sought by a public body for use in fulfilling a public function rather than for a private person for use in private litigation." 8 Moore's Federal Practice, paragraph 6.05[2] at 6-105 (1987); see also United States v. Sobotka, 623 F.2d 764, 767 (2d Cir. 1980) (fact that "independent public body charged with performance of public duty" sought disclosure "reduces the burden").4 First, 4Judge Hastings' reliance on United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) and Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972) for the proposition that "separation of powers principles" apply in the interbranch disclosure context is misplaced. Nixon did not even involve interbranch disclosures, since the parties were both in the executive branch. Second, Nixon supports the Committee's position. In that case, the Court upheld the denial of the President's motion to quash a subpoena duces tecum directing the President to produce tape recordings and documents of his conversations with aides. The Court held that the President's need for confidentiality in his office communications is "general in nature, whereas the constitutional need for production of relevant evidence in a criminal proceeding is specific and central to the fair adjudication of a particular criminal case in the administration of justice. Without access to specific facts a criminal prosecution may be totally frustrated." 418 U.S. at 713. Here, the generalized institutional interest in the secrecy of grand jury deliberations must yield to Congress' need for specific evidence contained in the grand jury record in order to carry out its duty to conduct an impeachment inquiry. Gravel is equally inapposite. In that case, the Speech or Debate Clause was held not to potect a Senator from questioning by a grand jury concerning private republication of materials (the Pentagon Papers) which had been introduced and made public at a committee hearing, as such publication had no connectior. with the legislative process. Gravel hardly supports Judge Hastings, because the Court permitted interbranch disclosure of all matters not privileged under the Speech or Debate Clause. Gravel in no way prevents Congress in an impeachment inquiry from obtaining grand jury material, the secrecy of which is protected not by a constitutional privilege such as the Speech or Debate Clause, but merely by a rule of procedure which itself authorizes disclosure preliminary to a judicial proceeding. Finally, to the extent that the Committee's request rests on the sole power of impeachment that the Constitution vests in the House of Representatives and on the Speech or Debate Clause, no balancing is even required. As the Supreme Court stated in Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 510, n.16 (1975): Where we are presented with an attempt to interfere Judge Hastings also argues that the district court must review in camera and identify those parts of the grand jury materials for which the Committee has a particularized need. Such an exercise is neither required nor possible in the present case. What this Court held when it granted the Investigating Committee's request applies with equal, if not greater, force here: To all appearances the grand jury had focused solely on the alleged bribery incident for which Judge Hastings was indicted and upon which the complaint is based. Only by examining all of the record can the Committee determine the true state of the evidence for or against the charge. No content-based limitation on the requested access is feasible given the Committee's mission: the Committee is interested in both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence that might have been revealed before the grand jury, and the Committee and the Council alone - not the district court can properly determine what is and is not significant. In re Petition to Inspect, supra, 735 F.2d at 1273 (Emphasis added). Since there is no reason to believe the grand jury materials include matters unrelated to allegations of misconduct against Judge Hastings and his co-defendant, the entire record is related to the proper object of the Committee's inquiry. Judge Butzner correctly held that the Committee had satisfied the requirement of showing "particularized need" for the entire grand jury record. A.12. The Department of Justice fully supported the Committee's request to review the entire record. In camera review would be superfluous where the entire record should be disclosed. In sum, Judge Hastings has failed to demonstrate the requisite likelihood of prevailing in his appeal on the merits. Nor does his application satisfy either prong of Garcia-Mir's "lesser showing" permitting the grant of a stay: he has failed to show either a "substantial case on the merits" or that the balance of convenience "weighs heavily in favor of granting the stay." Garcia-Mir, 781 F.2d at 1453. Rather, the balance of equities tips decisively against granting the stay. C. Judge Hastings Has Not Demonstrated that As Judge Posner observed in Graphic Communications Union v. Chicago Tribune Co., 779 F.2d 13, 15 (7th Cir. 1985): "[B]eing likely to prevail is a necessary but not sufficient condition for obtaining a stay (or other injunctive relief) pending appeal; another necessary condition is that the appellant will suffer irreparable harm if the stay is denied." Judge Hastings has advanced three generalized reasons why he will be irreparably injured by the denial of a stay.5 First, he argues that assuming he is impeached, United States Senators might be "tainted" as jurors in an impeachment trial by having had access to any grand jury materials made available to the Committee. This argument is wholly without merit. First, the requesting party herein is the House Judiciary Committee, and it is mere speculation to assume that Senators will seek or obtain the grand jury materials. Second, assuming arguendo that the materials are ever obtained or used by Senators, there is no reason to assume that any Senator will disregard the oath he or she takes at the start of an impeachment trial to render judgment fairly and impartially. (Opinion, A.176) Moreover, Judge Hastings' argument rests upon the faulty premise that the Senate in impeachment cases must be subjected to prophylactic measures which courts impose on a venire panel.6 In fact, as Judge Butzner noted, "the doctrine of separation of powers precludes 5Judge Hastings, who has been privy to substantial portions of the grand jury materials (see footnote 1, infra), has made no claim that disclosure of any particular aspect of the grand jury record will cause him injury. 6History demonstrates that the members of the Senate in impeachment cases are not bound by judicial doctrines requiring recusal in ordinary litigation. In the Senate trial of President Andrew Johnson, for example, a Senator related to the President by family ties voted without challenge as did the President pro tempore of the Senate, although a conviction would have made him the successor. Impeachment: Selected Materials on Procedure, 87 193d Congress, 2d Session 1974). the judiciary from imposing restrictions on the exercise of the impeachment power." A.176. The measures necessary to ensure a proper impartial trial are to be determined by the Senate alone and are not subject to judicial scrutiny. The notion that the Court may refuse to disclose grand jury materials to the Committee solely because of the possibility that the Senate might use them in a manner that the Court would be without authority to enjoin, is a contention that is clearly destructive of the separation of powers. If Judge Hastings were Judge Hastings also argues that a stay is necessary in order to preclude mooting his appeal, for unless the order is stayed it will be impossible for this Court to restore the status quo if the district court's order is reversed. correct, however, the losing party in an injunction case could automatically obtain a stay, even if his appeal was frivolous, by claiming that its denial would moot his appeal. Such is not the law. Even in this situation, an applicant for stay must still show the four factors set forth in Garcia-Mir. See also Collin v. O'Malley, 452 F. Supp. 577 (N.D.Ill. 1978); 7 Moore's Federal Practice, paragraph 62.05 at 62-26 (2d ed. 1985). Judge Hastings' mootness argument was implicitly rejected by this Court in In Re Grand Jury Proceedings, 689 F.2d 1351 (11th Cir. 1982). There, the Court refused to stay a district court's order enforcing a grand jury subpoena which required an attorney to produce records of communications with a client. Even though the effect of the denial of the stay was to require disclosure of |