ing after the issuance of the policy, and has the effect of a condition subsequent.-Wilson v. Commercial Union Assur. Co., Vt., 96 Atl. 540.

65. Interest-Open Account.-Where the account between the parties was open until plaintiff brought its action, plaintiff was not entitled to interest prior to the decree.-Buck Auto Carriage & Implement Co. v. Tietge, Iowa, 156 N. W. 313.

66. Landlord and Tenant-Repairs.-The lessor covenanting but failing to repair fences, the lessee is not required to repair them to save himself from liability for injury to the orchard because of cattle getting in through the want of repairs.—Bowling v. Carroll, Ark., 182 S. W.

314.

67. Libel and Slander-Newspaper Publication. A newspaper report referring to a detective as a "lly cop," and criticising his unwarranted arrest as "spearing" a man, and describing his blunder as "pulling off another bonehead stunt," is not libelous per se.-Addington v. Times Pub. Co., La., 70 So. 784.

68. Liens--Artisan.-Party constructing automobile body and attaching it to chassis owned by plaintiff held to have artisan's lien on the chassis.—Kansas City Automobile School Co. v. Holcker-Elberg Mfg. Co., Mo. App., 182 S. W.

759.

Account.

69. Limitation of Actions-Open Quarterly hospital charges, paid by a county to a state hospital for care of an insane person, constituted an open running account, and hence the county's action to recover of such person's husband was not barred as to payments made more than five years previous to the commencement of the action.-Scott County v. Townsley, Iowa, 156 N. W. 291.

70.-Tolling. -Where plaintiff, suing on a note, suppressed citation, and took no steps to procure issuance and service until four years from the maturity of the note, merely instructing the clerk after such date to issue in time for the next June term, plaintiff's suit did not interrupt the running of limitations.-Estes McWhorter, Tex. Civ. App., 182 S. W. 887.

V.

71. Lis Pendens-Parties.-Where a purchaser from a party to a pending suit involving title to the land bought gives a trust deed on same without warranty to title, and his grantor's title is thereafter decreed void, the incumbrance fails, though such purchaser was not a party to the suit.-Linn v. Collins, W. Va., 87 S. E. 934.

72. Mandamus-Remedy.--Mandamus held the proper remedy to compel mayor to refrain from attempting to remove commissioner of public safety without authority of law.—Cunningham v. Rockwood, Mass., 111 N. E. 409.

73. Marriage Annulment.-Plaintiff, suing to annul his marriage to defendant, after cohabiting as man and wife, was in no position to say that the marriage was void for either fraud or duress. Sherman v. Sherman, Iowa, 156 N. W. 301.

74. Master and Servant-Negligence.-Negligence of employer in failing to warn employe of danger when pouring melted iron into mold held a question for the jury, though he had worked as a molder where different cores were used.-Casey-Hedges Co. v. Oliphant, U. S. C. C. A., 228 Fed. 636.

to

75.—Termination of Employment.-Where a contract for service authorized either party terminate it at pleasure, and it was terminated after plaintiff had worked seven days during a month, plaintiff is entitled to compensation, not for the whole month, but merely for the seven-day period.--Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Monroe, Miss., 70 So. 689.

76. Trespasser.-Where a lumber company and a subsidiary company had passed rules forbidding employes of the lumber company to use the trains for their own benefit, and an employe knew that fact, he was a trespasser when riding on a train.-Prescott & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Hopkins, Ark., 182 S. W. 551.

77.-Workmen's Compensation Act.-Employe driving automobile at speed prohibited by Motor Vehicle Act, § 22, held guilty of willful misconduct within Workmen's Compensation Act, § 12a, subd. 3, as amended by St. 1915, p. 1081.-Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. In

dustrial Accident Commission of State of California, Cal., 154 Pac. $34.

78. Mortgages Assumption of.-Where defendant conveyed incumbered land by deed in which the name of the grantee was left blank and plaintiff's name was later filled in, plaintiff, though he stepped into the shoes of the original grantee, assumes no liability not appearing on the face of the deed.-Halvorson v. Mullin, Iowa, 156 N. W. 289.

79. Municipal Corporations--Annexing Territory. The Legislature not only has authority to determine the territory and boundaries of a municipal corporation, but also to change or alter them by annexation or disconnecting territory therefrom.-People v. City of Rock Island, 11. 111 N. E. 291.

80.Jitneys.-Ap ordinance requiring operators of jitney busses to file a bond conditioned that they will pay final judgments rendered against them is vaild, since it does not create new liability, but only secures the payment of a liability already existing-Willis v. City of Ft. Smith, Ark., 182 S. W. 275.

a

$1.- Ordinance.-Ordinance requiring surety bond from operators of jitneys or motor busses heid not invalid, though there was no similar provision as to taxicabs, rent cars, or individuals operating their own cars not for hire. Auto Transit Co. v. City of Ft. Worth, Tex. Civ. App., 182 S. W. 685.

82. Streets.-A "street" held a public way, and, though ordinarily one used for vehicles as well as pedestrians, no less a street, though confined to travel by pedestrains.---Home Laundry Co. v. City of Louisville, Ky., 182 S. W. 645.

is

85. -Invention.-Although an invention made for use in a particular business, yet, if the claims are not limited thereto, the field of prior art must be as broad as the field of infringement, and anticipations or limitations may be looked for in any art within the scope of the invention as fixed by the claim.-Jackson Fence Co. v. Peerless Wire Fence Co., U. S. C. C. A., 228 Fed. 691.

86.- -Patentability.-A mere measuring device, which does nothing except to give the operator information as to how much material is going into a machine, is no part of a true combination of the operative elements of the machine.—Gas Machinery Co. v. United Gas Improvement Co., U. S. C. C. A., 228 Fed. 684. 87. Defendants, Payment Application of. purchasers of a stock of goods from B., were entitled to have part of the purchase price received by plaintiff applied, as he agreed with B. it should be, on a debt secured by mortgage on the goods, rather than on B.'s unsecured debt. Eagle Drug Co. v. White, Tex. Civ. App., 182 S. WV. 378.

a

93. Religious Societies-Deed.-Deed reciting that land was conveyed for the purpose of parsonage, church, etc., held merely to express motive of grantor or intention of grantee, and not to create trust for such purposes.Stansbery v. First Methodist Episcopal Church, Ore., 154 Pac. 887.

94. Government of.-In church having congregational form of government, decision of council called to determine dispute resulting in a division, held not controlling upon the congregation.-Monk v. Little, Ark., 182 S. W.

511.

95. Implied Promise.-Where a church organization accepts the services of a priest after notifying him that his services are no longer required, it is liable on an implied promise to pay therefor.-Mady v. Holy Trinity Roman Catholic Polish Church, Mass., 111 N. E. 413. 96. Sales Condition Precedent. Where plaintiff contracted to manufacture and deliver railroad ties, and that, if they were not satisfactory to the buyer, the contract should be void, the buyer was the sole arbiter as to his satisfaction, so long as he acted in good faith. Humble & McLendon v. Wyatt, Ky., 182 S. W. 610.

97. Fraud.-If a manufacturer of an article delivers such for one contracted for but warranted to be of a different kind of material, he commits a fraud upon the buyer, which justífies a rescission of the contract.-Unadilla Silo Co. v. M. A. Hull & Son, Vt., 96 Atl. 535.

98. Specific Performance Case Stated.. Where the owners of mares exchanged them, one agreeing to convey an acre of land to the other as the difference between the values of the mares, which difference was at least as much as the acre was worth, the party to whom the conveyance was agreed to be made was entitled to specific performance.-Williams v. Kilpatrick, Ala., 70 So. 742.

a

99. Street Railroads-Negligence.-Where motorman, after seeing a child under four years of age running ahead of the car close to the track, fails to do anything to avoid injury if the child should attempt to cross the track, he is guilty of gross negligence.-Fulco v. Shreveport Traction Co., La., 70 So. $12.

100. Trade-Marks and Trade-Names-Assignment. A trade-mark cannot be assigned separately from business in which it is used, and ordinarily passes with a transfer of the business.-Jacoway v. Young, U..S. C. C. A., 228 Fed.

630

102. Waters and Water Courses-Drainage Ditch.--Where a drainage ditch for the removal of surface waters crossed lands of the plaintiff and defendant, in the absence of evidence showing that it was equally for the benefit of the dominant and servient estate, the court could not require the defendant to maintain so much of the ditch as crossed his land.-Cox v. Deverick, Ill.. 111 N. E. 560.

103. Wills-Construction Where testator's will created a trust fund for his daughter for life, to be paid to her children surviving her. and to the issue of her children who predeceased

her, the issue standing in the place of their deceased parent and taking his share, the interest of the daughter's children dying before her without issue became extinct, but, if they left issue, such issue took their deceased parent's interest, holding from the testator.Clark v. Wimberly, N. C., 87 S. E. 952.

104. Equitable Lien-Where a wife, in her suit to reach in payment of her husband's debt his father's legacy to him, not only created a lis pendens, but, before the husband's creditor attached in the hands of the father's executor, obtained an injunction order impounding the fund in the executor's hands, an equitable lien for the wife was created to the extent of the amount found due her by the decree.-Mabee v. Mabee, N. J. Ch., 96 Atl. 495.

105. -Exercise of Option.-The time for exercising the right of purchase of stock which testator gave his brother, and which sale he empowered his executors and trustees to make. is a reasonable time-a year from the grant of letters testamentary.-Hilgartner v. Hilgartner, Md., 96 Atl. 519.

106.- -Gift.-A gift by a savings bank depositor to his sister of what is not drawn by him or her from the bank during their joint lives, to take effect as a gift at the time of his death, is void unless the statute of wills was complied with.-Chippendale v. North Adams Savings Bank, Mass., 111 N. E. 371.

107.-Life Estate.-A will devising lands to trustees to control and manage the property and to pay the income for the support of a son and his family, the remainder on his death to the son's heirs, does not create a life estate in the son. but he is only a beneficiary of the trust.-Reeves v. Simpson, Tex. Civ. App., 182 S. W. 68.

108. -Notional Conversion.-Where a will devised land in trust, with directions that the rent be paid to testatrix's husband for life, and after his death to her children, there was no notional conversion of the property at her death, notwithstanding a provision of the will vesting in the trustees a discretionary power, thereafter exercised by them, to sell that part of the land which was unimproved.-Martin v. Kimball, N. J. Ch., 96 Atl. 565.

partition

109. Witnesses — Competency.-In decedent's wife, having no interest in the controversy, was a competent witness as to any agreement in regard to interests of heirs, except she could not testify as to admissions or conversations of her husband.-Mires v. Laubenheimer, Ill.. 111 N. E. 106.

110.-Competency.-A conviction on plea of nolo contendere cannot be used in another proceeding to discredit accused as a witness.Olszewski v. Goldberg, Mass., 111 N. E. 404.

111.- --Cross-Examination.-Where a portion of a conversation is elicited on cross-examination of a witness, it is the right of the other party on redirect examination to introduce in evidence the entire conversation in so far as material to the issues.-Brown v. State, Ind., 111 N. E. 8.

112.

-Impeachment.-A witness, impeached by disproving facts testified to by him, cannot be sustained by proof of general good character. -Harper v. State, Ga. App., 87 S. E. 808.

113. Work and Labor-Gratuitous Services. -Compensation for care and nursing rendered by daughter to mother residing with her can be recovered only on proof of a contract to pay therefor, such services being presumed gratui; tous, and proof of the mother's statement of a desire to compensate is not sufficient.-Bishop v. Newman's Ex'r, Ky., 182 S. W. 165.

114. Implied Contract.--Where defendant promised to pay his daughter for her household services some months before she reached her majority, but she continued to render such services through the following years, she was entitled to pay arising from acceptance of the services under the circumstances.-Wiley v. Wiley, Mo. App., 182 S. W. 107.

115.- -Quantum Meruit. Although a contract for employment of plaintiff by defendants was So vague as to be unenforceable he may proceed in quantum meruit for services rendered and accepted.-Washington, B. & A. R. Co. v. Moss, Md., 96 Atl. 273.

Central Law Journal.

ST. LOUIS, MO., MAY 5, 1916.

USE OF STREETS VESTED IN THE INHABITANTS OF A CITY BUT NOT TO CARRY ON PRIVATE BUSINESS THEREIN.

The Supreme Court of Louisiana composed of five members, on rehearing reversed its former conclusion by a vote of 3 to 2 and affirmed the conviction of defendant for violating a city ordinance for operating a "jitney," without having given an indemnity bond to answer for damages to persons injured by the "jitney." City of New Orleans v. Le Blanc, 71 So. 248.

The discussion in this case took a wide range in the four opinions delivered, but here we wish to call attention only to the views of the Chief Justice and of Justice Provosty regarding the right of the owner of a public convenience to use the streets of a city.

The Chief Justice said: "The streets of the towns and cities in Louisiana being among the things that are 'public' and 'for the common use,' no individual can have a property right in such use for the purposes of his private business, unless, speaking generally, that business being in the nature of a public service or convenience, such as would authorize the grant, the right has been granted by the State, which alone has the power to make or authorize it, or by the particular city or town, acting upon authority of the State, and in such case the right can be exercised only in accordance with the conditions of the grant. - Without such grant he can never acquire the right to make use of a street as his place of business."

Speaking further on, the Chief Justice said: "Defendant assumes the position that he is engaged in a legitimate business recognized by law. *** We concede that the business of carrying passengers for hire is legitimate, but so is that of a baker, and yet it cannot lawfully be in a public street save with the consent of the city authorities."

Justice Provosty said: "The streets belong to the public; and the jitneys, as part of the public, have the right to use them. The city of New Orleans possesses all the powers of the Legislature in the premises; but the Legislature itself is powerless to interdict the use of the streets to vehicles such as commonly, in every city the world over, use them. As well might it attempt to interdict the use to pedestrians. Such a statute would be, in effect, depriving these pedestrians of liberty and property without due process of law. Perhaps the situation might be different, if the State or the city, were not the mere agent or trustee of the public, for the administration of the streets; but were the owner of the fee, or, in other words, had the perfect ownership of the space occupied by the streets; though even then the abutting property owners on the street, would be in a measure deprived of their property, if the use of the streets were not left free to all; but the State or city possesses no such ownership, and can do not more than exercise whatever control over the street is consistent with the use to which they are destined."

This question seems not wholly unrelated to that discussed by us in 73 Cent. L. J. 73, in which U. S. Supreme Court held a city had the right to prescribe that vehicles engaged as common carriers could be forbidden to carry advertising upon their exterior surface. In comment, we said that: "There was outside of what was said, however, a valid reason for suppressing such advertising in the fact that a street is for the convenience of business and residence. The only seeming exception to this principle is that it may be used for transportation as a

business. This exception, however, is not a real exception, for transportation is itself but an aid to or incident of business done elsewhere than in a street."

NOTES OF IMPORTANT DECISIONS.

CARRIERS RIDING FREE WITH EMPLOYE'S CONSENT.-Recovery in a state court for one riding on the tender of an engine by the engineer's permission was reversed by the U. S. Supreme Court, because of federal statute making it a misdemeanor for a car

We submit that the learned justice is too much impressed by the fact, that the general use of such vehicles stands for recognition of absolute right to use the streets, when it merely indicates that regulation has not been asserted. The comparison the Chief Justice makes between a common carrier and a baker using the street for his private use scarcely could be more apt. Both businesses are subject to regulation and long have been.

If vehicles used for carriage of passengers or freight for hire have any rights in a street, that are not possessed by other businesses purely private, upon what is the difference based? The public interest in the business of a carrier cannot be thought to confer any right in a highway. Its only effect is to confer a right on the public because by its permission business uses highways for private advantage. But this is in the way of grant by the public, which can attach any conditions to the grant it sees fit. When it attaches one condition it is not implied that it has estopped itself from attaching other conditions. It is not presumed to exhaust its power by a single regulation or a series it makes. Were this so, none of the elaborate regulations, that are now being enforced, could have been begun at all, except as to subsequently established businesses. This subject has been very fully treated in cases, where it has been claimed, that public utilities were free from regulation, because of grants, in which it was expressly agreed vested rights were conferred, and the obligation of contracts were impaired.

state free transportation, the state court holding that the statute had nothing to do with the matter. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Messina, 36 Sup. Ct. 368, Justices Hughes and McKenna dissenting.

Justice Holmes said: "We cannot think that, if a prominent merchant or official should board a train and by assumption and an air of importance should obtain free carriage, he would escape the act. We are of opinion, therefore, that the act was construed wrongly."

Justice Hughes said: "Congress did not concern itself with the possibility that prominent persons or others might steal a ride through the unauthorized action of some employe of the railroad company. Congress was concerned

with the well-known abuse which consisted in the giving of passes or free transportation by railroad companies and it directed its legislation to that abuse."

Though it be evident that the mind of Congress was directed only to the things of which the dissenting Justice speaks, still it seems to us that all and every kind of free transportation was forbidden to be given or accepted. While it may be true that accepting permission to ride from one unauthorized to give permission may be the same thing as to "steal a ride," yet is not this true also of one riding in plain contravention of the statute, to-wit: the well-known abuse spoken of? In this way the "prominent merchant or official" who rides in the tender is the same as the tramp who does not steal by permission of the engineer.

BANKRUPTCY COMPUTING FOUR

MONTHS' PERIOD IN PREFERENTIAL TRANSFERS.-In Corey v. Donohue, 36 Sup. Ct. 386, the U. S. Supreme Court determines the question whether under the four months' period before bankruptcy a deed recorded within that time but executed prior to that time may be avoided as a preferential transfer.

The statute, as last amended, provides (60a) that: "Where the preference consists in a trans

In the sixth, seventh and eighth circuits their Courts of Appeals have held that the period of four months refers to the character of the instrument, while in the second, fifth and ninth circuits the time runs from date of the instrument or may, according to the requirement of state local law, so run.

Justice Hughes, in this case, refers to Ohio decision to the effect that under the statute of that state failure to record a deed did not render it invalid as to creditors of the grantor, notwithstanding they became such on the faith of his representation that he was the owner of the property conveyed. Construing this ruling, Justice Hughes said: "We assume that there was no requirement that this (one referred to) conveyance should be recorded in order to give it validity as against any creditor of the bankrupt, whether a general creditor or a lien creditor or a judgment creditor with execution returned unsatisfied; that is, as against any class of persons represented by the trustee or with whose 'rights, remedies and powers' he was to be deemed vested."

This, however, was claimed by the trustee not to be determinative of the manner in which the bankruptcy statute was to be applied. The Justice thereupon traces the history of section 60 and deduces the conclusion that "as Con

transfers (otherwise valid)"

*

* * the in

quiry is simply as to the nature of the requirement of recording to which it referred *

**

veyance. There is here merely construction of the bankruptcy statute and, as we see, it recognizes the validity of state laws, just as is recognized such validity where a bankrupt claims relief under homestead and exemption laws. In the latter case the bankrupt is not deprived of his rights because of the proceeding or the forum in which it is and so where his vendee claims a right.

RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF AUTOMOBILE DRIVER WHEN MEETING AND PASSING HORSE-DRAWN

VEHICLES.

Introductory.-All persons have equal right to use the public highways for purposes of travel by proper means;1 and all alike must exercise reasonable care for the safety of others.2

The driver of a horse-drawn vehicle has no rights in the highway superior to the rights of the driver of an automobile; both have the right to go upon the public highway, and each is restricted in the exercise of his rights by the corresponding rights of the other, and each is entitled to regulate his use of the highways by the observance of ordinary prudence under all circumstances.3

It is the duty of drivers of every kind of vehicle to watch ahead for other vehicles. so that injury to others as well as themselves may be avoided.

Sometimes by statutory provision operators of automobiles are required to keep

the natural and, as we think, the intended meaning, was to embrace those cases in which recording was necessary in order to make the transfer valid as against those concerned in the distribution of the insolvent estate.

Under this view the time to be considered, with reference to the four months' period, is not uniform but varies according to the rule in the state where a conveyance is made—in some it may begin from the date of the filing for record, in others from the date of con