(The requested information is as follows:)

Technical information obtained from innumerable sources is collated by the Armed Services Technical Information Agency (ASTIA). This agency provides a central service within the Department of Defense for the interchange of technical information consistent with effective security in order to promote progress and economy in research and development and to prevent unnecessary duplication of such services. ASTIA receives, stores, and disseminates to other agencies and contractors of the Department of Defense both classified and unclassified research and development information of a scientific and technical nature.

Technical information reports, including intelligence reports, are primarily used in the Air Research and Development Command to: (1) keep abreast of both the foreign and domestic state of the art in scientific and technological areas affecting the ARDC mission and, (2) search for technological breakthroughs in difficult or "blank wall" areas which U.S. technology has not yet penetrated.

Comprehensive utilization of technical information reports is encouraged, and such reports are made available on a need-to-know basis to military and civilian scientists, engineers, technicians and other specialists throughout the command, and civilian contractors holding U.S. Government commitments under the sponsorship of the Air Research and Development Command.

Mr. CHENOWETH. General, I would like to know something about your budget that covers all of these activities that you have mentioned here in detail. What is your overall budget?

General ANDERSON. The overall budget in the 600 area, which is the research and development area, for fiscal 1959 is-I think this is correct, and I know it is correct within $3 million-$753.8 million. Mr. CHENOWETH. Seven hundred what?

General ANDERSON. $753.8 million.

Mr. CHENOWETH. What is your budget for 1960, the next fiscal year?

General ANDERSON. $750 million.

Mr. CHENOWETH. Practically the same.

General ANDERSON. The same level, yes, sir.

Mr. CHENOWETH. There has been some criticism over the fact that perhaps we are not making money available fast enough for these scientific research programs.

Would you say that that criticism is justified? Are you spending all of the money that you have for the scientists and personnel that you have? If If you had more, could you use more money?

General ANDERSON. Naturally, I asked for more money than I got, but I am only looking at one segment of the total Air Force budget. I think we have a good program with what we have, but we could use more, of course.

Mr. CHENOWETH. You are spending twice as much as NASA. I believe they told us $345 million yesterday, and yours is over $700

million.

Mr. FULTON. $385 million, currently, $400 million next year. Mr. CHENOWETH. Not quite twice. What other agencies would be engaged in this, any others?

General ANDERSON. ARPA.

Mr. CHENOWETH. What would their budget be?

General ANDERSON. I don't know. I am interested in what they give us. They have given us $218 million since they came into being. Mr. CHENOWETH. I was trying to arrive at some overall figure of what we are spending on this program. Could you give us some idea of that, General?

General ANDERSON. Yes, I can give you almost exact figures. If you add in the other money which is appropriated and goes to Air Materiel Command but is spent on our programs, in this year of 1959 it comes to $2,781,100,000.

Mr. CHENOWETH. $2,781,100,000?

General ANDERSON. Yes.

Mr. CHENOWETH. And next year?

General ANDERSON. $2,722,600,000 for fiscal 1960.

Mr. CHENOWETH. You are spending less money in 1960?
General ANDERSON. Yes.

Mr. CHENOWETH. Why?

General ANDERSON. We are getting money to do things from ARPA, and we expect to do things for NASA, so actually the money we will spend overall will be more than presently.

Mr. CHENOWETH. You are talking about the overall program, aren't you?

General ANDERSON. No, just ARDC's program.

Mr. CHENOWETH. Oh, I was trying to reach the total overall figure of all of the agencies, just how much we are going to spend next year on this program.

General ANDERSON. I could get that for you, Mr. Chenoweth, but I don't have it right here.

Mr. CHENOWETH. Would you want to venture a guess?

The CHAIRMAN. The record will be left open for his statement on that.

(The requested information is as follows:)

The programed total Federal research and development expenditures for fiscal 1960 is $5.484 billion.

Mr. CHENOWETH. Would that run four to five billion, would you say?

Mr. ANFUSO. About $7 billion.

General ANDERSON. I believe that would be high.

Mr. FULTON. It is between five and six.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will say this: I had our counsel look into that, and they gave me the figure of $5.5 billion.

Mr. FULTON. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is substantially correct.

Mr. CHENOWETH. Of that amount, your agency will spend approximately half?

General ANDERSON. Just about.

Mr. CHENOWETH. I think that is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. If there are no further questions, Mr. Fulton, Mr. McCormack.

Mr. McCORMACK. General, you and I have talked over the telephone several times, and we have had very pleasant relationships over the telephone, and I am glad to see you personally. I was interested in asking one or two questions.

In your statement I was interested in the fact that at one of your installations you have a stand capable of withstanding a thrust of a million and a half pounds. Would you elaborate on this?

General ANDERSON. This is a stand for testing of large rocket engines. We have long had the project of developing a very highthrust, single-chamber rocket engine.

40691-59-7

That, of course, is in the NASA area, and they have now taken over that project. But the stand is there, and it will be capable of testing this single-chamber rocket engine when it is perfected.

Mr. MCCORMACK. What is the thrust power of it now?

General ANDERSON. Right now I think probably the highest it has gone is 360,000 pounds of thrust.

Mr. McCORMACK. That is in practical operation?
General ANDERSON. Yes.

Mr. McCORMACK. How long would it take, in your opinion, to develop it to the capability of a million and a half-pound thrust?

1

General ANDERSON. Well, that is a function of how much money and effort NASA puts into it. I don't know—may I ask a question here?

Mr. McCORMACK. Surely.

(Discussion off the record.)

General ANDERSON. Our program, as I recall it, called for 3 years' development. It has been taken over, as I said, by NASA, and I don't know whether they will fund it more adequately than we were able to do or less adequately or what their program will be.

Mr. McCORMACK. Will you state for the record what you mean by the capability of containing the thrust; just give that in layman's language.

General ANDERSON. I could give you an answer on that, but General Schriever can give you a better one.

General SCHRIEVER. Captive testing is testing the entire missile on a stand in a held-down condition, where we attempt to simulate all of the conditions in flight as best we can. In other words, we get test after test in this fashion, which increases greatly our confidence in the reliability of our flight test program.

Now, we also test individual engines. This is not called captive testing. This is called static testing of the engines themselves. The CHAIRMAN. Won't you have a seat, General? You can help us very much with this problem.

Mr. McCORMACK. Well, this is now under NASA?

General ANDERSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. McCORMACK. No further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?

Mr. KING. I didn't get the distinction between captive testing and static testing.

General SCHRIEVER. Captive testing is testing the complete missile; in other words, the missile and all of its parts, held down on a stand. Static testing is what we have always we referred to as testing an engine as such on a stand.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?

Mr. Sisk.

Mr. SISK. General Anderson, I have two or three questions with reference to your organizational setup, and as I understand it, you sit generally as what would almost be the chairman of a board of directors here. You have a number of establishments and many people involved in these various groups.

I am interested, of course, in the organizational setup, how you control your program, how you control and police contracts to see that we are getting the most bang out of each buck we spend, and

so on.

Let me ask you this first: Is there someone else in your organization that will be before the committee that should discuss this, or are you the man that these questions should be directed to, General?

General ANDERSON. I am the man they should be directed to, because, as you say, I am more or less chairman of the board. I have a deputy commander for research. I have a deputy commander for weapons systems. I have a deputy commander for resources. I have a programer. I have General Schriever, who is a deputy commander and also commander of the Ballistic Missiles Division, and I have General Hougan, who is part of the headquarters, a deputy commander, but who also commands Detachment 1.

Now, this detachment is made up of what we call WSPO's, weapons systems project offices, and for every system we are developing there is a project office charged with monitoring day-to-day progress on that particular system. That is what Detachment 1 does.

I have one other deputy commander who is also the commander of the Air Defense Systems Integration Division of my headquarters. This man's job is to manage the integration of all of the components of the Air Force part of the Air Defense system of the United States and see that they fit, that at least our part of it will work when and if it has to.

General Davis, the deputy for research, is here. I think if you are interested in how we manage the research portion of the work, he could best answer that.

Mr. SISK. Now, to go a little further, General Anderson, is your work all contracted out as far as the actual work, itself—that is, the research and development of specific instruments or specific pieces of hardware and then you have specific groups who supervise and watch and police that operation. Is that true, or do you do inhouse research and development?

Let me ask you this, General Anderson, to pin this down quickly, because I realize we must move along. But let's take, for example, the development of the nose cone of the Thor.

Now, in the development of that nose cone, who did the work; where was that done?

General SCHRIEVER. That work was done in industry under our overall supervision in terms of setting general specifications. But General Electric specifically is the developer of the nose cone for the Thor.

Mr. SISK. They furnished the manpower?

General SCHRIEVER. That is right.

Mr. SISK. And the management that went into that was handled from where?

General SCHRIEVER. Well, GE provided the technical management for the development of the nose cone, and it was under our rather detailed supervision from the Ballistic Missile Division.

We also furnished a great deal of the test facilities, which are governmental test facilities, such as those used for the sled tests that were conducted at Inyokern. These things were developed by the Air Force, and so it has been a team effort. But GE is the company responsible for the development of the nose cone.

Mr. SISK. Let me ask you this. Frankly, what I am attempting to do here, General, is to compare to some extent the type of manage

ment operation which you handle as compared to the arsenal-type operation.

Now, let's be frank. I am sure you know what I am getting at. And I am not critical of your type or the other type. But I think the taxpayers are entitled to some answers as to the cost of the development of these things.

What was the total cost, finally, as to the development of the nose cone of the Thor? What was the total cost in developing it to its present position? Can you give me that figure?

General SCHRIEVER. I can't give it to you off the top of my head. I can furnish you that figure.

Mr. SISK. There have been totals tossed around in public, as I am sure you are familiar, on the cost of developing that nose cone. I was curious to verify those figures with you gentlemen here today, because I would assume that those were figures that you would have at hand. The CHAIRMAN. Will you furnish the figures, General, for the record?

General SCHRIEVER. Yes, sir.

(The requested information is as follows:)

The Thor nose cone development program resulted from intensive nose cone development program at General Electric Co. for the Atlas missile. Inasmuch

as both missiles utilized the same nose cone, there is no way of proportioning development costs between the two missiles. Specific development application for this nose cone development program peculiar to the Thor missile cost $38.9 million.

General SCHRIEVER. I might also say that same nose cone also was used on the Atlas. It was used for both the Atlas and Thor missiles. Mr. SISK. I might say I have been told that the cost of the development of that nose cone was approximately $300 million. I was curious to know if that is somewhere generally correct.

General SCHRIEVER. I can categorically say it is not correct.

Mr. SISK. It would be substantially less or substantially more?
General SCHRIEVER. Substantially less.

Mr. SISK. Those are questions, Mr. Chairman, that I don't think I will take up further time with. Later on I am interested in getting into some of the operational problems that we are confronted with in their type of management program, because I think it is something that the taxpayers of the country are entitled to know.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from New York.

Mr. ANFUSO. I have just two short questions of General Anderson. I understood you to say, General Anderson, that you asked more money for your program. I gather by that statement that if you had gotten more money, you could have used it.

General ANDERSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANFUSO. Did you have to curtail any of your programing as a result?

General ANDERSON. Yes. We have established, particularly in the research area, projects in order of priority, and some of the lower priorities in the research area fell out. In the systems area we, in some instances, are going a little slower than we would like to. Mr. ANFUSO. You could very well have used that money? General ANDERSON. Oh, yes.

Mr. ANFUSO. May I ask how much in addition you asked?