for the long pull, we must accomplish proper organization of our people to insure that they function smoothly as an efficient team. This we are doing at the fastest possible rate.

Fortunately, it was not necessary for NASA to begin from a standing start. The Space Act provided for transfer to NASA of, and I quote, “all functions, powers, duties, and obligations, and all real and personal property, personnel (other than members of the Committee), funds and records" of the NACA, the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics.

In the transfer, the important item was not the $350 million value of the finest of research facilities or even the comprehensive flight research programs of the NACA that ranged all the way from problems affecting vertical takeoff and landing aircraft to those peculiar to satellites and space probes.

What was really important in that transfer was the group of nearly 8,000 scientists, engineers, and supporting personnel that we inherited from NACA. Last August at the confirmation hearing when I was asked what I thought my job called for, I said, "It isn't just a matter of the money that is involved, but it is a matter of the people involved and how one best can motivate the people to highest performance.' I have had no problem providing the motivation to obtain highest performance from these people. They believe very earnestly in what we are trying to do. They feel the urgency with which we must do our work. They are experienced and talented people who are contributing effectively to the national space effort.

In this manner, we were provided with first-rate research activities on a broad front in both aeronautical and space. There were, however, other research, development and operational areas in which NASA had to become deeply involved to accomplish its total mission. These included electronics, guidance, rocket systems, and so forth.

There were two possible, obvious solutions. One was to begin selecting sites, constructing and equipping new facilities, and then undertaking the painful process of staffing the new laboratories. Such a solution would have been very expensive. It would have required the raiding of staff from other organizations. Most serious of all considerations, it would have delayed our progress very materially. The other solution, and the sound one, I believe, was to acquire facilities already doing outstanding work in the required areas. This is the course we have been following.

The President, on December 1, transferred to NASA from Army jurisdiction the Jet Propulsion Laboratory at Pasadena, Calif., operated under contract by the California Institute of Technology. By this action, NASA acquired a high order of capability in electronics, propulsion, systems analysis, and in tracking and telemetry.

We requested also that the Army transfer to us a portion of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency at Huntsville, Ala. Such a transfer would have given us an imaginative, competent engineering and design group capable of serving in the planning and executing of both

short- and long-range programs in the development of boosters and vehicular systems. Such a group would have served also to monitor contracts with other governmental agencies and with industry, to provide a necessary ground testing and assembly capability, and to supervise all launching operations for NASA.

The Department of Defense determined that the Army Ballistic Missile Agency's special talents were necessary to the accomplishment of certain missile projects vital to the Nation's defense posture. We did not wish, of course, to interfere in any way with our defense effort, and, in fact, had included this proviso in our original request. Although the Department of Defense was unable to agree to the transfer, arrangements were made for ABMA to be "completely responsive" to requests of NASA for the performance of such work as we desired and the Army felt could be done without interference to its military projects. It is too early to say if this arrangement will be adequate for our needs. The Army has assured us of an earnest desire to be fully cooperative within the framework of existing limitations, and we intend to make the fullest use possible, under these circumstances, of the ABMA capabilities.

The Presidential order of October 1 transferred certain programs and projects already underway. These actions included, for example, a study contract the Air Force had with Rocketdyne Division of North American Aviation to determine the feasibility of undertaking development of a single-chamber rocket engine in the 12-millionpound-thrust class. Included also in these transfers were the Vanguard project and several Air Force and Army space probes then under the administration of the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Department of Defense.

The President has assigned to NASA the development of the national space program. In this effort we are working, of course, in closest cooperation with all other elements of our Government, particularly with the Department of Defense. Our method has been to deal substantively with each of the major elements of the problem. We have had to face up to the fact that we do not have available booster rockets sufficiently powerful to put into orbit or send on long journeys into space, the size payloads required to obtain the scientific information that is needed. This fact is made no more palatable by realization that today and for some time to come the Soviets have rocket boosters permitting them to send into space payloads heavier than we can manage.

We need a whole family of new rocket boosters and upper-stage rockets that, used singly or in combination, will give us the amounts of thrust we need to accomplish our missions in space. Because these boosters of varying capabilities are necessary for both civilian and military space programs, NASA undertook the development, with DOD, of an integrated program aimed at correcting this situation as soon as is humanly possible.

This program is based on a minimum number of rockets that will be used as building-block units in combination to meet expanding

mission requirements. By midsummer of next year or shortly thereafter a new, second-stage rocket engine, when used with an Atlas, will permit us to put approximately 6,000 pounds of payload into orbit, or send about 1,000 pounds of payload as far as the moon. Another rocket engine now being developed, also for use as the second stage of vehicles using the Atlas or Titan booster, will have been completed by early 1961-little more than 2 years from now-which will enable us to put 8,000 pounds of payload into orbit, and send a 2,000-pound payload to the moon. NASA and DOD are working together in the development of these and other upper stage rocket motors.

Clustering existing big rocket motors will provide a first-stage booster having a thrust of 12 million pounds by 1962. Engines of this cluster, procured under DOD auspices, are now in production, and the engineering on the total power package is well advanced. It will permit us to put 10 tons of payload into orbit and to send 2 tons of payload into deep space, for beyond the moon.

Development of a single-chamber rocket booster designed to deliver 1 to 12 million pounds of thrust is also being pushed, to bring it to a stage of usefulness inside of 4 years. Within 2 years thereafter, we believe we will have learned how to cluster four of these giant rocket motors, to provide a first-stage booster with 6 million pounds of thrust. It will lift 75 tons of payload into orbit.

Another problem area-that of guidance and control-requires particularly heavy emphasis both in planning and implementation. Development of midcourse and terminal guidance systems is clearly also necessary. Above all, simplicity and reliability must be built into these systems. Our principle task at the moment is to acquire information about the space environment-and this calls for reliability in getting our instruments aloft, whenever and wherever we may want to make our measurements.

Still another problem-to expand our capacity for tracking and data acquisition-is now well on its way to solution. Additional stations will be established in this country and abroad. These stations may be manned, in some instances, by nationals of the countries where they are to be located. Still further expansion of these networks will be required, as time and our programs move forward together.

Perhaps the most difficult of our problem areas is our understanding of the capabilities of man himself in this new and exciting adventure into space. While much progress has been made, intensive effort is required to assure us that the men who volunteer for space flights possess the physical and mental capabilities to withstand the rigors of flight into space.

Whatever the problems we may encounter in this particular area, I find it difficult to believe that we shall fail in our efforts to surmount them.

To focus all of these research and development activities, and give them real meaning-to sharpen the determination with which we tackle these problems-we have undertaken Project Mercury, an attempt by this Nation to send man into space. Last month, NASA

chose the McDonnell Aircraft Corp. of St. Louis to design and produce the prototype of a capsule to carry the man in this project.

Selection of the pilot astronauts has already begun. Initially, we will need a dozen men, chosen with greatest care from a group of volunteers. The group will be totally involved for many months in a program of rigorous training for the first orbital space flight. Although this first orbital flight by our modern Mercury will surely be a pioneering venture, we are determined that the risks to the pilot will be no greater than those experienced during the first flights of a new, high-performance airplane. As in such airplane flights, the astronaut will play a vital role in the Mercury project. Repeated flights of the space capsule, first carrying only instruments, and later animals, will have tested and proven the practicability of the final phase of Project Mercury-manned satellite flight-before it is undertaken.

I have referred to one other aspect of Project Mercury as being, in my opinion, of the utmost importance. Sending man safely into space is an arm-stretching, mind-stretching undertaking that thrills every one of us, and demands from every one of us the very best we can muster. It is a focal point for all our energies, all our enthusiasms, all our determination. It will result in much earlier development of the technology needed for other difficult space missions.

Ever since I took this job as NASA Administrator-it is now 5 months ago I have been saying that our space mission is so vital that we must carry it forward with the same sense of urgency we had during the war. I have made this comment so many times that some people might think that this phrase is becoming a cliche. But I know of no better way to say something that all Americans must believe and practice if we are to make maximum progress in this field. We have the resources. We have the intelligence and the technical skills. We certainly have the necessary wealth. What we have to decide is do we have the determination, the willingness to roll up our sleeves and get the job done?

As I see it, success of our national space program depends upon three factors: Time, money, and effort. We are behind the Russians on the time scale because they have bigger boosters. We shall have to spend large sums of money and work harder to attain our space goals as soon as we want.

This past year, we have shown we can move, but we have only started. The need is for urgently sustained effort for years to come. If our space programs are to be run on an off-again, on-again basis, zigging and zagging with the turn of every new year, then we'd better spend our money buying telescopes to watch the Russians pioneer in space.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Doctor, for your very strong statement. The last part of the statement is the portion of it which impresses me most. The part in which you state that "we can whip this problem, given the time, money, and effort. What we need is the determina

tion." I think the American people have the determination now. With your help we ought to be able to go ahead and catch up and pass the Russians.

I read your speech, Doctor, given before the Institute of Aeronautical Sciences in New York City. You begin that speech by referring to misunderstandings. I think you state there is a misunderstanding in the short-range program and in the long-range program of your administration.

Now, will you explain to this committee, what you have in mind by short-range program and long-range program?

Dr. GLENNAN. I would be very glad to, Mr. Chairman.

This misunderstanding came about, if I may be permitted to explain it, as a result of the use, shortly after the first of the year, of a very short clip from a recording that was made rather early in November last year when I had been on board about a month. And I was asked whether we had a long-range program and I said that this was one of our first tasks, the implication being that we did not have a long-range program. That indeed might be said to be partially true, because it takes time to develop a long-range program, and it is very easy to quibble about what is a short-range program and what is a long-range program. We have developed, and it is supported by our budget, actually, a well-rounded program for the next 2 or 3 years, including booster development, Project Mercury, space science activity and a variety of activities. We have undertaken, area by area, the development of a long-range program for the Nation which would extend over a period of 5 to 15 years.

This will be done in the areas of guidance, in the areas of payloads, in the areas of booster, in the areas of tracking, et cetera.

The CHAIRMAN. I have read a series of stories recently, Doctor, in reference to Mechta, I believe the Russians call it, the project which they sent up to probe the moon, but which they say bypassed the moon and went into orbit arount the sun.

I have also read that this was a hoax and that this missile did not bypass the moon, did not get into the sun's orbit. Have you any comment you would like to make in reference to that?

Dr. GLENNAN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a comment, then I would like permission for Dr. Stewart to comment on the technical aspects of this. It seems to me we do ourselves no great good by doubting the statements of our Russian competitors in fields of science when they say they have accomplished something. I have had personal experience in visiting Russia and seeing the results of some of their activities and I have respect for their scientific accomplish

ments.

I think that we can-we ought really not to kid ourselves about their abilities in the scientific fields. Now if I might ask Dr. Stewart to speak on this point.

Dr. STEWART. Mr. Chairman, I think the best way to answer this