accordance with 28 U.S.C. $372(c) (8). On March 23, 1987, House Resolution 128 was introduced, providing for the impeachment of Judge Hastings. Both the Resolution and the Certificate of the Judicial Conference were referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary. On July 15, 1987, the Committee on the Judiciary requested the grand jury materials from the District Court, declaring them "essential in order to make our inquiry complete." This request was initially granted on August 5, 1987, in an ex parte proceeding, but on August 10, 1987, Judge Hastings moved to stay the order arguing that disclosure should not be made to the Judiciary Committee. He also argued that if disclosure were granted to the Committee, disclosure should also be made to himself, and to the general public. The district judge who had signed the August 5 order thereafter recused himself, and the Judiciary Committee agreed not to seek access to the grand jury materials pending resciution of Judge Hastings' objections. The Honorable John D. Butzner, Jr., Senior United States Circuit Judge, was designated to hear this matter, and on September 21, 1987, after briefing and oral argument, ruled that the Judiciary Committee was entitled to the grand jury materials, that Judge Hastings should direct his request for access to the grand jury materiais to the House of Representatives, and that no showing had been made sufficient to warrant an exception to the rule of secrecy of grand jury materials, Rule 6(e) (2), Fed. R. Crim. P., in order to disclose to the public the grand jury This appeal followed. - 5. ARGUMENT I. THE DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER GRANTING ACCESS OF GRAND JURY The Department of Justice is not the principal party in interest in this aspect of the appeal, and merely notes for purposes of this appeal that it has no objection to disclosure of the grand jury materials to the Judiciary Committee. It agrees with both the Judiciary Committee and the District Court that disclosure to the Committee under the circumstances of this case is appropriate, and is authorized by Rule 6(e). 11. THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN ITS CONCLUSION THAT ANY Judge Hastings attempted to persuade the District Court to intervene in the impeachment proceeding by asking that it rule, in effect, on a discovery request that he be granted access to the grand jury record. The District Court properly declined to intervene, ruling that any such requests should be directed to the House of Representatives in the first instance. It should be assumed by this Court, as it was by the District Court, that the House of Representatives will abide by the principles of due process in its proceedings, and that adequate disclosure will be made to enable Judge Hastings to prepare a defense to any allegations which may ultimately be leveled against him. His request for wholesale disclosure now 15 based on nothing but speculation; allegations might be made against him based on information previously unknown to him: Congress "might" fail to give him adequate notice to enable him to prepare a defense; and there "might" be selective disclosure of grand jury information which would harm his ability to defend himself. None of these remote possibilities have occurred, however, and there 15 therefore no justification for Judge Hastings' request that the Courts intervene in the business of the House of Representatives. Should events progress to the point where Judge Hastings has grounds to believe his due process rights are being impaired, he will have an opportunity at that time to seek judicial relief. 111. THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN ITS CONCLUSION THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF THE GRAND JURY MATERIAL: 45 DIV HOSPE IS FORBIDDEN BY RULE 6(e). not clear from Judge Hastings' Emergency Motion intends to seek reversal of the District Court's ruling that no showing had been made sufficient to warrant public disclosure of the grand jury materials. The Judiciary Committee takes no position on this issue. Should Judge Hastings seek reversal on this issue, the position of the Department of Justice is that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in derlining to permit general public release of the grand jury materials, and indeed, that such disclosure would have been clearly contrary to the requirements of Rule 6 (e). It is settled law that grand jury records are to be treated with confidentiality; the grand jury's responsibility to explore all allegations, pursue all paths, ask any questions necessary, whether fruitful or not, must be supported by an assurance that its deliberations will be kept confidential, absent a particular need in a subsequent proceeding. See Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395 (1959); United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 683 (1958). The reasons for this are numerous, but the reason that remains applicable to this particular case is primarily one of precedent; future grand juries can only be assured that the confidentiality of their own proceedings will be protected if a record has been established that prior grand juries have had the confidentiality of their proceedings respected. Furthermore, without suggesting in any way that such matters may in fact be contained in this particular grand pury record, the Department of Justice suggests that not all the reasons for protecting the contents of the grand jury record evaporate simply because a particular defendant has been acquitted and several years have passed. Witnesses who did not testify at trial may be placed in jeopardy by public disclosure of their identity; the possibility of other coconspirators may have been investigated by the grand jury, but never indicted nor disclosed; allegations about the defendant himself may have been explored but ultimately not indicted; indeed, the grand jurors themselves, not being lawyers or trained investigators, may have asked questions or pursued a tangent that in hindsight might appear irrelevant or foolish. The grand jury is a freewheeling, 8 uninhibited body of inquiry; its job is to explore the possibility of criminal misconduct without restraint. That responsibility cannot but be undercut by a knowledge that without any showing of need, its proceedings might be revealed to the public at large. He Appellant made no effort to argue before the District Court that the disclosure he sought was warranted under Rule 6 (e). cited only his belief that some people might conclude that derogatory, but heretofore undisclosed, information about him might be contained in the grand jury record, prompting the Judicial Conference's referral. Therefore, apparently confident that there is no such information in the grand jury record, he argues that full public disclosure is the only way to completely clear his name. First of all, the grounds on which the Judicial Conference concluded that further action against Judge Hastings was necessary have now been made public, by action of the House of Representatives in voting to make public the 381-page report of the Investigating Committee. No one is left to guess the basis on which the Judicial Conference acted, and no one need speculate as to whether those grounds lurk in the pages of the grand jury record. However, even if this disclosure had not been made, there would be no basis on which to order public disclosure of these grand jury transcripts. The Department of Justice is obviously not blind to the important public position Judge Hastings holds, or to the fact that the public may legitimately have a |