whether the resources devoted to overseas representation in the aggregate were too much or too little. The guide which we used as a starting point for each of our investigations was to compare the scale of British activity with that of two other European countries, France and Germany, with economic resources comparable to our own. This device was, of course, no more than a preliminary benchmark. The scale of representation that would be appropriate for Britain in certain countries with which there is a long-standing and important political connection will naturally be very different from that of Germany for example. But in many other countries where there is no compelling national interest requiring Britain to be heavily represented, the comparison with what our neighbours are doing was useful. The principle that we adopted in our investigation was that special grounds of national interest had to be shown positively to exist in order to justify marked differences in the scale of our representation compared with Germany or France.

19. The evidence that we had about individual Posts indicated a general tendency for the British to be more generously staffed than the French or German, particularly at the junior levels. A comprehensive, though provisional analysis of expenditure provided by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office showed that excluding cultural activities-on which both Germany and France spent more, France considerably more, than Britain-British overseas representation costs more than either of the other two. It is very difficult to identify precisely where the differences occur and how far they correspond to variations in the scale or quality of the service which Britain's overseas representatives are expected to provide, compared with the French and German. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office analysis identified clearly two sectors of activity where the British effort was notably more elaborate; one was Information and the other was Administration. These are the subjects of further analysis in their later chapters of our Report.

20. Our main sources of evidence were Government Departments, public and private organisations, businesses and private individuals with academic, administrative and business experience. Much of our evidence was oral and given in the course of informal discussion with the members of the Committee. We found that by this type of procedure we were able to catch the nuances of the views held on the merits and demerits of British methods of overseas representation, which might not have come to so clear expression in a more formal question and answer session. We varied our arrangements as we found appropriate and used more systematic methods of examining witnesses in the investigation of certain key issues. All our evidence was given in confidence and none of it is being published.

21. From the start of our enquiry we encountered the difficulty that, while our terms of reference on a narrow interpretation cover only overseas staff and activities, the corresponding home establishment is integrally involved in any rational survey. Any attempt to exclude home staff and activities would have left us unable to deal with a number of fundamental questions implicit in our terms. of reference, e.g., the relative merits of basing a given officer in London or abroad, or the use made in London of information submitted by overseas Posts. We explained this dilemma to the Foreign Secretary in September 1968 and were encouraged by him to interpret our terms of reference widely enough to cover home establishments where these were relevant to overseas representation. We have not, in the time available, been able to examine home establishments in any detail. But we have felt it essential, in our consideration of the overseas end of the representational bridge, to take some account of the abutment at the home end as well.

THE WORK OF OVERSEAS REPRESENTATION

22. For the purposes of our investigation we have found it useful to distinguish various kinds of work involved in overseas representation under the following heads:

(a) The handling of intergovernmental relations. The essential function here is conducting intergovernmental dialogues formally, in set negotiations, or less formally through interviews and casual meetings. This is the basic and indispensable diplomatic function. The content of the relations involved, and the subject matter of the dialogues, can be very varied. They are by no means always political or politico-military. Increasingly often they are economic (including aid) or commercial. They can also be, c.g., consular. The essential criterion is that one government is being enabled to communicate with another;

or with several others, since the relations and dialogues can be multilateral as well as bilateral.

(b) Advice on foreign policy. A very important aspect of the conduct of international relations is the reliance which the home government must place upon advice of a general or specific character which its representatives in the field are required to furnish, on their own initiative or in response to enquiry.

(c) Advising and helping British subjects, overseas or in an overseas context. This includes the bulk of export promotional work, where the British Government are, through their agents, advising and helping British businessmen in the export field. Most consular work also falls under this head; British subjects of all categories need to be provided overseas with certain forms of protection and official services. A particular form of help to British subjects arises in the context of aid administration, since British aid personnel (even when formally employed by overseas governments) usually rely on a degree of financial and/or administrative support from the British Government by whom they are recruited. For a country like Britain, official export promotion work will always be of major importance. In our present circumstances, when our entire international standing depends upon our establishing a firm basis for our economy, export promotion is bound to become an even more crucial part of overseas representational work.

(d) Reporting. As here distinguished, this excludes the sending of certain types of report which flow directly from the activities described above in sub-paragraphs (a) and (c); e.g., reports of the course of a negotiation or of action taken to help a British subject. By reporting as a separate activity we mean the preparation and sending of reports on matters of general or particular interest-whether political, economic or military-to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and other official recipients in London or overseas. The material on which such reporting is based is usually available as "fall-out" from the activities at (a) and (c) above.

(e) Influencing overseas opinion. The direct influencing of overseas governments is of course part of (a) above. But the influencing of non-official opinion is a distinguishable activity, although related in the sense that even non-democratic governments are liable to be indirectly influenced by any changes wrought in public opinion among their subjects. The topics on which we may wish to influence public opinion can vary from a specific act of British policy, which we hoped to see rightly understood and perhaps supported, to the general reputation of British institutions, society and civilisation, which we hope to see highly regarded and perhaps imitated. Our main instruments for exercising this influence on public opinion are the external services of the BBC; the British Council; and the information staffs of our posts, known generally as the British Information Services, supported by the output of the COI in London.

(f) Processing potential travellers to Britain. Granting visas for temporary visitors, where required, is a familiar aspect of consular work. On the other hand, processing potential immigrants, in any numbers, is comparatively new type of work for Britain's representatives overseas, although it has long been familiar to those of, e.g., the United States. Recent legislation has tightened the controls we wish to exercise over immigration of all kinds, including from the main population-exporting countries of the Commonwealth. It is clearly necessary and right, in these circumstances, that the work of immigration officers at points of entry in Britain should be reinforced by work undertaken by our Posts in countries of origin. It seems likely that the demand for work of this kind will increase.

(g) Self-administration. There are broadly two types of work involved here: the provision of services for our overseas Posts, and the provision of welfare for their staff. The former covers communications, security arrangements and office equipment. The latter includes housing, travel arrangements, issue of pay, etc. The volume of both types of work is largely a function of staff numbers.

THE EFFECT OF OUR RECOMMENDATIONS

23. The following Chapters examine first the Diplomatic Service, as the principal instrument of overseas representation; secondly, the traditional categories of overseas work undertaken by civilian staff in Posts; thirdly, work undertaken by Service Attachés; and finally the special problems of accommodation. Our specific conclusions are set out at the end of each Chapter. As will be seen, our recommendations envisage that there should in due course be reductions of expenditure in many fields. The size of the information effort might be reduced by half (Chapter VIII), and the deployment of Service Attaché and Defense

Staffs by a third (Chapter XI). In the medium term the reorganisation of political work outside the Area of Concentration (Chapter IV) and in the longer term the rationalisation of estate management (Chapter XII) should also produce substantial savings.

Other economies would flow from reductions in overseas Security Guards (Chapter III); from administrative simplifications (Chapter III); from modifications in traditional consular services (Chapter IX); from the restructuring of Civilian Attachés' work (Chapter X); and from the construction of a modern Foreign and Commonwealth Office building in London ( (Chapter XII). Against these savings there would have to be set extra expenditure on certain short-term items, notably improved retirement compensation (Chapter II); and on certain continuing commitments, such as an increased export promotion effort (Chapter VI), the full implementation of the recommended manpower margin and increased training in the Diplomatic Service (Chapter II), a more enlightened use of international travel (Chapter III), more adequate provision of modern equipment (Chapter III), and the growth of immigration work (Chapter IX). It is impossible at this stage to forecast with any precision either the timing or the net financial effect of these changes. But we believe that they could be complete by the mid-1970s; and that the saving of total expenditure involved could by then be not less than 5 per cent (at constant prices) and perhaps of the order of 10 per cent.

CHAPTER II. THE STRUCTURE OF THE DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

CONCLUSIONS

34. (a) The Plowden Report created the unified Diplomatic Service and created satisfactory conditions of service for it; these should be built upon for the future. (b) The Diplomatic Service has achieved high standards of performance and maintaining these will be as important in the future as in the past; the Service's capacity for adapting itself rapidly to changing circumstances will be particularly needed.

(c) Quantitatively, however, the Service faces a period of contraction, due primarily to changing national requirements flowing from Britain's altered role in the world; this will create morale problems which should not be underrated. (d) A reduction in the size of the Service will involve retiring a number of competent officers prematurely; they should be fairly compensated and this will serve the interests of long-term economy.

(e) The promotion system should allow the ablest members of the Diplomatic Service to be more quickly advanced than has latterly been the case.

(f) The Diplomatic Service should be allowed the full 10 percent manpower margin recommended in the Plowden Report.

(g) In parallel with likely developments in the Home Civil Service following the Fulton Report, there should be freer temporary and permanent movement between the Diplomatic Service and other professions (including particularly the Home Civil Service); and there should be a merger between the Administrative and Executive Classes.

(h) The Diplomatic Service should consist neither of experts nor of amateurs but of "professional generalists"; its members' professionalism should include in addition to foreign languages a familiarity with the social sciences.

(i) The requirements of the Diplomatic Service today are more complex than in the past, and career planning should therefore avoid trying to give everyone a little experience of everything; the aim should be to encourage the acquisition of a relevant depth of knowledge on particular areas and subjects.

(j) The introduction of satisfactory superannuation arrangements for all local staff should be speeded up.

CHAPTER III. THE MANAGEMENT OF THE DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

CONCLUSIONS

24. (a) The Diplomatic Service's formal separation from the Home Civil Service, with which it remains closely linked, is an administrative convenience given the differences in its conditions of life.

(b) We found evidence of over-administration in a Service whose management was in other respects generally good.

(c) Given the high cost of manpower, particularly when United Kingdombased staff abroad is concerned, the Diplomatic Service could do more to modernise and mechanise its procedures.

(d) There should be more delegation of administrative authority from the Civil Service Department and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to Missions overseas. The principle of accountable management should be the key to this.

(e) While recognising the importance of good security we consider that there is scope for saving in relation to present security procedures.

(f) The Diplomatic Service should, in the interests of overall efficiency and economy, be authorised to observe a less restricted and more imaginative policy as regards travel.

(g) For understandable reasons, Commonwealth Missions tended to be more heavily staffed than foreign ones. This situation has improved, but some Commonwealth Missions are still heavier than they need be.

(h) The Diplomatic Service Inspectorate is a valuable instrument for controlling the scale and cost of British representation overseas. But its structure and practice need to be modified in certain ways; its scope should be widened to cover all staff concerned with representation; and new high-level machinery is required to provide for "policy inspection", i.e., to ensure that at the level of policy formulation there is adequate strategic thinking on organisational questions.

CHAPTER IV.-POLITICAL WORK

CONCLUSIONS

30. (a) In future our Missions abroad should be divided into "Comprehensive" Missions and "Selective" Missions. Comprehensive Missions would be maintained in the Area of Concentration, namely Western Europe and North America; in the Soviet bloc and China; and in certain other important countries in the Outer Area. Selective Missions would constitute the majority in the Outer Area. The changeover from Comprehensive to Selective Missions should in itself entail a reduction in present staff, although at the outset the streamlined organisation may cost only a little les than the existing one.

(b) The volume and range of intergovernmental business will grow in the Area of Concentration. Intergovernmental business will also grow on a multilateral basis involving international organisations.

(c) Comprehensive Missions should retain a full apparatus for diplomatic representation including staff for political work. Selective Missions, where political work and reporting will diminish to very small proportions, should be composed of a basic strength of three United Kingdom-based officers; any establishment beyond this basic strength would only be authorised for specific purposes.

(d) In the Area of Concentration a growing volume of business will be conducted on a direct government-to-government basis and by increased travel from this country. This process should obviate the necessity to increase the size of Missions in this area.

(e) The chancery should remain the central element in Comprehensive Missions but little more than the name would remain in most Selective Missions.

(f) Under a system of Comprehensive and Selective Missions, great flexibility will be essential including the ability to reinforce a Selective Mission if unexpected demands are placed upon it in times of crisis.

(g) A control system for political reporting should be instituted on the lines set out in Annex J.

(h) We expect the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to reduce progressively in size (a) in the light of the recent Foreign Office/Commonwealth Office merger, (b) as the institution of Selective Missions reduces the flow of political work and reporting, and (c) when a new building with up-to-date equipment is provided.

CHAPTER V.-COMMERCIAL POLICY AND ECONOMIC WORK

CONCLUSIONS

22. (a) Economic work and the conduct of commercial policy is a large part of the substance of political work.

((b) This field produces particularly striking examples of the "New Diplomacy" the increasing regular contact at all levels between specialists from various countries in the complicated techniques of modern life and the switch to multilateral organisations of activities which would previously have been bilateral. The task of our overseas representatives is to adapt themselves to this process, to master a wider range of subjects, and to support experts from outside the Diplomatic Service in the work of international organisations. For this purpose they will need to be kept more fully informed than hitherto.

(c) Staffing pilicies should take into account the increasing importance of international organisations in the implementation of economic policy.

(d) In particular we recommend that the United Kingdom Delegation to EEC should be strengthened and a cadre of officers with a special knowledge of European economic affairs built up. The degree of career specialisation implied is acceptable and indeed desirable in this case.

(e) We consider economic work and the conduct of commercial policy as basically a generalist function. We expect that within an integrated service there will be an increasing resource of officers experienced in handling economic concepts. We recommend flexibility in deciding whether commercial policy and economic work should be handled along with political or commercial work in any particular Mission.

(f) We feel that the division of responsibility for commercial policy and economic work at home might be clarified, particularly between the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Board of Trade. We see the role of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, whose particular expertise lies in dealing with other countries, as being one of co-ordination.

CHAPTER VI.-AID ADMINISTRATION

CONCLUSIONS

61. (a) In Britain's present economic situation commercial work is the most urgent task of our overseas representatives.

(b) Different areas impose different requirements; according to their aptitudes the careers of commercial officials should concentrate on either the area where new export opportunities are to be won by active effort in advanced industrial countries, or in areas where this effort depends more on the traditional intergovernmental diplomatic activity, and also on responsive work to the needs of exporters. We also recommend that the shift of Britain's export promotion resources to the former area should continue.

(c) The majority of Selective Posts should specialise in commercial work, and special attention will have to be paid to the quality of the commercial departments of Comprehensive Posts in growth markets.

(d) A survey conducted by the CBI has shown a wide use of the official services, but a need for more rapid communication and closer contact between the commercial service and exporters. There is an equal need for this between Posts and Departments at home.

(e) There should be greater selectivity in responsive work so as to enable more energy to be diverted to initiative work, especially in advanced industrial countries.

(f) We think that the study of other countries' systems of export promotion should be pursued, but we consider that the balance of advantage, given the urgency of the problem, is to build on the present system. In any case the unified Diplomatic Service should be preserved.

(g) Training programmes should be expanded, with more emphasis on techniques of management and market research.

(h) We recommended longer periods in Post, and greater specialisation in commercial work. We fully recognize that this will inevitably mean delay in spreading commercial experience throughout the Service.

(i) There should be more cross-fertilisation between industry and the Diplomatic Service.

(j) Locally-engaged staff are a valuable asset in British export promotion of which more use should be made.

(k) Subordinate Posts have an important potential for promoting British exports, and they should be more actively used, especially in growth markets like the United States.