it seems we have found a man completely immersed in water can stand more acceleration than any other way. So you will see right after this a space suit that weighs a total of 700 pounds and where the subject is immersed completely in water. That is put in the accelerometer and whirled around and he can withstand in this device 30 to 35 G, which incidentally is the same as if you went from zero to 11,000 miles an hour in 30 seconds which is a real good acceleration. When we first did it partially with water up to his shoulders, we found that the acceleration resistance did not go up much at all. We had to completely immerse him in it and he has controls that he has to manipulate under these forces to see whether he could perform his particular job. He did pretty well on his balance test.

This particular force, of course, would have killed any unprotected man. If he had not been in the water, he would have been killed. Now that means that this sort of capsule might very well be used to survive extremely high impact accelerations. Of course it seems awfully strange that a man may enter space immersed in water, yet the increased capability for rapid maneuvers and accelerations may warrant the weight penalty.

We were looking around, of course, like everybody does in the research and development field, to try to find a way in which we could get over some of the fundamental limitations of man. This sort of work, of course, as I say is hard and tedious and it takes time, but it is the only way we are going to make progress, because unless you have components you cannot put a system together. Unfortunately we have had a tendency in the past to try to put a system together without components and then we invent on schedule and then we never keep the schedule, obviously. The tank is being filled up with water at the moment now.

He has special glasses on and, of course, he has his oxygen.
Mr. FULTON. He is a brave man.

Admiral HAYWARD. That is a hard way to make a living. Yes, sir, we have our doctors up there; we have some real brave men. Mr. FULTON. Does he get extra hazardous pay for that?

Admiral HAYWARD. Yes, sir; he does. I do not know whether he can log that as flight time, however, under the general rules and regulations, but he gets hazardous pay. As you can see, he gets a rougher treatment than the monkey. The thing that amazed me was they gave him this balance test which they give all us aviators and I think he did better than I do without being whirled around at 31 G.

Of course, the Navy has not claimed water rights for space travel either, Mr. Chairman. Now this sort of work has to go on across the board in power sources, guidance, in addition to propulsion. Everybody is worried about propulsion and rightly so because naturally if you do not have the propulsion you cannot get into space but if you just have the propulsion and the rest of it falls by the wayside, you have not done your job either.

Incidentally, these facilities do not come cheaply, as I am sure most of you are aware, but you can see their usefulness in the research and development program. Now, those are all of the controls he had to manipulate under this 31 G and he did very well, actually. There he is doing his balancing test right after the acceleration with his eyes closed which he does real well, I feel.

40691-59-11

(End of film.)

Admiral HAYWARD. Now the reason I showed you that particular film, Mr. Chairman, was the fact that I wanted to emphasize once again the hard work and the detailed work in research and development that has to go on before one says we are really competent and capable to enter this space age to which everybody refers lightly. There is no substitute for hard work and competent people to do it. I will be pleased to answer any questions you may have in regard to the Nation's research program or our space program.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, you referred in your statement, on page 3, to reaching over and choosing package 3 from the shelf, launching it as a satellite, and recovering intelligence within an hour.

What do you refer to there as package 3?

Admiral HAYWARD. That is more of a philosophy. I feel very strongly, Mr. Chairman, that the time is going to come when we in the Navy or we in the United States, let us say, have to have the ability to put a small complex satellite into orbit from an airplane. In other words, there is no reason why one cannot. There are no physics laws that prohibit you from taking a solid rocket, flying it at 40,000 feet, and putting it in any orbit that you want, as far as polar or equatorial, and this would give you a tactical application.

For instance, if you just wanted to know one particular frequency spectrum, if you wanted to know one specific thing, let us say you wanted to cover southeast Asia to the north and you wanted some intelligence right then and there. This would give you flexibility in a tactical system. Everybody has referred to space as just a strategic thing. I feel that the ability to launch one of these from aircraft has lots of advantages, as you will see in our Pacific Missile Range where the only real good place in the United States exists to launch polar orbits, and this would give you the ability to launch a small satellite in any orbit you chose.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have in mind, for instance, if your commander were out in the Indian Ocean and he wanted to know whether there was a mobilization of troops or equipment, he would do it by sending up a satellite?

Admiral HAYWARD. Not necessarily, no, sir. It would be a great tool for tactical intelligence. He might want to know what radar stations were on, he might want to know what communications were on at that particular time.

Now I will go into a bit of this in the classified section. We have a presentation in the classified field of this nature.

The CHAIRMAN. But to demonstrate the practical application; from an airplane, launched from a carrier, you could send up a missile in orbit to obtain very valuable intelligence within the hour for the fleet? Admiral HAYWARD. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what you had in mind?

Admiral HAYWARD. That is exactly what I was thinking.

The CHAIRMAN. Now all through the hearing we have been discussing long-range missiles, ICBM's and others.

Admiral HAYWARD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I notice there is no reference to it in your statement. Did you overlook reference to the use of that?

Admiral HAYWARD. No, sir. Of course our ICBM is the Polaris. We are firm believers in mobility. We do not want target U.S.A., we

want to put the target away from the United States, and it is the inevitability of a deterrent that is important.

If you have a system that is invulnerable to surprise attack and effective so it would be possible to be effective even if a man read in the New York Times we were attacked, and still destroy your enemy, this is the thing you are working for. Any system that basically depends on being able to defeat a surprise attack is a weak system, and I say this and repeat it all of the time: Any system completely vulnerable to a surprise attack is a weak one; deterrence should be inevitable. We need flexibility in our deterrent system.

It is what the Russian planner thinks, not what you or I think. If he thinks he is going to be destroyed no matter what he does, he is not going to start it. That is why if we go down this one line of the megawar, if we go down just one part instead of addressing the whole challenge, the whole complex spectrum, we are making a mistake for the United States. We can't afford to do this.

Now, when I did not make any mention of ICBM's, the Polaris to my way of thinking is an ICBM.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, what progress are you making which you can speak about in open session-what progress are you making in reference to the Polaris?

Admiral HAYWARD. Excellent progress, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it operational at this time?

Admiral HAYWARD. No, sir; it is not operational at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. How close to operational is it?

Admiral HAYWARD. It will be operational in 1960.

The CHAIRMAN. In 1960?

Admiral HAYWARD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It is experimental now?

Admiral HAYWARD. It is in research and development now. We will give the committee in open session a complete rundown on the status of the Polaris program which is our part; this is the first system, Mr. Chairman, that the Navy has had in the deterrent business. This system is primarily a deterrent system. Any deterrent you get from the rest of the Navy, of course, is built in on the other side of the spectrum, and anything you get is a bonus in the general war. You must always remember that the Navy is peculiarly adapted to face the greater part of that challenge across the spectrum of war, from megawar down.

We make no bones, of course, or any hesitations or reservations, that the Strategic Air Command carries the great part of the deterrent force in the megawar part of the spectrum right today, but in that part of it you still have to have flexibility. You cannot just have one system. You cannot be dependent on just one way. Your system has to be inevitable, and it has to have flexibility, and it cannot be built just in fortress U.S.A.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, now who is going to give us that information about the Polaris?

Admiral HAYWARD. Admiral Raborn, who runs this entire program. Admiral Masterson will give you the general missiles, but Admiral Raborn will give you the complete briefing on that in the unclassified form and then we have some classified information on it.

I thought it would be best to have Admiral Masterson on the general situation first rather than the Polaris.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McCormack?
Mr. McCORMACK. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Fulton?

Mr. FULTON. Admiral, we are glad to have you back again. It is always a pleasure to hear somebody who speaks explicitly and in simple English. You come right to the point. Might I refer back to your comment on the fact that the Vanguard will now possibly stay up 2,000 years. That really brings us into the space age with a tremendous start, because if we are looking to see who is ahead in the field of permanency on satellites, it would certainly mean that we with the Vanguard program have been eminently successful. For example, with 31 million seconds in a year and if the Vanguard stays up 2,000 years, at 5 miles a second, that is 10,000 times 31 million, which is 310 billion miles that the Vanguard will have gone in 2,000 years with one puish, and that is a pretty good success, is it not?

Admiral HAYWARD. Yes, sir, that is the point that I want to make. People are too prone to see what happens on the launching pad and say failure or success.

Mr. FULTON. So really on distance with the Russian satellite now possibly in orbit, although nobody knows, around the sun, as far as distance is concerned we are doing a pretty good job of being ahead of them and being able to instrument it to show that we are right, is that not right?

Admiral HAYWARD. Yes, sir. If they had had our solar cells in theirs, theirs would still be broadcasting, but they do not have them. Mr. FULTON. That solar battery we estimated would last 150 years. What is your estimate now?

Admiral HAYWARD. It may be more. We do not know. It will depend on how much of the meteorite dust it runs into. We have gotten tremendous value out of the Vanguard and, of course, the second stage of the Vanguard is the same stage that is used in your lunar probes.

Mr. FULTON. So actually then you would say that the Vanguard as a series of tests has been successful on the amount of scientific knowledge that it has relayed to us and the free world as well as the Russians, likewise on the distance because the Russians have not been able to compete on distance.

Admiral HAYWARD. Not that way; no, sir. This is a very stable orbit and we have learned a tremendous amount about the earth. The actual data we have gotten on the earth has been of tremendous scientific value.

Mr. FULTON. Likewise on the instrumentation of the Vanguard we are ahead of the Russians because they do not have the solar battery setup that we have that is a continuous energy system that needs no repair?

Admiral HAYWARD. That is correct, and of course, as you know, the Vanguard program has been turned over to the National Aeronautics and Space Agency and they are going to continue with the Vanguard program. You know there are 512 separate functions that had to work in the Vanguard system to make it go. On the one that

we had the unfortunate explosion, 511 worked and a microswitch chattered for six-tenths of a microsecond and that was the end of it. That gives you an idea of the complexity of some of these things.

Mr. FULTON. The Army has one more moon shot to go in its program and then there remain two of the payloads that we could use the Thor-Able combination with for a moon shot. The question then comes up as to our programing, whether we should go for deep space probes, possibly Venus or Mars, just for distance, or should we say that strategy comes first in the cislunar area, this is between the moon and ourselves, where it is for our safety and security in the United States to know what it is and be strong. Generally on programing do you lean toward the strategic scientific research in the nearer area do you think there is more to be gained from deep space probes at

this time?

Admiral HAYWARD. Well, of course, I would answer that, Mr. Fulton, at this time, by saying that I have an awful lot of work to do in the state of the art in miniaturization: What will I accomplish with a deep space probe? Is it part of the psychological overall spectrum? If that outweighs other factors, you would go ahead to do it. But when we get to this pounds-in-orbit routine, admittedly, and I do not think anybody in the technical world would dispute it, the Russians have better rocket engines than we have. But has anybody ever looked as to why the Russians have better rocket engines than what we do in the United States. If you go back into Russian history, their Academy of Science, in 40 years and I attribute a tremendous amount to the U.S.S.R. Academy of Science-they made basic technical decisions a long time ago and they decentralized their research and development. They have state of the art work. In other words, there is one man in Russia who has nothing to do but make the best rocket engines. That is all he does. He has a dual incentive. If he does not do it he gets shot. If he does, he gets lots of money and he is a wheel. But we have gone the other way. Look at the IČBM. The Academy of Science in Russia right after the war decided they were going to go the ballistic missile route. They did not wait for any breakthrough by any Atomic Energy Commission. They did not care whether they had 20 megatons or 20 tons yield. They were going to go the ballistic missile route.

Did they try to make a 5,500-mile system? Oh, no, they said, "We are going to make a ballistic missile that will be better than the V-2." They went to a 700-mile missile, but they went the ballistic missile route. The rocket engine people had the best rocket engine. They had their guidance people. Our approach has been the other way.

You get a big system. We are going to have an ICBM. We rushed around in 1954 after the Killian report, we are going to have an ICBM, we have to have it tomorrow. This is not the way you do things technically, and the state of the art is the thing that you get dividends in, and this is the hardest thing really in this business to ever get anybody to believe. When I go before people I have a glamorous system and it can be put all over the front page. But when I try to get something for a solar battery or try to get something for something else, then I have a real rough time. What the system has done is made congenital liars out of all people like myself to get my money. This is where the Russians in their state of the art development are