disclosure to the Judge Hastings asserts that the grand jury record should be made available to the public (Motion at 2). With an utter disregard for consistency, however, he objects to the instant Order on the grounds that it does not contain the same restrictions on disclosure that were contained in Judge Gordon's Order of December 19, 1983, granting the application of the Investigating Committee. applicants. Clearly, the earlier Order can have no effect on subsequent Indeed, as Judge Hastings concedes (Motion at 12), it would be a violation of the separation of powers for this Court to dictate the conditions under which Congress may use or disclose the grand jury materials. This constitutional limit was recognized by Judge Sirica in the Watergate grand jury disclosure case, wherein he stated: Having ruled that the Recommendation of the Grand Jury and request of the House Judiciary Committee should be honored, the Court relinquishes its own control of the matter, but takes advantage of this occasion to respectfully request, with the Grand Jury, that the Committee receive, consider and utilize the Report with due regard for avoiding any unnecessary interference with the Court's ability to conduct fair trials of persons under indictment. In re Report and Recommendation of June 5, 1972 Grand Jury, 370 F. Supp. at 1231. In fact, in both that case and the instant case, the Committee has acted responsibly. Judge Sirica's request was fully accommodated by the Committee, which promptly adopted |